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 Abstract 
 
 
In addition to the lonely battles fought by Bomber Command crews in the night 
skies over Germany from February 1942 to May 1945 there was an equally 
intense if much less bloody struggle in the halls of power between the Air Staff and 
the AOC Bomber Command, concerning the best employment of the strategic 
bomber forces. The argument of this study is that the Royal Air Force’s 
contribution to the strategic air offensive was badly mismanaged: that Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bomber Command,  
from 22 February 1942 to the end of the war, by ignoring, or often over-riding the 
Air Staff, affected not only the course but also the duration of the Second World 
War.  Most histories of the bomber war provide the result of the disagreements 
between the Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles 
Portal and Harris, but rarely are the problems discussed in detail.  This thesis 
examines the arguments that were raised by the various authorities, together with 
the refutations presented not only by the major participants, but also by the 
advisers to those authorities.  The significant feature of the disagreements was 
that while Harris acted unilaterally, the Air Staff reached consensus decisions.  
Unfortunately, the decisions reached by the Air Staff on major issues were all too 
frequently either ignored or subverted by the AOC Bomber Command.  One 
significant feature of the refutations presented to Harris was their dependence on 
the operational experience gained earlier in the bomber war by junior members of 
the Air Staff.  For too long the direction of the war had been left in the hands of 
senior officers whose previous service had become irrelevant to war requirements 
in the 1940s.   By 1942, comparatively junior officers were thus tendering advice to 
senior officers who, in the case of AOC Bomber Command, resented the authority 
which, Harris argued, had apparently been accorded these juniors.  Harris was 
unable to accept that they were advisers and were never in a position to issue 
orders: orders could only come from Portal.  Finally, this thesis provides an 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the major participants and argues 
that, had the war been conducted as the Air Staff required, victory would have 
been achieved earlier than May 1945. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The subject of this thesis is Bomber Command, Royal Air Force, during the 
Second World War. But it is not a detailed description of actual operations or 
campaigns, nor will it provide lengthy descriptions of the scientific aids developed 
for bomber crews which made their Command an efficient and powerful force.  
The courage of the bomber crews, whose chances of surviving an operational tour 
of thirty sorties were grotesquely small, will also remain largely undiscussed.  
Rather, the focus of this thesis is the story of the bomber battle fought in the Air 
Ministry corridors of power from February 1942 to May 1945.  It is a story of 
conflict: conflict which should never have been tolerated.  Within any ordered 
society, but especially in a military organisation, there must exist a recognised 
chain of command.  There must be those who make the decisions and those who 
carry them out.  Initially, the right to discuss is acceptable but once a firm order is 
given subordinate commanders have but two options: obey or resign.  Within the 
Royal Air Force the Air Staff made the decisions and, in the case of Bomber 
Command, it was the Air Officer Commanding Bomber Command who was 
responsible for their implementation.  This thesis is a catalogue of discussion, 
disagreement and disobedience at the highest level.  All too frequently it meant 
that the strategic bomber offensive was not waged according to the wishes of the 
Air Staff.  Bomber Command fought its war largely on the lines determined by its 
Commander-in-Chief, who viewed his force as a potential war-winner rather than 
one component of the total armed forces required to overcome the enemy.  
When the Air Force Constitution Act passed the Report stage in the British 
House of Commons on 13 November 1917 it prepared the way for the 
establishment of two significant bodies: the Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force.  
To enable the new Air Ministry, the political controller of the military service, the 
Royal Air Force, to carry out its primary function, an Air Council was formed on 3 
January 1918.  The Air Council’s responsibilities were principally the determination 
of the regulations and operational procedures necessary for the efficient 
performance of both the Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force.  Although the 
Secretary of State for Air (who was also the President of the Air Council) held the 
whip-hand, the detailed planning required became the responsibility of the Air 
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Staff.  Their task was to provide a permanent staff charged with preparing for the 
next war including the provision of personnel, equipment, and both strategic and 
tactical planning.   
To enable the Air Staff to carry out its responsibilities it was divided into a 
series of Departments and those further divided into Directorates and even Deputy 
Directorates.  The system, developed in 1918, remained in existence during the 
Second World War despite enormous expansion.  Perhaps remarkably, in the face 
of such significant growth and development, the individuals central to this thesis 
also remained largely in situ throughout the war, promotions notwithstanding. 
For most of the Second World War Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir 
Charles Portal, as Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), was in overall command.  Under 
him were the Air Officers responsible for such areas as Operations, Policy, 
Intelligence and Operational Requirements and Tactics.  Operational control was 
delegated to Command level, and in this study the focus will be on Bomber 
Command.  Further delegation in Bomber Command was accorded Groups, 
Wings, Stations and Squadrons.   
Who were the principal players in the unfortunate and unnecessary drama 
with which this thesis is concerned?  Within the Air Ministry, after Portal, there 
were four significant figures: the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations), later 
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal Sir  Norman Bottomley, and in the 
Directorate of Bomber Operations, Air Commodore John Baker, Group Captain 
Sydney Bufton, and Squadron Leader Arthur  Morley.   Within Bomber Command 
one figure dominated: Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, with, in a distinctly 
secondary role, his Senior Air Staff Officer, later Deputy Air Officer Commanding-
in-Chief (AOC-in-C), Air Vice-Marshal Sir Robert Saundby. 
Portal’s appointment to CAS in October 1940 had been an unexpected 
promotion for a comparatively young and administratively inexperienced officer.  
He readily admitted that he was awed by the responsibilities entailed, and feared 
that his inexperience and lack of knowledge concerning the people with whom he 
would have to work would be significant handicaps.  He did not make friends easily 
and the remoteness of his appointment added to his concerns.  Yet, despite   his 
initial doubts, Portal was not a solitary figure.  He acknowledged his deficiencies 
concerning bomber operations and, although he did not suffer fools gladly, he was 
always prepared to listen to suggestions no matter how unorthodox or unfamiliar.  
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He was equally at home whether in discussion with a Squadron Leader or the 
Prime Minister.  Portal had enormous responsibilities, including attendance at 
Chiefs of Staff, Cabinet, or Defence Committee meetings, discussions with senior 
officers from the various Commands and formidably,  having to answer directly to 
Winston Churchill.  Portal, as CAS, had ultimate responsibility for decisions made 
by the Air Staff.   
Apart from a two year period from March 1927 to January 1929 when he 
commanded No 7(Bomber) Squadron, however, Portal had ended his active flying 
career in 1922.  Thus, by September 1939, it could not be claimed that he was 
fully  cognizant of  the  requirements  for the  bomber  war about  to begin.  
Fortunately, his brief sojourn as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber 
Command from April to October 1940 had at least alerted him to some of the 
problems that his bomber crews would have to overcome.   He early appreciated 
that the accuracy he himself had achieved in the Laurence Minot Memorial Trophy 
aerial bombing competitions in both 1927 and 1928 was not attainable in war 
conditions in 1940 by inadequately trained and ill-equipped bomber crews.  
Although aware of the need to destroy precise targets in Germany (and oil was an 
early selection in the Directives) he was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that,  
until the problems of navigation, target location and identification were overcome, 
area bombing, though not officially sanctioned, offered the best prospects for at 
least limited bombing success.  Portal was never an advocate of ‘terror’ bombing.  
He was prepared to send his bombers to attack German cities but the aim was 
industrial destruction, disruption of communications, and the shattering of urban 
life, all combining to create a lowering of enemy morale.  Portal’s greatest assets 
were possibly his awareness that he often required guidance, a cool head, a 
readiness to listen to, consider, and accept or reject advice, and his ability to 
“balance what was desirable with what was possible as far as the Air Force was 
concerned.”1 
Bomber Command, of course, was but one small part of Portal’s massive 
responsibilities.  It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that this section of his 
vast command should be largely left in the hands of senior officers whom he 
considered were best fitted to make judgements.  Target selection for Bomber 
Command was done at high level with political, military and industrial input, but 
Portal was responsible for the strategic decisions.  The tactical problems were the 
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responsibility of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris at Bomber Command.  Sadly 
Harris, all too often, allowed his tactical worries to override Portal’s strategic 
decisions and the result was not always as the Air Staff wanted.   
Air Vice-Marshal Norman Bottomley, as Assistant Chief of the Air Staff 
(Operations) and later, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS), was the link in the 
chain connecting the Directorate of Bomber Operations (and up to seven other 
Directorates) to the CAS2 and thence via the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Air to the Secretary of State for Air; and finally to Churchill himself as the 
ultimate arbiter.  It was Bottomley’s responsibility to issue the Directives for 
Bomber Command (often drafted by staff in the Directorate of Bomber Operations) 
defining the strategic requirements and priorities for bombing operations 
determined by higher authority. 
In 1939, however, Bottomley was among the majority of the Air Staff who 
lacked recent operational air experience: his last active posting, as Officer 
Commanding No. 4 (Army Co-operation) Squadron, had been completed in early 
January 1930 when he began study at the Imperial Defence College. He served 
on the North-West frontier in India between 1934 and 1938, but as a Group 
Captain it is unlikely he was regularly involved in air operations.  In any case, the 
aerial subjugation of dissident tribesmen in Waziristan provided no significant 
preparation for a European bombing war in the 1940s.  He was also seriously 
disadvantaged in that during his short tenure as Senior Air Staff Officer, Bomber 
Command, from November 1938 to November 1940, he remained wedded to the 
belief that Bomber Command was capable of living up to the pre-war expectations 
of a powerful day offensive by self-defending bomber formations.  Heavy 
Wellington losses in three operations in December 1939 against German naval 
units failed to disabuse him.  His argument was that good formation flying had 
confirmed RAF doctrine.  “In our Service” he claimed, “it is the equivalent of the old 
‘Thin Red Line’ or the ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ of Cromwell’s Ironsides.”3 
Bottomley was a good administrator and open to valid arguments; he was 
also capable of listening to and evaluating the opinions of those he appreciated 
had greater knowledge of a particular problem than he himself possessed.  But 
unfortunately he lacked the drive and authority to force Harris into action along the 
lines set by Air Staff.  A perhaps significant disadvantage for Bottomley was that 
he was junior in rank to Harris but, by appointment, in a position as either 
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ACAS(Ops) or DCAS, to issue  orders to him.  This would not have been a 
situation to Harris’s liking.  Nevertheless, an order signed by Bottomley had the 
authority of Portal and was therefore binding.  The seniority problem, however, is 
perhaps why, on many occasions, letters from Bottomley to Harris often began, 
unsatisfactorily, “I am to request.”    
Late in 1940, Harris, then serving as DCAS, had come to appreciate that 
his Directorate of Home Operations, responsible for both defensive and offensive 
operations, was concentrating itself overmuch with defensive affairs.  As an 
offensively minded bomber man Harris understood that if Bomber Command was 
to be an effective weapon then its policy, plans, and operations, would best be 
controlled by a separate Directorate.  Ironically, in view of the later problems he 
would experience with staff in the new Directorate, on Harris’s recommendation, 
the Directorate of Bomber Operations was established late in 1940 and its first 
Director, Air Commodore John  Baker, MC, DFC was  appointed in February 1941.  
Throughout the war, both Bottomley and Portal would rely heavily on the staff in 
the newly formed Directorate of Bomber Operations.   
The immediate concerns of the Director and his Deputy were the 
operational policy and the direction of the air striking forces.  They were also 
responsible for Air Staff policy relating to the composition, organisation, armament, 
and equipment of Bomber Command, and to relevant questions affecting air 
striking forces both at home and overseas. The Directorate was responsible, firstly 
through the Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) until July 1943, and then the 
Deputy Chief of Air Staff, directly to the Chief of the Air Staff.   In November 1941 
the Director of Bomber Operations was still Baker and the Deputy Director, about 
to be replaced by Group Captain Sydney Bufton DFC, was Group Captain Aubrey 
Ellwood, DSC.  Both Baker and Ellwood were considerably older than Bufton, 
having begun their flying careers in WW1 with the RFC and RNAS respectively.  
Neither had flown operationally in WW2.   Baker was guided largely by Bufton but 
they formed an efficient, amicable, and productive relationship.  Baker’s support 
and encouragement of Bufton earned him Harris’s dislike, but despite this he had 
a long and distinguished career in the Royal Air Force before retirement in 1956 as 
an Air Chief Marshal.  
Sydney Bufton, a key figure in many of the disagreements between the Air 
Staff and Harris from 1942 to 1945, and central to many of the debates over policy 
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and implementation with which this thesis is concerned, possessed one major 
advantage over those senior to him both on the Air Staff and in senior operational 
positions: he had commenced his flying career when the majority of them were 
ending theirs.  Additionally, despite the fact that he was in non-flying appointments 
during the 1930s ─ two years on an engineering course at Henlow, three years as 
an Engineering Officer in Iraq, three years at the Air Ministry, and one year at Staff 
College ─ he had kept in current flying practice.   By June 1931, shortly before he 
commenced his course at Henlow, he had accumulated, while training, then as a 
bomber pilot (flying the two seater Hawker Horsley day bomber on No. 100 
[Bomber] Squadron), and finally as a flying instructor, a total of 708 hours.  His 
rating in the latter role was ‘exceptional.’  By September 1939, despite being in 
non-flying appointments, he had accumulated a total of just under 1,400 flying 
hours.  With many flights lasting less than one hour it was an impressive 
accumulation of experience. 
After his evacuation on 17 June 1940 from France, where he had served in 
the Headquarters British Air Forces, France, the Postings and Personnel section 
of the Air Ministry were agreed that Wing Commander Bufton (he had been 
promoted on I June 1940) would best serve the Royal Air Force by being posted 
as an Engineering Officer.  He, however, had other ideas.  Employing his flying 
experience as a lever, Bufton sought an operational appointment.  He won that 
battle and was appointed to command No. 10 (Bomber) Squadron based at 
Leeming in Yorkshire and operating one of the so-called ‘heavy’ bombers, the 
Armstrong Whitworth Whitley.  His heavy bomber experience in 1940 was nil and 
his night flying experience, just under four hours, had been spread over twelve 
years.  Clearly, he had much to learn but training time in 1940 was in very short 
supply.   
During his operational tour Bufton quickly came to appreciate the many 
problems facing the bomber crews in the early war years.  More importantly, as 
will be discussed, he attempted to provide solutions not solely at squadron level 
but applicable to the bomber force as a whole.  He continued his learning 
experience for a short time as Officer Commanding No. 76 (Bomber) Squadron, 
one of the first to receive Halifaxes, and then as Station Commander, RAF 
Pocklington, before posting to the Air Ministry in November 1941, as Deputy 
Director of Bomber Operations in the rank of Group Captain.  
 7
As one of the first officers with current operational bombing experience to 
be posted to the Air Staff, Bufton proved invaluable.  Portal came to trust his 
judgement and opinions and relied heavily on him for advice on the many 
requirements of the bomber war.  When identified needs conflicted with Harris’s 
views, it was Bufton who was frequently required to provide Portal’s ammunition,   
furnishing not only a critique for Portal but often, also, the lengthy response.  
Prime Minister Winston Churchill also held Bufton in high regard and this is 
confirmed by the fact that he was invited to War Cabinet meetings and his opinion 
requested even in that exalted company.  The Prime Minister clearly appreciated 
both the courage displayed by Bufton in challenging his seniors and the 
experience that he could bring to operational questions.    
One other staff member in the Directorate of Bomber Operations who must 
be mentioned was Squadron Leader Arthur Morley.  He had served as an 
observer in the RNAS and RAF in the First World War but had left the Service in 
1919 and had been in private business until re-enlisting in November 1939.  He 
was posted to the Directorate of Bomber Operations in February 1941 and worked 
closely with Bufton on the many problems that faced the Directorate over the next 
few years.  In fact, on some questions, target indicators for one, he was the 
initiator.  He was awarded an OBE and was appointed an Officer of the Legion of 
Merit by the President of the United States of America.  Morley retired in 1954 with 
the rank of Group Captain. 
Within the Directorate of Bomber Operations there were three sub-divisions; 
Bomber Operations 1, [B.Ops. 1], Bomber Operations 2(a), [B.Ops. 2(a)], and 
Bomber Operations 2(b), [B.Ops. 2(b)], each controlled by a Wing Commander.  
The officer appointed as B.Ops. 1 was responsible for bomber operational 
planning and for the selection of targets and also for liaison with Air Intelligence 
and the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) regarding the enemy’s industrial and 
economic situation relative to the strategic air offensive.  B.Ops. 2(a) was 
concerned with current operations, operational analyses and returns, Air Staff 
policy relating to the composition, organisation and expansion of Bomber 
Command, navigational aids, blind approach systems, and night flying 
requirements.  B.Ops 2(b) had responsibility for Air Staff policy relating to 
development and provisioning of bomber aircraft and all forms of offensive 
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weapons employed in bombing operations, including incendiary and gas weapons, 
mines, and depth charges.  
The Air Staff day normally began at nine each morning with a conference.  
This meeting was attended by all operational directors and associated Assistant 
Chiefs of Staff together with those responsible for Signals, Armament, or other 
involved parties.  Bottomley normally chaired the meetings, where briefings were 
provided by the various Directors relating to the previous day’s activities.  A 
discussion would follow, covering the problems, shortages, and requirements that 
had been revealed.  These were then transferred to the appropriate Director for 
action.    
At Bomber Command Headquarters the final major player to be considered 
is the then Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Harris.  An examination of his early life 
provides important clues relating to his future behaviour and actions.  From the 
age of about five, because his father was working in India, Harris was deprived of 
the guidance normally provided in a family environment.  Boarding schools and 
foster homes became his life and thus, from an early age, he learned self-reliance 
and recognised that decision making was very much his personal responsibility.  
He also demonstrated that an Arthur Harris made decision was virtually 
irrevocable.  In 1909, at the age of seventeen, despite opposition from his father 
who had now returned to England on retirement, Arthur Harris advised his family 
that he was emigrating to Rhodesia and he sailed early the next year.4 
During the First World War Harris qualified as a pilot early in 1916 and 
served, initially, as a fighter pilot defending the London area from the Zeppelin 
attacks then being mounted.  Without either training or instruction Harris was 
launched into the night defence of London.  These, of course, were early days of 
flying and it was a very steep learning curve but it taught Harris a never to be 
forgotten lesson.  As Saward, his biographer, explained, 
 
It was this early experience of being expected to do the almost 
impossible things without any semblance of instruction that set his 
mind thinking about the value of proper training, a matter that was 
to become a fetish with him in his later life, and to which Bomber 
Command in World War II was to owe a great deal of its success.  It 
was also at this time that the possibilities of the use of aircraft by 
night as offensive weapons were first sown in his mind.5  
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In the summer of 1917 Harris was a flight commander on No. 45 Squadron 
operating in the Ypres sector.  He was thus an airborne witness to the slaughter 
that took place on the battlefields of Passchendaele.  It confirmed for him not only 
the understanding reached by vast sections of the British public that wars were to 
be avoided, but also that, if they had to be fought, different methods were 
imperative.  By 1937 the meaning of air power had crystallised for Arthur Harris.  It 
now offered “an efficient, clinical, and even humane form of warfare, infinitely 
preferable to a strategy [he] later described as ‘morons volunteering to get hung in 
the wire and shot in the stomach in the mud of Flanders,’”6 
In August 1919 Harris received a permanent commission in the rank of 
squadron leader but during his service on the North West Frontier of India in 1921 
as Officer Commanding No. 31 Squadron, his acerbic tongue, criticising a lack of 
Army support, threatened his continued existence in the Royal Air Force.7  It was 
an early sign of his outspoken and brusque temperament which, far from 
mellowing over the years, meant that he rarely enjoyed the respect of senior 
officers in either the Army or Royal Navy.  He also showed during those early 
years, both in India and later in Iraq, that once he had formed an idea it was 
pursued relentlessly.  His own conclusions were always accorded heavy personal 
investment which perhaps explains his concentration on bombing and night flying 
requirements, contrary to Air Staff policy, in those early days.  He was simply 
following paths of his own choosing.  It was a sign of things to come. 
In 1934 Harris was appointed Deputy Director of Plans in the Air Ministry, 
replacing Portal who was posted to Aden Command.  John Terraine, among 
many, has made clear that in the early 1930s there was “a nationwide mood of 
complete revulsion from the First World War . . . hope for the future, accordingly 
must depend on the League of Nations and on general disarmament.”8 Such views 
conflicted dramatically with those held by Harris who had long believed that further 
struggle with Germany was inevitable.  His efforts in Plans, therefore, were 
directed at building a bomber force capable of achieving not only a more positive 
result but also avoiding the trench warfare that had been the cause of such 
enormous casualties in the First World War.   
By 1935 it had been appreciated that the fighter aircraft then being 
developed would be faster, would possess greater fire power and also be more 
manoeuvrable than the short range, small bomb load, light bombers currently in 
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RAF service.   It was therefore decided that the new generation of bombers would 
be self-defending and Harris urged that “in view of the importance which the 
Germans attached to the long-range bomber we should concentrate our efforts on 
producing the type of aircraft which would give the best performance both in range 
and bombload.”9   He strengthened his argument for a heavy bomber force by 
pointing out the equipment essential for long-range operations would be best 
contained in heavy bombers.  Harris was thus one of those responsible for the Air 
Staff specifications B12/36 and P13/36, prepared in 1936, which ultimately 
resulted in the Stirling, Halifax, Manchester and possibly the best heavy bomber  
produced in the Second World War, the Avro Lancaster. 
Naturally there was conflict, particularly with politicians who controlled the 
purse strings, but Harris stood firm in his beliefs.   
His creed had become that espoused by General Jan Smuts in the Report 
he prepared in August 1917 entitled “Second Report of the Prime Minister’s 
Committee on Air Organization and Home Defence Against Air Raids” in which he 
had asserted that the air force would be best employed as an independent means 
of war operations.  The Report made clear that with regard to air power 
 
As far as can at present be foreseen there is absolutely no limit to 
the scale of its future independent war use.  And the day may not 
be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy 
lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast 
scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the 
older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary 
and subordinate.10  
 
Many, including Trenchard, Saundby and Harris, all voiced their approval of 
the Smuts’ Report.  Hans Rumpf, a German official, later, and from a different 
perspective, asserted that, like Douhet, it had been a signpost pointing the way for 
the development of air power and its enormous potential.   His vantage point to 
view the effects of air power during the Second World War had been as the 
German Inspector General of fire services.  Naturally, his was not an approving 
voice but at least he did not debate the Report’s accuracy.11 
Although Harris believed that much of his energy as Deputy Director of 
Plans was spent working against time and misguided public and political opinion, 
rearmament, he argued, was essential.  Fortunately, under the somewhat lax 
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leadership of the Chief of Air Staff, Sir Edward Ellington, he was accorded “full rein 
to develop his rather immoderate views . . . . Harris’s view that the bomber was a 
decisive weapon in war became more and more prominent in Air Staff papers.”12 
In 1936 Harris and two other Joint Planners, Captain Tom Phillips (destined 
to lose his life when the Prince of Wales was sunk in December 1941) and Colonel 
Sir Ronald Adam, were required to produce a paper for the Joint Planning Sub-
Committee of the COS Committee using as guidelines the situation they would 
envisage should war with Germany break out in 1939.13   The document they 
produced proved to be remarkably prescient.  France was ruled out as a  
potentially strong ally; Germany was expected to seize Holland, Belgium and 
France, and their paper made clear that greater attention to defence measures 
was essential. 
One important feature of the discussions of Harris, Phillips and Adam, in 
view of Harris’s position from 1942, centred on the best employment of the bomber 
force in a counter offensive.  They rejected any suggestion that German morale 
could be influenced by an offensive directed against cities and neither were they 
able to identify any potential bottleneck industrial targets.  As well, the Luftwaffe 
and its support structures provided such a plethora of potential targets that it had 
to be ruled out of contention.  Where they did reach accord was that, in the event 
of war, it was essential that British industries were developed while every effort 
was made to restrict those of Germany.  Perhaps Harris, from 1942, saw his area 
attacks not only being attacks on German cities and morale, but also the only  
tangible way  to reduce German industry.  
The Planners were also aware that it would be a long and intense struggle.  
The Allies, the Paper argued,  
 
must plan for along war . . . we are faced by an enemy who has 
fully prepared for war on a national scale, has superiority in air and 
land forces, and possesses the initiative . . . we must be prepared 
to face an attempted knock-out blow . . . we must concentrate our 
initial efforts in defeating this attempt, which, if in the form of an air 
attack on great Britain may well subject us over a long period to a 
strain greater than we have ever experienced . . . we must . . . rely 
on our industrial and economic power, backed by the resources of 
the Empire, eventually to bring a counter offensive against 
Germany.14  
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This Paper confirmed the need for a bomber force equipped, as far as was 
possible, with heavy bombers “designed to provide superiority in range and bomb 
load rather than mere equality of numbers.”15   Unfortunately, under the leadership 
of the new CAS, Sir Cyril Newall, from September 1937, the parity policy urged by 
Harris and the new Deputy Director of Plans, Group Captain John Slessor, had 
“simply become an expansion of inefficiency.”16   Training was reduced, crashes 
increased, aircraft were in short supply, and aircraft were being delivered to 
squadrons significantly under-equipped and usually requiring extensive 
modification.  Harris’s concern was expressed in a note to Sir Edward Ellington,  
the recently deposed CAS, when he wrote,  
 
What remains to me of conscience pricks, if ever, on raking over 
the embers of a heavy bomber and inadequately experienced crew.  
The best efforts to provide careers before now have only provided 
coffins.17 
 
By September 1939, although the wheels had been set in motion in the 
mid-1930s in the right direction, the establishment of a heavy bomber force, 
Bomber Command and the Royal Air Force was only a “shop window” air force 
and not the deterrent force which had been planned.  
By 1937, Air Commodore Harris, now serving as Air Officer Commanding  
No. 4 Group, was becoming increasingly concerned at the low efficiency of his 
command.  The inadequate training, he pointed out to Ludlow-Hewitt, meant that 
the crews were largely unable to even operate the sub-standard equipment with 
which their aircraft were equipped.  Servicing was also a problem because the Air 
Ministry had simply not provided the necessary facilities and this difficulty was 
compounded by equipping bomber squadrons with an aircraft such as the Whitley 
which required a major servicing after only twelve long range flights.   At the same 
time Harris became increasingly concerned at the low standard of navigation 
training being provided.  Pilots at this time were, of course, the only crew members 
employed on a full time basis.  Observers, wireless operators and air gunners 
were all ground tradesmen who flew when required and received (in 1934) an 
extra six pence a day for their efforts.18   His views were amplified by Sir Edgar 
Ludlow-Hewitt in 1938 when he advised a doubting CAS that he was unable to 
provide a date when he believed Bomber Command would be ready for war.  
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Ludlow-Hewitt  thought highly of Harris who, he observed,  
 
has an exceptionally alert, creative and enterprising mind balanced 
by long practical experience together with energy, force of character 
to give his ideas practical shape and realisation.  He has rendered 
great service in respect of improvements in the technical equipment 
of the aircraft in his command, and also in the creation and 
organisation of novel methods of dealing with extremely difficult 
problems of crew training.19  
 
They were all attributes that would be desperately needed by Harris when,  
in February 1942, he became Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber 
Command. 
On 11 September 1939 Harris, now an Air Vice-Marshal, was appointed 
AOC No. 5 Group and he immediately showed the consideration for his crews that 
became his hallmark, despite the fact that throughout the war he met them but 
rarely.  Crew comfort and defensive armament in the Handley Page Hampden, 
with which his squadrons were equipped, in his eyes, had been too largely 
ignored.  According to Harris the Hampden possessed but two virtues ─ it had 
reliable engines and was available in numbers. 
Harris was well aware of the limitations imposed on his Group by being 
equipped with Hampden aircraft, together with the fact that many of his crews had 
received limited and shortened training, so he immediately instituted a training 
programme concentrating on long range flights in preparation for what he believed 
would come.  He also realised that the Hampden could be used for mine laying 
and No. 5 Group took an early and leading part in these operations.  They 
commenced operations on the night of 13/14 April 1940 in the North Sea and the 
1,500 pound mines, parachute equipped, were responsible for sinking twelve 
German vessels during the short Norwegian campaign.20  
As can be seen in these introductory notes relating to Harris there is much 
to admire in his career up to late November 1940.   As Christina Goulter observed,   
  
no one can accuse Harris of lacking constancy of purpose.  He had 
been a staunch advocate of bombing since the early 1920s, and 
demonstrated an unshakeable faith that this was the proper role for 
air power.21    
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In 1941 Harris, during his brief tenure as DCAS, remained primarily 
concerned with matters of significance relating to Bomber Command.  Aircrew 
training, the provision of navigational and bombing aids and the proposed eventual 
introduction of four-engined bombers, all received his almost undivided attention.  
In April he became involved in the selection of targets.  In a Minute to Churchill he 
suggested that Berlin, Hamburg or Cologne should be bombed and that : 
 
Our objective should be to do the maximum damage and 
destruction to the populated areas, as a demonstration of that 
ruthless force which we shall have to employ against Germany 
sooner or later if we are to get the full moral effects out of our air 
defensive.[sic]22 
 
 
Harris was widely experienced in bomber matters, hard working, and 
enthusiastic.  Nevertheless, with regard to his appointment as Air Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, there are two outstanding questions.  
Why was he not appointed to the position on 5 October 1940?  Instead, he was 
appointed Deputy Chief of the Air Staff and a much less bomber-experienced 
officer, Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, was given the post.  Perhaps it was simply 
a matter of seniority but the appointment gives every indication that there was a 
great deal of uncertainty among the senior Air Staff as to who would perform well 
in the demanding requirements of the bomber war.   Indicative of the uncertainty 
displayed in the appointments of senior officers is that Harris, on his return from 
the United States as Head of the RAF Purchasing Commission in May 1938, had 
been informed that he was to be posted to Headquarters Fighter Command, to 
become Sir Hugh Dowding’s Senior Air Staff Officer.  That posting was cancelled 
and instead he spent the last year of peace as AOC Palestine and Transjordan.  
Furthermore, if Harris was such an outstanding prospect as the bomber leader, 
why was he sent to Washington in May 1941 as Head of the British Air Staff? 
Were officers actually groomed for particular posts, or was the one who was 
simply available appointed?  
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris’s appointment as Air Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, in February 1942, came at a crucial 
time.  The bomber war, as the Butt Report of August 1941 had confirmed, was not 
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going well and even Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who had earlier argued  that 
an “absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers”24 
provided the only way to win the war, appeared to be losing confidence. Bomber 
Command required a leader unsullied by earlier failures and Harris, although he 
had not been involved with the bomber offensive since late 1940, appeared to 
Portal to be the man.  Churchill agreed with Portal’s nomination and Harris’s 
appointment was confirmed.  Churchill, perhaps, identified in Harris characteristics 
similar to his own ─ an aggressive nature, stubbornness, and a candour to the 
point of rudeness.   Neither Churchill nor Harris was a good listener.  Each 
preferred to offer his solution to difficulties as the only possible avenue to be 
followed.  However, at the many private meetings with Churchill at Chequers 
during 1942 and 1943, it was Harris who was thrust into the background.  Churchill 
dominated the conversations and Harris later admitted that “he found it more 
satisfactory to listen than to argue.”25   Those who had direct dealings with Harris 
at Bomber Command Headquarters found it prudent to adopt a similar position. 
When Harris was appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber 
Command, in February 1942, he inherited the area bombing programme espoused 
by his superior Portal and tacitly supported by Churchill.  Only occasionally, for the 
duration of the war, would he be compelled to relax that attachment to what he 
viewed as a war-winning policy.  During 1942 and 1943 it is widely agreed that 
area attacks offered Bomber Command the best prospects for reducing the enemy 
war potential, and lowering morale.  But by 1944 the parameters had changed 
since Bomber Command then possessed the capability of delivering heavy, 
accurate attacks on precise targets. Harris, however, remained obsessed with 
area bombing and his obsession not only threatened Allied strategic planning but 
also further alienated his superiors in the Air Ministry. 
At the beginning of his tenure as AOC-in-C, Bomber Command, Harris was 
a considerably less controversial figure than he later became.  The Air Staff early 
appreciated that the bomber force lacked both the numbers and equipment 
essential for a precision bombing campaign and agreed, in 1942, that area 
bombing, as a stop-gap measure, offered the only way to both lower German 
morale and create a measure of destruction to the German war effort.  Harris was 
thus strongly supported by Churchill, the Air Staff, and the general public in his 
early area bombing campaign.  Churchill and the Air Staff were supportive 
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because at that time nothing else was available while the public was pleased that 
at last it was the Germans who were on the receiving end rather than themselves.  
Importantly, despite the heavy losses they were suffering, he also possessed the 
confidence of the bomber crews.  Support for Harris was thus not fleeting.  It was, 
however, based on insecure foundations: for too long the claims of destruction 
being achieved vastly exceeded the damage actually being created.  Thus support 
at the Air Ministry, in particular, waned dramatically when it was realised that 
Harris was obsessively following a path which was in conflict with Air Staff aims 
and better options had become available.  
At Bomber Command Headquarters Harris was a bully.  As he admitted, 
seemingly with pride, he did not invite discussion, but simply gave orders.  His 
staff was fully aware that dissent meant dismissal.  His power and even the loyalty 
of his Command  
 
hinged on this unequivocal ability to sack, or to give and take away 
acting rank of many of his officers: also his ability to influence the 
award of honours and to discredit or disgrace any of his personnel 
was much feared.26    
 
Evidence of this will be seen with regard to the Path Finder Force, where, as will 
be made clear, the support opposing its formation that he obtained from his Group 
Commanders was virtually agreement under duress. 
It early became clear to staff in the Directorate of Bomber Operations that 
with his area bombing programme Harris was deceiving himself.  Lessons he 
should have learned he ignored, or rejected, because they were not what he had 
anticipated.  Sadly, according to Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McCloughrey, he also 
deceived the crews of Bomber Command.   Harris’s Blue Books of German cities 
showed, he claimed, the effectiveness of the bombing they had undergone.  The 
crews were led to believe, Kingston-McCloughrey asserted,  
 
that they were fast defeating the Germans at home, and indeed, 
winning the war by themselves.  Had the real truth of the 
ineffectiveness of their bombing become known to them there 
would have been a serious danger of mutiny.  It may be true to 
some extent Harris was misled himself, but he was aware for 
sometime that the bombs were going wide yet he resisted 
independent investigation of this failure to hit the target intended.27
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Very few bomber crews ever saw their Commander in Chief but they 
believed that their role and sacrifice was crucial and that in Harris they had a 
leader with victory in his sights.   
With waning support from both Churchill and Portal, Harris remained as 
AOC-in-C, Bomber Command, until the end of the war.  His perceived path to 
victory required the destruction of German cities, together with the industries they 
contained, and the de-housing of the enemy civilian population.  His dogged 
pursuit of victory employing area bombing, contrary to the wishes of his superior, 
meant dispersion of the bomber effort.     
Harris’s link with his staff was maintained through the offices of his SASO, 
Air Vice-Marshal Saundby.  His role, he appeared to assume, was to fend off 
interference from Bomber Command staff, the Air Ministry, scientists, industrialists, 
and politicians.  His appointment to air rank in the Royal Air Force was probably 
unique in that, apart from a brief spell, in 1925, when he was posted to command 
the Aden flight of Bristol fighters implementing air control, he most often was in a 
subordinate role and frequently serving under Harris.  Saundby had a relaxed and 
approachable manner but had he been able to provide challenges, and possessed 
the moral strength to question decisions, his rightful duty, his service as SASO 
would have been of considerably greater value.  Unfortunately, the long time that 
he had served in positions subservient to Harris had made him well aware of his 
own vulnerability.  No doubt he was right for Harris but he was wrong for both 
Bomber Command and the bomber offensive. 
The disagreements and arguments between the Air Staff and Harris during 
the Second World War, although examined individually in this study, frequently 
over-lapped.  That concerning the relative efficacy of incendiary versus blast 
weapons was, for instance, never entirely put to rest.  Likewise, the Path Finder 
Force question, although seemingly solved in August 1942, by Portal’s insistence 
that the force be formed, never became fully a fait accompli because Harris 
subverted its implementation.  Schweinfurt and German ball bearings also 
provided on-going confrontations between Harris and the Air Staff beginning in 
April 1942, while German oil facilities were another target system that provoked 
extended arguments virtually throughout the war.  
The problem was that Harris, despite the evidence of precision shown by 
the pre-invasion railway marshalling yard attacks, continued to regard the bomber 
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force as a bludgeon, refusing to recognise that by early 1944 it had become a 
rapier.  Harris never departed from the view that the war could be won by the 
devastation of German cities and the undermining of the morale of the German 
people.  The tragedy was that for too long his views were permitted to prevail over 
those of the Air Staff. 
Despite the on-going nature of several of the arguments between Harris 
and the Air Staff this thesis has compartmentalised them into separate chapters in 
an effort to provide continuity and avoid becoming side-tracked ─ as frequently 
occurred in the differences that arose between Harris and Portal during the war.  
The classic example, to be discussed more fully in a later chapter, is the 
disagreement between the two authorities in April 1944 relating to Bufton’s role in 
the formation of the PFF.  The provision of separate chapters for the 
disagreements considered in this thesis means that each can be examined 
chronologically without any requirement for time vaults back to earlier, unrelated 
confrontations. 
The primary sources employed in this study are principally the papers of 
Portal, Harris, Bottomley and Bufton.  Other studies have concentrated on the 
Portal and Harris Papers but have largely ignored Bufton’s, with the result that the 
differences between the Chief of the Air Staff and his subordinate Harris have 
been insufficiently addressed.  This thesis is an attempt to remedy that omission.  
Bufton’s role in Portal’s decision-making regarding the use of incendiary weapons, 
the Path Finder Force, German ball bearings and German oil facilities, was crucial.   
With regard to sources mention must be made of the thirteen tapes made in 
1972 by Dudley Saward in extended interviews with Harris.  They were never used 
by Saward in his biography of Harris, nor as far as is known, by any other author 
writing on the bomber offensive in general, or Harris in particular.  The reason is 
not hard to find.  They are self-incriminating.  Harris’s admission that from the day 
of its inception he worked against the Path Finder Force in order to fulfil his own 
plan of a Path Finder Force in every Group, had it been known, should have 
required his instant dismissal. In interview, Harris may have indulged in 
exaggeration and hyperbole, but surely there was no reason for him to have been 
anything less than truthful, and the veracity of the tapes is borne out by the fact 
that they provide confirmation of the actions that he took during the war.  They do 
not display Harris in a good light.  It is thus possible to understand the reason for 
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the extended embargo that he placed on the publication of the biography in 
preparation by Saward: nothing was to be published until after his death.  Harris 
clearly wished to minimize his failings, even in such a matter as a failed first 
marriage, which in Dudley Saward’s biography, ‘Bomber’ Harris, is not even 
mentioned.   
What restrictions, if any, were subsequently placed on these revealing 
tapes is not known.  If they were available to other historians of the bomber war 
but not used, then it must be argued that they were overly selective in the 
evidence they presented.  The picture that they have presented of Harris is 
incomplete and seriously lacking in detail. 
This thesis attempts to provide the detail of the arguments between the Air 
Staff and Harris between 1942 and 1945, relating specifically to the bomber war, 
from an examination of the correspondence of the main participants.  Most 
published accounts of the problems experienced largely give the impression that 
Portal and Harris acted in isolation.  In fact, in Portal’s case, he was very 
dependent on advice ─ advice and guidance most frequently provided by his 
trusted Director of Bomber Operations, Sydney Bufton.  If at times the study 
makes Bufton a central figure that is because, as an adviser to Portal, he was vital.  
Many of Bomber Command’s problems stemmed from the fact that those in 
command had but an imprecise knowledge of techniques, weapons, and 
equipment, and that ignorance was displayed in the strategies, tactics, and even 
the policies, they attempted to employ.  Bufton provided the voice of reason based 
on operational experience: his role was crucial. 
With regard to Harris, many have written in praise: in places it is praise well 
merited.  His authorised biographer, Dudley Saward, however, offers no word of 
criticism.  One reviewer of Saward’s work argued that the author should have 
provided 
 
a more subtly coloured presentation of his  former commander-in-
chief.  That he chose instead to write so uncritical and adulatory a 
work is a very great pity for Harris was a most remarkable leader, 
and deserved to be presented in Oliver Cromwell’s words ‘warts 
and all.’28  
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This thesis, without apology, is also thus a ‘warts and all’ portrayal of Harris in his 
many arguments with the Air Staff between February 1942 and May 1945. 
Although the Allied forces eventually achieved victory in Europe in May 
1945, two questions present themselves.  Firstly, could it have won earlier?  
Secondly, in parallel with the first question, would it have been won earlier had 
Harris been replaced as AOC Bomber Command when clearly his views 
concerning the application of the bomber offensive differed so radically from those 
of the Air Staff he was required to serve?  No final answers are possible and 
arguments will continue, but it is hoped that this thesis will provide the grounds for 
a more informed judgement to be reached.   
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Chapter One 
 
Between the Wars 
 
Although I will argue in later chapters that the bomber war was poorly 
managed, it is first necessary to provide the reasons why, in 1939, Bomber 
Command was so ill-prepared.  How was it that the Air Staff, whose primary 
function was to prepare the RAF for war, apparently failed so dismally?  There is 
no simple answer.  It is the story of a struggle between those in the Services who 
had identified some of the problems that required attention and those in 
government who controlled the purse strings. The priorities accepted by 
successive governments were never necessarily those nominated by the military 
authorities.  It was also clear to those in both politics and the military that there 
was no profit in war.  Serious efforts were therefore made at Geneva between 
1932 and 1934 not only to ban aerial bombing but also to outlaw military aircraft 
entirely.  Peace, it was hoped, would be maintained by disarmament.  Although 
the Geneva meetings continued into 1934, Germany’s final withdrawal in October 
1933 had made clear that any talk of either the abolition or reduction of armaments 
had lost its relevancy.  The decision for offensive rearmament in Britain, accepted 
reluctantly, was made only just in time.  
On Armistice Day, 11 November 1918, which for all practical purposes 
marked the end of the Great War, the Royal Air Force was arguably the most 
powerful tactical air force in the world.   It also included a very small strategic 
element, the Independent Force, formed in June 1918, under Major-General Sir 
Hugh Trenchard.1   In October 1918 the Royal Air Force had on charge a total of 
22,171 aeroplanes.2   Comparable numbers for France and the United States of 
America were 13,100 and 17,400 respectively.3   But the pre-eminence of the 
Royal Air Force was not to be long maintained.  Its break up had actually begun 
earlier, with the majority of the training schools having disappeared by August 
1918, outstanding contracts having been cancelled, and much equipment simply 
destroyed.  For the ninety-nine squadrons on the Western Front disbandment 
began in February 1919 and by 2 April the number of squadrons in France, 
Belgium and Germany only totalled forty-four and many of these existed in name 
only having been placed on a care and maintenance basis with a much-reduced  
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staff.   After the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on 28 July 1919, squadron 
closures proceeded apace such that by the end of October 1919 there was only 
one squadron serving with the Army of the Rhine.   By April 1920 the Royal Air 
Force had a grand total of only thirty-three widely dispersed squadrons.4  
The question on many lips was what was to become of the Royal Air Force, 
whose independence had only been secured on 1 April 1918?  Was it to remain an 
independent and viable force or were the aircraft and crews to become ancillaries 
of either the Royal Navy or the Army? Churchill’s appointment in January 1919 as 
both War Minister and Secretary of State for Air, together with the removal of 
Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes as the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) only two 
months later, were both interpreted as danger signs for those anxious to retain air 
force independence.  Trenchard’s reappointment as CAS also provided another 
reason for concern because for much of the war he had, as a supporter of General 
Sir Douglas Haig, seen the air force’s role as pre-eminently army support. 
On 9 December 1918 Sykes, then serving as CAS, produced his vision of 
the future for the Royal Air Force, the Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff on 
Air-Power Requirements of the Empire.  It was a grandiose and wide-ranging 
scheme totalling sixty-two Service and ninety-two cadre squadrons based 
throughout the British Empire.5   No attention was given by Sykes to economics in 
his plan, although in his book, From Many Angles, he estimated the establishment 
cost to be £21,000,000.6   Not surprisingly, in view of the post-war political and 
public malaise and the economic straitjacket, his plan was rejected.  Nevertheless, 
a closer reading of his plan would have shown that there were some elements 
worthy of consideration.  His call for state assistance and a form of state control for 
commercial aviation ─ ruled out by Churchill’s comment that “Civil Aviation must fly 
itself “7 – might, for instance, have prevented the rapid decay of the British aircraft 
industry that so much delayed Royal Air Force expansion during the 1930s.   
 Churchill, as Secretary of State for Air, eagerly sought the return of 
Trenchard as CAS.  Sykes was transferred to a civilian post as Controller-General 
of Civil Aviation in April 1919 and, after considerable cajoling from Churchill, 
Trenchard accepted the appointment.  In response to a request from Churchill, he 
produced a paper detailing his plans for the peacetime Royal Air Force which was 
presented to Cabinet in November 1919.  It appeared as Command Paper (Cmd.) 
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467 on 13 December 1919.  Trenchard, in his preamble, compared the Royal Air 
Force to Jonah’s gourd, declaring that  
 
The necessities of war created it in a night, but the economics of 
peace have to a large extent caused it to wither in a day, and we 
are now faced with the necessity of replacing it with a plant of 
deeper root.8
                       
Trenchard’s aim was to confirm the independence of the Royal Air Force, 
develop an esprit de corps and establish a sound base from which rapid expansion 
could occur should another conflict arise.  The major costs in his plan were bricks 
and mortar: the establishment of a cadet college, an air staff college and a school 
for apprentices.  It was estimated that the costs for the first year would be 
£15,000,000.9  It was, perhaps, not a coincidence that the Air Estimates for 
1920/21 were for just over £21,000,000 million, less nearly £6,000,000  for war 
liabilities – a nice balancing of the books. 
The air element detailed in Trenchard’s vision of the future Royal Air Force 
called for a total of twenty-four and a half squadrons, with eighteen serving abroad 
in India, Egypt and Mesopotamia, plus one divided between overseas naval 
stations.  One squadron would work with the Army and two and a half with the 
Navy, while responsibility for the defence of Great Britain would rest with the 
remaining two squadrons.  One author10 described himself as stupéfié by the plan, 
but largely it was welcomed because it was seen as being economically viable and 
war appeared a very unlikely prospect. 
Lloyd George’s Coalition Cabinet in 1919 also welcomed the prospect of a 
long peace.  Certainly there were military side shows in Siberia and Archangel, a 
garrison was required in Ireland, and large forces were still necessary in the 
Middle East, but the prospect of an all-out war with a major power appeared most 
unlikely.  With the Service Ministers and particularly the First Lord of the Admiralty 
exerting pressure for guide lines as to future military policy, the Cabinet finally 
reached agreement.  On 15 October 1919 they announced that their assumption 
was  
 
for framing the revised estimates, that the British Empire will not       
be engaged in any great war during the next ten years, and that no 
expeditionary force is required for this purpose.11
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As a broad guide the “Ten Year Rule” became a useful tool for reining in 
Service expenditure.  It was also accurate in its summation ─ there was no major 
war in the first ten years.  No immediate impact was thus made on the R.A.F. by 
the “Ten Year Rule” but from 1925-26 its influence became more marked.  Service 
policies were affected.  On 28 June 1928, Churchill, as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, expanded the parameters.  From that day, he confirmed, the ten years 
would begin again each morning.  The self-perpetuating “Ten Year Rule” had been 
invoked and was approved by Cabinet.  It became the excuse for a succession of 
cabinets to defer increased spending by Service chiefs and put brakes on 
expansion and development.  It was finally rescinded on 15 November 1933.12
What the Royal Air Force required in 1919 was a raison d’être.  This was 
offered Trenchard in May of that year when he volunteered his force to remove 
once and for all the twenty year threat posed in British Somaliland by Seyid 
Mohamed Abdille Hassan, perhaps better known as the ‘Mad Mullah’.  The 
campaign, which began on 21 January 1920 with twelve De Havilland DH9 two-
seat day bombers, twenty-one vehicles and 192 support staff, backed up by a 
single battalion of the King’s African Rifles with a detachment from an Indian 
infantry battalion assisted by the Somaliland Camel Corps, was completed in less 
than three weeks at a cost of only £30,000.  Estimated costs, had the army been 
employed as the primary weapon, were £6,000,000 to £7,000,000.13   
The Colonial Under-Secretary, Colonel Amery, announcing the successful 
conclusion of the Somaliland campaign to the House of Commons, pointed out 
that it had been the “first time that the aeroplane has been deliberately employed 
as the primary striking instrument, and not merely as an auxiliary weapon.”14   As 
such, of course, it was a victory for Trenchard’s advocacy for the employment of 
the RAF as a controlling agent of overseas territories, at considerably reduced 
costs.  Although it was Trenchard’s first success in identifying and confirming a 
raison d’être for the RAF, there were still those, mainly in the Army, prepared to 
argue that the Somaliland campaign had not been a purely Air Force affair. 
In a letter to General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the Commander-in-Chief India, 
Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, declared that he did not 
believe that Churchill’s “ardent hopes of being able to govern Mesopotamia with 
hot air, aeroplanes and Arabs”15 were capable of realisation.  Trenchard was also 
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having other difficulties.  His battles with the navy continued. Moreover, he was 
being assailed in the Northcliffe press (whose enemy he had become in late 1917 
when he refused to join Lord Northcliffe and his brother, Lord Rothermere, in an 
attack on Haig) on the grounds of incompetence.  Trenchard’s critics, 
nevertheless, were losing these particular battles.  His efforts had been noted by 
cost-conscious politicians, notably Churchill in his dual role as Secretary of State 
for both War and Air, and in 1920 Trenchard was invited to prepare plans for the 
air policing of Mesopotamia.  Ironically, the financial restraints which post-1919 
had reduced the RAF to but a shadow of its previous strength, were now to 
provide the means for its deliverance.  Equally ironically, Churchill in his dual 
political role, now faced the difficult task of advising Army leaders that, while their 
budgets would be reduced, the RAF’s would rise. 
Although it was not until 1 October 1922 that the RAF was given supreme 
command of all the forces in Mesopotamia, now renamed Iraq, its worth had been 
confirmed.  The RAF in those early years in Iraq had shown that it possessed the 
ability to strike, at short notice, rebel held areas largely inaccessible to ground 
forces; could widely and rapidly distribute propaganda leaflets; could provide early 
intelligence; and accurately deliver punishment.  As an instrument of control, the 
RAF had shown itself to be swift, and, as far as enemies were concerned, 
unpredictable.  Equally importantly, by the establishment of the Cairo ─ Baghdad 
air mail service, and the construction of landing grounds in many areas of the Near 
East, the first links in the chain that would one day become the ‘All-Red’ route to 
the Far East, had been formed. 
The retention of the air force, as a controlling agent, made sound economic 
sense. Importantly, Trenchard had found a future for his force in a continuing, 
independent, peacetime role as a colonial controlling agent.  Policing, however, 
although it provided peacetime employment for the RAF, provided no justification 
for the long-term retention of the third, independent, military arm.  The RAF also 
required a vocation and for a military force that was provided by war. 
War is the primary function of military forces.  They must prepare for war 
and, when required, fight wars.  What role did Trenchard foresee for the Royal Air 
Force? During the Great War, although he was a believer in the value and 
importance of the offensive, he had seen the primary role of the Royal Flying 
Corps (RFC) as army support.  As General-Officer-Commanding (GOC) of the 
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Independent Force from 6 June 1918 he followed generally similar lines.  His force 
was never large, never more than ten per cent of the total British air strength in 
France,16 and his bombers were more frequently employed in attacking tactical 
rather than strategic targets.  The offensive was only carried into Germany when 
by so doing the fighting efficiency of the flying corps at the front was not 
impaired.17
Although Trenchard became a hard-headed political opportunist following 
the intrigues in which he became embroiled in 1918, he was never fluent in either 
speech or writing.  But he was aware of the power of the press.  From June 1918  
he waged an efficient public relations campaign.  Regular and frequent press 
releases were provided by his headquarters in France and he complained bitterly if 
they were either ignored or not published verbatim in major English papers.  He 
painted a glowing picture for the public of the effectiveness of the strategic 
bombing campaign.  It was, however, only a picture of future possibilities.  
As early as November 1917 Trenchard had made clear his expectations of 
strategic bombing.  “That purpose” he declared,   
 
is to weaken the power of the enemy both directly and indirectly ─ 
directly by interrupting his production, transport and organization 
through infliction of damage to his industrial, railway and military 
centres, and by compelling him to draw back his fighting machines 
to deal with the menace ─ indirectly by producing discontent and 
alarm amongst the industrial population . . . Actual experience goes 
to show that the moral effect of bombing industrial towns may be 
great, even though the material effect is, in fact, small.18   
 
Despite his war-time propaganda concerning strategic bombing, Trenchard, 
post-war, made no great claims as to the success of the limited bombing 
programme carried out by the Independent Force.  Difficulties had been 
experienced with the weather, accurate navigation had been a problem because of 
both weather and a lack of aids, bomb sights had been inadequate, and no 
attempt had been made to investigate the effects that various bombs would have 
on particular target systems.  In addition, much of the bombing effort had been 
wasted on German aerodromes in an attempt to reduce bomber losses due to 
German fighter activity.  The use of incendiary type weapons against aerodromes 
should never have been expected to produce significant results.    
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Trenchard’s despatch on the work of the Independent Force was issued on 
1 January 1919.  Despite the appalling weather, his small force had carried out 
142 raids, fifty-seven on targets in Germany.19 His aim had been to attack as many 
large industrial centres as possible because he did not believe that his force had 
the ability to destroy totally any one large centre, or disperse its industrial 
population.  Even with a larger force, he argued, it would not have been practical 
unless the war had been prolonged for at least another four or five years.  So  
much for the material damage.  Bombing, however, he claimed, had had a 
significant effect on enemy morale.  Without reference to either figures or 
examples, and after no in-depth investigations, he asserted that the morale effect 
of bombing against material results stood as twenty to one.20   It was to be a much 
quoted figure.  
Bombing surveys carried out independently from March to May 1919 in 
Germany by both British and American teams confirmed that Allied aircrew claims 
of accuracy and material damage were largely wishful thinking.  No measurement 
was made by either French or American investigators of the effects that bombing 
had had on enemy morale.  For the British survey team that investigation had 
been given first priority. Trenchard was not the first to target enemy morale.  The 
War Office in January 1918 had issued a paper entitled Memorandum on Bombing 
Operations.  Targets were to be attacked until they were either destroyed or the 
morale of the workers so disturbed that production was reduced.  Bombing, the 
paper continued, will produce the maximum morale effect if it is repeated at short 
intervals.21   
Enemy morale of course had been Trenchard’s target since taking over the 
Independent Force and his operational concept appears to have been supported 
by his superiors in the Air Ministry in London.22   Had Trenchard retired in 1918 the 
importance attached to enemy morale as a target might have rapidly disappeared. 
He served, however, for another ten years and the conjunction of his wartime 
assessments together with his assumption of responsibility for air control, 
replacing the Army, meant that the rhetoric of the morale effect of bombing 
assumed a significant importance in the formulation of Royal Air Force doctrine. 
During the early years of peace Trenchard saw few opportunities for 
expansion, deeming it politically impossible.  Ever alert to political nuances he 
awaited the chance to develop a powerful but independent Royal Air Force.  His 
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aim was to have two strings to his bow.  The first, air control or substitution, he had 
achieved; the second, an independent strategic bombing force, awaited an 
opportunity.  These two aims he saw as complementary developmental policies 
and his approach was subtle.  At least until 1921 no claim was made for the 
formation of a bomber force but he frequently pointed out that air threats to 
Britain’s security were always possible.  If those threats were to be countered, he 
argued, then a strategic bomber force was essential. His opportunity came in 1922 
when French air power was recognised at a time when her relations with Britain 
were strained.  French demands for German reparations and her readiness to 
occupy the Ruhr were some of the roots of the growing tensions. 
It has never been suggested that France entertained aggressive intentions 
towards Britain at that time but Trenchard’s call for Royal Air Force expansion was 
a reminder of her apparent vulnerability.23   Fear of the bomber and death from the  
air were still fresh in many minds.  The Government, quick to appreciate the public 
mood and aware of the country’s air defence deficiencies, acted promptly and 
began a programme to form a Home Defence Air Force (HDAF).  
On 1 June 1923 Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for Air, outlined in a 
paper for the National and Imperial Defence Committee the plan for an expansion 
of the Royal Air Force for home defence.  The aim, he made clear, was to reach a 
three to four ratio of front line machines with front-line French aircraft; expansion 
would be in stages in step with French expansion, and the scheme would provide 
for regular, territorial and civilian elements.  Included in his preamble, however, 
was a cautionary proviso.  “I do not pretend” he admitted, 
 
that the scheme is more than an outline or that the figures that it 
contains whether it be men or money, are more than rough 
estimates . . . . For the time being I cannot be expected to do more 
than give my colleagues a general sketch of the main features of a 
possible expansion.24    
 
The first target was to produce an HDAF totalling fifty-two squadrons of day 
and night bomber and fighter squadrons.  Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, 
announcing the plans in the House of Commons later in June, asserted that what 
was required was a force of sufficient strength adequately to protect the British 
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people against an air attack by the strongest air force within striking distance of the 
country.25   
The ratio of bomber and fighter squadrons required discussion but 
eventually, largely because of Trenchard’s insistence, it was decided that there 
would be seventeen fighter and thirty-five bomber squadrons.  In making this 
decision, with deterrence the aim, one of the guiding principles was that “the 
addition of bombers at the expense of fighters would inflict more damage on the 
enemy than the absence of the fighters would permit the enemy to inflict on us.”26
Trenchard’s vision, of course, was of an offensive defence that would either 
deter aggression or be sufficient to launch an effective destructive bombing 
campaign.  At meetings to decide on the broad lines to be followed in the 
expansion programme he was quick to reject any suggestions that the actual 
numbers of fighter or bomber squadrons to be formed was open for discussion.  
He had determined that the first requirement was to establish the number of 
bomber squadrons required for offensive operations.  Once that number had been 
agreed,   then the remainder would be established as a defensive fighter force.  
Both Air Commodore T. C. R. Higgins, Director of Training and Staff Duties, and 
Squadron Leader Charles Portal, then a member of the Directorate of Operations, 
were given sharp reminders that numbers were not negotiable.27   It appears that 
lessons that Trenchard should have learned regarding the need for fighter escorts 
during operations with the Independent Force had either not been learned or had 
been forgotten.  Confirmation that the fighter escort question had been overlooked 
is provided by a survey of the minutes of several meetings where the main 
discussion point centred on whether the squadrons were to be employed on day or 
night operations. 
Remarkably, even though the types of aircraft had yet to be decided, the 
decision reached was that squadrons should be capable of both day and night 
operations.  Where were the voices pointing out that different techniques, different 
training, and different equipment were all essential requirements depending on 
whether the attacks were to be in the dark or during the day?  Day operations 
required air gunners if the formations were to provide mutual protection, whereas 
at night darkness provided the cover.  Thus, at night, a greater weight of bombs 
could be carried.  Bomb aiming also differed between day and night operations 
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because by day aircraft flew higher to avoid anti-aircraft fire and so different 
abilities and equipment were required for those responsible for bomb aiming.   
Many lessons had been learned in night bombing raids late in the First 
World War.  One was that aircraft suitable for bombing by day were not 
necessarily the best aircraft for night operations.  Another was that the training 
given pilots for formation operations by day did not equip them for night bombing.  
Unfortunately they were lessons that were frequently overlooked, or worse, 
ignored.  Thus, when Bomber Command was forced to operate at night early in 
the Second World War, the training deficiencies became very apparent.  Also 
forgotten was that effective night attacks required precise navigation.  This had 
been provided in 1918, on the allied side of the lines, by lighthouses, situated from 
five to twenty miles apart, flashing in morse a particular identification letter.  In 
order that these lights be seen crews flew at comparatively low levels – around 
3,000 feet.28   
Another problem, never adequately solved in 1918, was that of target 
location and identification.  Furthermore, the wrong impression was often provided 
by the degree of opposition the British bombing aircraft encountered.  If a target in 
either French or Belgian territory was considered unimportant, the Germans 
provided little, if any, opposition.  For targets within Germany, the opposition was 
often so intense that that the defences could not be penetrated.  The lesson of air 
superiority was too often misapplied.  Finally, too much weight was given to crew 
reports following bombing missions.  Crews rarely report failure so night bombing 
often received greater acclaim than the actual results merited. 
Despite the numerous and weighty discussions that took place concerning 
the fifty-two squadron scheme it ended up as a paper plan rather than an air force.  
The decision that thirteen of the squadrons would be either auxiliary or special 
reserve squadrons meant that any belief in achieving parity with France either in 
total, or front-line numbers, was unfounded.  Only four aircraft were allotted to the 
auxiliary squadrons, two trainers and two service machines, and the part-time 
volunteers manning the squadrons carried out their flying training at weekends and 
the once yearly fortnight’s camp.  Two of the three flight special reserve squadrons 
had only part-time volunteers while the other flight was manned by regulars. They 
did not equate to a first-line reserve. 
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The initial intention had been that the expansion would be complete by 
1928.  A delay was built into the scheme, however, when it was decided, as an 
experiment to avoid the necessity of establishing additional ab initio Flying Training 
Schools, that all flying training would be carried out on the squadrons.  That 
required students to spend one year flying only training aircraft prior to conversion 
to Service machines.  An approximate completion date for all squadrons to 
become  operational became 1930.29  In December 1925 the completion date was 
advanced to 1935.  Then, in response to Churchill’s revision of the “Ten Year 
Rule” in 1928, the completion date became 1938.  
From 1923 to 1933 the fifty-two squadron scheme remained largely 
unchanged although economic and political disturbances created further 
unplanned delays.  The economic crisis on Wall Street in 1929 had spread to 
Britain by late 1931 and it brought with it feelings of uncertainty – economically, 
socially and militarily.  British officials, fearing that European and possibly Far East 
peace was at risk, and aware that an arms race could develop, became leaders in 
a disarmament movement.   
Two factors combined during the early 1930s to severely restrict all efforts 
at air force expansion.  Firstly, Britain’s economic ills were naturally reflected in the 
financial pressures applied by Government to all three Services.  Budgets were 
reduced or remained virtually static between 1931 and 1934.  Possony’s dictum30  
was fully tested.  How were the allotted monies best spent to prepare for war 
against an unknown enemy?  Secondly, a dominant feature of life in Western 
Europe during the 1930s was the development of the fear of the bomber and the 
threat it posed of a knock-out blow.31   Perhaps it was most clearly enunciated by 
Stanley Baldwin, Lord President of the Council, when in the House of Commons 
on 10 November 1932 he told Members that everyone must appreciate “that there 
is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed . . . . the bomber will 
always get through.”32   The fear of the bomber, combined with the belief that it 
would always get through, made Great Britain a willing participant in the Geneva 
Disarmament Conferences during 1933 and 1934.  With the potential menace of a 
resurgent and militaristic Germany having been recognised by 1935, the 
attendance of some politicians at disarmament talks that year was perhaps 
somewhat less than willing.33   
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This concern was emphasised in July 1936 when a deputation from both 
Houses of Parliament met with the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, Secretary for 
War, Lord Halifax, and Minister for Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, to 
express their anxiety about “the European conditions, which seem to us extremely 
menacing, and about our own position faced with these conditions.”34   Among the 
twenty-person delegation, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Leopold 
Amery, Brigadier General Sir Henry Page, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes and Lord 
Trenchard were prominent figures. 
The armaments’ truce occasioned by the Geneva Conferences was 
significantly disadvantageous to Great Britain because her air defences were 
already weak and the organisation responsible for expansion could easily have 
been brought to a state of collapse.35   Many hoped but few believed that success 
would attend the Geneva talks.  General Balbo, Italian Air Minister, called the 
conference “a huge illusion factory.”36   War, he acknowledged, would be neither 
prevented nor delayed by anything that was done at Geneva.  Nothing was done.  
Discussions on banning either bombing or bomber aircraft and on the status of 
civil aircraft went around in circles.  Germany’s temporary withdrawal on 29 August 
1932 because she had been refused equality of rights – parity with France – was 
of considerable concern.  Her final resignation on 14 October 1933 spelled the end 
of meaningful discussions at Geneva.37
The failed disarmament conferences revealed that although there was 
cause for concern in the Far East there was even greater cause for worry in 
Europe.  While France demanded security, Germany sought a return to the 
equality she had enjoyed prior to the Treaty of Versailles.  The demands were 
incompatible.  With Hitler’s accession to power on 1 January 1933 German 
nationalism surged.  Germany now replaced France as the theoretical potential 
enemy, though Great Britain took heart from the belief that rearmament for 
Germany appeared a long-term proposition.   
In 1933 the HDAF comprised forty-two squadrons, including twelve non-
regular units.  With the possibility that twenty-eight squadrons could be deployed 
at any moment under the Defence of India requirement (should Russia attack that 
country), Britain’s defences were precariously placed.  There were additional 
problems.  Reserves of pilots, aircraft, engines, transport and general stores were 
all in short supply. 
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Germany’s withdrawal from both the League of Nations and the 
Disarmament Conferences in October 1933 heightened tension.  On 15 November 
1933 the Cabinet, responding to a suggestion from the Committee of Imperial 
Defence (CID), established the Defence Requirements Committee (DRC).  Their 
task was to identify the deficiencies that existed in Britain’s defence arrangements 
after fifteen years of comparative neglect.38   They reported on 28 February 
1934.39   Threats were acknowledged in the Far East and India by the DRC but the 
most urgent was that posed by a resurgent and militaristic Germany.  They 
recommended that the fifty-two squadron scheme formulated in 1923 be 
completed, with war reserves, as quickly as possible.  Cabinet was asked to 
consider whether an additional twenty-five squadrons were required. The total cost 
of rearmament for all three Services over five years was estimated at £71,300,000.   
The R.A.F. share was £8,800,000.40 
For a government which hitherto had pursued ruthless economic measures 
the report gave rise to considerable concern.  In an effort to reduce expenditure, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, suggested that the states 
of Europe enter into a limited liability partnership guaranteeing each other’s 
security.  Politicians welcomed the plan, but the Chiefs of Staff pointed out that 
while the mutual assistance scheme might work, liability could never be limited.  A 
German attack against Poland was given as an example.  For Britain to render air 
aid to Poland would require that her bombers be based in Poland and it was 
impossible to accept that Britain would not then become a target for German 
bombers.41
With Germany now identified as the potential enemy, the Low Countries 
became of significant strategic interest to the RAF.   Should Germany occupy 
them then London would not be the only target.  Germany would also possess 
early warning of raids against German targets.  Conversely, if the RAF could base 
her bombers in the Low Countries then German targets in the Ruhr were made 
accessible and the German early warning system no longer existed.  Air Ministry 
staff, like many others, feared the ‘knock-out ‘ blow.  It was the worst case 
scenario.  Well aware that an all-out air offensive would involve heavy casualties, 
the Air Ministry called for a build-up of both pilots and aircraft and warned that 
essential industries must prepare for expansion.  Others also expressed their 
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concern. Newspapers (the Daily Mail in particular) and politicians, with Churchill 
taking the lead, demanded rapid and extensive rearmament. 
On 16 July 1934 Expansion Scheme A was announced by the CAS to 
prepare the RAF for war in 1942.  In that period the HDAF was to increase to 
seventy-five squadrons plus four flying boat and five army co-operation squadrons.  
The paper deterrent force was to be augmented.  Unfortunately, although seventy-
five squadrons was the aim, national economics prevented the provision of 
reserves. The RAF was to continue to be a ‘shop window’ force with empty store 
rooms. It was a dangerous decision.  A rider, that the reserve must be provided 
should war appear imminent, was issued on the false premise that provision of 
essentials such as personnel, aerodromes and buildings could be accelerated 
should war threaten.  Major expansions in the Services can never be 
accomplished in the short-term. 
In a leading article the Daily Mail lamented that the plans announced in the 
House of Commons by Lord President of the Council, Stanley Baldwin, (serving in 
Ramsay MacDonald’s Second National Government), would  
 
be received with extreme disappointment and anxiety.  Face to face 
with an emergency of the gravest character the Cabinet had been 
content with half measures, taken in the most dilatory manner. . . .  
The first duty of every Administration is to place the nation it 
controls in such a position as to be able to resist external 
aggression. The National Government is not discharging this duty.  
Unless it wakes speedily from its condition of inertia, and refuses 
longer to allow itself to be bemused by schemes for pacts and 
disarmament conferences, it will bring the Empire down in utter 
catastrophe.42
 
Winston Churchill, in the House of Commons, described the proposed 
increase in air strength as “tiny, timid, tentative, tardy,” but he opposed a vote of 
censure, asserting “that while he disliked the ‘apologies and soothing procedures’ 
adopted by the Government, he feared even more the Opposition’s refusal to face 
the facts.”43   He warned the House that  
 
By the end of 1935 the German air force will be nearly equal in 
numbers and efficiency . . . to our home defence air force even if 
the Government’s present proposals are carried out. . . . if Germany 
continues this expansion and if we continue to carry out our 
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scheme, then some time in 1936 Germany will be definitely and 
substantially stronger in the air than Great Britain . . . once they 
have got that lead we may never be able to overtake them.44    
 
Germany, of course, had never fully complied with the requirements of the 
Treaty of Versailles in respect of her air force.  A structure was kept in place and 
later strengthened when Deutsche Lufthansa commenced operations.  The new 
national airline had rapidly become the most efficient in Europe.  Its programme of 
research and development in night and all-weather flying, blind approach systems 
and long range navigation, was far in advance of anything in the United Kingdom 
in either commercial or military aviation.  Although not readily convertible for 
military purposes, Lufthansa became a military training facility. 
In March 1935 Hitler announced the creation of the Luftwaffe, the German 
Air Force.  It was a much-delayed birth announcement.  Two weeks’ later, in an 
aside to Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary, Hitler claimed that Germany had 
achieved parity in numbers with Britain’s metropolitan air force.  The Cabinet, 
greatly disturbed, believed that an immediate response was necessary.  The Air 
Staff, already in difficulty with Expansion Scheme A, was much less eager.  They 
believed that Hitler had over-stated German Air Force strength.  In any case 
training facilities then in existence in the RAF would be unable to cope with 
additional students without lowering standards while industry was already at full 
stretch. 
It is one thing to announce an expansion scheme but it is another for action 
to be taken.  The fifty-two squadron scheme is a typical example.  Announced in 
1923, it still awaited completion in 1935.  Meanwhile the RAF deterrent force 
remained a short-range, light bomber component.  Specifications had been issued 
for a heavy bomber replacement for the obsolete Virginia and the obsolescent 
Heyford but the Whitley (Spec B3/34), first flown in 1935, was not due in squadron 
service until 1937.  Specifications had been issued in 1932 – B9/32 from which 
Wellingtons and Hampdens would arrive and P27/32 for the Fairey Battle – but 
they were not expected in the air until late in 1935.  Light bombers were available, 
but for a war with Germany they were useless. 
The Military Correspondent for The Times summed up the situation.  We 
have a high quality air force he observed, but 
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our bombing force is mainly equipped with machines of small bomb-
load and narrow radius of action – about 250 miles.  Against attacks 
launched from beyond this radius the greater part of our counter-
offensive forces would not appear to be capable of effective 
retaliation.45     
 
A Flight editorial of 11 April 1935 took comfort in the fact that the writer 
believed that, should it become necessary, the RAF was capable of accelerated 
expansion. “Air power” he claimed, “depends not so much on the number of 
existing aircraft as upon the power of rapid expansion in personnel and material.”46   
The lesson to be hard learned was that rapid expansion in the Services without 
lowering standards and compromising efficiency is simply impossible. 
Expansion Scheme A set the stage for disaster for the RAF.  Orders were 
given for aircraft that would be obsolete when the war came but which would still 
be in front-line operations.47   The Fairey Battle is a case in point. Faireys 
underwent extensive tooling-up to establish the production line but output was 
slow. Technical problems concerning engines, wings and bomb carriers all caused 
delays.  Production was expected to reach 220 aircraft in 1937; only eighty were 
completed.  By the time the shadow factory organisation began producing aircraft 
in 1938 the Battle was already obsolete.  Nevertheless, because of the desire to 
achieve parity, at least in numbers, and the need to provide for future large scale 
production, Battles continued to flow off the assembly lines.  By May 1939 
seventeen squadrons were either equipped or in the process of re-equipping with 
the Fairey Battle.  It was symptomatic of a process that has been called 
“rearmamental instability”.48  
With a further deterioration in the international situation following Italy’s 
invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, and increasingly threatening gestures from 
Germany, British expansion plans were widened. On 4 May 1935 after Hitler’s 
claim to parity, Scheme A was replaced by Scheme C.  The Metropolitan Air 
Force49 was to be increased to 123 squadrons, with 1,500 first-line aircraft, to be 
completed by 31 March 1937.50   The aim was to increase the number of medium 
and heavy bomber squadrons at the expense of the light, thus confirming 
Germany as the potential enemy. It was a scheme designed to save money, but 
was flawed in that it provided an air force without reserves, capable of little more 
than thirty days’  intensive war operations. 
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On 3 March 1936 the British Government issued another Statement 
Relating to Defence, expressing concern at the rapid rate of German rearmament.  
The Statement announced that although Scheme C was proceeding, “new 
developments in design will render it possible to make great advances to the 
striking power of the Force.”51   The new programme, Scheme F, was for a target 
figure of 124 squadrons with 1,750 first-line aircraft exclusive of the Fleet Air Arm.  
No significant increase in the number of squadrons had been provided for but 
medium and heavy bomber units were to have their Initial Equipment (IE) raised 
from twelve to eighteen aircraft.  Importantly, and for the first time, Scheme C 
included reserves. 
Scheme H, considered by Cabinet in January 1937, planned to further 
increase the Metropolitan Air Force to 145 squadrons but was never implemented.  
There were two reasons.  Firstly, assurances were received from German 
authorities that their air force would have a first-line strength of only 1,620 aircraft 
by autumn 1938.  Secondly, there were production difficulties in the British aircraft 
industry.  The Air Staff disapproved of Scheme H because the increased strength 
was to be achieved by taking 150 aircraft from the reserves should war break out. 
In 1937, with international tension between Britain and her potential 
enemies showing no signs of abating, the British government had come to realise 
that the country faced, virtually alone, the triple threat of Germany, Italy and 
Japan.  Isolationist United States, doubtful France, and the enigmatic Soviet 
Union, together with Belgium’s declaration of neutrality, meant that it was time for 
an urgent stocktake of available manpower, materiel, and industrial capacity, 
measured against essential requirements both at home and overseas.  Lord 
Swinton, the Secretary of State for Air, asked the Air Staff to provide details of the 
force they considered essential in order to deter possible aggression.  Uniquely, 
the perceived needs were not restricted by either political or economic 
considerations.  It was to simply be a listing of the strategical requirements to 
enable the Royal Air Force to provide a measure of security both at home and 
abroad.  
Scheme J, as it came to be called, was presented on 20 October 1937.  It 
provided for a total of 203 squadrons (including thirty-eight fighter and ninety 
bomber squadrons for the Metropolitan Air Force) to be completed by 31 March 
1941.52  The main effort was to be directed at achieving parity in bomber striking 
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power with the Luftwaffe.  However, General Milch, Secretary of the German Air 
Ministry, had visited England in November 1937 and thanks to his boasting about 
German aircraft production figures, the British authorities abandoned any notion of 
parity in numbers.   
Unfortunately, unless the country was placed on a war footing, Scheme J 
was not achievable in either industrial capacity or in available manpower.  
Moreover, by calling for a thirty-eight per cent increase to the budget figure of 
£467,500,000 already allocated for Scheme F, it over-reached economic 
realities.53   Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, insisted that 
the scheme be drastically pruned.  His letter calling for reductions in expenditure 
also contained a series of questions.  For example, he asked, how much would be 
saved if, while the number of fighter squadrons was maintained, bomber 
squadrons were left with reduced establishments and only brought to full strength 
after mobilisation?54  It was the first movement of the pendulum towards the build 
up of a defensive fighter force at the expense of an offensive bomber arm.    
Naturally, Lord Swinton and the Air Staff objected.  They argued that the 
bomber force had been planned to provide a deterrent equal in strength to the 
force which it was believed the Luftwaffe could employ against England.55   
Reduction in bomber numbers could only be accepted if Bomber Command were 
seen to be capable of inflicting more damage on German targets than the 
Luftwaffe could on British targets.  Alternatively, reduction was permissible if 
German targets were more readily accessible for Bomber Command than English 
targets were for the Luftwaffe. As neither situation pertained, Inskip’s solution was 
rejected by Lord Swinton and the Air Staff.  
Inskip remained obdurate.  He accepted the proposed increase in the 
number of fighter squadrons but rejected increases for overseas squadrons and 
only agreed to minimal increases in the number of bomber squadrons.  At the 
same time bomber reserves were severely pruned, which meant that Bomber 
Command would only become fully efficient after mobilisation.  Bomber 
Command’s teeth had been effectively drawn.  Inskip’s proposals were accepted 
by the government and the Air Ministry were advised to prepare, with Inskip, a less 
ambitious and cheaper expansion scheme.  Scheme K, with a bomber force of 
seventy-seven squadrons but with a reserve for only nine weeks, was presented in 
January 1938.  The rejection of Scheme J effectively ended the race for parity; it 
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also marked a turning point in that air policy, instead of preparing for offensive 
action in the event of war, was forced to pay most attention to defensive 
requirements. 
In a final attempt to assuage the despondency among the Air Staff at the 
demise of Scheme J, Inskip claimed that the reduction in bomber production was 
in order to create “industrial capacity to produce bombers once war had begun.”56   
Nevertheless, it was now becoming clearer to the Air Staff that their reliance upon 
the ability of Bomber Command to act as a deterrent, or provide effective counter 
blows, had been severely reduced.  In order to avoid defeat, but contrary to 
established RAF doctrine, security was to be focussed on fighter defence. 
  A further Statement Relating to Defence was issued in March 1938.  It 
announced in general terms that air force training facilities, both air and ground, 
were to be increased.  Furthermore, the number of different types of aircraft 
employed in the RAF was to be reduced.  As a consequence, factories would each 
produce only one type of aircraft.57
Under the influence of the Munich crisis Scheme M was introduced on 25 
October 1938.  Priority in this scheme was given to the production of fighter 
aircraft.  As far as bombers were concerned, the aim was to have the capability to 
achieve parity with German striking power.  Production of heavy bombers such as 
the Stirling, Manchester and Halifax, under development since 1936, became the 
priority.  Plans were announced for eighty-five heavy bomber squadrons totalling 
1,360 aircraft and fifty fighter squadrons with 800 aircraft. 
In all the various expansion schemes most attention was given to aircraft 
numbers but what must not be overlooked is that during the period 1934 ─ 1939 
enormous changes in aircraft had also taken place.  Monoplanes had replaced 
biplanes and metal had largely replaced wood in their construction.  Some of the 
new aircraft appeared at the last-ever Hendon display in 1937 but few were yet in 
squadron service. By 1938, at Empire Air Displays, although Blenheims and 
Battles predominated, Wellingtons and Hampdens also made a showing as part of 
the bomber forces, while Spitfires and Hurricanes appeared as representatives of 
Fighter Command.  
By 1936 it had also become clear that the Air Defence of Great Britain 
(ADGB) Command, established in 1923 in face of a perceived threat from French 
air power, had become unwieldy.  Under the ADGB scheme the planned fifty-two 
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squadrons, bomber and fighter, were placed under a centralised command 
responsible to the Air Ministry.  With bomber squadrons outnumbering the fighter, 
concentration was thus centred on the bomber element to best display the 
independent offensive capability of the Royal Air Force.  The ADGB scheme had 
been of significant value because it had confirmed the continued existence of the 
RAF as a single unified air force under centralised control and equal in status and 
independence with both the Royal Navy and the Army.  Nevertheless, by 1936, 
with expansion increasing, it was time for change.   
The ADGB was thus replaced by four Commands ─ Bomber, Fighter, 
Coastal and Training ─ each independent of the other and directly responsible to 
the Air Ministry.  It was an acknowledgement of the fact that the application of air 
power required specialists in training, equipment, and command.  At root was the 
desire to ensure that the visualised war requirements would differ little from the 
practices of peace.  Air Marshal Sir John Steel, formerly Commander-in-Chief of 
the ADGB, was appointed head of Bomber Command, and Air Marshal Sir Hugh 
Dowding became the first Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command.  One 
significant benefit was that although the division between offensive and defensive 
elements of the RAF became more identifiable, neither was totally subservient to 
the other. 
By the winter of 1938/39 Bomber Command was still in a state of transition.  
The force, predominantly, was flying aircraft deemed if not obsolete, then largely 
obsolescent.  Munich fortunately provided the breathing space.  Although the total 
number of bomber squadrons had reduced from forty-one on 1 October 1938 to 
thirty-four on 1 August 1939, the heavy bomber squadrons had increased from ten 
to fourteen with six weeks of reserves.58 The steps taken were in the right 
direction.  In September 1939 thirty-eight squadrons were mobilised.  First-line 
bomber strength was one Harrow (to be used on transport duties), ten Battle, ten 
Blenheim, five Whitley, six Wellington and six Hampden squadrons. Although the 
Harrow was obsolete, the Battles obsolescent and the Blenheims of doubtful 
value, Bomber Command went to war.  
In 1936 it had been hoped that the first of the truly heavy bombers, to be 
built to specification B12/36, would have been available by 1939, but military 
aircraft, built to exacting specifications, can rarely be built to timetables.  The 
prototypes of the Stirling, Manchester and Halifax first flew in May, July and 
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October 1939 respectively, but the first truly heavy bomber operation was not 
carried out until the night of 10/11 February 1941 when three Stirlings of No. 7 
(Bomber) Squadron bombed oil storage facilities at Rotterdam.  Manchesters 
followed on the night of 24/25 February and Halifaxes on the night of 11/12 March.  
Bomber Command went to war in 1939 believing that it possessed the 
capacity to wage a strategic bombing offensive in daylight with self-defending 
bomber formations.  There were hard lessons to be learned.  Very little night flying 
had been carried out in the leisurely days of peace and navigation problems during 
day flights were overcome by employing the ‘Bradshaw’ technique – follow the 
railway line or descend and read the station name.  Navigation, at least until May 
1938, had been the responsibility of inadequately trained and largely unwilling 
pilots. At that time, although an observer may have been doing the navigation, the 
pilot still retained responsibility.  Eventually, at a policy meeting in the Air Ministry 
on 16 May 1938, it was finally agreed that “the navigation of the aircraft in war 
should be carried out by a properly trained observer/navigator.”59 Finally, in this 
catalogue of deficiencies, no research had been carried out regarding the type or 
weight of bombs to be employed against particular targets and available air 
intelligence was totally inadequate. 
Other crew members, air gunners and wireless operators, were largely 
ground tradesmen who received, as we have seen, an extra sixpence a day for 
undertaking part time aircrew duties.60   Bombing was not going to be a problem, 
so it was believed, because peace-time, day exercises, at medium levels, in 
known flying areas, had produced reasonable results.  Had the night bombing 
errors sustained during the Sector and Combined Training Exercise in August 
1937 been considered, then any notion of attempting night attacks on distant, 
unknown targets, deep in Germany, would have been totally rejected.  In this 
particular exercise forty-seven attacks were made at night on targets at Enfield, 
Leytonstone and Kidbrooke, and the bombing errors from 6,000 feet were so great 
that only one could be measured: it was 1,889 yards.  According to Air Vice-
Marshal Patrick Playfair, AOC 3 Group, these results were the norm; they simply 
repeated results obtained in the Air Defence of Great Britain Exercises in June 
1935.  His forecast was bleak.  “The time has now come,” he reported, 
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when the limitations in the efficacy of precision bombing by heavy 
bomber aircraft at night in war must be squarely faced.  Past results 
have clearly indicated that much has yet to be done before the 
problems of navigation over unknown and unlighted territory and 
the identification of strange and unilluminated targets even 
approach solution.  It is for serious consideration whether under 
present conditions bombing at night will not have to be regarded as 
in terms of area bombing.61
  
Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, Commander-in-Chief Bomber 
Command, in his report to the Air Secretary, was equally critical:   
 
Though these results . . . are nothing unusual in this country to date 
against unlighted targets . . . they are none the less deplorable . . . . 
until, if ever, we can produce equipment suitable for the purpose, 
we must recognise that precision bombing at night especially with 
high speed aircraft against unilluminated targets, i.e. in war 
conditions, remains a matter of very great difficulty.62
 
In March 1939 Ludlow-Hewitt provided his Readiness for War Report.  It 
made equally sombre reading.  He admitted that in 1938 Bomber Command had 
been unprepared for war.  He also expressed concern that while some progress 
had been made “in many essentials we are still far from attaining to a satisfactory 
standard of war efficiency.”63   The major problem identified by Ludlow-Hewitt was 
the continued expansion.  Operational efficiency had been impaired he asserted, 
because  
 
almost the entire effort of the Command has had to be devoted to 
the elementary training of new drafts of inexperienced personnel, 
and to mastering the maintenance and elementary operation  of 
new equipment .  . . . The results of this are illustrated by the lack 
of progress made in the programme of investigation of operational 
problems.64
  
The CAS, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, had always been well aware of 
the urgent need for expansion.  On 8 April 1938, with regard to expansion Scheme 
L, he reminded the Secretary of State that  
 
unless the Cabinet are prepared to incur . . . the full expenditure 
required for Scheme L . . . we must accept a position of permanent 
inferiority to Germany in the air . . . . we shall not survive the knock-
out blow.65    
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Perhaps, however, despite reminders from Group Captain John Slessor, his 
Director of Plans, Newall took less cognizance of Bomber Command’s lack of 
preparedness for war than is desirable in a Chief of the Air Staff.  Ludlow-Hewitt’s 
deficiencies list in 1939 merely provoked the comment from Newall that “the AOC-
in-C was trying to clear himself.”66   The list demanded action which it did not 
receive.  The implication accepted by Newall was that Ludlow-Hewitt had no 
intention of going to war with the equipment provided.  Newall, however, admitted 
that he was unsure of the reply that should be made to Ludlow-Hewitt’s letter.67
The accuracy of Ludlow-Hewitt’s judgements was soon to be demonstrated. 
Virtually throughout the 1930s, Royal Air Force expansion programmes  
had been concentrated on building a bomber force capable of mounting a strategic 
counter-offensive sufficient to either deter or, in the last resort, destroy a potential 
enemy.  Thus, in September 1939, Bomber Command went to war determined to 
show that strategic air power had a significant role to play in three-dimensional, 
modern war.  Pre-war planning had identified strategic German targets the 
destruction of which by daylight precision attacks, launched by self-defending 
bomber formations, would not only reduce the enemy capacity for war making but 
also lower the morale of the population at large.   War time reality provided the 
harsh learning experience that to persist with the methods for which they had 
trained and been equipped would early lead to the destruction of the limited 
bomber forces then available.  In order to avoid extinction Bomber Command 
would have to operate by night, for which its crews were largely untrained and the 
aircraft both unsuitable and ill-equipped.    
The immediate aim, forced upon the Air Staff, was that conservation of the 
limited resources was essential coupled with an enormous further expansion of 
aircraft and crews, aerodromes, bombs and flares, improved and modernised  
training facilities, together with the extensive recruitment and training of ground 
staff to maintain the aircraft in flying condition.  Time was the element most 
desired by the Air Staff because they were well aware that the specifications laid 
down in 1936 for a truly heavy bomber force would eventually provide them with 
the weapon they mistakenly believed they would possess in 1939.  Fortunately, 
time was provided by both Germany’s and Britain’s unwillingness to be the first to 
launch bombing attacks where civilians were put at risk.  Time, the vital 
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commodity, was also provided by Britain’s ability, backed by her widespread 
Empire, to stand alone until June 1941 and carry on the attritional warfare so 
necessary in the defeat of a nation as powerful as Germany.  In June 1941 Hitler 
made his move against Bolshevism and invaded Russia and new vistas were 
revealed for Britain who had gained another unexpected ally.  There were to be 
many setbacks but progress was inexorable and, providentially, it was time that 
would prove to have been on the Allies’ side.  
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Chapter Two 
 
The Learning Process 
 
During the 1930s the British public had become fearfully aware that the 
threats posed by aerial bombardment meant that the geographical defences 
previously provided by their island home were no longer relevant.  Wars in Spain 
and China had shown that urban centres, densely inhabited, had become the 
target and the public fears generated were not only widespread but also 
profoundly felt.  The bomber, with its ability to reduce the distance between the 
civilian backwater and the scene of military operations, was now identified as 
posing a threat to both civilian and serviceman alike.  Hospitals were prepared to 
receive a vast influx of casualties within the first few hours of a war.  After Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain’s announcement of the declaration of war on 3 
September 1939, therefore, many in Britain fearfully awaited the long-promised 
‘knock-out’ blow by Luftwaffe formations.  Air raid sirens did sound on that day, but 
the intruder was eventually identified as a French aircraft en route to Croydon that 
had either omitted to file a flight plan or whose details had not been forwarded to 
the appropriate defence authorities.    
By September 1939, despite a succession of expansion programmes and a 
vast increase in expenditure on the RAF, the only air force capable of delivering a 
knock out blow was the Luftwaffe.  Bomber Command was neither equipped nor 
prepared to wage a long range strategic air offensive.  Its war preparations had 
been hurried and were far from complete, but the Air Staff believed that time was 
on their side and that the bomber force under construction would ultimately bring 
victory.  Their first priority was thus to avoid any action that would cause Germany 
to launch an attempted knock- out blow. 
Specific planning for a bombing war with Germany had its origins in the first 
rearmament discussions as early as 1933.  Nothing concrete could be determined 
at that time because no general war plan had yet been defined.  The ‘worst case’ 
scenario at that early planning stage was the German occupation of the Low 
Countries and the heightened threat thus posed for Britain.  In order to counter 
such a possibility it was decided that Britain’s bomber force needed to be capable 
of reducing that threat by an air offensive launched against German airfields, 
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communications and supplies.  On 1 October 1937 Western Air (WA) Plans were 
drawn up for the Air Staff under thirteen headings – later extended and modified.  
These were forwarded to Bomber Command on 13 December 1937 with the 
instruction that detailed planning was to commence on just three, on the premise 
that war would commence on 1 October 1938.  The three were WA 1, WA 4 and 
WA 5. 
WA 1 was a plan for the attack on the German Air Striking Force and its 
supporting maintenance organisation.  Aircraft factories were not initially included.  
WA 4 involved preparing for attacks on German military communications including 
rail, roads and canals, while WA 5 involved a possible attack on German war 
industry, including oil, particularly that based in the Ruhr, Rhineland and the Saar.1   
The Air Staff exhibited no great enthusiasm for either WA 1 or WA 4 because 
target systems were too varied and widespread and the position of many potential 
military airfields was very likely to remain unknown.   
Only WA 5 appeared to offer prospects for a successful air offensive.  For 
the first time Bomber Command examined potential target systems which, if they 
could be totally destroyed, would, it was believed, cripple the German war 
machine. The first targets selected were power and coking plants in the Ruhr.  The 
Ruhr, however, was a densely populated area and attacks directed at these 
targets would have meant that German civilians would be placed at risk.  At the 
beginning of the war British, French and German authorities, in response to an 
appeal from President Roosevelt on 1 September 1939,  had agreed that a ‘gloves 
off‘ bombing policy would not be implemented.  The so-called ‘rules of war’ 
(nominated but unratified in the Hague Draft Rules of 1923) were not to be 
infringed.  Bomber Command was thus at war but the only possible target, for 
which little planning had been completed, was the German navy.  Its vessels could 
be attacked at sea but when in harbours, only where no threat would be posed to 
German civilians.  
It was to be a war where the German forces set the pace, with Britain 
merely following and trying to react to German pressures as best it could.  This 
situation prevailed for almost two years.  The German Scandinavian venture, their 
assault in the west, the Battle of Britain and the night offensive that followed, 
invasion preparations, and the successes of German U-boats, all called for 
different responses from Bomber Command.  It was always on the defensive and 
 53
in no position to attempt offensives that had been so much discussed during 
preparations for war.  Actualities had overcome theory.  Offensive actions were 
always tentative and amounted to little more than trials.  They were always on 
such a small scale that neither significant material nor morale damage should ever 
have been expected.  Optimistic aircrews, however, painted a glowing picture of 
bombing successes. 
Although this chapter will only deal with events prior to Air Chief Marshal 
Harris’s arrival as AOC-in-C Bomber Command, it would be useful here to 
describe the intricate target selection process that evolved as the war progressed.  
A wide selection of agencies was employed with varying degrees of influence.  
Questions of policy were first discussed at high level by the Air Staff and then, 
after consideration by the Chiefs of Staff, referred to the War Cabinet.  Overall, of 
course, was the Prime Minister Winston Churchill (who was also Minister of 
Defence) with his assumed power of veto.  This process provided opportunities for 
other departments of government to have an input into target selection and, 
perhaps, applied an extra, unwelcome pressure on the Air Staff.  The final 
responsibility for target selection to comply with the bombing policy rested with the 
Targets Committee.  It was first established in the Directorate of Plans in the Air 
Ministry, but was later moved to the Directorate of Bomber Operations where the 
meetings were chaired by the Director ─ firstly Air Commodore John Baker, then 
from March 1943 by Air Commodore Sydney Bufton.   Representatives from the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), War Office, and the Admiralty, were also 
part of the Targets Committee.  
The MEW as an independent body under the control of a Cabinet Minister 
was first established on 4 March 1938.  It was an extension of the intelligence 
gathering agency, the Industrial Intelligence Committee, formed in 1929.  In order 
that air action against economic targets was most effectively employed, it had 
been agreed that it was essential that it was closely related to other forms of 
economic warfare such as blockade. The MEW was charged with keeping  
 
a close watch on the enemy’s supply position, and, acting on its 
information as to the distribution of enemy industry, centres of 
storage and sources of supply, and as to the key points of his 
transport system, will be responsible for advising the Air Ministry as 
to the selection of suitable economic targets.2 
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Perhaps the agency with the greatest influence on both target selection and 
bombing policy was the Objectives Department of the MEW.  As the war 
progressed, however, it became increasingly noticeable that the views expressed 
by the Objectives Department were frequently opposed by the Intelligence 
Department.  These differences were exemplified in the winter of 1943/44 when, 
with the MEW pressing for attacks on the German ball bearing industry, the 
Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence), Air Vice-Marshal Inglis, was calling for a 
series of attacks on Berlin. 
Another agency with considerable influence in target selection was 
Research and Experiments 8 (RE 8), a branch of the Ministry of Home Security. 
First established to measure the success of the bomber offensive against German 
industry by means of photographic interpretation, it had been initially set up 
outside Air Ministry jurisdiction but its responsibilities had multiplied.  Because no 
pre-war research had been completed on the effect of different types and weights 
of bombs on various structures, and there was now considerable evidence 
available in Britain following the German Blitz of 1940-41, RE 8 was called upon to 
advise on the possible effects to be obtained from a bombing offensive against 
German cities.  RE 8’s responsibilities included the assessment of the relative 
values of incendiary versus high explosive bombs in creating destruction, the 
effects that could be expected on particular building structures from the wide range 
of weapons available to Bomber Command, and to suggest ways in which German 
fire and rescue organisations could be inhibited by the bombing tactics and 
weapons employed.  Increasingly, RE 8 had to call upon the MEW for economic 
intelligence and, early in 1944, it was placed directly under the control of the 
Directorate of Bomber Operations. 
Occupying a place above these agencies was the Joint Intelligence Sub-
Committee (JIC), an advisory body to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.  The JIC was 
made up of the intelligence heads of the three Services and the MEW.  Its function 
was to advise the Chiefs of Staff, on a united basis, of their solution to the 
problems referred to them for consideration.3     
Targeting, of course, was a perennial anxiety throughout the war.  Basically, 
it was a matter of too many targets and too few resources, with European weather 
all too often the arbiter.  In the selection of the target the problem required the 
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balancing of three elements: the definition of the strategic intention or the tactical 
requirement; the necessity of accurate economic intelligence; and finally, whether 
the nominated force possessed the operational ability, numbers, weapons, and 
equipment, for the delegated task.  
Bomber Command’s activities during the war were controlled by means of 
Bombing Directives. Their purpose was to provide the priority order in which the 
Air Staff wished particular targets or target systems to be attacked.  They were 
issued to the AOC Bomber Command firstly over the signature of the Director of 
Plans and later that normally of a Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, both on behalf of 
the Chief of the Air Staff. Amplifications or modifications to the general directive 
were normally provided either by follow-up signals or letters.  Although executive 
orders, these Bombing Directives were rarely precise and all too often appeared 
more as statements of general policy. The vague wording was often to become a 
source of friction at the highest level.  When implementing these instructions the 
AOC Bomber Command had authority to interpret them as best he was able in the 
prevailing weather and tactical situation. 
The effective distribution of Directives took a long time to organise.  As late 
as November 1941 concern was being expressed in the Directorate of Bomber 
Operations that the content of these Directives often remained unknown to both 
Station Commanders and crews detailed to carry out the operations who remained 
unaware of the official war plan current at that time.  The necessity for secrecy 
was noted but it was felt that if the bombing policy were to be effectively carried 
out then at least aircraft captains and their navigators should be given greater 
details.  Nor was it only the rank and file who operated in ignorance.  The poor 
distribution went even further.  In November 1941, Air Vice-Marshal Slessor, Air 
Officer Commanding 5 Group since 12 May of that year, informed Group Captain 
Ellwood, Deputy Director of Bomber Operations, that he remained unaware of the 
contents of the Transportation Directive issued to Bomber Command on 9 July 
1941. He also informed Ellwood that he had yet to see a paper, written on 29 
September,  relating to the value of incendiary attacks on area targets.4  
Situations changed rapidly in 1940, and in that year Bomber Command 
received no fewer than twelve Directives, some only six days apart.  Even so, one 
pattern that can be recognised in these Directives is that the Air Ministry early 
identified one target which they believed would bring the German war machine to 
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a halt if it could be destroyed.  That target was oil.  It was the first priority target in 
four of the Directives in 1940 and mentioned in most of the others; it disappeared 
early in 1941 but reappeared much later in the offensive.  Oil was a weak link in 
the German economy in 1940, despite the large quantities captured in France, but 
Bomber Command lacked the ability to reduce German supply.   By 1941, with 
increasing importations from Romania together with expanded synthetic 
production, immediate German oil problems had eased.  Bomber Command’s 
attack on oil in 1940 and 1941 thus had virtually no effect on German war capacity 
and only amounted to annoying pinpricks.   
In selecting oil as the primary target in 1940, Bomber Command made two 
major miscalculations. Firstly, it lacked the capability to inflict significant damage at 
night on small precision targets.  The second error, closely related to the first, was 
that it had been assumed that average night bombing errors in moonlight would be 
300 yards, the same as the average day.  During pre-war night bombing practices 
crews used well lit targets in known and familiar areas and flights were conducted 
at low or medium levels and only in good weather.  On 30 November 1938, shortly 
after the Munich crisis, planning officers met to consider certain tactical 
assumptions necessary in the production of achievable bombing plans. The 
accepted average error for high level bombing by day was 300 yards.  Presumably 
this had been the average determined from many observed and measured 
practices carried out by day on bombing ranges in the United Kingdom.  
 At this same meeting it was further agreed that a standard average error 
for night bombing, although required, could not be ascertained.  The problem was 
that peace-time regulations had prohibited practice bombing of unlit targets at 
night and there were consequently no figures available to determine average night 
bombing errors.   Nevertheless, after the outbreak of war but prior to the launching 
of the first bombing offensive, without the introduction of any new bombing device 
or further fresh evidence, 300 yards was accepted as a credible figure for average 
night bombing errors in moonlight conditions.  This, of course, was a surprising,   
critical, but mistaken decision.  Had a larger average night bombing error been 
accepted then it would have become clear that Bomber Command lacked the 
capability, certainly to the end of 1941, to apply the weight of attack necessary to 
destroy small precision targets such as oil facilities. 5 
 57
The formulation of well thought-out doctrines and planned strategies is an 
essential requirement for military campaigns.  Yet both are nothing unless the 
means to implement them exist.  A gross error was made in selecting 300 yards as 
the average error for night bombing operations in moonlight.  Another, equally 
gross, was a failure to appreciate that bomber crews in the Royal Air Force in 
1940 and 1941, inadequately equipped, were incapable of navigating their aircraft 
at night, in bad weather and under wartime conditions to a blacked-out target 
somewhere deep in Germany.   The navigational failures revealed early in the war 
were the direct result of twenty years of neglect by what had been a pilot oriented 
air force.  It was a lesson that should have been learned earlier.  One glaring 
example of the lack of navigational ability had been revealed during training for 
King George V’s Royal Review held on 6 July 1935.   The Royal Air Force was 
inspected at Mildenhall, Suffolk, in the morning and then the Royal party drove to 
Duxford, Cambridgeshire, for the fly-past in the afternoon.  During practices for the 
fly past it had been revealed that some bomber crews could not accurately 
navigate the twenty-five miles that separated the two military aerodromes.  To 
assist crews to make the journey safely and accurately, smudge fires were lit at 
intervals on the route.  Unfortunately, farmers were burning off crops at that time of 
the year and their fires caused confusion.  A light beacon was then installed at 
Duxford and the fly-past proceeded according to plan. 
Navigation, at least until 1937, had been the responsibility of pilots.  The 
importance of accurate navigation had long been appreciated but little had been 
done either to train navigators or to provide the tools and the appropriate space for 
that crew member to successfully carry out his task.  Few long-range night 
navigation exercises were ever carried out and thus, when Bomber Command was 
forced into the night role, it was, with regard to navigation experience and ability,  
seriously deficient.  Some thought had been given to actual bombing at night but 
very little as to how the aircraft could be brought to the target area and nothing as 
to how the actual target would then be located and identified.   
Bomber aircraft in 1939 were equipped with direct reading compasses, 
thermometers, altimeters and airspeed indicators as aids to navigation. The crew 
member responsible for the aircraft’s navigation was provided with maps and 
charts, sextant and sight reduction tables, together with wireless frequencies to 
obtain bearings from known and identified transmitting stations. The sextant and 
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sight reduction tables were very little used because few had experience of using a 
sextant in the air and even fewer had the ability to use the tables to obtain a 
position line from the sextant measurement.  Confidence in the use of 
astronomical observations is only achieved through frequent and regular practice.  
But with the weather frequently experienced over Europe, especially when flying at 
low or medium altitudes, there are few opportunities to sight the stars to obtain 
altitude readings and thus gain confidence.  Cloud, for bomber navigators, was an 
almost permanent problem.  There was also the problem that obtaining a useful 
sextant reading required the aircraft to be flown accurately and steadily for one or 
two minutes while the sighting was taken.  Under war conditions few crews 
enjoyed that experience.   
As for the accuracy of wireless bearings, that was limited by possible night 
effect or coastal refraction and corrections to readings were not able to be 
assessed.  Enemy interference, successfully carried out by British scientists 
against German radio beams, so-called ‘meaconing,’ was another worrying 
possibility. 
Observers, as the navigators were called early in the war, were thus left 
relying on ‘dead reckoning’ (DR).  This required keeping a record by employment 
of vectors of the headings flown for the particular period of time at the calculated 
true airspeed or airspeeds.  With frequent turns being made, the airspeed rising 
and falling, and variations of altitude plus possible compass inaccuracies, the plot 
was not likely to be very accurate.  Indeed, given the best of conditions and the 
best and most accurate of pilots and navigators, the expected errors of DR 
navigation were thirty nautical miles per hour flown.  Then, if the crew were able to 
identify a pinpoint, by joining the air position (the position the aircraft would have 
been in still air conditions) to the identified and plotted pinpoint, a wind velocity 
could be determined for the period that the airplot had been running.  Errors in the 
found wind meant that there would be errors in bombing.  If no pinpoints were 
obtainable due to weather, crews flew on DR and then in the final instant bombed 
on their estimated time of arrival (ETA).  Inaccurate navigation always meant poor 
bombing results.  Bombing on ETA was an extreme last resort. 
At the outbreak of war the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bomber 
Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, was well aware of the 
deficiencies of his Command.  He had available for operations twenty-five 
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squadrons totalling 352 aircraft and not even this small number had fully 
operationally trained crews.6  His aircraft not only lacked effective armament but 
also bombing and navigational equipment, so his Command was in no position to  
launch the all-out bombing offensive on which war doctrine had been based.  Such 
an offensive risked heavy losses – losses which he knew his Command could ill-
sustain. 
His awareness of the limited navigational skills possessed by his crews 
caused Ludlow-Hewitt, even at that early stage, to consider the possibility of night 
training flights over Germany dropping propaganda leaflets.  He was also aware 
that Bomber Command had a large number of medium bombers in the force and 
he believed that their best employment would be in an Army support role when 
ground operations finally began.  In seeking some action for his force perhaps he 
was simply trying to avoid the Clausewitzian concept of unemployed forces being 
“quite neutralized.”7   Nonetheless his assessments were realistic and clear-
sighted.  Conservation, of necessity, became his watchword. 
Ludlow-Hewitt, knowledgeable and fearless in presenting the situation as he 
saw it, made no attempt to keep the poor state of Bomber Command from his 
superiors in the Air Ministry.  His Annual Report on Bomber Command in 19378 
and Readiness for War Report in 19399 were both couched in terms that brooked 
no misunderstanding.  Bomber Command, he admitted, was operationally 
inefficient and in no position to launch offensive air operations.  Considerations of 
independent air power and knock-out blows should have been swept aside by his 
revelations but the CAS, Sir Cyril Newall, received the reports with some 
scepticism.  The faults, he chose to believe, lay with the messenger and not with 
Bomber Command.  
In 1938 Ludlow-Hewitt, well aware of Bomber Command’s deficiencies, had 
rejected WA 1, the Air Staff’s plan for the attack on the German Air Striking Force 
and its maintenance organisation, and targets in the German aircraft industry.  He 
deemed the defensive plan “wasteful and ineffective.”  Somewhat incongruously, 
however, regarding WA 5, the plan for the attack on the industrial Ruhr, he 
declared that he was “much impressed with the high importance of this plan as a 
practicable operation.”10   He selected forty-five power plants for attack as being a 
feasible war operation, estimating that their destruction could be accomplished in 
one month, using 300 aircraft flying 3,000 sorties, with the possible loss of 176 
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aircraft.11   Such a campaign would have been an all or nothing venture.  Either 
German industry would have been crippled or Bomber Command would have 
been annihilated.  
But Ludlow-Hewitt was more than the messenger: he was one of the few in 
possession of the facts.  At least one of his Group commanders was also worried.  
Late in August 1939, Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham, AOC 4 Group, in a letter 
to Air Commodore Norman Bottomley, SASO Bomber Command, also expressed 
his concern.   His letter was not one that would have inspired confidence.  His 
Group, he cautioned, could only provide “60 trained aircrew and 70 serviceable 
aircraft.”12 
The long-held belief that Bomber Command could operate successfully by 
day, employing self-defending formations, was quickly shattered.  Attacks by 
Bristol Blenheims on German naval units at Wilhelmshaven on 4 September 1939 
showed that German anti-aircraft fire was not to be underestimated.  Five 
Blenheims were shot down.  On 14 December 1939 the loss of six Wellingtons, 
from a formation of twelve on reconnaissance, was a warning that bomber 
formations were unable to provide effective defences against fast, heavily armed, 
German fighter aircraft.  Finally, only four days later, 9 Squadron, based at 
Honington and only officially operational on Wellingtons since June 1939, sent 
nine aircraft in a formation of twenty-two on a reconnaissance of Wilhelmshaven.  
The formation was intercepted by single and twin-engined German fighters and 
ten Wellingtons were shot down including five from 9 Squadron.  A total of fifty-
nine  aircrew were killed and five became prisoners of war.13  German Freya radar 
was more sophisticated (although lacking a height-finding facility) than the British 
authorities had appreciated. The Wellingtons had been detected at sixty miles 
range so the Bf109s and 110s had no trouble carrying out an interception.  
It was clearly time for a change of tactics.  Confidence in the self-defending 
ability of bomber formations, though seriously eroded, was not completely 
discarded, but restrictions were placed on day operations.  The lesson was that 
fighters with superior speed and greater fire power were, at this time, more than a 
match for British bombers by day, and particularly those unfortunate enough to still 
not be equipped with self-sealing petrol tanks.  Some blame was laid by Ludlow-
Hewitt on the crews for poor formation flying but by January 1940 he was advising 
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Air Staff that any alternative plans held for attacks on Ruhr targets were in urgent 
need of reassessment.14
But by 1940 other views held by Ludlow-Hewitt’s had also changed.  He 
now fully appreciated the limitations of his bomber forces.  Firstly, his Blenheims 
and Battles lacked the range to bomb the Ruhr from England without over-flying 
the Low Countries. Secondly, daylight attacks on Ruhr targets by his heavy 
bombers (Wellingtons, Whitleys and Hampdens) were ruled out because they 
required  significant penetration of German territory.  All that remained for 
offensive operations were night attacks at high level by inexperienced crews in 
aircraft which were still only equipped with the course-setting bombsight developed 
at the end of the First World War.  Conservation thus became the guiding principle 
and bombing of German targets, it was agreed, would have to be done at night, 
despite Bomber Command’s lack of preparedness and dearth of navigational aids.   
Faute de mieux, on the night of 19/20 March 1940 the first trial night 
bombing attack was carried out on a German seaplane base at Hornum on the 
island of Sylt. In moonlight conditions fifty aircraft took part and a significant 
number of crews claimed to have attacked the assigned target.  They reported that 
the target had been readily visible and that fires were created in hangars and 
barrack accommodation.  Although photographic evidence obtained on 6 April 
showed no signs of damage to the base, this was simply taken to mean that either 
the damage had been repaired or was at least hidden from prying aerial cameras.  
Such ill-advised optimism boded well for the assumed success of a night bombing 
offensive.  Unfortunately, it also provided misleading support for Air Vice-Marshal 
Coningham’s contention, expressed in February 1940, that the “accuracy of night 
bombing will differ little from daylight bombing.”15   Not until eighteen months later 
was the inaccuracy of night bombing finally revealed by the Butt Report. 
On 1 April 1940 Air Chief Marshal Portal (about to replace Ludlow-Hewitt as 
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command) received a new Directive 
from Air Commodore Slessor.  As a consequence of the German invasion of 
Scandinavia, air plans were reviewed.  Two situations were considered.  Firstly, 
should the Germans not invade the Low Countries but authority be given for 
unrestricted air warfare to commence and, secondly, should Germany invade 
Belgium and Holland.  In the first case, WA 8, the plan to attempt to dislocate 
German industry by means of night attacks, was to be launched.  Oil targets were 
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the first priority followed by electricity plants and self illuminating targets.  In the 
second situation, a German invasion of Holland and Belgium, vital German 
targets, particularly in the Ruhr, were to be attacked.  The aim was to disrupt troop 
concentrations, interfere with communications in the Ruhr, and destroy oil targets.   
Portal was advised that a sustained operation might be required but neither plan 
was to be put into effect without an executive order from the Air Ministry.16
During the overrunning of Norway, possible targets for the heavy bombers 
of Bomber Command were restricted to German aerodromes and shipping on 
supply routes to Norway as far north as Narvik.  The major problems were weather 
and the lack of range of the bombers employed and little of consequence was 
achieved.  It was fortunate that a tight rein had been kept on the bomber forces 
since the debacle of December 1939, because on 10 May 1940 Germany began 
her major campaign in the West. 
Although the Air Staff believed that considerable value, from a strategic 
point of view, would be obtained from an assault on industrial targets in the Ruhr, 
they had long been thwarted.  French opposition was aroused by the fears of 
German retaliation and their belief that all bomber forces should be held in reserve 
to be committed for Army support as and when required.  Nor had War Cabinet 
approval been obtained for attacks which created danger for German civilians.  On 
23 April 1940 France had reluctantly agreed that, should Germany invade the Low 
Countries, targets in the Ruhr could be attacked, particularly oil plants and railway 
marshalling yards but the War Cabinet remained inflexible.  Thus the Air Staff plan 
to seize the initiative was forestalled.  Instead, for almost one week after 
Germany’s Blitzkrieg began in the west on 10 May 1940 the heavy and medium 
bombers of Bomber Command were employed in Army support requirements 
attempting to isolate the battlefield by cutting communications (road and rail) to the 
battle areas. 
Tactical strikes were the first priority for Bomber Command during the battle 
for France and every effort to establish a strategic bombing programme was 
thwarted by immediate operational requirements.  Bomber Command suffered 
grievous losses during the disasters in France, with the medium squadrons 
operating Blenheims and Battles being particularly hard hit.  The loss of 
experienced crews was a severe blow to any plans for expansion of the 
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Command, since such crews would have been employed as instructors in the new 
Operational Training Units (OTUs) about to be established. 
After the fall of France the greatest threat facing the British Isles was that of 
a German invasion.  It was yet another diversion.  A new Directive was issued to 
Bomber Command listing targets in their order of priority.  The Luftwaffe appeared 
to offer the greatest threat so the German aircraft industry was to be the primary 
target.  It was followed by communications, minelaying, oil targets and, finally, 
crops and forests.  The invasion was to be countered by having the entire bomber 
force, prepared at short notice, to attack any invading force preparatory to 
embarkation, at sea, or at the point of attempted landing.  
What was the result for Bomber Command of the frequent diversions?  It 
was that one of the basic principles of war was never applied: that of 
concentration.  One definition is “Concentration is application of purpose and 
energy towards achievement of a single aim.  The maximum effort, moral, physical 
and material, must be concentrated at the critical time and place.”17   Bomber 
Command, at least in the first two years of war, rarely achieved this concentration.  
In fact the force was so small that the concentration required to achieve 
destruction was beyond its capacity.  Apparently this fact was not appreciated by 
the Air Staff, so that the Directive issued on 13 July 1940 was doomed to failure 
from the outset.    This latest Directive called for a greater weight of attack to be 
applied to a smaller number of targets to obtain the hitherto unobtainable 
concentration.  It was replaced eleven days later. 
In 1940 and 1941 bomber tactics were largely determined by individual 
squadron commanders.  Forms Bravo were teletyped by Bomber Command 
Headquarters to squadrons detailed for operations, listing numbers of aircraft 
required, target and alternatives together with bomb loads.  The time on target, 
altitude to fly, route to follow, and take-off times, were all at the discretion of either 
the squadron commander or even individual crews.  Forward looking squadron 
commanders, Wing Commander Bufton of No. 10 (Bomber) Squadron for one, 
attempted to devise tactics to improve bombing performance.  He selected his 
best crew or crews to lead the squadron, with instructions that when the target had 
been located and identified, Verey lights were to be fired, or additional flares 
released, in an effort to attract following crews to the target area.  It was an 
embryonic form of path finding.   Later, the refined Path Finder Force plan which 
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Bufton and staff prepared, believing it was essential for improving Bomber 
Command’s performance, would bring him and his Directorate into direct conflict 
with the AOC-in-C, Bomber Command, Harris. 
Bufton early realised that the illuminating flares available to Bomber 
Command were totally inefficient.  They operated after falling a set distance below 
the aircraft and were not shielded.  Thus, if that distance was 4,000 feet, then a 
flare released at 12,000 feet would ignite at 8,000 feet.  Had the release height 
been 5,000 feet ignition would have occurred at 1,000 feet.  What was required 
was a barometrically operated flare operating at the required height above the 
ground.  It was also essential that flares be hooded to prevent significant ground 
haze and smog (as in the Ruhr) reflecting flare illumination upward rather than 
revealing potential ground targets.   It was just another of the many problems 
calling for urgent attention.   
The problems of navigation were also early recognised by Bufton and until 
they were solved he realised precision bombing was impossible.  He well 
appreciated the futility of nominating an individual building in a large city as the 
target when he knew that many crews could not even find the city.  Bufton 
therefore accepted that in the interim, area bombing offered the only prospects for 
limited success.   Later, when serving as the Deputy Director of Bomber 
Operations, with Gee entering general service use in March 1942, he held high 
hopes that ultimately Bomber Command would possibly be able to begin precision 
attacks on specific targets.  Again, it was going to be a long struggle because, 
even with the additional employment of Oboe and H2S, Harris was reluctant to 
accept that his force was capable of precision bombing.    
Portal well understood the difficulties created by the new Directive issued 
on 13 July 1940, and he prepared a detailed criticism.  Firstly, he reminded the Air 
Staff that even in moonlight many of the listed targets would not be located by 
even average crews.  In addition, many of the targets were so isolated that near 
misses would create no residual damage.  Portal had for some time been a 
supporter of the calls for an area bombing programme.  His submission was 
rejected by the Air Staff because they still laboured under the misapprehension 
that large objectives would be readily identified in moonlight.  Residual damage, 
they conceded, had not been considered.  Material damage was the aim.18   Did 
they believe that all bombs released found the target? 
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On the first anniversary of the outbreak of war Churchill issued a 
memorandum to the War Cabinet giving his views on the war situation.  “The Navy 
can lose us the war” he warned, 
  
but only the Air Force can win it. Therefore our supreme effort must 
be to obtain overwhelming mastery in the Air. The Fighters are our 
salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory. We 
must . . . pulverise the entire industry and scientific structure on 
which the war effort and economic life of the enemy depends.19
 
Political pressure was growing, probably under the influence of public 
opinion, for Bomber Command to make retaliatory attacks on German towns and 
cities as a response to German raids on London and other cities.  Churchill made 
the suggestion directly to Portal.  He was advised, in response, that British 
bombing was successful, and was more effective than the German, because the 
bombs were aimed at specific targets the destruction of which was reducing 
German war-making capacity.  It was the Air Staff’s belief that widespread,  
sporadic attacks, were producing material damage and even some reduction of 
enemy morale.  Harsh lessons would soon be learned. 
By October 1940 some experience had been gained by Bomber Command 
of the limitations of the strategic bombing offensive.  Weather had been a major 
problem, icing particularly so, for aircraft, instruments and even the crews 
themselves.  Aircraft were inefficiently heated so while a crew member near the 
hot air outflow perspired the others froze.  Weather also severely complicated 
matters for the observers because cloud often prevented pinpoints from being 
obtained and, in the target area, frequently obscured the aiming point.  Target 
identification was made difficult and unforecast wind changes further complicated 
the observers’ tasks.  Weather also caused problems for returning bombers, with 
fog the primary cause of many crashes. Early in the war, although bomber bases 
may have been equipped with primitive instrument approach systems, crews were 
too often expected to operate in conditions beyond their capabilities and 
experience.   
The second winter of war was also notable for the lack of expansion in the 
bomber force.  There were several reasons.  One was a lack of aircrew.  Many 
crews with hard-won experience were taken off operations to staff the OTUs being 
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established as part of the expansion and training programmes.  There was also a 
failure of the ferry pilot organisation.  Bomber crews were called upon to ferry their 
own aircraft replacements. With some factories and servicing units being based in 
Ireland or northern Scotland this meant that crews could be absent as long as a 
fortnight should weather intervene.  The failure to expand was also a consequence 
of the continual demands from the Middle East for bomber reinforcements.  
Between 31 August 1940 and the end of February 1941 3 Group transferred 
ninety-six Wellingtons and crews to the Middle East.20
Early in October 1940 Portal became CAS and his place at Bomber 
Command Headquarters was taken by Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse.  The first 
Directive Peirse received, on 30 October 1940, called for the resumption of attacks 
on German oil targets.  But there was a double aim in that attacks were to be 
concentrated in an effort to create both material and morale damage.  This 
Directive marked the beginning of the area bombing campaign. 
Diversions for Bomber Command were never far away, however, and in 
November 1940 one was the threats posed by heavy enemy warships being 
prepared in French harbours, and by the Admiral Scheer roaming free in the North 
Atlantic.  Another, in December, was the increasing threat posed by German U-
boats operating in the Western Approaches.  The critical struggle in the Atlantic 
was to require the attention of Bomber Command on many occasions during the 
period from December 1940 to May 1941 and later.  It would also involve much 
wasted effort on attacks directed at concrete-protected U-boat bases on the 
Atlantic seaboard in occupied France. 
In January 1941 Peirse was advised by the Vice Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, that Germany’s oil position was expected to become 
critical by Spring of 1941 provided the scale of attacks could be maintained.  From 
then on, unless the scale of attacks was increased, Germany’s oil position was 
expected to improve.  Any disruption to Romanian supplies would be a bonus but 
the destruction of the German synthetic oil plants, it was argued, would be 
sufficient to bring about a crisis.  Should weather conditions prevent attacks on the 
seventeen oil installations identified, then Bomber Command was to continue the 
offensive by attacking industrial towns and communications, particularly those 
connected with the oil industry.21    
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  Many attacks were carried out against oil targets in the first twenty months 
of war and pilots reported fires, explosions, and falling chimneys, all indicative of 
massive destruction.  To support these claims analysts in England had little direct 
evidence.  There were meagre intelligence reports from Germany, possibly 
exaggerated, but very few reconnaissance photographs.  Oil samples, taken from 
German aircraft shot down over England, were also analysed in an effort to 
determine if the Germans were being forced to use synthetic products.  
Comparisons were also made with similar German attacks on British oil 
installations as one way of determining results.  Although intelligence gathered 
directly from enemy sources via Signal Intelligence (Sigint) in 1940 and 1941 
provided valuable tactical information concerning the German Air Force’s 
deployment, strength, and order of battle, there was little of strategic importance 
for either target planning or raid damage assessment.  The Luftwaffe used 
wireless telegraphy (W/T) sparingly at this time so there was little Enigma traffic to 
intercept.22   
An even more fallible assessment was estimating the possible results from 
the total weight of bombs released in relation to the size and type of target.  D. A. 
C. Dewdney, recruited by Bomber Command to act as oil adviser, provided his first 
report in September 1940.  He was one who, lacking photographs, favoured 
assessing results from the weight of bombs released.  At this stage he evinced 
little trust in what the camera may have shown.  It was his opinion that “However 
little damage appears in a photograph, an objective must have suffered damage in 
proportion to the weight of bombs dropped over it.”23
Dewdney’s hypothesis was rudely rebutted on 24 December 1940, when a 
reconnaissance aircraft returned with good photographs of the two oil plants at 
Gelsenkirchen.24   These targets had been frequently and supposedly heavily 
bombed and pilot reports indicated that severe damage had been inflicted.  The 
photographs, however, showed that both plants were working and that they 
appeared undamaged.  This discovery sent shock waves not only through the Air 
Ministry but also to higher levels – the Chiefs of Staff and War Cabinet.  The oil 
plan had, in fact, suffered a serious and long-lasting set back.  The perception that 
night precision bombing was impossible with the equipment then available was 
slowly being realised.  Bomber Command was not the rapier that so many had 
believed it to be.  It was rather a bludgeon.  This being so, more power was 
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required to deliver the blows than had previously been necessary for sharp rapier 
thrusts. 
In March 1941 Churchill intervened.  The Battle of the Atlantic had reached 
a critical stage and he ruled that for the next four months the bombing offensive 
had to be directed against U-boats and long-range aircraft.  Priority was to be 
given to those targets in Germany situated in congested areas so that the greatest 
morale effect could also be obtained.25   Although this campaign was aimed at 
easing problems in the Battle of the Atlantic, when weather intervened an 
increasing number of area attacks were carried out against German towns 
including Berlin.  General areas rather than specific points became the target. 
On 9 July 1941 the requirements were spelled again out for Bomber 
Command.  Their new Directive defined the weak points in the German political, 
economic and military situation as being the morale of the civil population and their 
inland transportation system.  Before this campaign was fully underway, urged by 
Lord Cherwell,26  D. M. B. Butt from the War Cabinet Secretariat undertook a study 
of 600 night bombing photographs taken in June and July 1941.  His report to 
Bomber Command on 18 August 1941 was a devastating blow.  Only one in five of 
the bombers sent on an operation was ever within five miles of the target, while of 
those claiming to have attacked the target, only one in three got within five miles.27  
The expression ‘within five miles’ of course means somewhere within an area of 
75 square miles surrounding the target.  It must also be noted that these were 
average figures.  Against difficult targets, in bad weather conditions, in the 
industrial haze in the Ruhr, or when there was no moon, the figures for aircraft 
within five miles of the target could fall as low as one in fifteen.  
It was a very bitter pill to swallow, and Peirse’s reaction confirms human  
reluctance to accept information which undermines long-held beliefs. He 
commented: “I don’t think at this rate we could have hoped to produce the damage 
which is known to have been achieved.”28   The AOC 4 Group, Air Vice-Marshal 
Carr, responded similarly, noting that because an aircraft failed to produce a 
photograph it did not necessarily mean that the target had not been attacked.29
With bombing cameras yielding such valuable information, why had the 
truth been hidden for so long?  Firstly, their value had been under-estimated and 
calls for them to be installed had been ignored.  There was also a degree of 
aircrew resistance, some regarding them as checks on their ability.  The belief that 
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failure to obtain an aiming point photograph might mean that the operation would 
not count towards their operational tour was also a vast disincentive for crews 
detailed to fly with fitted cameras.30   Finally, camera production was slow.  On 13 
January 1941 the establishment for night cameras was four per squadron.  With 
forty-two squadrons in the first-line that required 168 cameras: only twenty-two 
were available.  Supplies had improved fractionally by 25 April 1941 when 165 
night cameras were on issue, fifteen belonging to OTUs.  The establishment, 
however, had now increased to 693 cameras.   
One factor which seriously delayed the fitting of cameras in bomber aircraft 
was that neither the Air Ministry nor Bomber Command itself could reach final 
agreement on the main object of night photography.  The argument centred on 
whether it was to provide damage evidence, or simply to record the aircraft’s 
position at the time of bomb release.  In 1942 a camera to determine target 
damage was still under development but the simplified version, already in 
production, was available to meet the latter requirement.  On 31 August 1941, 
thanks no doubt to the Butt Report, Bomber Command agreed to accept all the 
simplified cameras that could be provided.31   But it was not until 19 September 
1941 that Bomber Command spelled out to all Group Commanders that cameras 
were installed to confirm the bomber’s position at bomb release time, to pinpoint 
fires, and provide general information.   Staff  were reminded that cameras were 
not installed for raid damage assessment purposes.32
The Butt Report finally convinced Portal, as CAS, that the bludgeon would 
have to be employed. To that end he set two wheels in motion. To assist those 
responsible for navigation, he called for a speed up in the research and 
development of improved navigational aids.  Some were in the pipeline but 
development had been slow. Late in September 1941 he prepared a paper for 
Churchill calling for Bomber Command to receive a greater proportion of the 
national war effort and aim for a force of 4,000 bombers.  With such a number he 
claimed that “decisive results against German morale” could be achieved after a 
six months’ offensive.33
Churchill, apparently wearing his anti-air force hat (which he donned and 
doffed frequently during the war), responded brusquely.  He reminded Portal that 
Bomber Command had promised much but had achieved little.  The bombing 
effects, he protested, “both physical and moral, are greatly exaggerated . . . . The 
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most we can say is that it will be a heavy and, I trust, a seriously increasing 
annoyance.”34 
This sharp response, written on 27 September 1941, illustrates Churchill’s 
contradictory relations with the Royal Air Force, for on 7 September 1941 he had 
written to the Lord President of the Council, Sir John Anderson, expressing his 
concern at the slow-down in heavy and medium bomber production.  The ultimate 
aim was 4,000 medium and heavy bombers.  This force required the construction 
of 22,000 aircraft between July 1941 and July 1943 with 5,000 expected from 
American sources.  The expected shortfall in British production was 5,500.  “If we 
are to win the war’ he cautioned, ‘we cannot accept this position.”35   Anderson 
was given a fortnight to provide a preliminary proposal and advised that Churchill 
would be watching over the progress of the scheme. 
As the third winter of the war approached, concern was growing at the 
increasing number of bomber losses.  In August 1941 525 aircraft were struck off 
charge, only 225 of which were battle casualties.36  Crew inexperience, 
improvement in the German defences and severe weather conditions were 
exacting a heavy toll.  In the same month, British bomber production was only 331.  
Planned expansion was becoming contraction. Tentative efforts were made to try 
to achieve greater concentration during raids in the hope that the defences would 
be overwhelmed but crew inexperience meant that concentration was rarely 
achieved. 
On the night of 7/8 November 1941 Peirse launched 400 bombers against 
targets in Berlin, Mannheim, Cologne and Essen.  It was a difficult night and thirty-
seven failed to return.  Weather was the main problem, with extensive icing, 
compounded by crew inexperience, causing many aircraft to run short of fuel.   
Peirse’s initial explanation to Portal was that the meteorologists had failed to warn 
him of the hazardous weather conditions which his largely inexperienced crews 
had encountered that night thus, it was simply the fortune of war.  Churchill, on 
learning of the heavy losses, and apparently angered by what he viewed “as a 
false emphasis on air policy” minuted Portal and Sinclair on 11 November: 
 
I have several times in Cabinet deprecated forcing the night 
bombing of Germany without due regard to weather conditions.  
There is no point at this particular time in bombing Berlin.  The 
losses sustained last week were more grievous.   We cannot afford 
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losses on that scale in view of the short fall of the American bomber 
programme . . . there is no need to fight the weather and the enemy 
at the same time.37 
 
Portal, no doubt disturbed by both Churchill’s minute and the heavy losses 
experienced, had Bottomley issue a new Directive to Peirse on 13 November 
emphasising the need to conserve the bomber forces with the view to resuming 
heavy attacks in the spring of 1942.   This Directive was, in effect, an admission 
that the bombing programme that Bomber Command had been following was 
being made at too high a cost.  As Webster and Frankland made clear: 
 
At one time 1941 had been looked to as the year in which bomber 
Command would become a weapon of war-winning power.  Now 
the hope was transferred to 1943, and in the meantime it had been 
rudely frustrated and the Government’s confidence in strategic 
bombing had been seriously undermined.38 
 
 Peirse was also reminded that his limited bomber forces were not to be 
exposed to hazardous weather conditions.  At the same time Portal also began 
enquiring into meteorological briefing provided for Peirse on which he launched the 
attacks on the night of 7/8 November.  By 23 November he had been made aware 
that thunderstorms, hail and icing had all been forecast, contrary to Peirse’s report, 
and that 5 Group (under Slessor) had in fact been allowed to withdraw its aircraft 
from the long-range Berlin attack, because of  the forecast  weather, and had been 
sent instead to Cologne and suffered no losses.  
Peirse’s revised report, issued on 2 December, repeated his claim 
regarding what he considered to have been an inadequate weather forecast and 
also lamented the inexperience of his bomber crews.  Freeman, the VCAS, 
denounced Peirse’s revised report and, rather unfairly, blamed him for the 
inexperience of his crews calling it a “damning admission.”39   All the reports were 
in Churchill’s hands by 4 January 1942 so Peirse’s days as AOC-in-C, Bomber 
Command, were numbered.  An AOC, having been associated with failure, 
whether or not it was his fault, is rarely permitted to benefit from the policy 
changes made as a result of the original failure.  On 8 January 1942 Peirse was 
posted as Commander-in-Chief of the allied air forces in the American, British, 
Dutch and Australian Command. 
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The year 1941 had been a momentous one for Britain, Churchill, and the 
armed forces.  Defeats had been suffered in Greece and Crete and the battle in 
North Africa had ebbed and flowed.  In the Atlantic, the U-boats continued their 
ravages, while in the air war Bomber Command had been found wanting.  As a 
counter-weight, Germany was now heavily engaged in Russia with the winter 
approaching, and Japan had brought the United States into the war with her attack 
on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941.  This latter event had two profound effects 
for Britain.  There were now Pacific concerns to consider and it also meant that the 
supplies of aircraft expected from American factories would cease as that country 
attempted to fulfil its own shortages.   
But it was not all doom and gloom.  A navigational aid, Gee, was about to 
appear; the possibilities of incendiary attacks were to be investigated; training 
facilities were to be extended; bombers were to become one-pilot aircraft, thereby 
reducing training commitments; heavy bombers were now appearing in larger 
numbers, and the new year promised improved weather.  On 14 February 1942 a 
new Directive was issued in which conservation measures were modified and 
Bomber Command was told that it could now operate without restriction until 
further notice.  Their target was clearly and unambiguously defined in the new 
Directive as the “morale of the enemy civil population and in particular, of the 
industrial workers.”40   To further this goal, concentrated incendiary attacks were 
suggested.  When the Directive was received Air Marshal John Baldwin was 
standing in as AOC-in-C, Bomber Command, but one week later he was replaced 
by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris.  The change in personnel was to prove as 
momentous as that in bombing policy. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Incendiaries versus High Explosive Bombs 
 
Air Vice-Marshal Harris took up his position as AOC-in-C, Bomber 
Command in February 1942 having spent the earlier war years in a variety of 
appointments.  At the outbreak of war he was on sick leave in England, without 
either a job or a settled home, as he had recently been repatriated from Palestine, 
on medical grounds, suffering from a duodenal ulcer.  Knowing that Portal, an old 
friend, was then serving as Air Member for Personnel, and employing the ‘old boy’ 
network, Harris let it be known that he was seeking a position in Bomber 
Command.   On 11 September 1939 he was appointed AOC, No 5 Group Bomber 
Command, equipped with the inadequate, twin-engined Handley Page Hampden.  
As a disciple of Trenchard, Harris undertook his duties with largely preconceived 
notions as to the best employment of the bomber force.   However, the gloves 
were not yet off in the bomber war and Harris’s Hampdens were largely employed 
in the pioneering of aerial mine laying.   
 When Harris assumed command of No. 5 Group on 14 September 1939 
neither his Group nor Bomber Command as a whole was in any position to fight an 
aggressive war.   He was also aware that in many respects his crews were largely 
untrained for most of the tasks they were being ordered to undertake.  Thus, 
despite the shortage of supposedly qualified crews, he was prepared to take 
squadrons off operations in order to complete specialised training.  The attack on 
the Dortmund-Ems canal on the night of 12/13 August 1940 provides a good 
example.  Crews for this attack by Nos. 49 and 83 Squadrons were taken off 
operations in order to practice attacks on similar canals in Lincolnshire.  Later, 
when AOC-in-C Bomber Command, it was No. 5 Group to whom Harris turned 
when seeking resources to be applied to difficult and dangerous tasks.  The 
Möhne Dam raid on 16/17 May 1943 is one example for in this instance, No. 617 
Squadron, newly formed in late March 1943, was given seven weeks’ preparation 
time.  Incongruously, the Path Finder Force was given neither training time, nor 
specially trained crews, when it was established in August 1942.  It appeared on 
Battle Orders the day of its formation although weather did cause a cancellation. 
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 Harris was also well aware in September 1939 that the navigation 
equipment with which his Hampden aircraft were equipped was woefully 
inadequate.  Thus, in November 1940 in a letter to Bottomley, he urged that a 
navigator-operated direction finding loop be installed.  He even suggested that 
German beacons could be used to obtain position lines!  Radio compasses, of 
course, are notoriously unreliable at night and are dramatically susceptible to 
enemy interference but Harris appears to have been unaware of their limitations 
and potential dangers.  In the same letter he was equally sarcastic concerning the 
progress that was being made with regard to Gee.  “I note” he complained, 
 
that the GEE equipment is to have ‘an estimated range of 350 
miles.’  This would be fine for Hinds and Harts when we get it, and 
we must remember to keep some Hinds and Harts to fit it into.  The 
whole business leaves me in a state of complete despair.1  
 
 As Probert admits, what Harris  
 
was not appreciating were the changes now being made possible 
by rapidly advancing technology, a technology with which he was 
unfamiliar.  He would learn soon enough the advantages of GEE 
and the subsequent radar aids to navigators, but his initial reaction 
to its development indicated a degree of mindset that would 
continue to hinder some of his relations with the scientists.2 
 
 In November 1940 Harris was posted to the Air Staff as DCAS responsible 
to Portal for concerns relating to Air Force operations ─ a broad area of 
responsibility.  He did not enjoy his stay in the Air Ministry but neither did many 
with whom he came in contact.  From the first he indicated in no uncertain terms 
that he was not only wary of those purporting to provide advice but also 
questioned their motives and ability.  R V Jones and the German Knickebein 
bombing beams, together with the MEW, were early and unwarranted targets.  
Nevertheless his belief in the war winning capability of the bomber was growing. 
 Harris’s move to the United States of America as Head of the RAF 
Delegation to that country in May 1941 was surely remarkable, bearing in mind 
that it required both tact and diplomacy.  He had rarely provided evidence that he 
possessed either.  Determined, yes, but throughout his Service career he had 
shown that opposition was not to be circumvented but rather swept aside, 
 78
trampled underfoot, or ignored. His term in the USA, as the CAS’s representative 
on the British Joint Staff Mission, was not entirely successful as, even to the 
Americans, he appeared domineering and possessed of an unwarranted 
superiority complex.   During his stay in America, which ended shortly after that 
country was thrust into the Second World War in December 1941, Harris met 
many important military figures including Generals George Marshall, ‘Hap’ Arnold 
and Ira Eaker.   Only time would tell if his often piercing frankness had offended 
his future close allies. 
The first on-going controversy between the Air Staff and the AOC-in-C 
Bomber Command in February 1942, centred on aircraft bomb loads.  Both Group 
Captain Bufton and his superior, Air Commodore Baker, the Director of Bomber 
Operations, had been convinced by experts in the field that incendiary bombs (IB) 
were greater destructive agents than high explosive bombs.  Comparative 
photographs of English and German towns attacked by similar numbers of 
bombers had shown significantly greater damage in English towns than in 
German.  The difference in bomb loads was that the Luftwaffe aircraft carried a 
higher proportion of incendiaries than the RAF.  Incendiarism was thus identified 
as the destructive agent.   
Two additional lessons were learned; either the RAF attacks had been too 
light to saturate the enemy fire-fighting services, or, the attacks were insufficiently 
concentrated.   Although pre-war bombing policy had focussed on the destruction 
of military objectives, the Directive Harris inherited in February 1942 made clear 
that because the attack was to be employed primarily against the morale of the 
industrial workers, a list of selected area targets was provided.  It fitted well with 
the lessons that Harris had learned while AOC No 5 Group more than a year 
earlier. The Directive also called for concentrated incendiary attacks but Harris, 
firm in his belief that it would be necessary to kill a lot of Germans before the war 
was won, was wedded to the notion that high explosive bombs provided the 
answer.  It was to be a marriage that the Air Staff would find difficult to dissolve.   
  Incendiary bombs had been employed by the Germans in the First World 
War for attacks on London.  Zeppelins, in four raids in 1915, created only one 
large fire although more than seventy per cent of the bombs released were 
incendiaries.  Gothas, in 1917, with bomb loads half incendiaries and half high 
explosives, also reported little evidence of large fires resulting from their attacks.  
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British reports of large fires were taken by German authorities as an attempt to 
delude them into believing that incendiaries were useful, destructive weapons.  
Their use by the Germans was thus discontinued, although experiments continued 
in the hope that the incendiary could be developed into a viable, destructive 
weapon.3   Unfortunately, during the inter-war years, the belief that the incendiary 
bomb was an unsatisfactory weapon also persisted with the British authorities.  In 
1936 a committee was established in the United Kingdom to test the effectiveness 
of incendiaries when employed against oil storage tanks.  One trial was held –- in 
April 1939 –- confirming what the authorities already accepted: incendiaries were 
inefficient weapons. 
  With day bombing early ruled out as an option in the Second World War, 
Bomber Command was forced into a night role.  But hopes continued to be held 
that bombing accuracy would be maintained despite the changed conditions.  
Peirse was urged to follow the instructions contained in the Directive dated 30 
October 1940.  The first bombers in a raid were to carry mainly incendiaries to light 
fires in or near the target so that following aircraft would have an identified aiming 
point.4   It was the bombing tactic employed by the Luftwaffe for attacks on British 
targets during their Blitz earlier the same year. On the night of 16/17 December 
1940 Mannheim was the target.  War Cabinet approval had been given on 13 
December for this attack, which was to aim at the centre of the city to create 
maximum damage. Leading aircraft for this attack were flown by experienced 
crews with maximum incendiary loads designed to create an aiming point for the 
others.  Enthusiastic crew reports painted a picture of a successful attack.  Yet 
photographic evidence, obtained on 21 December, showed that the attack had 
been widely dispersed and that most of the fires were outside the target area. 
  Peirse blamed the instructions given to crews to bomb fires, claiming they 
were too rigid.  Crews, he stressed, should have been instructed to first positively 
identify the target and not simply bomb fires.  He was supported by both Bottomley 
and Air Vice-Marshal Coningham, AOC 4 Group.  Coningham, by subscribing to 
the notion of selected crews leading the attack, had taken a first step in the 
direction of some form of a target finding force. It was to be a long journey, but the 
acknowledgement that navigation was inadequate was a vital preliminary.  
 The Butt Report of 18 August 1941 revealed the true state of the air 
offensive as far as Bomber Command was concerned.  Crews were not hitting 
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their targets.  A comparative study was then made of the destruction created in 
German towns with that created in British towns by raids of similar strength.  
British high explosives were believed to be as effective as the German but 
photographic evidence showed that German bombing apparently created greater 
damage.  The major difference was in the Luftwaffe bomb loads: their average 
incendiary load was thirty per cent, rising at times to sixty per cent while Bomber 
Command’s incendiary loads only varied between fifteen and thirty per cent. 
Nonetheless, Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, 
suggested that damage variations were the result of German fire fighting 
organisations being better organised than British.5
  A comprehensive report was then prepared by Air Staff on the value of 
incendiary weapons in attacks on area targets.  It was suggested that rather than 
considering incendiary loads as percentages of bomb loads, the concern should 
be the total number carried.  The conclusion reached by this paper was that, in 
order to swamp the German fire fighting organisations, 25,000 to 30,000 four 
pound incendiary bombs should be considered the minimum load for the 
incendiary force.  Concentration was to be aimed for in both space and time.  The 
main attack, carrying high explosive bombs, should use the principal main fire 
sources as aiming points.  To achieve maximum material and morale effects, 
attacks should be repeated on three or four successive nights.  The Air Staff 
attached a reminder that, as stocks of incendiaries were in short supply, the main 
incendiary weight should be delivered on the first night attack.6  
  Wing Commander Morley, B.Ops. 1 in the Directorate of Bomber 
Operations, also prepared a paper on the use of incendiary weapons.7   He 
pointed out that the tactic being employed of dropping incendiaries throughout a 
raid meant that they were dispersed in both place and time and thus could be 
effectively dealt with by the German fire fighting organisations.  A limiting factor 
was that only the Stirling could carry a load of incendiaries equal to that carried by 
German Heinkels and Junkers. But the Stirling was still only available in limited 
numbers.  The bomb bay configuration of the Wellington, for example, meant it 
could carry only twenty per cent of the incendiary load carried by German aircraft. 
  A trial of Morley’s suggested incendiary technique was attempted on the 
night of 12/13 October 1941.  Nuremberg was the target.  The raid was not a 
success. Moreover, Ellwood, the Deputy Director of Bomber Operations, observed 
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that implementation of the incendiary plan had, at best, been luke-warm.  Despite 
the employment of sixteen heavy bombers, only half the required number of 
incendiaries were dropped: the seven Stirlings carried no incendiaries and the nine 
Halifaxes had loads averaging only just over one hundred incendiaries per aircraft.  
Ellwood suggested to Baker that it was high time for Portal to issue firm orders to 
Peirse for a full incendiary trial to be carried out on an easy to find town, in good 
weather, in the next moon period.  Maximum incendiary loads were to be carried 
and the force was to be led by the best navigators in Bomber Command.  
According to Ellwood, Air Ministry instructions to Peirse were being largely ignored 
both as to spirit and letter.8   
  In a ten-page memorandum, Dewdney,9 Portal’s oil adviser, also 
supported the contention that incendiary weapons were more destructive than high 
explosives.  Incendiary bombs, he pointed out, “are worth at least five times as 
much as H.E. per ton of Bomb lift, and probably more.”10   As a deterrent, he 
suggested that explosive incendiaries be incorporated in bomb loads to reduce the 
efficiency of the German fire-fighting crews.  
 On 25 October 1941 Bottomley wrote to Peirse outlining a new plan of 
attack employing incendiary weapons.  Code-named Unison, the plan was 
preparation for the time when it was accepted that the full weight of the area 
offensive would be directed against enemy morale.  The attack was to be 
launched in the best moon period and when weather forecasts gave indications of 
good conditions both en route and in the target area.  The selected target was to 
be within reasonable range and acknowledged as being easy to find and identify.  
A fire-raising party of at least fourteen Stirlings and twenty-five Halifaxes and 
Manchesters would lead the attack to release a minimum of 30,000 incendiaries 
within a space of twenty minutes.  The first wave of the main force, at least 300 
medium bombers, was planned to arrive on target forty-five minutes after the fire-
raising party.  Main force aircraft were to carry mixed loads of incendiaries and 
General Purpose (GP) bombs and the attack was to be maintained for as long as 
practicable.11
  The weaknesses in the Unison plan were those that had plagued Bomber 
Command since the beginning of the war.  Good weather was required, target 
location and identification were essential, and success hinged largely on the ability 
of crews to navigate precisely and arrive on target at specified times.  
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Unfortunately, previous experience had shown that without additional navigational 
aids, success was certainly not guaranteed.  Concern was again expressed, this 
time in the Directorate of Bomber Operations, at possible shortages of the four 
pound incendiary bomb because magnesium was only available in limited 
amounts.12
  Despite the potential problems, an Operational Instruction was issued by 
Bomber Command Headquarters to all Groups on 10 November 1941 providing an 
outline plan for the creation of maximum damage by fire to an unspecified town in 
Germany.  The aim was to saturate the enemy fire services in the shortest 
possible time and raise a fire of “such size and intensity that it cannot be simulated 
by decoys.”13   Three days later, on 13 November 1941, with no trial of the Unison 
plan having been attempted, the policy of conservation of the bomber force was 
implemented.  Unison was shelved, but not completely forgotten ─ certainly not by 
the enthusiasts in the Directorate of Bomber Operations   
  During the winter months, staff in the Directorate of Bomber Operations 
continued their research into the effectiveness of the incendiary bomb as a 
destructive agent. In late November and early December Morley made an 
extensive tour of the bomber groups to spread the incendiary bomb gospel among 
the group commanders and aircrew, visiting twenty squadrons and four group 
commanders.  His talks focused on the effects of enemy raids on England and the 
incendiary plan to be launched against Germany.  He reported that both 
individually and collectively the crews were enthusiastic, not only at the incendiary 
plan, but also that someone had seen fit to provide them with a somewhat fuller 
picture 
  At the conclusion of Morley’s lecture, discussions were held and crews 
were encouraged to offer suggestions.  These mainly centred on the need for 
improved flares in greater quantities to assist in target location and identification.  
There was also a call from the majority of squadron commanders for the formation 
of specialist fire-raising squadrons crewed by skilled and experienced pilots and 
navigators.  In concluding his report, Morley noted that morale among the crews 
appeared to be on the decline.  This he attributed to the frequent failure to  locate 
the briefed target even in good weather.  Casualties, with no noticeable 
improvement in bombing results, also appeared to be of concern. 
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  A copy of Morley’s report was sent to each of the four group commanders 
he had visited, identifying perceived deficiencies.  Unless action was taken, he 
pointed out, further reductions in crew morale would follow and the effectiveness 
of Bomber Command would be reduced.  Air Vice-Marshal Slessor of 5 Group and 
Air Vice-Marshal Baldwin of 3 Group both rejected the call for specialist 
squadrons.14   Any further reduction in experienced personnel, they argued, could 
have fatal consequences.  The question of fire-raising attacks was largely ignored.  
No response from either 1 or 4 Group Commanders has been found. 
  Bufton, who replaced Ellwood as Deputy Director of Bomber Operations in 
November 1941, was also keenly interested in the incendiary debate.  His 
concerns were that targets were not being located and, even when they were, they 
were not being accurately bombed.  Aircraft continued to operate individually and 
squadrons were devising their own tactics.  These methods, even when 
successful, were on such a small scale that little evidence was forthcoming that 
Bomber Command was developing into an effective, destructive force. Citing his 
own experience when commanding No. 10 (Bomber) Squadron, Bufton called for 
increased use to be made of flares to assist target location and identification.   In a 
paper entitled Suggestion for Increasing Efficiency of Night Attack, he argued that 
combining the flare and fire-raising techniques might well provide results equalling 
those achieved in daylight conditions.15
  On 14 February 1942 the conservation requirement for Bomber Command 
was lifted.  The Directive to Baldwin, standing in as AOC Bomber Command 
pending the arrival of Air Chief Marshal Harris, defined the primary target for 
Bomber Command as “the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular, 
of the industrial workers.”16   The Directive claimed that the weather would provide 
the best opportunity for concentrated incendiary attacks and the Russians would 
be heartened by the resumed air offensive.  It was also believed that the 
combination of the renewed air offensive together with Russian successes would 
further lower German morale.  
 With winter weather still prevalent it would appear, at first sight, that this 
was not the best time to resume the bomber offensive.  The deciding factor was 
the impending introduction of TR 1335 (or Gee, as it came to be called), and its 
possible employment as both a navigational aid and a target finding and blind 
bombing device.17   At 15,000 feet Gee had a range of about 350 miles and could 
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be used by any number of aircraft accurately by both night and day.  It was 
expected to have an operational life of six months before enemy jamming began 
and it is clear that much was expected of this, the first significant aid provided for 
Bomber Command crews.  It indeed became a very useful navigational tool but it 
did not fulfil the hopes of those who had seen it as both a navigation and bombing 
aid. 
On 22 February 1942 Harris took over the reins of Bomber Command.  His 
first brush was with Lord Cherwell, who had written to Portal supporting the fire-
raising proposition.  Many ideas had been proposed, Cherwell indicated, but there 
had been very little practical experimentation.  He also suggested that 
consideration should be given to making one particular bomber group responsible 
for target location and identification.  With a man like Slessor in charge, he 
believed, much might be achieved.18   Portal agreed with Cherwell and forwarded 
his letter to Harris.19
  Harris’s somewhat sharp reply to Portal gave every indication that he had 
not taken command in order to learn.  After an apology for disagreeing, he claimed 
that the practice contemplated had been in use when he commanded 5 Group in 
1939/40 and he had assumed that the other groups did the same.  However, he 
continued,  
 
The proposal to allot the fire-raising tasks and leadership of raids 
generally to one particular Group would not work in practice 
because, by no practical means that I can foresee, could any one 
particular Group be composed entirely of superior crews.20    
 
 The transfer of skilled crews from other groups, he pointed out, would 
create morale problems among the remainder.  His conclusion gives every 
indication that he had never seen the Butt Report.  Our attacks on the oil industry 
in 1939/40, as far as the weight of attack allowed, Harris asserted in a letter to 
Portal, were a “great success.”21   His claim was allowed to pass unchallenged by 
the CAS but few in authority were still making that same assertion in 1942. 
 The Director of Bomber Operations, Baker, needed no second urging to 
take up the cudgels.  He reminded Harris that in a meeting on 6 December 1941, 
when the latter was DCAS, it had been agreed that incendiaries would be used 
extensively in future operations.  Baker assured Harris that provided attacks were 
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concentrated in time, weight, and space, sufficient to overcome the defences, they 
would prove to be very effective against any German town or city.  He called for a 
full scale trial to confirm the theories advanced by Morley.22 
  Although Bufton’s name had not been mentioned in Baker’s letter he 
became embroiled in absentia.  Harris, in his reply, admitted that he was 
 
a little at a loss to understand where you and Bufton imagine that I 
do not see eye to eye with you. I am full out to employ the 
incendiary technique, but not as yet the 100% incendiary technique  
. . .  we must not forget the enormous moral effect of high explosive.  
We are . . . only in progress of our fourth GEE effort, and we are still 
trying to perfect our methods.  Whether perfection will take the form 
of a greater or lesser proportion of incendiaries remains to be seen   
. . . I am still not amenable to be weaned entirely from H.E. . . . I 
propose to run the whole  gamut in experimentation, and we shall 
see what we shall see.23
  
Bufton’s suggestion of increased flare usage provided in his paper of 5 
November 1941, related to means of improving night attacks, was given a trial on 
the night of 3/4 March 1942 when the Renault works at Billancourt, west of Paris, 
was attacked by 223 aircraft from a force of 235.  With an almost full moon, helpful 
weather, no cloud below 10,000 feet, slight ground haze and weak defences, great 
damage was created.  The higher than usual number of crews claiming to have 
attacked their briefed target is indicative of the good weather experienced and the 
comparatively short range nature of the target.  Lorry production was brought to a 
standstill for a month.  This raid was successful but special conditions had 
prevailed.  They would rarely be provided on long penetration attacks deep in 
Germany, or targets located in the Ruhr valley. 
 Then, on the night of 28/29 March 1942, in the first major trial of the Unison 
incendiary technique, Lübeck, a former Hanseatic city on the Baltic, was attacked. 
Although Gee did not provide coverage all the way to the target, Lübeck was not a 
difficult target to find because of its near coastal siting.  Additionally, the weather 
was fine, the moon almost full, and it was known to be only lightly defended.  Its 
selection, Harris acknowledged later, was because it had been “built more like a 
fire-lighter than a human habitation.”24   The bombers, 234 in total, attacked in 
three waves, many from very low levels, and with great accuracy.  Photographic 
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reconnaissance, two weeks later, showed enormous fire damage. The key, of 
course, was concentration. 
  But in spite of the success of the raid on Lübeck, staff in the Directorate of 
Bomber Operations were not convinced that Harris had fully accepted that 
incendiaries were more destructive than high explosive bombs.  They appreciated 
that Lübeck had been a highly inflammable target and only lightly defended but, 
they argued, similar attacks, led by specialist crews, would achieve comparable 
results against even strongly defended targets.  To gather support for the efficacy 
of incendiaries, Morley wrote to T. Hutson of the Fire Service Department of the 
Home Office.  He, in turn, wrote to twelve Fire Chiefs in heavily blitzed areas in 
England who all agreed that incendiaries were the main cause of fires.  
 They were asked,  
 
What, speaking in round figures, is your personal experience of the 
percentage of the total number of fires caused by enemy action 
which  originated from high explosive and incendiary bombs, 
including oil bombs, respectively ?25   
 
 Personal estimates of fires caused by incendiary bombs were between 
seventy and ninety-eight per cent, but averaged out at eighty-nine per cent.  Their 
estimates of fires caused by HE ranged between two and thirty per cent, but 
averaged out at eleven per cent. 26  
 Baker passed the information to Harris, who, in reply, noted that he had 
read the papers with interest but claimed that both he and the Air Ministry were in 
agreement on the need to increase incendiary percentage in bomb loads.  He 
continued, “I am also, however, convinced that a good ration of H.E. is always 
necessary for moral effect.  We have got to kill a lot of Boche before we win this 
war.“27
  Criticism of Harris’s attitude regarding the use of incendiaries continued.  
Late in April 1942, Freeman cited the relative failure of four recent attacks on 
Rostock.  These failures, he warned Harris, resulted from the reduced number of 
incendiaries employed, coupled with the failure to achieve concentration.  He 
made clear that he was not opposed to the use of “blasters” but the proportion of 
HE carried should never be at the expense of material capable of making 
satisfactory fires.28   Harris replied that he considered Freeman had been 
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misinformed.  Lübeck, Harris explained, had been an exceptional target and could 
not be compared with any other target in Germany.  Rostock, by comparison, 
apart from a small section of old mediaeval town, had many wide open spaces and 
broad avenues.  Harris then admitted that he disagreed with the laid down policy in 
respect of the use of incendiaries.  His argument was that 
 
The moral effect of H.E. is vast.  People can escape from fires, and 
the casualties on a solely fire raising raid would be as nothing.   
What we want to do in addition to the horrors of fire is to bring the 
masonry crashing down on top of the Boche, to kill Boche, and to 
terrify Boche; hence the proportion of H.E.29 
 
 Freeman passed Harris’s two-page response to Baker agreeing that, while 
Lübeck had been an exceptional target, Rostock should have therefore received a 
greater weight of incendiaries.  He concluded his short note with the words: ‘We 
shall have to keep up the pressure on the C.-in-C.”30
  Morley, in turn, was asked to comment on Harris’s letter. In the main he 
disagreed with Harris but accepted his suggestion that two-thirds incendiary to 
one-third high explosive was an acceptable bomb load.  Unfortunately, the small 
number of aircraft available for operations on any one night was a severely limiting 
factor.   In order to produce sufficient points of fire to overcome the fire fighters 
required that the bombing force carried nothing but incendiaries.  Dropping 
100,000 incendiaries on Cologne, for example, in a two hour period, was ten times 
more destructive, Morley claimed, than dropping 25,000 on four successive nights 
on the same city.  The expected introduction into service of an explosive, four 
pound incendiary bomb, with two or four minute delays, he believed, should further 
reduce the need for high explosives.31
  Late in March 1942 believers in the efficacy of the bombing offensive were 
greatly buoyed by a mathematical confirmation, provided by Lord Cherwell, 
Churchill’s scientific adviser, that bombing would ultimately break the spirit of the 
German people.  From a study Cherwell had made of German attacks on Hull and 
Birmingham, he calculated that one ton of bombs on a built-up area demolished 
twenty to forty buildings and made 100 - 200 people homeless.32   It thus followed, 
Cherwell continued, if every British bomber produced could complete fourteen  
operations, with an average three ton bomb load on each operation, then each 
aircraft would de-house approximately 6,000 German citizens.  Aircraft production 
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estimates, Cherwell claimed, were for 10,000 heavy bombers (including 
Wellingtons) between April 1942 and June 1943. If only half the bomb load of 
10,000 bombers was dropped on fifty-eight German towns, about one third of the 
total population would be rendered homeless.  Both Portal and Sinclair accepted 
Cherwell’s mathematics and indicated that his message was “simple, clear and 
convincing.”33   They, however, added qualifications.  Success was dependent 
upon aircraft production meeting planned targets, the development of additional 
navigation and bombing aids, that bombers survived on average at least fourteen  
operations and that there were no significant diversions from the bomber 
offensive.   
  Sir Henry Tizard, one-time honorary Scientific Adviser to the former CAS, 
Newall, challenged Cherwell’s assessment and wrote to both Cherwell and the 
Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair.34   His disagreement was not 
related to bombing policy but was rather empirically based.  Firstly, he challenged 
the figures provided by Cherwell, related to possible bomber numbers, as being 
over-optimistic.  He also suggested that Cherwell had been somewhat sanguine in 
his assessment of average crew ability on night operations.  Finally, Tizard 
rejected the time-frame that Cherwell had envisaged, viewing it as unrealistic.35
  The correspondence between Tizard and Cherwell concerning Cherwell’s 
paper, although conducted amicably, drew a veil over their fundamentally different 
bombing philosophies.  Cherwell believed that area bombing, with its industrial 
destruction and de-housing coupled with a consequent lowering of German 
morale, would bring victory.  His paper, employing grossly inflated figures and 
over-estimation, was a mathematical attempt to prove his theory.  Tizard’s 
perceived path to victory followed more pragmatic lines.  He appreciated the 
realities of aircraft production and was well aware of the consequences of losing 
the battle in the Atlantic.  Bomber Command expansion, he considered, was a long 
term project.  Although in one letter to Cherwell he had claimed that he did not 
“disagree fundamentally with the bombing policy,”36 he was well aware that this 
would require a front line bomber strength of at least 4,000 aircraft.  He doubted 
such numbers could be reached even by late 1943.  His fear was that by 
attempting to win the war by area bombing “with a much smaller force it will not be 
decisive, and we may lose the war in other ways.”37
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 Sinclair accepted Tizard’s letter of 20 April with a word of thanks for his 
support of bombing policy: “I am grateful for your reassurance that you did not 
disagree fundamentally with our bombing policy.”38   Thus, by the end of April, 
what had started out as a protest by Tizard was being interpreted by the Secretary 
of State for Air as an indication of support for current bombing policy.  As time 
would show, Tizard was right and Cherwell was wrong, but in April 1942 even this 
disagreement served only to heighten Cherwell’s mana and increase his influence 
with Churchill, Sinclair, and Portal.  Correspondingly, Tizard’s stock with the 
hierarchy fell, although in the wider community he continued to command respect. 
 Lord Cherwell’s paper was, of course, of great comfort to believers in high 
places of the significance of the air offensive, and exerted considerable influence.  
Sadly, it converted few, settled nothing, and disbelievers remained in limbo.  
Controversy continued and the Government, in April 1942, seeking an unbiased 
independent judgement, appointed Mr Justice Singleton to undertake an enquiry.   
 Singleton had been given an impossible task.  He was asked to define the 
results to be expected from the bombing offensive, at greatest possible strength, 
over the next six, twelve and eighteen months.  His calculations were to be based 
on the experience gained from German bombing in England and any other 
information available.  Such indeterminates provided no firm basis or starting point 
for his enquiry.  The imponderables were numerous and his report, filed on 20 May 
1942, provided no answers.  As Cherwell pointed out to Churchill, the only time 
that Singleton came close to reaching a conclusion was when he wrote: “I think 
there is every reason to hope for good results from a bombing policy.”39   It was 
not a great foundation for basing the planning policy for the strategic bombing 
offensive for the next year or eighteen months. 
 In May and June 1942 Harris mounted three 1,000 bomber raids.  They 
were, of course, significant events in the air offensive but they were aberrations.  
The first, Cologne, was successful in that fire-raising, Gee-equipped Wellingtons 
and Stirlings, marked the three aiming points and concentration was achieved in 
an attack lasting only ninety minutes.  The follow-up attacks on Essen and Bremen 
were scattered affairs that achieved very little.  At that stage of Bomber Command 
development these were singular events and such numbers were not produced 
again until 1944. 
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 Shortly after the Cologne attack, Bufton was asked by Portal whether he 
thought that Harris, who had only been AOC Bomber Command for four months, 
should be replaced.  Bufton, for several reasons, supported his retention.  He 
applauded Harris’s tenacity in organising the attack on Cologne, coupled with the 
significant improvements noted in bombing concentration.  He also supported 
Harris’s efforts in fending off those, such as Coastal Command and the Special 
Operations’ Executive, who were attempting to divert Bomber Command crews 
and aircraft for their own purposes.40
` Concern, however, was also expressed by Bufton, late in June 1942, 
concerning the apparent lowering of standards in bombing accuracy.  Crews were 
taking the easy path, he believed, and were simply bombing the first fires they 
observed rather than taking time to identify the briefed target.  But taking time in 
the target area was never a popular activity. He called for “Immediate energetic 
and positive action to prevent this prodigal waste of our bombing effort.”41
 Another worry, becoming evident late in June 1942, was the shortage of 
magnesium, a vital ingredient in the manufacture of the four-pound incendiary 
bomb.  Bottomley, Freeman, and Baker, met in late June to consider the problem. 
A draft was prepared for Freeman’s signature requesting Harris to reduce the use 
of incendiaries.  As a follow-up to previous correspondence calling for maximum 
use of incendiaries, it could not have been an easy letter to write.  Rostock was 
one example of wasted effort, Freeman observed, when weather conditions did 
not favour the use of incendiaries.  Bremen, when blind bombing using Gee had 
been employed, was another.  In such conditions concentration was not 
achievable.  He concluded: “In the meanwhile . . . you must go easy on the 
expenditure of this type of bomb except when conditions clearly favour its use.”42
  Not unnaturally Harris was somewhat bemused and distressed by 
Freeman’s letter. In his response to Freeman he pointed out that the latter’s letter 
of 27 April had called for increased use of incendiaries and that no mention had 
been made of possible shortages.  He also reminded Freeman that Air Vice-
Marshal Saundby, Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) at Bomber Command 
Headquarters, had previously warned Baker that incendiary production was to be 
reduced but Baker had claimed that supplies were adequate even for increased 
usage.  Harris disclaimed responsibility for the shortage of incendiaries and 
denied that they had been wasted.  Bomb loads, he confirmed, would be 
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reversed.  High explosives would henceforth make up two thirds of bomb loads 
and incendiaries one third.  As on other occasions, Harris then continued his 
attack on members of the Air Staff.  Doubtless Bottomley and Baker were 
responsible for your letter he complained to Freeman, adding, much against my 
wishes they have continually urged increased use of incendiaries.  “I hope that 
you will now rub their noses in it!”43    
 The year 1942, as far as Bomber Command was concerned, had been 
marked by tremendous endeavour, heavy casualties, but few successes.  
Cologne, and the 1,000 bomber raid on the night of 30/31 May 1942, was an 
exception.  The effort, however, was not sustainable.  With a total of about 500 
medium and heavy bombers on unit charge, that meant that, on average, 
Bomber Command would be hard pressed to provide 350 serviceable aircraft on 
any particular night, even for a maximum effort operation.  Bomber Command, in 
1942, simply lacked the capacity to deliver the Cologne weight of punch at 
regular intervals.  Moreover, the Operational Training Units had been hard hit in 
the 1,000 bomber operations, and the losses of seasoned instructors and crews 
about to graduate were additional blows to Bomber Command’s expansion 
programmes.  Cologne was a remarkable propaganda success but, considering 
the numbers of aircraft involved, industrial damage was amazingly light.   
 Notwithstanding, the question of incendiaries versus high explosive bombs 
remained.  It was also becoming apparent that German decoy fires in large 
industrial complexes were very effective in misleading British bomber crews.  On 
too many occasions the first arrivals in the target area were deceived by the fires 
they sighted.  Naturally, their sticks of incendiaries on the decoys were accepted 
as the aiming point for the remainder of the bomber force.  Morley, in a note to 
Bufton, suggested that, as an interim measure,  
 
In order to obtain an immediate improvement in the effect of our 
bombing, and until we can obtain the concentration essential to a 
successful incendiary attack it is suggested that H.E. bombs only 
are dropped. 44  
 
 It must be recalled, however, that at the time of this note the arguments 
regarding the Path Finder Force were reaching a climax.   Morley, in concluding 
this note, stressed that 
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The formation of the T.F.F. [Target Finding Force] and the 
successful employment by this force of new aids such as Oboe, 
Marker bombs etc. would demand an immediate return to the 
incendiary technique in which the incendiary bomb is employed as 
the primary weapon of attack.45    
 
 Later in 1942 Bufton was again involved in the debate.  Reports of raids on 
Munich and Mainz indicated that many aircraft released their incendiaries not on 
flares marking the target, but rather on flares that had been released in an effort 
to locate the target.  He argued that a common tactical doctrine was necessary to 
achieve success.  Although Bomber Command Headquarters issued the basic 
orders for an attack, Groups, Stations, and even Squadrons, superimposed their 
own interpretations and emphases on the original instructions.  Bufton called for 
increased support for the newly formed Path Finder Force which was attempting 
a difficult but vital task with insufficient backing and with too many inexperienced 
crews.46
 The apparent failure of the attack on Munich on the night of 19/20 
September 1942 had revealing repercussions.  Although only involving a small 
mixed force of eighty-nine Lancasters and Stirlings, Harris was quick to express 
his anger at their lack of success and attempted to apportion blame.  In a 
blistering letter to Air Vice-Marshal Alec Coryton, AOC 5 Group, he insisted that 
the lack of damage in the city was  
 
beyond any shadow of doubt due firstly to the carriage of an utterly 
inadequate quantity of incendiaries in the make up of the bomb load 
and, secondly, to a lack of concentration by later arrivals which can 
also be ascribed very largely to the lack of fires in the city . . . . As a 
result of disobedience of orders or failure to carry out orders with 
regard to the bomb load, this raid, potentially a highly successful one, 
carried out not without heavy loss at great range, was ruined as a 
successful military operation.47   
  
 Coryton was instructed that one or more of the individuals responsible, 
whether through negligence, stupidity, or sheer disobedience, were to be removed 
to less responsible positions, or be put up for disposal.  If blame was not 
immediately attachable, a Court of Enquiry was to be convened, and a Summary 
of Evidence taken.  
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 Much as Harris would have done, Coryton stood his ground, informing 
Harris that he would  
 
take the full responsibility for the orders which are issued on 
operations from this Group . . . . I do not write this with any form of 
threat in my mind . . . . but, quite honestly, I could never look up 
again if I felt any member of my staff was being penalised because I 
was not prepared to accept my responsibilities . . . if anybody has to 
be removed I would much prefer to go myself than to pass the blame 
to others.  We must each have some principles in life which we are 
not prepared to break, and this one I must stick to.48 
 
 Harris’s response was terse and to the point: 
 
The view which you take in this matter, although pedantically correct, 
is practically quite wrong . . . . similar unilateral interference by 
individuals with the orders issued either by you or your Command will 
in no circumstances be permitted, and that the most drastic action 
will follow in any future cases.49 
   
 The significance of this exchange is that although Harris had displayed that 
he was prepared to bend or ignore orders issued to him ─ and would continue to 
do so ─ he had no intention of permitting any of those subordinate to him  
following a similar path.  Specific bomb loads for Harris continued largely to be a 
matter of his preference and not subject to what he identified as the whims of the 
Air Staff.  
  Coryton, however, had become surplus to requirements and in February 
1943 he was advised by Harris that Portal had been asked to find him another 
appointment.  Harris praised the work that 5 Group under Coryton had carried out 
but explained that  
 
There must also be complete unanimity of doctrine and of 
understanding if the conduct of operations is to proceed smoothly 
and with the rapidity of decision necessary under the ad hoc 
conditions imposed by the weather, on the one hand, and the ever 
changing operational situations on the other . . . you have displayed 
persistent and apparently unresolvable differences of view with me 
and with my staff . . . . You are leaving therefore because . . . you 
do not fit into our pattern.  I do not say you are not right.  But we are 
the majority and in that sense it is therefore you who are out of 
step.50 
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In closing, Harris commented on their more that twenty years of friendship and 
made clear that he had stressed with Portal that there was no requirement for an 
adverse report.  Five days later, on 28 February 1943, Air Vice-Marshal The Hon. 
R. A. Cochrane replaced Coryton as Air Officer Commanding 5 Group, Bomber 
Command. 
 A largely ineffective daylight raid by 5 Group Lancasters on the north Italian 
city of Milan, on 24 October 1942, provided support for Bufton’s call for a better 
understanding of the principles required for a successful incendiary attack.  In this 
particular raid concentration was not achieved, an insufficient number of 
incendiaries were dropped, and no explosive incendiaries had been included in the 
bomb loads.  Baker’s comment was that clearly Bomber Command is “a long way 
from being instructed in the employment of the incendiary technique.”51
 In November 1942 Morley suggested means whereby what he called “the 
missing link in the incendiary technique” could be provided.52   Although exploding 
incendiaries had first been introduced in the 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne, their 
delay fuses were of very short duration.  German fire crews were able to attack 
incendiary fires almost as quickly as they were located and civilians had been 
instructed in methods to render them harmless. Morley requested that long delay 
fuses be fitted to all incendiary weapons.  His suggestion presented many 
difficulties.  In the case of the smaller incendiaries they appeared insurmountable.  
In order that the area covered by sticks of incendiaries could be rendered suspect 
for several hours, he made clear, required that high explosives with variable long 
delay and non-disturbance fuses be included in bomb loads.  With the knowledge 
of that possibility in the back of their minds, enemy fire crews would approach all 
fire scenes with a certain amount of trepidation.  Long after the “all clear” had 
sounded fire crews would know that they were still in danger. 
 Bufton prepared a minute incorporating Morley’s suggestions and forwarded 
it to the Director of Operational Requirements in the Air Ministry.  He pointed out 
that the weapon required was of the greatest importance and that it should be on 
the highest priority.53   Baker forwarded his own minute supporting the concept 
and suggesting that, in future, bomb loads should comprise eighty per cent normal 
incendiary bombs, ten per cent exploding incendiary bombs, and ten per cent high 
explosives with delays of up to six hours.54
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 For the remainder of the war there is very little evidence of controversial 
material relating to incendiary weapons in the papers of the staff in the Directorate 
of Bomber Operations.  New weapons were developed, and there were problems 
with supplies, but only of a minor nature.  The one on-going refrain was the need 
to provide constant reminders to Bomber Command of the percentage of 
incendiaries that should be carried in any mixed bomb load.  As late as March 
1944 Bufton, then Director of Bomber Operations (DBOps), was still being 
reminded by his staff of the apparent shortcomings in Bomber Command.  He was 
asked to encourage Harris “to increase materially the ratio of incendiaries to H.E. 
carried and . . . emphasise that only enough H.E. bombs should be carried to 
break windows, discourage fire fighters and interrupt services.”  According to the 
writer of this unsigned note either Bomber Command, or the Groups, were 
confusing “maximum bomb load” with the more vital “effective bomb load.”55 
 One lesson that had been learned early in 1942, however, was that if action 
was required of Harris it was indeed necessary to keep the pressure applied.  A 
second lesson, perhaps not fully absorbed immediately, was that Harris, who had 
served two terms in the Air Ministry, possessed an already developed suspicion of 
staff motives.  Bottomley, he claimed in a post-war interview with Saward, “was 
doing his damnedest the whole time to discredit me in the hope of getting my 
job.”56   As for the Directorate of Bomber Operations, responsible to Bottomley, 
Harris even objected to the name.  He called it “idiotic nomenclature” and 
assumed that Directors believed that they were running the war when, as he 
asserted, it was the responsibility of the appointed Commander-in-Chief.57  
  This first contretemps between Harris and staff in the Air Ministry is 
indicative of the problems that always exist between higher authority, required to 
satisfy a multitude of demands, and a field commander with one identified 
responsibility.   The broad sweep of the strategic direction of the war was 
determined by politicians and Chiefs of Staff.  In the case of the Royal Air Force, 
Bomber Command was then given its specific task, or tasks, in order of priority, by 
means of Directives which should have been lessons in clarity and precision.  
  Unfortunately, this was not always the case.  Loose wording all too often 
permitted deviations from the ordered requirements.  These deviations may have 
been deliberate; contrariwise, they may simply have been misunderstandings.  
Prior to issuing the Directive it was the CAS’s responsibility to ensure that the task 
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ordered was able to be met with the materiel and personnel, with reserves, 
available to the field commander.   
 Bomber Command went to war in 1939 with the Air Staff articulating the 
destruction that would be created to identified German military targets by precision 
bombing but having, in the back of their minds although rarely expressed, the 
significant reduction in German morale to be obtained from a rain of bombs on 
their cities.  Bomber Command’s doctrine, developed during the late 1920s and 
1930s, was based on the belief that the bomber would win the war.  The need to 
defeat the enemy air force, in order to be able to conduct an effective bombing 
offensive, was ignored.  As a consequence Bomber Command itself became the 
first victim of its own beliefs.  Thus, early in the war, the means by which it was 
believed the struggle would be won were identified as simply not up to the task.  
Harris, of course, was not responsible for the largely obsolescent aircraft with 
which Bomber Command was initially equipped, and neither was he responsible 
for the inadequate training or lack of aids provided for the bomber crews.   But 
what must be noted from this initial confrontation between Harris and the Air Staff 
is that Harris had early made clear that he would not be easily turned from the 
path that he had decided his bombers would follow. 
 During the Second World War Portal, as CAS, fought the war on several 
fronts ─ on the Home front appeasing politicians and the Naval Chief of Staff, but 
also in Europe, Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Far East areas.  Harris had but 
one front to deal with.  The demands placed on Portal, however, impinged directly 
on Harris as men and materiel were transferred to face other specific threats 
thereby reducing Bomber Command’s capacity to complete its nominated task.  It 
was to be an increasingly serious problem as the war progressed and, as we shall 
see, relations at the highest levels became seriously strained.  What began as 
minor differences developed into major disagreements and offers of resignation.  
That, however, was all in the future.     
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Chapter Four 
 
Formation of the Path Finder Force 
 
The prime mover in the efforts to form a Target Finding Force (TFF) was 
Wing Commander S. O. Bufton, DFC who, as Commanding Officer of No. 10 
(Bomber) Squadron from 11 July 1940 to 11 April 1941, had carried out nineteen 
operations and had learned at first hand of the extreme difficulties the bomber 
crews faced not only in locating the general target area but also in identifying,  
marking and bombing the nominated target.    He subsequently commanded No. 
76 (Bomber) Squadron and then for six months had been Station Commander at 
RAF Pocklington.  On 1 November 1941 he took up duties in the Air Ministry as 
Deputy Director of Bomber Operations.  In a note to the Director of Bomber 
Operations, Air Commodore J. W. Walker, later in November, he expressed his 
concern  
 
at the present time, firstly with the low efficiency which we can 
expect from our bomber forces in the location of targets and, 
secondly, with the inaccuracy of the actual bombing at night . . .  At 
the present moment, however, the ‘last 20 miles’ problem seems an 
insuperable one.  I am convinced, however, that this difficulty can 
be quickly overcome simply by employing the right tactical methods. 
While tactics are discussed and evolved on an individual crew 
basis, there does not seem to be any effort at co-ordination . . . . I 
suggest that the time is now ripe for the formation in Bomber 
Command of a ‘K.G. 100’ equivalent  [the German TFF] and that 
the development of tactical methods and coordination . . . be 
tackled energetically and immediately.1  
 
Bufton’s disquiet was that the bomber offensive had been ineffective 
because the tactics employed had been developed at squadron, and in some 
cases, crew level, rather than being determined at Group or Command level.  
Moreover, inefficient flares and inaccurate flare positioning had meant that 
bombing concentration was impossible to achieve.  Although tactics had been 
based on the provision of a significant incendiary conflagration, this required 
continuous target illumination throughout the attack if accurate bombing was to be 
achieved.  Unfortunately the flare dropping aircraft were rarely well co-ordinated 
while the incendiary loaded aircraft frequently neither identified nor even saw their 
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target before bombing.   It was essential, Bufton argued, that the flare and 
incendiary crews were briefed together and were made fully aware of what they 
were required to achieve.  Even then, he insisted, only the best crews will be 
successful.  Bufton’s solution was the formation of a TFF “well drilled, of high 
morale and of the highest quality.”2  
Bufton admitted that the introduction of Gee navigation equipment would 
increase the chances of crews navigating to the target area but the problems of 
identifying the target remained.  Failure to identify the target city was a crucial 
problem and flares or incendiaries wrongly positioned meant that crews arriving 
later tended to assume that the flares, incendiaries or decoys they observed were 
the briefed target.  His point was that successful operations required the first 
arrivals at the target to not only find the target but also illuminate and mark the 
aiming point.  It was therefore essential that first arrivals were specialists of proven 
ability, welded into closely located units, under one control, in the shape of a TFF. 
The outline plan for the TFF suggested by Bufton was that it be comprised 
of  two squadrons of heavy bombers and four squadrons of medium, all fitted with 
Gee, and that they be closely located under one control.  The crews of the 
squadrons selected to serve in the TFF, he continued, should be transferred to 
their new command en bloc.  One third of the selected squadrons’ crews should 
then be replaced by forty selected crews, about one crew from every squadron in 
Bomber Command.  Subsequent crew requirements were to be met by the 
selection of highly rated graduates from the Operational Training Units.  The TFF 
was to work in close cooperation with both scientific advisers and a Bomber 
Development Unit, still to be established, so that new ideas could be fully 
considered and tested by experienced crews with minimum delay.   The selection 
of officers to command the TFF squadrons was considered critical. 
The advantages of a specialised TFF foreseen by Bufton were that by 
making it responsible for target finding, illumination and marking, plans could be 
formulated quickly and refinements generated from the undoubted enthusiasm of 
the participants.  With the fullest attention being given to bombing developments, 
combined with effective leadership, new navigation and bombing aids could be put 
to best use prior to their becoming available to squadrons outside the TFF.  Once 
it was fully appreciated that successful operations were utterly dependent upon 
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them, TFF crews and squadrons would make every effort to find, illuminate and 
mark the selected targets and specific aiming points. 
Bufton’s call was widely supported by VCAS Wilfrid Freeman (initially with 
reservations), ACAS Bottomley, Oxland (I Group), Carr (4 Group), DBO Walker, 
Director of Intelligence F. F. Inglis, the Navigation Section in Bomber Command 
Headquarters, scientific advisers Sir Henry Tizard and Lord Cherwell, Arthur 
Morley (in the DBO) and, finally, sixteen squadron and station commanders with 
extensive operational experience, including Bennett, the future leader of the Path 
Finder Force (PFF), and a future bomber baron, Willie Tait.   Carr gave his support 
in November 1941 but, apparently under pressure from Harris at a conference in 
June 1942, signified his opposition to the TFF, as did all the Group Commanders.   
The Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, was apparently aware of the 
pressure that Bufton was applying for the formation of a TFF from March 1942 
because at that time he added a note to the material that Bufton had sent out to 
his former operational friends.  It made clear that “The Corps d’elite principle is 
only bad when all units have the same job.  The T.F.F. has a different job and 
would therefore be regarded as a specialist force and not a Corps d’elite.”3   From 
June 1942 his support became crucial. 
When Air Marshal Arthur Harris took his place as Air Officer Commanding-
in-Chief, Bomber Command, on 22 February 1942 he was well aware of the 
enormous task he had undertaken and the many problems that faced his bomber 
crews.  The Butt report of August 1941 had revealed that very few bombs were 
hitting their target and, unless this situation could be improved dramatically, 
Bomber Command itself could be in jeopardy.  Politicians were most unlikely to 
vote vast sums to a non-productive war weapon.  During the winter of 1941/42 the 
Command had adopted a policy of conservation in an effort to build up its strength.  
The bombers operated when weather conditions allowed but no attempts were 
made to challenge the German defences in any extremes of the European winter.  
Harris had clearly identified his responsibilities; Bomber Command expansion was 
imperative; he had to enthuse the bomber crews; convince Churchill that Bomber 
Command could be a viable and significant force, and take the war to the enemy 
under the terms of the Directive he had inherited when taking office.   
This Directive, issued on 14 February 1942, ordered that attacks were to be 
delivered on industrial areas in Germany both within and beyond the range of the 
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new navigational aid Gee (which was not operationally employed until the night of 
7/8 March 1942) with the aim of creating destruction and lowering the morale of 
the enemy civil population, particularly that of the industrial workers.  As a disciple 
of Trenchard who lauded the principle of the offensive, it was a war path with 
which Harris readily identified.   In a Note to Churchill and the War Cabinet in June 
1942 he emphasised that  
 
The purely defensive use of air power is grossly wasteful . . . . 
Bomber Command provides our only offensive action yet pressed 
home directly against Germany.  All our other efforts are defensive 
in their nature, and are not intended to do more, and can never do 
more, than enable us to exist in the face of the enemy.4 
 
Harris, however, unlike Trenchard, never attempted to quantify, numerically, the 
relationship between the destruction and dislocation caused by bombing, and the 
resultant effects on morale.  Morale and material effects, he believed, were inter-
related ─ the greater the damage his bombers could create, the greater the effect 
on enemy morale  
Harris was fully cognizant of the fact that with only fifty heavy and 250 
medium bombers5 he did not possess a force capable of meeting the full 
requirements of his Directive.  His primary need was a vast expansion of his 
bomber fleet but he knew that it would be a long struggle and was well aware that 
it would bring him into conflict not only with the Air Staff who were required to fill 
many demands for aircraft, and the Admiralty, who required long range aircraft for 
anti-U-boat operations, but also politicians.  On 25 February 1942 the Lord Privy 
Seal, Sir Stafford Cripps, had made a speech in the House of Commons 
questioning  
 
whether in the existing circumstances, the continued devotion of a 
considerable part of our efforts to building up this Bomber Force is 
the best use we can make of our resources . . . . I can assure the 
House that the Government are fully aware of other uses to which 
our resources could be put.6 
 
If bombing was to be successful Harris was well aware that accuracy was 
but one requirement; concentration in both time and space was imperative.   
Concentration meant that the German fire and rescue services were overwhelmed 
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and, as German defences developed, provided some protection for the bomber 
crews.  Harris regarded the area bombing campaign about to begin as the way to 
victory.  Bufton, on the other hand, accepted area bombing as a necessary first 
step towards the time when Bomber Command, Target Finding Force led and 
equipped with the latest navigational and bombing aids, could deliver accurate 
attacks on precision targets.  The grounds for future dispute ─ differing bombing 
philosophies and discordant personalities ─ had thus been early defined.  
It would appear from an early date, from the tapes that he later prepared 
with his biographer Dudley Saward, that Harris had determined that bombing 
performance would be improved not necessarily by the establishment of a Target 
Finding Force, but rather by reorganisation within the individual bomber Groups.  
The first objection that he raised against the formation of a Target Finding Force 
was that it gave the appearance of the establishment of a force d’élite.   His view 
was that the creation of such a force would mean that the morale of all the 
squadrons would fall when their best crew was posted into the new unit.  He also 
predicted a problem among the crews transferred into the TFF when they realised 
that promotion, which previously had been almost automatic, had now become 
highly competitive.  Additionally, with the limited number of crews available in early 
1942, Harris foresaw administration problems in attempting to provide sufficiently 
experienced crews to maintain a fully operational and useful TFF.   His first 
suggestion, which he had employed in 5 Group in the first year of war, was that 
which had been followed by Bufton when in command of No. 10 Squadron late in 
1940 ─ select the best squadron crews to lead the attack.  A little later, when it 
appeared that cameras would become more readily available to Bomber 
Command crews, Harris advocated that the squadron or squadrons obtaining the 
most accurate aiming point photographs in any month should be selected as the 
Target Finding Squadron (or Squadrons) for the following month.  He believed that 
the competition engendered to become the lead squadron would bring about 
overall improvements in bombing performance.  
Harris, in April 1942, with the support of all his Group Commanders and 
senior staff members, was still continuing to defend his rejection of the TFF.  
Firstly he admitted to having a very open mind on the question of the TFF but 
explained to Bufton that he had yet to be convinced that it was necessary.  It 
would appear he possibly believed that Bufton was interfering in matters outside 
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his area of jurisdiction as the Deputy Director of Bomber Operations.   Harris also 
discounted the support provided by senior squadron and station commanders who 
had enthusiastically agreed with Bufton’s call for a TFF.  He explained,  
 
Much as I appreciate and pay attention to the ideas of the lads who 
really do the work, they necessarily have a very circumscribed view 
on any particular subject and are not given to appreciating any 
factors outside those which affect their own comparatively narrow 
spheres.7 
 
Furthermore, Harris, in this same letter, made clear that with Gee apparently 
performing well there was no requirement for a TFF.  He continued, 
 
I am convinced now, after the last two months [sic] experience, that 
generally speaking the target when it can be seen at all is being 
correctly found . . . there is also not the least doubt that over the 
last few weeks the progressive development of the TR.1335 
techniques has led to the majority of our bombs landing usefully in 
built up areas . . . reasonably close to the intended target . . . . I am 
not prepared to accept all the very serious disadvantages of a 
Corps d’Elite in order to secure possibly some improvement on 
methods which are already proving reasonably satisfactory and 
certainly very costly to the enemy ─ at serious loss of morale and 
efficiency to the other Squadrons.8 
 
For a rounded picture of the path finding story it is first necessary to 
consider a little of the history of the German Air Force – known after March 1935 
as the Luftwaffe.  In 1933, Major-General Walter Wever, the first Air Force Chief of 
the German General Staff, set out to build an independent strategic bombing 
force.  In a speech he delivered at the opening of the Air Warfare and Aero-
Technical Academies at Gatow in Berlin on 1 November 1935, he told the first 
intake of students they must never forget that “the bomber is the decisive factor in 
aerial warfare.  Only the nation with strong bomber forces at its disposal can 
expect decisive action by its air force.”9   
In 1934, in the effort to fulfil this dream, the development of a four-engined 
bomber was accorded top priority by the German air staff.  They were not alone, 
for air power enthusiasts in the United States, Great Britain and Russia, were 
setting out along similar paths.  For all, it seemed, the heavy bomber with its ability 
to strike at long range, was confirmation of air service autonomy.  By 1936 
Germany had developed and flown two prototypes, the Dornier Do19 and the 
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Junkers Ju89.  Unfortunately, from the German point of view, despite their 
impressive appearance, the engines of both aircraft were under rated and their 
performance consequently mediocre.  Both programmes were cancelled until more 
powerful engines became available.  This cancellation, coupled with Wever’s 
death in 1936, in an air accident at Dresden, very largely marked the end of 
German efforts to develop a heavy, four-engined, strategic bomber force. 
Like the majority of the Luftwaffe staff, General Albert Kesselring, Wever’s 
successor, favoured smaller bomber aircraft more suited for tactical operations 
with the army but also capable of whatever strategic operations were required.10   
As a continentally based power, Germany, it was appreciated by both the military 
and political authorities, was vulnerable to invasion because of its extensive land 
frontiers.  Rearmament was thus a matter of urgency in case foreign powers, 
anxious to forestall another rise of German militarism, should physically intervene.  
Time, the Germans decided, was not on their side.  There was no point in 
attempting to develop a capacity to inflict strategic damage if, meanwhile, the 
Fatherland was being overrun.  Rearmament, as far as the Luftwaffe was 
concerned, became the effort to develop the largest possible air force in the 
shortest possible time. This required concentration on a twin-engined bomber 
force. 
The Spanish Civil War also provided significant lessons for the Luftwaffe.  
At Franco’s request – because of artillery shortages – medium bombers were 
employed in a close tactical support role.  Guernica was a name, tainted with 
horror, that flashed around the world.  European politicians and peoples were 
imbued with the fear of the bomber.11   A notion had been born that total victory in 
another war could be achieved by air power alone.  German leaders came to 
believe that a medium bomber force – a much less user of scarce raw materials 
and manpower than heavy bombers – could secure that success.  The complete 
and rapid victories gained by the Wehrmacht in Poland, Scandinavia, the Low 
Countries, France, and in the early months of the invasion of Russia in 1941, 
added further credence to that view.  
Although German efforts to create a heavy strategic bomber force had 
largely ended by 1936 ─ the year that specifications were set out in Great Britain 
for what would ultimately result in the Stirling, Halifax, and Lancaster ─ Luftwaffe 
planners were ahead of the British in at least one respect.  They had recognised 
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that bombers, heavy or medium, would require precise navigation and bombing 
aids.  Thus, while Royal Air Force bomber crews were still attempting to use 
‘Bradshaw’ methods and map read their way to the target, at least until the arrival 
of Gee in March 1942, Luftwaffe bomber crews, often captained by the navigator, 
had, since 1939, been equipped with accurate electronic navigation and bombing 
aids, X-Gerät (X-device) and Knickebein (crooked leg).12
Both these aids were developments of the Lorenz blind approach landing 
system,  but while the Knickebein system could be used by all aircraft fitted with 
the Lorenz blind landing receiver, and without the need for special crew training, 
the X-Gerät required both additional equipment and crew familiarisation. The first 
German bomber unit to be fitted with X-Gerät was Kampfgruppe 100 (Kgr 100).  
Path finding over the British Isles began on the night of 13/14 August 1940  but the 
greatest success came on the night of 14/15 November 1940 when aircraft of Kgr 
100 led 552 German bombers in a heavy and successful attack on Coventry.13
Indicative of a gap that had developed between those in the Air Ministry 
responsible for the direction of the bomber war, and those who nightly had to 
attempt to overcome the problems in the face of mortal danger, was an incident 
regarding these German beams.  The scientists dealing with the problem were 
investigating the possibility of flying down the beam and bombing the transmitter 
complex.  Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, who had worked in the radar section of 
the Signals Department, supported their efforts.  He wrote to a senior Air Staff 
officer in the Air Ministry recommending that action be taken.  He was rebuffed.  
The response Joubert received, dated 1 February 1941, was that the German 
beams appeared to be causing the British authorities to lose their sense of 
proportion.  They did not constitute a significant threat, he was informed, as they 
were only a navigation aid and barely useful even in that capacity.  “We use no 
beams ourselves” the writer continued, “but we bomb just as successfully as the 
Germans bomb, deep into Germany.”14 The senior officer respondent in the Air 
Ministry was the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Harris who, just over a 
year later, would become AOC Bomber Command. 
Path finding in the Royal Air Force was not the result of any blinding flash of 
inspiration by any one individual. Nor did it result from the examination of bombing 
methods employed by the Luftwaffe. Rather, path finding was employed by the 
Royal Air Force because if Bomber Command was to retain its position as a viable 
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offensive weapon the bombing results had to improve.  Bufton’s role in the 
establishment of the Path Finder Force was not as its inventor but as its champion.  
Without the pressure he applied, and the dogged persistence he displayed in 
pursuing his aim, even against the awesome authority of Harris, Bomber 
Command’s role in the war could well have been reduced with who knows what 
result.  
One of the first letters relating to the perceived need for some form of target 
locating force was that written on 1 February 1941 by D Dewdney, the civilian oil 
expert.  Late in 1940 he had occasion to visit several Bomber Command 
squadrons where he spoke with crew members.  He learned at first hand that 
individuals were calling for the establishment of some form of target finding force.  
Dewdney passed the request to Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, then head of 
Bomber Command.15 
Lord Cherwell was also early in the target finding force picture.  In 
September 1941, greatly disturbed at the Butt Report released the previous 
month, he wrote to Churchill.  He suggested that Bomber Command should  
 
re-examine most carefully the possibilities of making specially 
expert navigators, or bombers equipped with special navigation 
aids, fly ahead of the main body to light fires in the right region for 
the rest to home on, as the Germans do.16  
 
Cherwell continued in the same vein in February 1942.  His letter was to 
Portal this time and was prompted by what he considered ill-advised criticism of 
the efforts of Bomber Command in both the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords during debates on the war situation.  His argument was based on the need 
to be able to rely, in most circumstances, to get from ten to twenty bombers to 
what he termed the “right place.”  He lamented the lack of experimentation 
undertaken to find ways to ensure that more bombs found their targets and, as we 
saw earlier, suggested that one of the bomber groups, with someone like Air Vice-
Marshal Slessor in charge, be given the task of finding the target.17   
Portal, however, was early aware that positive action was essential.  He 
knew that Bomber Command had to improve its performance and he was 
prepared to offer suggestions as to how this might be achieved.  On 17 August 
1941, in a letter to Sir Henry Tizard, now working in the Ministry of Aircraft 
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Production, he had made clear that it was essential that the limited bombing effort 
should be seen to have positive effects.  His letter related to the future use of Gee 
navigational equipment.  Well aware that the aid would initially only be available in 
limited numbers, he suggested to Tizard that perhaps the best plan might be to 
emulate the methods employed by the Luftwaffe.  His suggested plan was to fit the 
equipment in aircraft manned by specially selected and trained crews who would 
create fires in the aiming point area for the guidance of the main bulk of the 
bomber force.18
Squadron Leader Morley, Bomber Operations 1, was of similar mind.  In a 
six page assessment of the night bombing policy being pursued by the Royal Air 
Force, he called for the techniques employed by the Luftwaffe to be duplicated by 
Bomber Command.  He pointed out that the German fire-raising crews leading the 
attack were specially trained and equipped airmen.  Their task was to find the 
selected target and place their incendiary loads as near to the aiming point as 
possible.  The resulting fires, initiated by these specialists of proven ability, would 
“act as a first class marker beacon to the main force of aircraft carrying H.E. 
bombs and it is strongly urged that we should adopt similar tactics.”19 
Nor was the urgent need for something to be done to improve bombing 
results confined to the squadrons and the Air Ministry.  The same understanding 
had also been reached by some in Bomber Command Headquarters at High 
Wycombe itself.  The Navigation Section, on 1 November 1941, offered their 
solution in a paper entitled ‘The Problem of Navigating to, Locating and Bombing 
of a Target by Night.’  After pointing out the difficulties and potential errors of dead 
reckoning navigation, map reading, radio position finding and astro navigation, 
they offered their solution. The paper called for the formation of “Squadrons 
specially trained and equipped for the task of target location.“20   It also stressed 
the importance of crew selection and the need for the hand-picked crews to be 
provided with the latest navigational and radio equipment on a priority basis.  The 
paper was distributed to the AOCs of 1, 3, 4 and 5 Groups and their comments 
invited. 
A major disadvantage under which Bomber Command suffered throughout 
the war was that Air Officers Commanding all the Bomber Groups, with one 
exception, lacked recent operational experience.  The exception was Air Vice-
Marshal Donald Bennett of No. 8 (Path Finder Force) Group, formed in January 
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1943.  An additional problem in November 1941 was that all the Group 
Commanders had been away from active flying appointments for at least nine 
years.  In the case of Air Vice-Marshal Sir John Slessor of 5 Group, the absence 
had been thirteen years.  Thus the practical lessons they had all learned in the 
Middle East, Iraq, and India, were not relevant to the problems facing the bomber 
crews in late 1941.  Nevertheless, their responses to the paper from Bomber 
Command Headquarters showed that some were prepared to read, listen and 
learn.  Their freedom of action under Harris from February 1942 was to be much 
more circumscribed.   
Responding to the paper, Air Vice-Marshal Robert Oxland, I Group, agreed 
that there was a  
 
strong case for the formation of target locating squadrons.  The 
possibility that the target locators will make a mistake and lead the 
‘followers’ astray is admitted but it is considered that occasional, 
perhaps frequent successes might . . . counter balance the 
failures.21     
 
Oxland felt that only above average crews should be selected for the target 
locating squadrons and that specialised training should be provided. 
Air Vice-Marshal Sir John Baldwin, 3 Group, also admitted the need for 
selected crews to lead bombing raids but he opposed the formation of special 
target locating squadrons.  He cited the loss of experience on front line squadrons, 
a lowering of esprit-de-corps, and the difficulties of providing replacement crews 
solely from the Operational Training Units.  His suggested solution was that the 
torch bearers should be selected crews in the normal front line squadrons.22    
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Roderick Carr, 4 Group, agreed that previous efforts 
with selected squadrons acting as fire-raisers had not always been successful.  
Crews, he continued, had been of average efficiency and were, in many cases, 
inexperienced.  Carr’s summation was that  
 
target finding Squadrons composed of selected and specially 
trained pilots, assisted by all the aids to navigation presently 
available, seems to be the best solution, and to offer the most 
favourable prospect of successful target location.23 
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Slessor, 5 Group, strongly opposed the establishment of special target 
locating squadrons.  He perceived problems with training the selected squadrons 
and asked why all crews could not be trained to do what was their duty ─ find the 
target.24   Too many crews, he argued, were staying at altitudes that made target 
identification impossible and too little time was spent in the target area in the effort 
to locate the aiming point.  Perhaps these criticisms underline the desirability of 
senior commanders having an appreciation of modern war.   When Slessor took 
command of 5 Group in May 1941 his most recent experience of night bombing 
had been in 1917 on the Arras Front.25  
The paper issued by the Navigation Section in Bomber Command was, 
however, welcomed by Bufton, who responded with a wide ranging analysis.26   
With regard to the establishment of a target finding force, he pointed out that even 
if the targets were not located accurately on every occasion, Bomber Command 
would be no worse off than it was at the present time.  If conditions made it 
possible for the target to be identified and marked then there was every possibility 
that the system would work as intended and the bombers would become an 
effective force. 
As far as crew selection for the proposed force was concerned, Bufton 
admitted that taking the best crews from Groups might well cause problems.  He 
made one concession.  Specially selected crews were desirable but they were not 
essential.  It was a view that he would later change.  He urged that the scheme be 
given a trial because he believed that the successes that would be achieved would 
bring about a change of attitude among the non-believing group commanders.  Of 
primary importance was the early establishment of the tactical organisation.  He 
also argued that the target finding force should be equipped with aircraft of the 
same type.  Aircraft of varying speed, weight carrying capability, and height 
limitations, created undesirable complications for planners.  Additionally, it should 
be so located that regular and frequent meetings and discussions could be held to 
formulate a common doctrine and build up understanding and mutual confidence. 
Although Bufton only assumed responsibility as Deputy Director of Bomber 
Operations on 14 November 1941, he was not idle during his first days at the Air 
Ministry.  As early as 5 November, while still only a supernumary, he wrote a 
minute suggesting ways in which he considered the efficiency of night attacks 
could be improved.27   He admitted that some squadrons had developed 
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techniques aimed at improving bombing results but such systems, he argued, 
were on too small a scale to significantly improve the overall efficiency, or 
accuracy, of the raids.  This particular minute highlighted the methods that he had 
initiated when leading No. 10 (Bomber) Squadron at Leeming.  These were that 
much greater use be made of flares and that an overall plan be made for each 
bombing raid.  Co-ordination of the bombing force was essential. 
Later in November Bufton again minuted Baker on the subject of tactical 
developments in Bomber Command, hammering the need for co-ordination of the 
bombing effort.  If the maximum effect was to be obtained the bombing force had 
to be organised and the specific requirement for each element of that force 
detailed.  Although he admitted that there would be opposition and prejudice, with 
each squadron considering itself at least as good as the next, he defined the 
requirement for a target finding force as imperative. His conclusion was that “the 
time is now ripe for the formation in Bomber Command of a ‘K. G. 100’ equivalent, 
and that the development of tactical methods and co-ordination . . . should be 
tackled energetically and immediately.”28
The day that Bufton wrote this minute he also wrote another to a staff 
member in the Directorate of Bomber Operations, Wing Commander Cleland.    
Entitled  ‘Daylight Bombing’ at Night,’29  this paper advised Cleland that plans were 
being considered for attacks to be headed by a small force of specially selected 
crews charged with the responsibility for locating the target and keeping it 
illuminated with a high concentration of flares.  To develop this plan he sought 
information from Cleland on the flare carrying capacity of various aircraft, could a 
large salvo of flares be released from small bomb containers, and how many flares 
could be carried in stowages within the fuselage adjacent to aircraft flare chutes?  
Both these papers were read by Baker, the Director of Bomber Operations, 
and he advised his deputy that the themes were well worth pursuing.  In order that 
they could be forwarded, he suggested that they be combined in one paper to be 
sent to Bomber Command.  
The paper that resulted, dated 29 November 1941, was Bufton’s outline for 
a target finding force.  He first pointed out that bombing results had deteriorated 
because aircrew casualties had meant that much of the pre-war experience had 
been lost.  Shorter training for replacements had meant the lowering of both target 
finding and bomb aiming standards.  Moreover, the flares that had barely been 
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adequate when bombing from 10,000 feet were ineffective when employed from 
the 15,000 feet at which the bombers had been forced to operate because of 
improved German searchlight and flak efficiency.  Tactics were also criticised.  
Although crews were still given precise aiming points, even an individual building 
in a city, these were usually impossible to identify and crews had settled for 
attempting to drop their bombs within the built-up areas.  As far as tactical 
planning was concerned, Bufton argued that apart from one or two joint routing 
attempts, inefficiently carried out, there had been nothing.30
In this important letter Bufton pointed out that for bombing results to 
improve, problems arising within twenty miles of the target must be solved.  They 
were the location, identification, illumination and marking of the precise aiming 
point.  He suggested that the co-ordinated and extensive use of flares might well 
provide the answer.  Individually flares were virtually useless but if used en masse 
their true value might be realised. 
Tactics were Bufton’s next consideration.  Although all crews were trained 
to a particular standard there were always some above the standard, a few below, 
with the majority average.  His argument was that if his flare homing beacon plan 
was adopted it was essential that the initial target finding force consisted of above 
average crews.  He also admitted that numerous arguments might be raised 
opposing his suggestions.  There were many factors to be considered.  They 
related to training, development of ideas, the size of the force – four or five 
squadrons were suggested – and the necessity for the latest in navigational and 
bombing aids to be provided, even if they were in short supply. 
In concluding his submission, Bufton recommended that the proposed 
system be given an operational trial immediately.  But, indicative of the state of flux 
then existing in the higher command of the Royal Air Force, and the slowness of 
the wheels within Bomber Command, the first trial of Bufton’s flare technique did 
not take place until the night of 3/4 March 1942.31   On that night the Renault 
works in Boulogne-Billancourt, just west of Paris, were attacked with significant 
success.  This target, lacking flak defences, was accurately bombed in good 
weather and in full moonlight conditions, from a low level, and required no 
penetration of German territory.  What it indicated was that there might well be 
merit in Bufton’s ideas.  But, as time was to show, considerable opposition still 
remained to be overcome.   
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Paradoxically, in the light of subsequent events, the Boulogne-Billancourt 
attack occurred shortly after Harris became AOC Bomber Command.  Although it 
did not convince him that precision attacks were possible, it should perhaps have 
alerted him to the possibility that suggestions of some value were being generated 
in the Directorate of Bomber Operations.  He subsequently provided few reasons 
to show that any lesson had been learned. 
Throughout the winter of 1941 and 1942 there was a mounting chorus of 
criticism directed at the strategic bombing offensive.  It came from politicians, army 
and navy circles, and the public at large, and was widely publicised in what is now 
known as the tabloid press.  Bufton was of the opinion that it was useless to 
attempt to allay the doubting Thomases either by promises of what might be done 
in the future, or what had been done in the past.  Bombing to date had been 
confused, inaccurate, and of very doubtful value.  The unsatisfactory results 
achieved, he observed in a letter to Baker, were the result of the lack of tactical 
direction of the bomber forces.  Unless immediate steps were taken to improve the 
situation Bomber Command risked losing its pre-eminence as an offensive 
weapon.  In addition, the bombing policy pursued by the Air Staff would be seen to 
have failed.32
Bufton called for personal disagreements and prejudices to be put aside 
and the opportunity taken immediately to form a target finding force.  With the new 
equipment now becoming available to Bomber Command there was no reason, he 
believed, why the improved bombing results so urgently required, should not be 
obtained.  “Form a target finding force, cut away the dead wood throughout 
Bomber Command” he advised, “and so tighten the sinews of control that the 
bomber force may be wielded and directed as a dynamic, flexible, hard hitting 
instrument.“33
In a covering minute that Baker attached to Bufton’s letter when it was 
forwarded to Bottomley, he made it very clear that he strongly supported his 
subordinate.  He was unsure whether or not Portal should see the letter and left it 
to Bottomley to decide.  “But,“ he concluded, “I am sure something in these terms 
needs to be put to the C in C if the Command is to achieve the high aims towards 
which our plans are laid.”34 
Harris, too, was concerned at the mounting criticism directed at Bomber 
Command.  His uneasiness was related to the possible effects such criticism might 
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have on the morale of the bomber crews. He suggested  “that those who make 
these wild and unfounded charges so lightly, and so often solely to serve ends and 
interests, be now instructed to reckon well the cost.“35   He made, however, no 
promises for either improvements in results or changes in tactics. 
Early in March 1942, in an unsigned letter, the Station Commander at Royal 
Air Force, Feltwell, called for the formation of what he called a “Bomber 
Commando Force.”36   His suggestion, addressed to Group Captain Gray, 
Headquarters No. 3 Group, was that two squadrons should be formed, comprising 
specially selected crews chosen for their offensive spirit, wide experience, and 
superior skills.  His belief was that the results such a force could achieve would 
improve morale throughout Bomber Command.  He made no suggestion that they 
should form any type of target finding force but rather that they should operate 
either individually or as a pair.  His letter evoked no response. 
Harris’s only suggestion for improving bombing results was that all Groups 
should aim at intensifying the bombing effort in good weather conditions and 
reducing operations when conditions were either doubtful or bad.37  Although the 
conservation of the bomber forces ordered by Churchill on 11 November 194138 
had been lifted by the Directive issued on 14 February 1942, Harris was well 
aware that the critical crew position in Bomber Command left little margin for 
extravagant or risky ventures.     
Early in March 1942, Baker, concerned at the lack of progress, asked 
Bufton to briefly summarise the arguments supporting the establishment of a 
target finding force.  Bufton began by declaring that the bomber offensive had 
been ineffective because the individual tactics employed, using sub-standard 
flares, had failed to concentrate the bombing effort.39   Additionally, there had been 
delays in instituting changes while Bomber Command awaited the arrival of Harris 
and until the first operations using Gee had been carried out.40
Bufton next pointed out that to achieve success it was necessary to co-
ordinate the incendiary and flare parties in any attack and that they should be 
briefed together and have a complete understanding of each other’s roles.  This, 
he argued, could only be attained by the establishment of a Target Finding Force 
made up of highly skilled and determined crews under the leadership of a specially 
selected and gifted officer with operational experience.  Six squadrons were 
initially nominated for the force – including No. 75 (Bomber) Squadron, the only 
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New Zealand unit in Bomber Command.  Each of the nominated squadrons was to 
be bolstered, where necessary, by posting in one or two first class crews from 
other Bomber Command squadrons.   
Bufton’s paper admitted that his proposals could lead to a dilution of quality 
crews in some squadrons.  However, he reasoned, any dilution would be slight 
and would occur only once because later replacement crews would be selected 
from the top crews graduating from the Operational Training Units.41   Change was 
essential, he continued, because even the best crews were becoming 
disheartened at the increasingly obvious lack of success.  Although the recent raid 
on Boulonge-Billancourt had raised morale, the failure at Essen on the night of 8/9 
March 1942, despite the availability for the first time of Gee, had had a dampening 
effect.  The paper called for the immediate establishment of a target finding force.  
Such a force, Bufton claimed, would raise morale throughout Bomber Command 
and “the increase in their efficiency and determination would eclipse any small 
effect that dilution would produce.“42   
On 15 March 1942 Bufton and Baker were invited to High Wycombe to 
attend a meeting with Harris, his Group Commanders and their Senior Staff 
Officers, to discuss the target finding force.43   That morning, prior to the official 
meeting, Baker and Bufton met privately with Harris.  During their early 
confrontation Harris explained what he saw as potential difficulties with the 
formation of a corps d’élite.  He also mentioned that the transfer of highly qualified 
crews to the target finding force could jeopardise their promotion prospects.  At 
this point Bufton thumped the table.  “Sir,” he exclaimed, “you are not going to win 
the war that way.  These chaps aren’t interested in promotion.  They don’t know 
whether they are going to be alive tomorrow.”44   Harris then looked at his watch 
and suggested it was time for lunch. 
After lunch the full meeting was opened by Harris, who declared that before 
lunch he had almost been assaulted in his own office over the question of the 
target finding force.  He then informed the gathering that he was implacably 
opposed to the formation of any such force.  Opinions were then invited from the 
floor.  Apart from Bufton and the officer detailed as secretary, no other at the 
meeting had operational experience of the problems being encountered in the 
night bomber offensive.  Few questions were asked and the Group Commanders 
then gave their unanimous support to Harris. 
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Without possibly putting their appointments at risk, could they have done 
otherwise?  Regrettably, their enforced support of Harris’s position is strong 
evidence that they lacked the moral courage later to be displayed by Air Vice-
Marshal Sir Alec Coryton.  All were no doubt aware that they held their positions 
only for as long as they were required by Harris.  They also were aware that Harris 
resented opinions that conflicted with his own and in this case he had made his 
position very clear.  Even so, it must be remembered that in November 1941, 
Oxland of No. 1 Group and Carr of No. 4 Group had both supported the notion of a 
target finding force, while Baldwin of No. 3 Group, although opposed to the 
formation of a target finding force, had believed that there was a need for selected 
crews to lead bombing raids.   Their volte face could be considered, perhaps 
uncharitably, to have rendered their responses invalid.  Nevertheless, no matter 
how it was contrived, Harris could still claim that he enjoyed the full support of all 
his Group Commanders.  Of all those at this momentous meeting only Slessor of 
No. 5 Group, who in opposing the suggestion of a target finding force had at least 
been consistent, was prepared to admit later to Bufton that in supporting Harris he 
had been wrong.45 
Bufton’s feelings after this meeting on 15 March 1942 must only have been 
those of frustration.  The Butt Report had confirmed what he and many others 
already knew: the bombing war was not being won.  What was even worse was 
that nothing was apparently being done to remedy the situation.  In order to 
provide an identifiable aiming point targets had to be located and marked.   
Bomber crews knew this and their calls for some form of target finding force were 
supported by both Lord Cherwell and Sir Henry Tizard.  In addition, at least two 
Group Commanders, staff in the Navigation Section in Bomber Command 
Headquarters, and the Directorate of Bomber Operations, were all agreed that a 
target finding force was essential.  Thus, Bufton must have gone to the meeting 
with Harris in March with high hopes.  Perhaps it was at this first meeting that he 
came to appreciate the strength of the opposition provided by the AOC Bomber 
Command.  The support that he had been tacitly promised by Carr and Oxland 
faded in the face of Harris’s vehemence and Bufton must have appreciated that it 
was going to be a long and difficult struggle. 
The following morning Bufton met Harris on the Air Ministry steps and they 
walked up together.  Before parting Harris invited Bufton to put on paper any 
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further ideas he might have regarding the target finding force and they would be 
considered.  
The next day, Bufton sent Harris the first in a series of letters expounding 
his ideas, supported by staff of the Directorate of Bomber Operations, on the 
subject of the target finding force.46   It was the first salvo in a paper war in the 
corridors of power.  The introduction stated that the ideas had been maturing for 
some time and were not the result of any flash of inspiration.  They were the 
carefully considered lessons he had learned as both a squadron and station 
commander, together with the continuing exchange of information with personnel 
still employed on bombing operations.  He confirmed that when he arrived at the 
Air Ministry in November 1941 the subject of a target finding force had already 
been given considerable thought. His initial involvement had been the 
recommendation that a vastly greater number of illuminating flares would increase 
the number of crews able to identify the target and improve bombing results.  The 
immediate and urgent requirements were the co-ordination of the bomber force to 
achieve concentration, and the formation of a target finding force. 
Bufton also admitted that there could be difficulties.  One was possible 
dilution of experience in squadrons not selected for the target finding force.  This 
could be easily overcome, he explained, by the fact that no more than one crew 
would be withdrawn from each of the unselected squadrons.  Later replacements 
for the new force would come from carefully chosen crews graduating from the 
Operational Training Units.  Thus, any small dilution would be non-recurring. 
The advantages foreseen following the formation of a target finding force, 
Bufton claimed, far outweighed the admitted possible criticisms.  With target 
location and marking the responsibility of six closely located squadrons, the 
development of tactical methods would eventuate after discussions and trials.  
Refinements would also follow as the systems evolved.  Then, enlarging on the 
theme which remained constant in the Directorate of Bomber Operation’s 
repertoire, Bufton pointed out that precision targets such as oil plants, and others 
beyond Gee range like the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt, would become 
vulnerable.  He was clearly not yet fully aware of Harris’s commitment to area 
attacks. 
A warning note was also sounded in this first letter to Harris.  Where 
previously the tactics employed had been dependent on individual ability, the 
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pendulum had swung and all Bomber Command’s eggs were now placed in the 
Gee basket.  The aid had been long awaited and great hopes had been placed on 
its usefulness as both a navigational and bombing aid.  But Bufton warned that 
Gee might possibly have a short operational life  
 
which will result in a reversion to our former ineffective tactics.  We 
must  exploit TR133547  fully and immediately by coupling with it 
the highest degree of operational ability . . . if this were done 
through the medium of a target finding force, the latter would 
remain an effective spear-head,  when TR1335, had been denied to 
us as a target finding device.48   
 
No immediate response from Harris was received from this first letter so, 
early in April 1942, the Directorate of Bomber Operations enlisted the support of 
the Directorate of Intelligence, Operations (D of I [O]).  In a paper, jointly prepared, 
they commented on the criticisms voiced with regard to the perceived failures of 
the bombing offensive.  Although better results were promised for the future, they 
argued that unless outstanding improvements became evident, there would be 
another calling to account. In their opinion, Bomber Command had been “reluctant 
to learn by experience.“49
The threat, the paper continued, was that if Bomber Command’s results fell 
below the anticipated expectations 
 
there is a very grave risk of our striking force being subjected to a 
constitutional change which disregards the accepted principles of 
the role of a bomber force.  This might prove calamitous in spite of 
an apparent justification for the disintegration of Bomber Command.  
There are powerful agents at work to bring this about.50
 
Indeed there were. Mention has already been made of the mounting 
criticism directed at Bomber Command, the failure to expand, the diversion of 
effort, and the Butt Report, which had showed that bombs were not hitting the 
target.  But, in addition by March 1942, the war situation had also changed.  The 
German drive in Russia had been halted, not least by winter snow, and America, 
with her vast manpower and industrial resources, was now involved.  America’s 
entry however was a double edged sword.  Her insistence that American aircraft 
be crewed by American airmen meant that Bomber Command expansion was 
further hindered. There were also the diversions to which Bomber Command was 
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continually subjected: bombers and crews to the Middle and Far East, squadrons 
to Coastal Command, and the absolute necessity to win the war at sea.  It was 
pointless to build an enormous bomber fleet if the war was lost at sea.  Thus, with 
Bomber Command’s future role remaining ill-defined, what was required within the 
Royal Air Force was a unanimity of aim.  Instead, even between the Air Ministry 
and Bomber Command, there was persistent discord and, all too often, acrimony.  
Doubts flourished and arguments raged concerning the form to be taken for the 
strategic bombing offensive.   
In April 1942 hopes had been raised by Lord Cherwell.  Earlier that year two 
scientists, Solly Zuckerman and J B Bernal, carried out an examination of the 
effects of German bombing on Birmingham and Hull.  Anticipating their report, 
Cherwell prepared a minute for Churchill.51   It was a Trenchardian vision and a 
ringing endorsement of the area bombing campaign inherited by Harris under the 
terms of the Directive issued on 14 February 1942.   Unfortunately, as we have 
already seen,52 although the mathematics were clear and simple, the numbers 
used and the conclusions reached, were wrong.  Tizard, in his response, took the 
opportunity to remind Cherwell that under the law of diminishing returns, many 
bombs would simply add to the damage already created and provide nothing 
additional.53   Cherwell’s paper had summarised hopes but failed to convert the 
sceptics.54   The bombing path to victory remained ill-defined. 
Equally disappointing, for the optimists anyway who had hoped for at least 
something, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was the lack of guidance able to 
be provided by Mr Justice Singleton.55   His summation of the bombing offensive, 
presented on 20 May 1942, was that he did not think that it 
 
ought to be regarded as of itself sufficient to win the war or to 
produce decisive results; the area is too vast for the effort we can 
put forth; on the other hand, if Germany does not achieve great 
success on land before the winter it may well turn out to have a 
decisive effect, and in the meantime, if carried out on the lines 
suggested, it must impede Germany and help Russia.56   
 
Singleton’s suggestions as to possible outcomes were all heavily laden with 
provisos.  The vagueness of the Report meant that rather than provide the desired 
ray of hope, it simply exacerbated the arguments that raged concerning bombing 
policy. 
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In forwarding the joint paper prepared in April by Bufton and the Directorate 
of Intelligence to Sir Wilfrid Freeman, the Vice-Chief of Air Staff, Bottomley, 
signified his strong support for the formation of a target finding force.57   According 
to Anthony Furse, it was about this time that Freeman also became a supporter of 
the campaign for the formation of a target finding force.58   Bufton was gathering 
powerful allies. 
Late in March 1942 staff in the Directorate of Bomber Operations 
approached the question of the target finding force from another angle.  Several, 
including the Deputy Director, had close contact with squadron and station 
commanders with wide and recent operational experience.  A paper was prepared 
setting out why it was considered essential to form a target finding force, the 
advantages of such a force together with the objections that had been raised, and 
this was sent to these contacts.  Much of the paper was a repetition of that which, 
sent earlier to Harris, had failed to evince a direct response.  Two questions were 
asked.  Did the recipient generally agree with the proposal to form the force and 
operate under the conditions outlined, or were the objections sound enough to 
abandon the scheme?  Criticisms and suggestions were invited.59
A later criticism by Harris, that by contacting Bomber Command members 
directly without going through the Air Officer Commanding, Bufton had broken 
Service conventions can be rejected, because Portal was also involved in this 
exercise.  As made clear earlier, Portal had added four lines of his own noting that  
the corps d’élite principle is only bad when “all units have the same job.“60    Portal 
then continued by pointing out that the force would have a different job and should 
therefore be regarded as a “specialist   force and not a ‘Corps d’elite.’ “61     Portal’s 
addition indicated that he accepted the paper and questions as a reasonable 
exercise. 
Bufton’s papers contain sixteen responses to this request; without exception 
they all vigorously supported his call for a target finding force.  Among those who 
replied were several who would in time be acknowledged as true ‘Bomber Barons’.  
They included the future head of the Pathfinder Force, Don Bennett; J B (‘Willie’) 
Tait later of 617 (Bomber) Squadron and Tirpitz fame with his DSO and three Bars 
and DFC; Trevor Freeman, a New Zealander who had joined the Royal Air Force 
in 1936 and who, after winning the DSO and DFC and Bar and having completed 
60 bomber operations in Europe, was killed in action in the Pacific in December 
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1943; the legendary, one-armed, G A (Gus) Walker; H A Constantine, who would 
later command 5 Group and J H (Groucho) Marks, destined to die in September 
1942 as a Path Finder and Officer Commanding No. 35 (Bomber) Squadron. 
One recipient working in 3 Group Headquarters, who agreed fully with the 
paper, showed it to Baldwin, the Group Commander.  He commented he did not 
expect there would be any great improvement by employing a Target Finding 
Force.  His belief was that Bufton was being too optimistic.  “Perhaps” he 
continued, 
 
his operational experience has become a little dimmed since he 
occupied the office chair at the A. M. and allowed his suspicions of 
Group and Operational Station Commanders to get the better of 
him! 62   
 
When one considers that Bufton had been away from the operational arena 
for less than six months, and Group Commanders had no operational experience 
of modern war conditions, the sarcasm rings somewhat hollow.  What Baldwin’s 
note did make clear to Bufton was that the long-held prejudices of senior non-
operational commanders were not going to be easily broken down. 
Because of the overwhelming support he received, Bufton decided, despite 
the promise of secrecy that he had given, that Harris should see all the considered 
opinions of a cross section of operational commanders.  He acknowledged that 
many of the replies were outspoken but requested that Harris study them 
impartially and believed that they would prove to be enlightening.63 
Harris’s first acknowledgement of both Bufton’s original letter of 17 March 
1942 and the follow up of 11 April 1942 enclosing the operational staff’s 
considerations, was dated 17 April 1942.64   His response confirmed his dogged 
determination to resist change and preserve the status quo.  Harris admitted that 
he had found the letters interesting but argued that the writers were not in a 
position to be able to appreciate wider concerns.  He also confirmed that the 
Group Commanders and the majority of Station Commanders, who had again 
discussed the matter on 16 April, remained opposed to the formation of a target 
finding force.  With cameras becoming more widely available, he continued, “the 
squadron or squadrons producing the best results in finding and photographing the 
target will be designated for the ensuing month as the Target Finding Force.“65 
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Harris then went on to claim that over the preceding two months the 
designated targets were usually being located.  He also maintained, as we also 
saw earlier, that thanks to Gee “the majority of our bombs [were] landing usefully 
in built up areas of the Ruhr reasonably close to the intended target.“66   In fact 
official reports made a nonsense of his claims.  In eight raids on Essen from 8 
March to 12 April 1942, ninety per cent of the bombs fell between five and one 
hundred miles from the target.  In three of these raids forty-nine photographs were 
taken but none within five miles of the target.  With regard to an attack on 
Gennevilliers on the night of 5/6 April, a short range, distinctive, and lightly 
defended target, eighty-eight per cent of the photographs were not of the target.  
For a raid on Hamburg on the night of 8/9 April, 272 aircraft took part but of the 
seven photographs taken, none were within five miles of the target.  Three were 
plotted between thirty and seventy-five miles from the city.67   These were facts 
available to Harris but in order to foil calls for a target finding force he claimed that 
the bomber offensive was succeeding. 
There is, however, the possibility of self-delusion.  Harris was a convinced 
believer in the effectiveness of the area bombing tactics.  Did he actually accept 
the exaggerated claims, provided for public consumption, of Bomber Command’s 
successes?  Conclusive evidence was readily available that the destruction being 
claimed was not being achieved.  What information was being withheld from 
Churchill and the War Cabinet?  What did Churchill mean when he informed Portal 
that he was “pleased with the weekly digest of Bomber Command’s activities“68  
that he was receiving?  Was it because of the successes that were claimed, or 
was it simply because he was receiving regular bulletins?  It is inconceivable that 
Churchill would have been happy each week to have received a list of failures.   
In his first response to Bufton, Harris had asserted that with regard to the 
Target Finding Force he had an open mind.  Bufton therefore assumed that Harris 
was prepared to listen to further arguments, so in May he wrote a further letter.  
Firstly, using the figures from official reports quoted earlier, he argued that the 
bomber offensive was not achieving the satisfactory results that Harris had 
claimed.   Secondly, while Harris had warned that bomber crew morale would 
lower as a direct consequence of the formation of a target finding force, Bufton 
believed that it would be raised.  Crews, he observed, would have a greater 
guarantee of success.  As part of a target finding force, he continued, they would 
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be personally involved and others would aspire to join them.  Promotion, he 
suggested, did not enter largely into the minds of operational aircrew.  Most were 
“hostilities only” volunteers so did not have a career to consider.  Besides which, 
the possibility of imminent death tended to concentrate the mind to the exclusion 
of such minor matters as promotion.69
Bufton also opposed the suggestion made by Harris that attacks be led by 
crews that had in the previous month obtained the best bombing photographs.  He 
agreed that the selected squadrons might well have a limited number of 
exceptional crews but their best efforts could well be nullified by others of a lesser 
standard, marking places other than the specified target.  The fundamental defect 
he identified was that chance might very well enable an inferior squadron to obtain 
good photographs and thus become leader.   Having only two or three good crews 
in the leader squadron, Bufton argued, would not provide either sufficient 
illumination to identify the target, or a large enough conflagration to attract the 
other crews.  Moreover, because the selected squadrons would not necessarily be 
closely situated, and because there would be constant change, there would be no 
development of either tactical methods or techniques. 
In this long letter Bufton also debated whether or not the Group 
Commanders fully appreciated the gravity of the situation.  Had the question 
regarding the formation of a target finding force been put impartially to Station 
Commanders?  Were those consulted ex-operational commanders, or were they 
senior officers from another era, lacking experience of modern war?  It was 
Bufton’s expressed opinion that too many decisions regarding the bomber war 
were made by older officers, widely experienced in administrative and 
organisational matters but unwilling to accept the advice of younger officers with 
hard-earned operational experience.  Attitudes that cramped and frustrated both 
imagination and the development of ideas proposed by those aware of the 
problems of modern war, he suggested, were behind the continuing refusal to 
create a target finding force.  He called for the marriage of the “mature judgement 
and wide experience of the older officers with the imagination, drive and 
operational knowledge of the younger.”70 
The letter closed with an apology for the frankness of the views expressed.  
It had been written, Bufton explained, only because of his deep concern for the 
success of the bomber offensive.71 
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No direct reply to this letter has been located in the Harris, Portal or Bufton 
Papers but Saundby, Harris’s Senior Air Staff Officer, was concerned enough to  
request a staff member in Bomber Command Headquarters to examine and 
comment upon the contents.  Wing Commander N W D Marwood-Elton did so on 
11 May 1942.  His first comment was that although the writer was “obviously 
biased”72 the conclusions that had been drawn could, on several counts, be 
justified.  Marwood-Elton then compared Bufton’s figures regarding bombing 
photographs with those from the Operational Research Section in Bomber 
Command.  Although there were minor differences, he admitted, they were not 
enough to invalidate the overall claims.  With regard to two successful attacks, he 
believed, they constituted “a good argument for a target locating force.“73     
Marwood-Elton then attempted a delicate balancing act.  Poor bombing 
results were being obtained, he argued, because of faulty navigation, bad weather, 
the enemy’s use of decoys, the strength of the defences, and inaccurate bomb 
aiming.  He agreed that the crews that most often located the target were usually 
those who determined squadron morale.  However, he continued, if they were 
posted to a target finding force, although the number of crews who would locate 
the target under the first three reasons would increase, the number failing to find 
the target under the last two would also increase.  His summation was that, even if 
a target finding force was established, “on the balance we would not be much 
better off.“74   It was a somewhat incongruous finding. 
Nevertheless it was an assessment much to Harris’s liking.  On Marwood-
Elton’s paper there is a hand-written annotation: “No further action.”75
Later in May 1942 staff in the Directorate of Bomber Operations prepared 
another paper expressing concern at the apparent lack of tactical direction in the 
bomber offensive.  The results obtained, they affirmed, indicated that neither 
aircraft nor crews had been employed in a manner likely to achieve their fullest 
potential.  A weakness in the control and guidance provided by the Air Staff 
contributed but the primary problem was the failure of Bomber Command “to 
assume full responsibility for the tactical direction and control of the bomber force 
as a single and co-ordinated instrument.“76   In addition, it appeared that tactical 
ideas proposed by the Air Staff after wide consultation, had almost without 
exception, been ignored.  The failure by Bomber Command to implement the 
incendiary plan embodied in the Directive of 25 October 1941 was a classic 
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example.  The fires that were started at Lübeck on the night of 28/29 March 1942, 
even though the attack was less than half the scale demanded in the original 
incendiary plan, should have provided convincing evidence to Bomber Command 
that the scheme was worth pursuing.  Instead, Harris had discounted the 
conflagration at Lübeck, citing it as an aberration.77
The major Air Staff failure cited was that nothing had been done to ensure 
that Directives, issued on behalf of the Air Staff, were fully and effectively 
implemented.  Equally, it was considered that the control exercised by the Air Staff 
over Bomber Command had been lax in the extreme.  This had meant that 
Bomber Command’s delegation of responsibility to Groups had gone unchecked.  
Consequently, when it was at last appreciated in Bomber Command that tactical 
failures called for immediate remedies, Air Vice-Marshal Saundby, and the Group 
Senior Air Staff Officers, lacked the knowledge and the operational experience to 
either diagnose the problem or provide the appropriate responses. 
This May 1942 paper called for only the best men, regardless of age or 
seniority, to fill key positions.  It also maintained that those officers responsible for 
tactical control must have had operational experience.  Once staffing matters had 
been settled, the paper continued, it was essential that the Air Staff, backed by 
Portal, became more closely involved in the day to day running of the bomber 
offensive.  Next, Bomber Command itself had to take a much greater cognisance 
of suggestions and advice initiated by the Air Staff.  It was also essential that the 
direction of the bomber force be centralised so that Bomber Command was in firm 
control of the night’s bombing efforts rather than either Groups or even individual 
squadrons.  The aim, the paper urged, must be to replace Group parochialism, so 
very evident, with a totally unified bomber force.   
Finally, the paper submitted, although the suggested moves struck at the 
heart of some of the problems facing Bomber Command, they were not 
necessarily going to provide quick cures.  In the field of tactics immediate action 
was essential if adequate and effective concentration was to be achieved against 
heavily defended targets.  At this point the paper took up the refrain that had been 
heard before.  Without mentioning the words “target finding force” it called for a 
 
special force composed of the most able and determined crews.  
This  force, with every new navigational and scientific aid at its 
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disposal, would develop its own specialised technique for fulfilling 
its role of finding, illuminating and marking the target for the less 
skilful crews which  constitute the large majority of the bomber 
force.78 
 
Although this paper was largely prepared by staff in the Directorate of 
Bomber Operations, they had not worked in isolation.  Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid 
Freeman, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, was also involved. Aware that the paper 
would ultimately be sent to Bomber Command Headquarters, he had suggested 
changes to the draft, saying that “I think your only way with Bert is to treat him 
rough.”79   Only fifteen days later Freeman did himself what he had suggested to 
Bufton.  In a reply to Harris concerning armoured Lancasters, he confessed that 
after eighteen months he had become accustomed to Harris’s “truculent style, 
loose expression and flamboyant hyperbole“ and that he would now be glad “ if 
you would carry out the orders given to you.“80   Undoubtedly others in the Air 
Ministry should have followed Freeman’s example.  Few ever did. 
That all was not going well with the bomber offensive was admitted by 
Harris on 22 May 1942 in a letter to Oxland, AOC No. 1 Group.  Photographic 
evidence available to Harris showed that despite aircrew claims to have severely 
bombed Mannheim, damage to the city following a raid on the night of 19/20 May 
was negligible.  Local forests and decoy fires had borne the brunt of the attack.  
This same letter also discussed the “hopeless” bombing of Rostock on the night of 
23/24 April 1942, when little damage had been done to the city.  Early arrivals had 
started fires short of the target and the main energy of the bombing force had been 
expended on “inoffensive villages, in some cases many miles from the target 
Area.”81   As the Official History suggests, this particular letter contradicts the 
claims made by Harris to Bufton as to the “satisfactory nature”82   of the bombing 
offensive.    Rather, it supports the efforts being made by Bufton and others to 
develop means whereby Bomber Command could justify its continued existence,  
an existence which Harris admitted in this same letter was under threat unless 
inefficiencies and “inability to achieve effective work”83   were eradicated.  Harris, 
however, gave no indication that any changes were in the pipe line.  Rather, he 
looked for improvements in the performance of the bomber crews. 
The next salvo in the target finding force war was contained in a paper 
prepared by Bufton and Morley and filed as an Air Staff Paper on 25 May 1942.  In 
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essence, it was a repeat of the demi-official letter Bufton had sent to Harris, at 
Harris’s invitation, on 17 March 1942.  As an Air Staff Paper it was therefore given 
the tacit, if not the acknowledged, support of Portal.  As well as repeating earlier 
calls concerning the requirements of a Target Finding Force, the opportunity was 
taken to refute the system, instituted by Harris, of appointing raid leaders each 
month on the basis of successful bombing photographs.  According to Bufton and 
Morley’s Paper the system was doomed to fail.  Target location, illumination, and 
marking, required understanding and co-ordination between crews, and adherence 
to a standard operating procedure.   Although a small number of crews from the 
lead squadrons would possibly locate the target, in the writers’ opinion, the 
majority would only position potential decoys.84   
The arguments in this paper were based on the firm belief that there was no 
half-way house as far as a Target Finding Force was concerned. Harris’s claim 
that morale in Bomber Command would fall because some squadrons might lose 
their best crews was rejected.  Bufton and Morley also again rejected the claim 
that the possible loss of promotion was a viable argument against the formation of 
a desperately required force.  Failure to take positive action, the paper made clear, 
would mean the failure of the bombing offensive.  Diversion of the bomber force to 
other ends would be inevitable and could neither truthfully nor logically be 
opposed.  Time, they stressed, was of vital importance.  Their conclusion made 
bleak reading.   Unless the Target Finding Force was formed immediately, it 
threatened, “the doctrine of strategic bombing will remain unsubstantiated.“85
At the end of May 1942 Air Commodore Ellwood, Bufton’s predecessor as 
Deputy Director of Bombing Operations, also pleaded for the formation of a Target 
Finding Force.  At the time that he wrote his letter he was Assistant Commandant 
at the RAF Staff College where he had attended lectures delivered by both 
Bottomley and Saundby relating to the bomber offensive. What had disturbed 
Ellwood was that Bottomley had hinted that resistance to change within Bomber 
Command, evident in late 1941, still existed.  Furthermore, he had been greatly 
disturbed by Saundby’s arguments as to the reasons for rejecting the proposals to 
form a Target Finding Force.  It appeared to Ellwood that advice and direction 
provided by the Air Ministry was either being ignored or rejected.  Bomber 
Command, by accepting the requirement for raid leaders, had conceded the need 
for specialisation.  The differences between the Air Ministry and Bomber 
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Command, as he saw them, were based not on principles but rather on methods.  
Ellwood re-examined all the arguments against the formation of a Target Finding 
Force including the imagined problems of a corps d’élite, administrative difficulties, 
and the claim by some that Bomber Command already had too many specialist 
units.  He concluded that it would be “manifestly absurd “86 for Bomber Command 
not to take the final step and form a Target Finding Force.   
Early in June 1942 Bottomley minuted Freeman concerning Harris’s 
continued opposition to the formation of a Target finding Force.  He suggested that 
a paper, drawn up in the Directorate of Bomber Operations, outlining current 
thinking on the subject, be sent to Harris inviting his detailed criticism.87   Freeman, 
on the basis of past  experience, believed that it would be a waste of time as it 
would only result in yet another protracted correspondence with little prospect of 
progress.  In a note to Portal, he suggested a conference be held to discuss the 
subject attended by three officers from Bomber Command and another three from 
the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff’s (Operations) Department.88   Portal agreed 
with the suggestion and Harris was advised that the conference was provisionally 
scheduled for 11 June 1942 and he was invited to bring one or two of his best 
squadron commanders to the meeting.  The meeting was destined never to take 
place. 
More ammunition for Bottomley over the question of a Target Finding Force 
was provided by a letter from Tizard prior to the planned conference.  A copy of 
the Air Staff Paper, The Target Finding Force, dated 25 May 1942, had been sent 
to Tizard and he responded positively. “I think” he observed, “that if you are to get 
worthwhile results in the bomber offensive you will have to develop a highly trained 
and efficient target finding force.“89   
Perhaps in an effort to short circuit the Air Staff’s designs, Harris, on 10 
June 1942, called a meeting of his own at Bomber Command Headquarters.  He 
chaired the meeting and in attendance were the Air Officers Commanding Nos. 3, 
4, and 5 Groups, the Senior Air Staff Officer from No. 1 Group, an operational 
squadron commander from each of 1, 3, 4, and 5 Groups, a scientist, B G 
Dickens, and a civilian, G A Roberts, the Radio Operational Research Officer at 
Bomber Command Headquarters.90
In opening the meeting, Harris explained that before he was to discuss with 
Portal the subject of the Target Finding Force, he wanted to confirm the attitude 
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prevalent throughout the Command.  Harris then claimed that he believed 
bombing accuracy had improved following the introduction of Gee, although 
special difficulties remained with targets in the Ruhr such as Essen.  Perhaps, 
suggested Harris, the problems might be “cured if it were possible to form a target 
finding force of sufficient size composed entirely of experts.“91    Some who heard 
these words from Harris may have thought that perhaps his attitude had softened.  
They were to be rapidly disabused.  He then explained that it was impossible to 
form a specialist force because the removal of the best crews from squadrons to 
form the force would have an appalling effect on the morale of the remainder.  
Moreover, because foreign and colonial squadrons were not available for 
selection, and because some squadrons were re-equipping, there were only ten or 
twelve squadrons available to provide replacement crews.  His final point was that 
crews not selected for the force would get rapid promotion, whereas those chosen 
would find that competition meant promotion was slow. 
Baldwin of No. 3 Group and Carr of No. 4 Group both agreed with Harris in 
opposing the formation of a Target Finding Force.  Coryton of No. 5 Group 
favoured the system in use of selecting raid leaders on the basis of recent 
successful bombing photographs.  Of the four squadron commanders present at 
the meeting, two, Freeman of No. 3 Group and ‘Groucho’ Marks of No. 4 Group, 
had previously enthusiastically supported Bufton’s call for a Target Finding Force.  
The minutes of the meeting give no indication that their opinions were even 
requested. 
Harris’s summation in closing the meeting was that crews were to be told 
that the bombing offensive had created massive damage in Germany and that 
they were not to be disheartened if photographs showed that they had missed 
their targets.  The Ruhr, he pointed out, “was a district of considerable importance 
. . . and damage to the communications and factories there all helped.“92   The 
aim, he concluded, must be to reduce mistakes in target identification and it had to 
be recognised that it was an individual responsibility. 
Following this meeting Harris wrote to Portal.93  This letter was a further 
confirmation that as far as Harris was concerned the raid leader scheme that he 
had initiated pre-empted any requirement for a Target Finding Force.  Nothing 
would be gained, he declared, either by gathering the selected crews into one unit, 
or by basing them on neighbouring airfields.  Despite his persistent opposition to 
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anything remotely connected to a corps d’élite, Harris then admitted that he fully 
supported a call for his raid leaders to be awarded an identifying badge.  This, he 
suggested, could be the Royal Air Force gilt eagle worn below the wings and 
medal ribbons, at the top of the left breast pocket.  
Harris next pointed out that his Command believed that the problem the 
crews faced was not in actually finding the target but in seeing it on the average 
night when faced with flak, searchlights, and industrial haze.  Why, he asked, 
would a Target Finding Force have any better chance of actually seeing the target 
than anyone else?  He also claimed that Bomber Command, at this stage, was too 
small to consider establishing a Target Finding Force.  There were also aircraft 
problems as the Command was in the process of re-equipment and high 
unserviceability rates were being encountered.  Any attempt to establish a 
specialised force from limited resources would mean that they would be below, 
rather than above, the standard of the scheme presently in operation. 
In conclusion, Harris affirmed that all his Group Commanders and their best 
squadron commanders “were all decisively and adamantly opposed [to the 
formation of a Target Finding Force].  The only dissentient” he continued,  
 
was an ex-Squadron Commander from Feltwell . . .  But he could 
offer no reasoned argument for the constitution of such a special 
force beyond asserting that he wanted to find the target as often as 
possible. Which naive statement received of course the chorused 
reply of ‘and so say all of us.’94    
 
Portal replied at length to Harris on 14 June 1942.95   He asserted that it 
appeared evident that both the Air Ministry and Bomber Command were agreed 
that there was an urgent need to devise means whereby the best crews were 
enabled to find the target and identify it for the remainder of the bombing force.  
Although Harris and the Bomber Command representatives unanimously opposed 
the Air Staff suggestions, Portal made clear to Harris that he found no reasonable 
argument in Harris’s letter to support their disagreement. 
The notion that the formation of a Target Finding Force would create a 
corps d’élite was totally rejected by Portal.  He pointed out:  
 
To pack one unit with experts at the expense of other units which 
have to do the same job is most unsound and bad for morale.  This 
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is emphatically not what we are proposing.  The T.F.F. would have 
an entirely different and far more difficult task than the ordinary 
‘follow up’ squadrons and this creates both the need and the 
justification for having a formation containing none but expert 
crews.96
 
Harris was then reminded that over the preceding three months his stance 
had changed substantially.  From total rejection he had moved to a Target Finding 
Squadron and later to a raid leader scheme.  Portal made clear he saw no logic in 
Harris’s continuing refusal to go the one extra step and weld the selected crews 
into a tightly knit organisation.  This Portal identified as the nub of the matter. 
Regarding crew selection Portal made clear that he disagreed with Harris.  
He confessed he saw no valid reason why either foreign or Commonwealth crews 
should not be available for the proposed force.  In fact, he continued, a mix of 
crews could be of benefit.   
The admission by Harris of the difficulties that crews experienced in actually 
seeing the target on dark nights was seized upon by Portal as providing striking 
evidence that the methods being employed by Bomber Command were unequal to 
the task.  What is required, Portal argued,  
 
is an effective degree of illumination and incendiarism in the right 
place  and only in the right place . . . this admittedly difficult task 
can only be done  by a force which concentrates upon it as a 
specialised role, and which excludes those less expert crews whose 
less discriminating use of flares or incendiaries .  .  . have recently 
led so many of our attacks astray. 97
  
Two copies of this important letter have been located and they differ in one 
very interesting respect.  In the copy at the National Archives,98  there is an 
additional paragraph omitted from the letter held in the Portal Papers in the library 
at Christ Church.99   It is worth quoting because, even at this late stage in the 
protracted argument, it possibly shows an unwillingness and a weakness on 
Portal’s part to exert final authority ─ an unwillingness to be repeated in January 
1945 over the question of oil targets.  In this extra paragraph Portal told Harris he 
recognised the practical difficulties but considered the proposals that Harris had 
made did not go “nearly far enough. “  Portal continued,  
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I am reluctant to impose the Air Staff proposal upon you while you 
object so strongly to it.  I would therefore like to discuss the subject 
with you tomorrow as a preliminary to holding the conference 
arranged for next Thursday, and I hope we shall be able to 
formulate an agreed scheme.100
 
What concerned Bufton when he was shown the letter was that the words “I 
hope we shall be able to formulate an agreed scheme” could offer Harris a 
possible escape route.  By offering a compromise, Harris might very well establish 
a force along lines which differed from those desired by the Air Staff.  Portal had 
already displayed a reluctance to order his subordinate to form a Target Finding 
Force and Bufton wanted no relaxation of the Air Staff demands.  Freeman, 
earlier, had told Bufton how he believed Harris should be handled but this 
paragraph appeared to Bufton to offer the possibility of concessions.  Bufton saw 
this as the critical moment for Portal to make a stand.  In order that there be no 
misunderstanding of his own position, he advised Freeman that he wanted to 
“disassociate himself entirely from the possibility of a compromise”101 that he 
pointed out had been suggested in the additional and offending paragraph.  Portal 
apparently conceded the point because, in the copy of the letter held at Christ 
Church, the paragraph has been omitted.   
Despite Portal’s reluctance to order his subordinate to form a Target 
Finding Force, he had in fact decided, after consulting Freeman, who had 
examined Bufton’s comprehensive file on the matter, that it would be formed.   On 
the same day that he had written to Harris, 14 June 1942, Portal called Bufton to 
his office.   Bufton’s file relating to the Target Finding Force lay on the CAS’s desk.  
“I’ve been through the folder“ Portal began,  
 
and have discussed it with the Vice-Chief.  We have decided that 
Bomber Command will form a Target Finding Force forthwith, and I 
have arranged for the C-in-C to come here to discuss the matter 
tomorrow afternoon.  In the meantime, could you please let me 
have your ideas on what the force should consist of, on who should 
be in it, and who should command it.102  
 
The following morning, 15 June 1942, Bufton gave Portal his blueprint for 
the Target Finding Force.  He suggested that it should consist of six squadrons 
and a Bomber Development Unit, the equivalent of another squadron.  The 
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selected squadrons, he suggested, should be located in one area under one 
control and work in close co-operation with both scientists and the Bomber 
Development Unit.  With regard to crews, Bufton proposed that one third of the 
crews in the selected squadrons be replaced by forty picked crews – 
approximately one from each bomber squadron.   After calling on the knowledge of 
other operational members in the Directorate of Bomber Operations, he also 
provided six names as potential squadron commanders.  To command the new 
force he recommended Group Captain Basil Embry, a tenacious and driving 
personality who he had first encountered in 1930.103   As Embry’s Senior Air Staff 
Officer, Bufton volunteered Donald Bennett.  Embry, then serving in Fighter 
Command as Sector and Station Commander at Wittering, was seen as an 
outstanding commander while Bennett was the professional in flying, navigation 
and air operations generally.  He saw them as an unbeatable combination.   
On 15 June 1942, Harris came to Portal’s office.  Neither the tone of the 
discussion nor what was considered at this meeting has been recorded.  
Nevertheless the decision was reached that a Target Finding Force would be 
formed.  Portal informed Bottomley and Freeman that Harris had agreed to form a 
“TFF composed partly of tour-expired crews who volunteer and partly of crews 
from the remaining squadrons in the Command.“ 104  Harris made three requests: 
firstly, that Dominion and Allied aircrew be permitted to volunteer for the force,  
secondly, that captains selected for the force be granted a step up in rank and, 
finally, that they be awarded a special badge.  Portal agreed that he would support 
the additions requested by Harris. 
On 19 June 1942, in a telephone link with his Group Commanders, Harris 
advised them that, although he and they opposed the formation of what he now 
called the Path Finder Force (PFF), “we had been ordered to form the Force and 
we must accept the decision loyally and do our best to make it a success.“105   
Unfortunately, his later actions belie his words, making it clear that he resented 
having been forced to yield.  His own words provide an insight into the extent of 
his displeasure.  In the tapes he made with his biographer, Dudley Saward, he 
was unequivocal.  What I wanted, Harris admitted,  
 
and I argued like blazes with Portal over this, I wanted each Group 
to have its own Path Finder Force . . . Well, I lost that battle . . . but 
I never for a moment abandoned the intention of having a Path 
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Finder Force in each Group so I just went my own sweet way.  I let 
‘em form the Path Finder Force and let ‘em take a number of the 
best volunteer pilots who wanted to go there . . . as soon as they 
got away with the insistence on just the one, I started behind their 
back on the others.106
The theme was repeated.  Bennett and the Path Finders, Harris continued, 
 
got a lot of absolutely first class people but they didn’t get ‘em all 
and they didn’t bleed the Groups to death because the Groups, at 
my instigation, were busy forming their  own ideas and their own 
surreptitious Pathfinders.107   
 
What this refusal (the word ‘betrayal’ comes to mind ) by Harris to honour 
the word and spirit implicit in his agreement with Portal cost Bomber Command 
and the Path Finder Force in particular, must remain a matter of conjecture.  One 
thing is certain.  Morale throughout Bomber Command would not have been raised 
had crews been aware of the attitude adopted by their Commander-in-Chief. 
In a personal minute to Churchill on 6 July 1942 Harris, in a reference to the 
formation of the Path Finder Force, claimed that he had “been overborne by the 
C.A.S. and the Air Staff.“108   Three years’ later, in his Despatch on War 
Operations, Harris varied the accusation.  The Air Ministry’s insistence that the 
Pathfinder Force be formed as a separate Group was, he insisted, “yet another 
occasion when a Commander in the field was over-ruled at the dictation of junior 
staff officers in the Air Ministry.”109   Harris was wrong.  As he had earlier admitted 
to Churchill, in the minute quoted, the order had come from his superior officer, 
Portal.  
Perhaps because of unavailability, or a possible clash of personalities, or a 
desire to exert his authority, Harris’s selection as AOC of the about to be formed 
Path Finder Force (which he had decided the new force should be called) was 
Wing Commander Donald Bennett.  An Australian, Don Bennett had transferred to 
the Royal Air Force in 1931, on loan, after cost-cutting measures in Australia had 
meant that there was no future in the Royal Australian Air Force for those still 
under training.   After attending a navigation course at Calshot, on the Solent, he 
was posted to No. 10 (Flying Boat) Squadron based at Pembroke Dock in South 
Wales.  Shortly after Bennett’s arrival on squadron, Harris arrived as Station 
Commander.  While serving in the Royal Air Force Bennett became the seventh 
person in the world to gain a First Class Navigator’s License.  He also gained 
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qualifications as a professional pilot, wireless operator, flying instructor, and 
various ground engineering licences.  He retired in August 1935 as a Flying 
Officer. 
During the years of peace Bennett enjoyed a varied flying career 
culminating in the establishment of the Atlantic Ferry organisation shortly after the 
outbreak of war.  He rejoined the Royal Air Force, as a Wing Commander, in mid-
1941.  He first commanded No. 77 (Bomber) Squadron flying Whitleys, and then, 
early in April 1942, was posted to No. 10 (Bomber) Squadron equipped with 
Halifaxes.  On the night of 27/28 April 1942 he was shot down while attacking the 
Tirpitz in a Norwegian fjord.  Evading, he returned to England via Sweden and 
rejoined his squadron.  Shortly before he was due to leave England with his 
squadron, on posting to the Middle East, he was called to the Bomber Command 
HQ and advised that he had been selected to command the Path Finder Force as 
an acting Group Captain.  On 25 January 1943 the Path Finder Force became 8 
Group and Bennett was promoted to Air Commodore.  A few months later, thanks 
to Harris’s aggressive handling of the Air Member for Personnel, he became an Air 
Vice-Marshal.  He was then thirty-two years of age. 
Harris described Bennett as “the most efficient airman I have ever met.”110   
But Bennett was intolerant, very conscious of his own intellectual powers, youthful 
when compared with other Group Commanders, had never attended staff or 
command courses, and had received accelerated promotion.  His on-going 
arguments with Air Vice-Marshal The Hon. Sir Ralph Cochrane, AOC 5 Group 
from February 1943, could often be described as acerbic.  Cochrane, as AOC of 
what was called “Cocky’s Private Air Force,” and another of the Harris-chosen, 
was perceived by Bennett as being favoured by Harris at the expense of the Path 
Finders.  Cochrane, like all other Group Commanders except Bennett, lacked 
operational experience and it rankled with both Bennett and Bufton.111   But, it 
must be noted, outside No. 8 Group it could not be held that Bennett was a 
popular figure. 
Decision-making is one thing, implementation another.  In the case of the 
establishment of the Path Finder Force it was to require a protracted period of 
negotiation.  The major stumbling block concerned the question of promotion.  
Harris had requested that aircraft captains transferred to the Force be granted one 
rise in rank and this had been accepted by Portal.112   Then, in a broadcast to all 
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Groups on 19 June 1942, Harris went further and promised that every member of 
every crew posted to the Path Finder Force would receive automatic promotion.113   
He did, however, qualify the statement by saying that the question of promotion 
had still to be confirmed.   
The question of promotion dragged on interminably.  In an effort to 
overcome the apparent impasse, Harris sought Churchill’s assistance.  He 
informed the Prime Minister that despite repeated appeals from himself and the Air 
Ministry, Treasury had remained obdurate.  His letter ended with a plea to 
Churchill to ensure that every crew member selected for, or volunteering for, and 
qualifying as a Path Finder, be granted a step up in rank.  Churchill, at the foot of 
the sixth page, addressed a question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer: “What 
can you do?”114   
Two days later a meeting was held in the Secretary of State’s room at the 
Air Ministry to discuss the sticking point of aircrew promotion.  It was inconclusive.  
Harris remained implacably insistent that the new force would not come into being 
without his demands being met for a step up in rank, an identifying badge, and the 
co-operation of the Dominion squadrons.  Sinclair suggested that a plan be 
produced for Treasury that did not demand promotion for every aircrew member of 
the proposed Force, but instead, provided the opportunity for either Harris or the 
Force commander to recommend promotions after the completion of fifteen 
sorties.   With Harris dissenting, it was agreed that the Air Member for Supply and 
Organisation, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Courtney, should prepare a 
suggested establishment for the new Force.115  
At this point, having seen Harris’s letter to Churchill, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Sir Howard Kingsley Wood became directly involved.  In a note to the 
Prime Minister he suggested that Harris had been premature in appealing to 
Churchill as, at that time, the matter was still being considered by Sinclair.  
Although Sinclair supported Harris’s call, this was not known to the Chancellor until 
only twelve hours earlier.  Kingsley Wood argued that he opposed the Harris 
proposals, not on financial grounds, but rather on matters of principle.  It could 
lead, he believed, to a chain reaction of demands from the other Services.  He saw 
no precedent in military history where those facing special dangers in the face of 
the enemy had been rewarded in such a manner.  Churchill saw reason in this 
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response and told Sinclair that Harris should be made aware of the Chancellor’s 
arguments.116
By the third week of July 1942, Baker, Bufton and Bottomley were all 
growing increasingly concerned at the lack of progress.  Although the question of 
the step up in rank remained unresolved, Baker, who himself opposed the idea, 
maintained that the force should be formed immediately and await a Treasury 
decision.  Bottomley echoed Baker’s words and suggested that Harris should be 
instructed to implement the order he had received on 16 June 1942.117   Bufton 
was equally concerned.  With Bennett and his staff already nominated, he had 
been hoping for more rapid progress than had been achieved.  In a note to Portal 
he admitted that his worst fears were being realised. “ There is, ” he complained,  
“an absence of  goodwill and sense of urgency in dealing with the formation of the 
force . . . without which it must inevitably prove a complete failure.“118
Courtney produced his suggested establishment for the Path Finder Force 
squadrons at the end of July 1942.  It was a compromise between the demands of 
Harris and the figures for the normal establishment of a heavy bomber squadron.  
With one-third of the crews to come from the Operational Training Units, he 
suggested that two-thirds of all posts of Flight Lieutenant and below be upgraded 
and that Flight Commanders and Squadron Commanders be promoted to Wing 
Commanders and Group Captains respectively.119
On 11 August 1942 Bottomley confirmed with Harris that the arrangements 
for the establishment within Bomber Command of the Path Finder Force had 
received final approval.  Crew establishments were to be in accordance with those 
laid down by Courtney on 28 July 1942.  This special establishment, Bottomley 
advised, provided for accelerated promotion for eligible aircrew after completing 
particular numbers of operational sorties: for promotion to Flight Lieutenant or 
Flight Sergeant fifteen sorties, for promotion to Squadron Leader or Warrant 
Officer twenty sorties, and for promotion to Wing Commander twenty-five sorties.  
Initially there were to be four squadrons – one Stirling, one Lancaster, one Halifax 
and one of Wellington IIIs.   There was also to be one special squadron associated 
with the force but established independently.120
Despite the extended gestation period, when the crews began to assemble 
on 17 August 1942, the Path Finder Force was not a finely honed instrument.  
There had been no crew changes: squadrons had simply been transferred.  
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Squadrons were lodger units at the bases to which they moved and hence were 
guests, on suffrance of the Station Commander, who was responsible for the 
administration and discipline of both the station staff and squadron crews.  Neither 
the Station Commander nor the permanent station staff  were members of the 
Path Finder Force.   Orders for the Force commander, Bennett, were routed via 
Baldwin of No.3 Group and crew replacements and servicing requirements were 
the responsibility of the group from which the squadron had been transferred.   
Harris ignored the long standing calls that had been made requiring a 
training period for the new force and demanded that they operate on the same 
night that they moved to their new stations.  Fortunately the weather intervened 
and operations were cancelled.  However, they were required to operate the 
following night against Flensburg and perhaps it is not surprising to learn that the 
attack was unsuccessful.  They had received no special training, they were 
operating from new bases, they possessed no special aids, the flares and marker 
bombs were inadequate, and their primary navigation aid, Gee, was now being 
jammed.  When Harris’s stubborn and extended opposition to the Path Finder 
Force is recalled, perhaps it was a result he desired. 
After August 1942 the conflict that had raged between the Air Ministry and 
AOC Bomber Command over the formation of the Path Finder Force abated.  As 
far as the Air Staff were concerned the Path Finder Force had become a fait 
accompli.  Harris, for his part, now surreptitiously embarked upon his plan to 
establish a path finding force in each bomber Group.  What developed was not a 
difference between himself and the Air Ministry, but a struggle between Bennett in 
what became 8 Group, and Harris’s protégé, Cochrane, AOC 5 Group.  Bennett 
claimed, with justification, that although he was personally supported by Harris, 8 
Group too often took second place to 5 Group.  The differences between Bennett 
and Cochrane are worthy of deeper study but not in this consideration of 
relationships between Harris and the Air Ministry. 
During 1943 Bomber Command, under Harris’s direction, continued its area 
offensive, very often in conflict with the current Directive.  Efforts were made in 
some seven Directives issued in 1943 to divert Harris from his pre-determined 
path, often with little success, but never without an argument.  At various times U-
boat bases, German submarine construction yards and German fighter strength 
were all listed as priority targets.  Harris viewed them as diversions.  Instead, early 
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in 1943, Bomber Command was involved in what came to be called The Battle of 
the Ruhr.  It was followed in the second half of the year by the Battle of Hamburg.  
Both battles created enormous damage and in the case of Hamburg, roused 
considerable concern among the German hierarchy.  Speer, in a report to Hitler, 
warned that similar attacks on six more major German cities “would bring 
Germany’s armaments production to a total halt.”121   Bomber Command, 
however, lacked the capacity to bring armament production to an end through the 
destruction of German cities. 
Nevertheless, had the destructive power possessed by the bomber force 
been used in precision attacks against selected elements of German industry ─ 
ball bearings, oil, electric power, and coal, are all good examples ─ then 
Germany’s war making potential might have been severely reduced.  The long 
term plan for many in the Air Staff had been a return to precision attack once it 
became possible.  Certainly by the end of 1943 the heavy bombers were available, 
they were equipped with the latest navigational and bombing aids, the Path Finder 
Force was refining its techniques and it was led by Bennett, who had declared his 
force’s readiness to attack precision targets with every prospect of success.  
Harris, however, continued to regard anything other than an attack on German 
cities as an unwarranted and undesirable diversion.  The bomber war dragged on. 
Then, in November 1943, Harris launched his bomber force against Berlin.  
It was a battle in which both the German capital and Bomber Command suffered 
severely.  No victory was achieved and Bomber Command was forced to 
reconsider its options.  By early 1944 it was clear to most of those in authority that 
bombing would not bring victory.  A second front would be required.  The Soviet 
Union had been promised one by both Churchill and Roosevelt, Eisenhower had 
been appointed Supreme Allied Commander, and Pointblank was being 
superseded by the bomber requirements for Overlord.  The arguments that took 
place over that question will be considered in a later chapter. 
By April 1944 it would not be unreasonable to expect that the controversy 
associated with the formation of the Path Finder Force would be nothing but a 
distant and best forgotten memory.  The invasion of Europe was imminent and 
Bomber Command faced the challenge of precision attacks which Harris had said 
in January were beyond his force’s capability.122  Despite the many pressures in 
both the Air Staff and within Bomber Command Headquarters, it soon became 
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clear, unfortunately, that Harris’s anger over the enforced establishment of the 
Path Finder Force had not abated.   
In early April 1944 Portal and Harris, in discussing the transfer of three Path 
Finder squadrons to 5 Group, had for some reason referred to the establishment 
of the Path Finder Force in August 1942.  Harris made claims with which Portal 
disagreed and Portal advised him that he would re-examine the relevant papers.  
After doing so, he advised Harris that he had looked up the correspondence and 
could find nothing to substantiate Harris’s claim that the only opposition to the 
formation of the Path Finder Force was that it would be premature. “On reading 
your letter to Bufton on the 17th April, 1942, and his reply of the 8th May,” Portal 
indicated, “I see no reason at all to modify my opinion as to where the credit lies 
for the Air Ministry share in what had been achieved.  I hope that you will agree to 
have a talk some time with Bufton.“123
This letter apparently touched very raw nerves in Harris, for his peremptory 
reply commenced: “ It has frequently been obvious to me that I am often unable to 
make myself either clear or even understood when discussing such matters with 
you.“124   Harris then went on to deny that he had either claimed or implied that the 
opposition in his Headquarters to the formation of the Path Finder Force was 
based solely on the grounds that it would be premature.  He went further. He 
maintained that he had kept an open mind on the subject but that his Group 
Commanders and staff were totally opposed to the formation of a unit which, if 
Bufton’s proposals were accepted, amounted to the establishment of a corps 
d’élite. 
Harris then warmed to the task and launched a scathing attack on Bufton’s 
methods.  His ideas, asserted Harris,  
 
are rammed down our throats whether we like them or not . . . more 
weight is given to his opinions as a junior officer 2 years out of the 
Command than to the considered opinion of the Commanders 
concerned on the spot and responsible for the outcome of 
events.125    
 
Despite the fact that he was the CAS and Harris a subordinate, Portal’s 
reply, two days later, was the epitome of diplomacy.  He pointed out that as Harris 
had claimed to like Bufton personally, commended his ability and honesty, 
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welcomed his suggestions, and accepted his criticisms, there was no reason for 
not improving the relationship between Bomber Command Headquarters and the 
Air Ministry.126   He then proceeded to define Bufton’s responsibilities and pointed 
out to Harris that Bufton was required to advise the CAS on matters relating to the 
supervision of Bomber Command’s operations.  Finally, Harris was politely advised 
that any decision reached by Portal, on the advice of a subordinate which 
conflicted with Harris’s own opinion, should not be regarded as improper.  
Harris responded on 18 April 1944 but his acceptance of Portal’s definitions 
of Bufton’s responsibilities was hedged with provisos.  Bufton’s trouble, Harris 
claimed, 
 
has always been that he has, no doubt with good intentions, short 
circuited Command headquarters, thus giving the impression that 
his real aim was not so much to keep in touch with and assist the 
Command as to exercise detailed control over it from the Air 
Ministry.127   
  
At that point Portal apparently allowed the contretemps to lapse as he made 
no further reply.  
Harris never gave up on his efforts to remould the Path Finder Force to the 
shape he desired.  In November 1944, on learning that Portal was considering 
posting Cochrane (he became AOC-in-C, Transport Command in February 1945), 
he raised a vigorous protest.  Cochrane, he claimed,  
 
is in fact a genius.  Therefore if he is taken away at this particular 
juncture or during the next three or four months, it is my honest 
opinion that it will be a serious factor towards postponing the 
conclusion of the European War.  As I have always told you, I 
always hoped that Cochrane would replace me.128 
 
But Harris also had other concerns besides the removal of Cochrane.  He 
reminded Portal that he  
 
was about to suggest closing up 8 and 5 Groups into one super 
P.F.F. cum Main Force Group under Cochrane, and to ask for him 
to be promoted.  I then thought that Bennett was going ─  a loss 
which could be easier borne because Cochrane has now acquired 
most of Bennett’s outstanding technical knowledge and, apart from 
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that knowledge and his personal ability as an operational pilot, 
Bennett has serious shortcomings.129 
 
Bennett, of course, late in 1944 had advised Harris that he was going to 
stand for parliament in the forthcoming election but although they had exchanged 
several letters on when he would leave the Royal Air Force, no firm decision had 
been made.  But what were the unidentified ‘serious shortcomings’ to which Harris 
had referred?  Could it possibly be that Harris provided the answer in his own 
book?  In a tribute to Bennett he acknowledged that Bennett’s 
 
consciousness of his own intellectual powers sometimes made him 
impatient with slower or differently constituted minds, so that some 
people found him difficult to work  with.  He could not suffer fools 
gladly, and by his own standards there were many fools.130 
 
With regard to the disagreements between Harris and the Air Staff relating 
to the formation of the Path Finder Force there is one outstanding, almost unique, 
feature.  Portal, after receiving and evaluating the advice offered by Bufton and 
others, came to the decision that the Path Finder Force was an urgent requirement 
if Bomber Command was to operate efficiently.  Harris’s arguments were 
considered but finally rejected and, behind closed doors, Harris was informed (it 
cannot be said that he was ordered because what took place at their meeting has 
never been disclosed) that a Path Finder Force was to be established.  Harris, 
clearly, because of his later actions, was upset by the instruction so it is possible 
that he had been given a direct order but the true situation remains obscure.  
Nevertheless, Portal had acted as the decision maker and brooked no further 
arguments from his subordinate. It was a display of competent and decisive 
leadership.  Unfortunately, Portal provided very little follow-up and his apparent 
tacit agreement to Harris’s pernicious erosion of the Path Finder Force, 
culminating in the removal of three squadrons in April 1944, suggests that either 
he was never fully in command, or that Harris had become too powerful a figure to 
be totally overborne. 
In many histories of the bomber offensive that touch upon the establishment 
of the Path Finder Force there is one refrain, oft repeated.  Harris, it is claimed, 
who had opposed the formation of the force on the terms offered, was determined 
once it had become a fait accompli,  “ to make it a success.“131   John Terraine put 
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it somewhat differently.  He argued that it was “the better side of Harris asserting 
itself once more; having bitterly opposed the setting up of the Force, now that it 
was decreed he was determined that it should have its rights.“132   Another author, 
Robin Neillands, in relation to the force, agreed with Terraine, declaring that 
“Harris was determined that everyone, including himself, should give it every 
chance of success.“133   Anthony Verrier’s summation was that “Harris had seen 
the practical value of a special marking force to assist in the attainment of his 
objective.“134   Rather than finding and marking precision targets, as desired by 
Bufton and others in the Air Staff, the Path Finder Force was largely employed in 
providing the spearhead for Harris’s area bombing programme.   In his biography 
of Harris, Saward summarised his former Commander-in-Chief’s attitude towards 
the Path Finder Force as accepting it “with good grace.“135   
It appears in Saward’s case, however, he allowed his loyalty to Harris to 
overcome the sine qua non of historical accuracy for these opinions are, of course, 
totally contrary to Harris’s true aims as spelled out in the tapes that he made with 
Saward.  That aim was a Path Finder Force in every Group.  The Path Finder 
Force never received all the best crews and, with regard to the latest equipment, 
they were always simply another Group in competition with others, particularly 5 
Group.  The provision of Very High Frequency (VHF) radio for inter-aircraft 
communication to 5 Group before the Path Finders, provides a classic example.  
The struggle to be the first to receive new equipment becoming available thus 
became a competition between Cochrane and Bennett, encouraged by Harris,  
who readily acknowledged that both “were rather at daggers drawn which I didn’t 
discourage because it made both of them do their damnedest.“136   The final blow 
to the independence of the Path Finder Force was delivered in April 1944 when 
Harris transferred three squadrons from 8 Group (the Path Finder Group) to 5 
Group.  Ostensibly they were on loan but they were never returned. Harris had 
taken another step towards a Path Finder element in every Group. 
Unfortunately the acrimony generated by the disagreements between Harris 
and Bufton persisted and seems to have seriously eroded Harris’s views of the 
motives behind other recommendations for improving the bomber offensive 
provided by members of the Directorate of Bomber Operations.   At best he saw 
Directorate staff as trying to direct bomber operations without having to accept 
responsibility; at worst, as an enemy attempting to undermine his position for their 
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own advantage.  Both Bottomley, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and Baker, the 
Director of Bomber Operations, he accused of seeking his own position.  Bufton, 
he claimed in one interview, was looking to be leader of the newly formed Path 
Finders.137 
Before closing this chapter it is necessary to acknowledge, despite his 
remoteness, severity, and apparent inability to accept advice, that Harris cared for 
his bomber crews and was aware of the dangers they faced.  It also goes some 
way to explaining the passion he displayed in attempting to obtain promotion for 
crews transferring to the Path Finder Force.  In 1943 after the attack on the 
German dams he visited Scampton and spoke to No. 57 Squadron and other 
invited crews.  He told them how proud they should be that they were the only 
force taking the war to the enemy.   He also issued a chilling warning.  “I want you 
to look at the men on either side of you.  In six months’ time only one in three will 
be left, but if you are the lucky one I promise you this.  You will be two ranks 
higher.”138   After a momentary pause the crews cheered.  Harris paused as he 
was leaving, saluted, and departed without another word. 
Finally, in any consideration of the formation of the Path Finder Force it is 
perhaps relevant to consider the views of one who was indirectly but heavily 
involved after its establishment – the Air Officer Commanding 5 Group, Sir Ralph 
Cochrane.  In an interview with Saward for the Harris biography, Cochrane 
claimed that he knew Bufton well but, as the buffer between Portal and Harris, he 
believed that Bufton had been placed in an impossible position.  There he was, 
Cochrane continued, with very sound ideas, trying to give advice to a senior 
whose plans “didn’t seem to be going very well“ but who rarely accepted decisions 
conflicting with his own, and certainly not when they came from junior officers.  
Fortunately, Cochrane concluded, Portal became involved.  Portal’s involvement, 
Cochrane affirmed, showed that the Air Ministry, as required, did “retain 
control.”139
Harris, as we will see, however, was not easily controlled, even by the Air 
Ministry.  
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Chapter Five 
 
     Schweinfurt and Ball Bearings 
 
In his treatise On War Carl von Clausewitz defined courage as one of the 
first requirements of great commanders: not solely the physical courage required 
in battle but also the moral courage required by those in positions of ultimate 
responsibility.1   Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris possessed both.  Courage 
alone, however, does not fully define the qualities of great commanders: they also 
require an ability to reason objectively coupled with resolution.  Unfortunately 
these latter two qualities in Harris’s character had deteriorated, by 1943, into 
intolerant dogma.  As far as he was concerned there was only one way to win the 
war and that was his way: by the continuation and extension of the area bombing 
of German cities.  He was not prepared to accept the advice of his superiors in the 
Air Ministry while he totally ignored that offered by civilians in the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare (MEW).   
Harris’s aversion to the MEW is not readily explained.  It was partially that 
targets recommended by the MEW normally required precision attack and that 
method was anathema to the bomber leader who had long determined that victory 
could only be achieved by increasingly heavy area attacks on Germany’s cities.  In 
his mind precision attacks demanded a diversion and diversions, in his eyes, 
possibly meant an unwarranted extension to the war.  Certainly up to early 1944 
Harris was inflexible in his opinion that Bomber Command did not possess the 
capability for effective precision attacks.  But that alone is not the complete picture.  
As Webster and Frankland observed one of Harris’s problems was that he 
confused “advice with interference” and when that advice was offered by civilians it 
was doubly unwelcome.   
The MEW, a 1939 creation, was broadly based on the Industrial Intelligence 
Centre which itself had been established in 1931 as an additional intelligence 
source to supplement the understaffed Air Intelligence Department in the Air 
Ministry. The MEW’s responsibility was the collation of industrial intelligence but 
when they began to suggest targets for Bomber Command to attack, Harris was 
not the only one to object.  Air Ministry Intelligence also saw the selection of 
targets by the MEW as an intrusion into a domain for which they believed they 
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were responsible.  They agreed that the MEW was best equipped to measure the 
effects of the bombing on the German economy but strongly argued that Air 
Ministry Intelligence was responsible for target selection, together with the weight 
of bombs required to achieve destruction.  The Air Ministry Intelligence were 
prepared to admit that while the MEW was best equipped to measure the effects 
of the bombing on the German economy, physical bomb damage assessment was 
their prerogative. 
 The first major clash between Harris and the MEW was that which followed 
the ill-fated Lancaster daylight attack on the U-boat diesel engine factory in 
Augsburg in April 1942, examined in detail later in this chapter. 
Harris also clashed with the MEW over the Dams Raid in May 1943 when 
he claimed that he had been advised that the destruction of the dams would bring 
Ruhr industry to a halt.  However, the MEW was never optimistic over the dams 
raid as they had always argued that it was the Sorpe Dam that was critical and if it 
was not destroyed then only minimal damage would be created by the destruction 
of the Möhne.   Unfortunately Bomber Command did not possess an air weapon 
capable of destroying the Sorpe. 
It is thus clear that another reason for Harris’s rejection of MEW advice was 
that he doubted its accuracy. 
But nowhere is the dichotomous nature of Harris’s character better 
displayed than in the problems that occurred between him and the Air Staff over 
the question of Schweinfurt and German ball bearings.  The problems relating to 
Schweinfurt were basically made up of three different elements.  Firstly, after his 
defeat over the Path Finder Force question, Harris had come to regard the Air 
Staff and the Directorate of Bomber Operations in particular, as opposition to be 
overcome.  The latter, in regard to Schweinfurt, acted largely on the advice offered 
by civilians in the MEW, but civilian advisers, as far as Harris was concerned, were 
personae non gratae.  Personalities thus played a prominent role in the on-going 
disagreements.  Secondly, the bureaucracy for running the war, even by 1943, 
was still not a well-oiled or finely-tuned machine.  Precision in many of the parts, 
including the written requirements issued to Harris in the form of Directives, was all 
too often lacking.  On too many occasions Directives provided escape paths for 
Harris to evade what the Air Staff believed almost amounted to direct orders.  
Finally, the Air Staff had continually to remember that Harris had been accorded 
 158
tactical control of the bomber force and had thus been granted some freedom of 
action in target selection based on operational considerations.  Increasingly, 
however, as the war progressed, when challenged by the Air Staff as to why a 
particular target had been attacked and not that nominated by the Air Staff, 
Harris’s answers were found to be unsatisfactory.  The disagreements between 
Harris and the Air Staff which began in 1942 over the Path Finder Force question, 
escalated in 1943 and 1944 over Schweinfurt and other precision targets relating 
to Overlord, and climaxed in 1945 over German oil. 
Harris believed that area bombing provided the only way to victory.  
Precision bombing had been tried but had been seen to be a failure.  Germany 
would be defeated, claimed Harris, by destroying its cities and so reducing the 
morale of its people, particularly the industrial workers, that they would no longer 
possess the will to continue the struggle.  Enemy morale had become the primary 
target, along Trenchardian lines, with industrial destruction an ancillary by-product.  
Any suggestion that the bomber force was capable of destroying small targets was 
anathema to Harris.  It was an attitude he steadfastly maintained until Bomber 
Command itself displayed its precision bombing capabilities during the pre-
invasion bombing in early 1944.  Yet, even that confirmation was not sufficient to 
cause Harris to deviate from his self-determined, area bombing path. 
Contrariwise, several members of  the Air Staff viewed the area bombing 
programme, decreed in the February 1942 Directive, as but one step to an 
ultimate return to the precision attack of selected targets considered crucial to the 
German war effort.  Bufton was involved in the drafting of this Directive, and he 
also viewed it as an interim requirement prior to a return to the attack of precision 
targets, once bomber crews possessed the necessary skills and equipment.  In a 
paper in November 1941 he defined a possible formula.  His vision was the 
massed use of flares for target identification, replenished by each bombing aircraft, 
followed by incendiary equipped aircraft to provide a marked aiming point.  He had 
argued that  
 
The successful development of a system on these lines might have 
a far reaching effect on our planning and enable us to undertake 
effectively the complete destruction of vital factories, synthetic oil 
plants, and to attack at night such targets as the battleships at 
Brest, which at present we find ourselves incapable of doing.2     
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Schweinfurt was included in the February 1942 Directive as an alternative 
area target, outside Gee range.3   Harris was not easily convinced.  Bomber 
Command would not deliver its first attack on this prime target until the night of 
24/25 February 1944. 
Perhaps the problems that developed between Harris and the Air Staff 
might never have done so had firm action been taken by Portal at the outset.  
Directives issued to Bomber Command, with considerable input from the 
Directorate of Bomber Operations (DBO), were virtually direct orders.  The broad 
selection of a target system was the responsibility of the Air Staff after considering 
a wide spectrum of political, economic, military, and intelligence advice.  But too 
many Directives offered widely varying options.  The February 1942 Directive for 
example, offered choices between area, precision, and other targets considered 
operationally vulnerable.  Harris had the tactical responsibility for organising and 
planning the wide ranging attacks nominated in the Directive.  Many factors had to 
be taken into account in planning attacks, so Harris always had a plethora of valid 
reasons when questioned by the Air Staff as to why a particular target complex 
had not been bombed.  A direct order could have been given to Harris, but when 
tactical considerations had to be borne in mind, it would have been a very unusual 
step.   
The potentially critical position of the German ball bearing industry in the 
production of aircraft, tanks, and other machinery essential to the war effort, was 
no secret to British planners.  Schweinfurt, they were from the first aware, was the 
main production centre, with others located at Stuttgart and Bad Constatt, and 
smaller ones in Leipzig, Berlin, and Elberfeld.  Estimates of production from the 
four factories in Schweinfurt were as high as seventy per cent of the total German 
output and the complex was believed to employ 13,000 workers.4    On those 
figures it presented the classic industrial bottleneck target.  It also offered another 
attraction.  Schweinfurt was, as one paper put it, “an old world town and should 
burn well.”5   Harris, soon after his arrival at Bomber Command, was made aware 
of the possibilities.  Destroy Schweinfurt, so the argument ran, and the German 
war machine was halted in its tracks.   
During March 1942, Baker, as Director of Bomber Operations, had 
discussed informally with Harris the question of Schweinfurt as a potential target.  
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His suggestions were somewhat coolly received.  Baker then had the question re-
examined by staff at the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW).  They confirmed 
that it remained an extremely significant target.  This time Baker put his thoughts 
on paper.  In a note to Harris he argued,  
 
I am quite sure, if it were tactically feasible, that it would be well 
worth the effort to give Schweinfurt the same sort of medicine as 
you gave Lübeck, particularly in the sense of the capital we could 
make out of  it of giving assistance to the other two Services and, 
more especially,  to Russia.6
 
Harris’s reply was less than enthusiastic.  It was his opinion that the figures 
quoted were a projection to 1942 based on pre-war statistics and did not take into 
account changes forced upon German industry by the early outbreak of war.  He 
refused to accept that German industrialists would not have done everything to 
avoid such a potentially disastrous bottleneck.  As a target Schweinfurt also 
presented tactical difficulties.  It was a small town, he declared, with a population 
of 40,0007 and lacked suitable navigational lead-ins to the target factories.  With 
regard to its inflammability, Harris believed that it did not compare with Lübeck, but 
he did agree that it appeared to be an important target.  For that reason, he 
conceded, “I am keeping an open mind . . . and, given the right conditions, I might 
decide to burn the town and blast its factories.”8    
Although five supplementary Directives were issued to Harris between May 
and September 1942, none mentioned either Schweinfurt or ball bearings.  They 
simply added to the targets listed in the original Directive issued on 14 February 
1942.  Ball bearings continued, however, to be of interest to staff in the DBO.  
Perhaps one reason was that, despite the dispersal efforts that had been made, 
they were acutely aware of the susceptibility to air attack of the same industry in 
the United Kingdom.  Morley had made clear that, in regard to the supply of ball 
bearings in the United Kingdom, too many eggs had been put in too few baskets.  
Destruction of factories at Chelmsford and Newark could, wrote Morley, “reduce 
our engine output by 3,400 units per month for six months.”9   His paper was 
passed to W. Hubbard, the ball bearing controller at the Ministry of Supply.  His 
response was that it was essential that the factories be “adequately protected“ and 
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he confirmed that in both England and Germany they presented “an attractive 
target.“10   
The Directive inherited by Harris in February 1942 listed industrial targets 
for attack by Bomber Command both within and beyond effective Gee range.  
However, the final paragraph of the Directive had noted that, on occasions, the 
Command might be required to deliver diversionary attacks on targets of 
importance in the light of altered strategic developments.  Submarine construction 
facilities were given as one example.11
Early in April 1942, with shipping losses in the Atlantic reaching crisis 
proportions, Harris made the unilateral decision to attack a factory in Germany 
producing diesel engines for U-boats.  He requested details of such towns from 
the Air Ministry and was provided with a list prepared by MEW on 8 January 
194212   Low on that list for economic reasons, the MEW later explained, was 
Augsburg, in southern Germany.   
No further discussions took place with either the Air Staff or the MEW but 
on 17 April Harris launched twelve Lancasters on a low level, daylight attack on 
the Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg Aktiengesellschaft (MAN) U-boat diesel 
engine factory, in Augsburg.  The attack was delivered in failing light, eight aircraft 
bombed the factory but only five returned to their bases in England.13  The claims 
made at the de-briefing after the raid were modest and an  official report merely 
claimed that “Although it is unlikely that production was completely stopped . . . 
there is no doubt that work must have been seriously delayed.“14  
The repercussions in England were much more serious.  Lord Selborne, the 
Minister responsible for the MEW, wrote to Churchill claiming that there were facts 
concerning the Augsburg attack which gave him cause for concern.  U-boat diesel 
engine plants had been given a low priority for attack, he made clear, because in 
the opinion of his experts, they were not considered to be vulnerable.  Moreover, 
the total building capacity in Germany and the occupied countries was such that, 
even had the MAN factory at Augsburg been totally destroyed, all requirements of 
the U-boat construction programme could still have been met.15
Selborne also had other concerns.  The first was that the MEW had not 
been directly involved in target selection; the second, that there were more worth-
while and vulnerable targets, close to Augsburg, whose destruction would have 
been “far more disastrous to a far wider range of war production.“16   He provided 
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two examples in detail – the ball bearing works at Schweinfurt-am-Main and the 
Robert Bosch works at Stuttgart-Feuerbach, producers of injection pumps for 
aero-engines and a major producer of spark plugs. 
Churchill forwarded Selborne’s complaint to Portal with a note: “This seems 
to me very disquieting.  It must be thrashed out . . . Surely there ought to be some 
well considered plan and effective liaison.”17
In response Portal provided a strong defence of Harris’s actions.  Augsburg, 
he asserted, had been a tactical experiment with target value not the sole 
consideration.  He also agreed that, on security grounds, it was probably best that 
neither the Air Ministry nor the MEW had been involved in prior discussions.  
Finally, he argued that target vulnerability was for the Air Staff and Bomber 
Command to decide – not the MEW.18   On the evidence available concerning the 
Augsburg operation it would appear that Portal’s post hoc defence of Harris’s 
action was a misjudgement.  Harris had involved himself in strategic matters and 
of this fact he should have at least been reminded.  Portal’s support, on the other 
hand, provided confirmation for Harris that perhaps the Air Staff’s reins were only 
loosely held.  He was to run very freely because of that slackness. 
On 30 April 1942 Baker, as instructed by Portal, passed Selborne’s letter 
and Portal’s response to Harris.  A rider, provided by Portal, was that in future, 
information on targets not included in the Directive was to be obtained from the 
Directorate of Bomber Operations prior to their implementation “without prejudice 
to security.”19
Harris’s explanatory letter to Churchill merits close consideration.  Firstly, he 
acknowledged the Prime Minister’s oral warning of Selborne’s concerns.  Now that 
he had seen the correspondence, continued Harris, he was ready to reply.  The 
intention of the Augsburg operation, he claimed, was to force “the enemy to retain 
and exercise in Northern France a major portion of his Fighter Force . . . . to 
disabuse him of the idea that a mere defensive crust on the coast is enough.”20   
The aim, Harris pointed out, was to force the Germans to spread their air and anti-
aircraft defences, and thereby reduce concentrations in the Ruhr.   
Another factor involved, continued Harris,  
was to find entry for the Bombers in daylight at some point where 
the operations of Fighter Command could protect the Bombers 
while  
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they broke through the crust, in the foreknowledge that, further 
inland, they were unlikely to meet serious fighter opposition.21   
 
It was a dangerous and mistaken perception, as the Americans would quickly 
learn when they attempted penetration of German airspace. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Harris then admitted that only after answers to 
these questions had been found, was any consideration given to target selection.  
It would appear, therefore, that neither the Directives, nor a desire to assist in the 
Battle of the Atlantic, had played any part in target selection.  It was the reverse of 
the norm.  Target selection was based on many factors; including weather, 
operational requirements, the current Directive, and forces available.  Augsburg, 
uniquely, was selected only after the route had been determined.   
In selecting the target, Harris acknowledged that Schweinfurt had been 
considered.  Unfortunately, he claimed, the chosen route meant that “Schweinfurt 
was out of range unless the aircraft returned thence due west across the Rhine.  
This, however, would have brought them, while still in too much daylight, right 
across the heaviest defences in Germany.“22    If that had been the case, then 
surely it would have been a planning error.  The time on target, which ever target 
was selected, should have meant that the aircraft returned in darkness.  All that 
was required was an adjustment to the take-off time.  In any event, the return from 
Augsburg was commenced in daylight, but whether that was caused by a mistake 
in planning, or confusion of civil, nautical and astronomical twilight, or being early 
on target, is now purely conjecture.  
Finally, Harris particularly stressed the need of secrecy for the Augsburg 
operation.  Without being specific, he protested:  
 
I could not in any circumstance agree to discuss projected attacks 
outside my Headquarters with other Departments . . . . I am sure 
indeed that a continuation of that policy is the first essential of 
security.23    
 
Surely it was the same for every operation.  Of course there never should 
have been idle discussion concerning possible targets.  Security was vital.  But to 
avoid discussion with those in possession of the facts, and who were regularly 
involved in target planning, meant that the crews on the Augsburg operation went 
inadequately prepared.24
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Despite the deficiencies and errors, Churchill declared himself completely 
satisfied with Harris’s response, and suggested that Selborne and Harris meet for 
lunch.25   Selborne, still unwilling  to yield despite the somewhat shaky ground, 
wrote again to Churchill.  He expressed surprise that Harris had been given the 
latitude to undertake an operation, outside his current Directive, without specific 
approval.  Churchill, who clearly had had enough, responded tersely: “I see these 
officers every week.  We often talk these things over together.” 26 
 Unintentionally or not, the impression had been given that the relationship 
between Harris and Churchill was of a special nature.  What is known is that 
henceforth advice provided by the MEW officials was treated by Harris with 
considerable suspicion.  Crossing swords with such an unforgiving opponent as 
Harris, as others had learned, was unwise.  The MEW, from this early date, had 
come to be regarded by him as another enemy.  Post-war, Harris was to lament 
the number of occasions when he claimed he had been led up the garden path by 
MEW assertions that the destruction of a particular target or industry would 
provide enormous benefits.  As an example during his long interviews with 
Saward, Harris quoted the notable Dambuster raid in May 1943 where, despite 
MEW pre-raid claims to the contrary, the results, he asserted, were “minimal.”27  
Not for the first or last time during his long interview with Saward, Harris’s 
memory was at fault.  With regard to the Möhne Dam, Lawrence, the MEW official 
consulted prior to the attack, refused to confirm that its destruction would seriously 
affect water supplies to industries in the Ruhr.  His recommendation was that the 
Sorpe was the vital target.  The destruction of both the Sorpe and the Möhne 
Dams, he advised, “would be worth much more than twice the destruction of 
one.”28  
 Perhaps, however, Harris would have been somewhat less disparaging had 
the crews on the dams’ raid been able to breach the Sorpe.  It was known by 
Barnes Wallis that the weapon developed for the Möhne dam was unsuitable for 
the Sorpe because it had a solid concrete core covered by an earth and stone 
wall.  The attack on the Sorpe was therefore to be parallel to the dam wall and not 
at right angles to it, and the bomb was to be released approximately twenty feet 
out from the rampart.  The Sorpe was attacked by only one Lancaster, without 
success.  After the war, Speer admitted that “if the Sorpe valley dam had been 
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destroyed instead of the Eder dam, Ruhr production would have suffered the 
heaviest possible blow.”29
In May 1942, no further progress having made over Schweinfurt, Harris, in 
a letter to Baker, confirmed his position by declaring that he was  
 
no believer in these highly concentrated and vulnerable bottlenecks 
in the enemy’s economy.  We are always having them pointed out 
to us and, as in the case of oil, no sooner have we expended great 
effort in the destruction of his reserves than the experts begin to 
dispute and hedge and assert that it was not so important after all.30  
 
Harris then prophesied that with 1,000 bombers Germany would be 
knocked out of the war in six months.  With 10,000 it would only take six weeks.  
He concluded, “In the meanwhile . . . let us keep to our correct and set tasks 
without paying too much attention to the bright idea merchants who surround us 
on every side.“31   This letter was simply further confirmation that Harris believed 
that the war would be won his way, without recourse to either official or expert 
guidance. 
In November 1942 a further attempt was made by Baker to interest Harris in 
Schweinfurt as a suitable target.  On instructions from Portal, Baker had again 
been in contact with the MEW for their opinion on the ball bearing situation in 
Germany.  They confirmed that they still considered Schweinfurt to be a valid 
target.  Ball bearings, they warned, held a central place in the industrial economy.  
The factories were concentrated and recovery from bomb damage would be a 
slow process.  The destruction of the factories in Schweinfurt, asserted the MEW, 
“would result in a loss to the Germans of considerably more than half their 
requirements in ball bearings for their production of armaments.“32 
Although no supporting material has been located to confirm his belief, 
Baker was of the opinion that Harris had prepared a plan for an attack on 
Schweinfurt employing normal resources.  Baker suggested that on the latest 
MEW assessment these plans should be revised.  What was required, he 
believed, was an attack “on the heaviest scale and in the most effective manner as 
our total resources will permit at whatever the cost.“33  
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Late in November 1942 a draft, unsigned, Air Staff Paper, ‘Appreciation on 
Tactical Plan – Town of Schweinfurt and Associated Ball Bearing Factories,’ was 
produced.34     The aim, the paper declared, was “the complete destruction of the 
four ball bearing factories and the town of Schweinfurt and with the infliction of 
maximum casualties upon the skilled workers.”35   The planned, daylight attack, 
was seen as a major war operation requiring the maximum concentration of British 
and American air power.  The operation, the paper concluded,  
 
should be conceived as one of the major battles of the war . . . We 
must  be prepared to face heavy casualties.  On night operations 
we are ready to lose up to 200 aircraft and crews per month: the 
complete success of this operation would warrant the cessation of 
night bombing for two months.36    
 
Was it meant that losses of up to 400 aircraft could be expected?  The next 
statement was, perhaps, added as a tempering influence.  With “meticulous 
planning” the paper continued, “there is no reason to expect unduly heavy 
casualties.“37 
Doubtless, the proposed long range, daylight penetration of German air 
space explains the potentially high casualty rate.38   Had the Augsburg lesson 
been forgotten already?  Precision attacks using high explosives were planned for 
the factories, while the town was to be subjected to an area attack employing a 
high percentage of incendiaries.  The result, it was hoped, would provide a 
significant conflagration to act as a beacon for another attack on the same night 
employing OTU and Conversion Unit crews, supplemented by as many aircraft 
from Coastal Command as could carry a bomb load to the target area. 
On 21 November 1942, the day following the presentation of this paper, 
Bottomley sent a Directive to Harris, couched in letter form, confirming the Air Staff 
requirement for an early and heavy attack on Schweinfurt.  He included with his 
letter an enclosure prepared by the MEW entitled ’The European Ball-Bearing 
Position’.  There was no ambiguity in his call.  Because of the importance of ball 
bearings to the German war effort, plus the fact that a major portion of that 
industry was located in Schweinfurt, Harris was, in effect, ordered to reconsider his 
plans for a two-pronged, overwhelming attack on Schweinfurt and present them to 
the Air Ministry for their consideration.  The aim, Bottomley confirmed, was “the 
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complete devastation of the factories and the town in one overwhelming 
operation.”39   The Air Staff, however, were well aware that with the navigational 
and bombing equipment then available to Bomber Command Schweinfurt would 
not be an easy target.  Nevertheless, its importance required that risks be taken 
and Harris had already shown, in the attack on Augsburg with two newly formed 
Lancaster squadrons, that he was prepared to chance his arm.   
Harris’s reply was quickly forthcoming.  He agreed that the town could be 
dealt with by a night attack, but protested that the factories would require either a 
low level night attack in good weather, or an attack in daylight.  Precision attacks 
were essential to destroy the factories, and on those grounds crews under training 
could not be considered for the operation.  If they were included, he asserted, 
casualties would rise without any significant increase in the number of bombs 
hitting the target.40   His desire not to include OTU or Heavy Conversion Unit 
(HCU) crews may have stemmed from the replacement crew flow problems that 
had resulted from losses of instructors and training crews from those units in the 
1,000 bomber raids on Cologne, Essen, and Bremen, in May and June 1942.   
Next, Harris bolstered his case using the figures provided by MEW in the 
paper accompanying Bottomley’s Directive presented the previous day.   This 
paper, he pointed out, claimed that “52% of the present ball-bearing supplies 
available to Germany are concentrated in the . . . factories . . . at Schweinfurt.”41   
Later, in the same paper, it was stated that “the real load of armaments demand 
upon the ball-bearing industry is probably . . .  in the region of 66%.”42   Thus, 
protested Harris,  
 
the complete destruction of the SCHWEINFURT group of factories 
would not necessarily do more than reduce the production available 
for the armaments industry by more than a small percentage.43    
 
Any deficiencies, Harris argued, would quickly be made up from other factories 
throughout Europe, or by increased imports from Sweden.   
By the employment of these arguments Harris, rather than concerning 
himself with the tactical problems centred on an attack on Schweinfurt, was now 
attempting to interfere in the strategic decision that had already been made by his 
seniors.  The Air Staff had decided that a successful attack on Schweinfurt would 
provide invaluable returns.  It was not Harris’s prerogative to question the possible 
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returns that such an attack would provide.  His task was to decide that the task 
was a reasonable operation of war and have it carried out. 
With regard to the losses possible on the operation envisaged, Harris made 
several pertinent points.  The loss of 200 crews in a month of operations, he 
maintained, was only acceptable provided the percentage on any one squadron 
was not high because replacements were then gradual.  Empty seats in the 
Officers’ and Sergeants’ Messes were a constant reminder to the aircrew of their 
own vulnerability so overnight losses were normally replaced immediately.  With 
potential losses at the level mentioned, immediate replacement would be 
impossible and crew morale would decline steeply.  In rejecting the suggested 
plan, Harris concluded:  
 
I am of the opinion that the existing plan of attack, which I had 
hoped to make with my normal force shortly, is adequate and will 
achieve probably as much as the wholesale plan at a tithe of the 
cost.44             
 
Bufton, asked by Bottomley to comment on Harris’s reply, took issue first 
with Harris over the use of crews from the OTUs.  He agreed that they would not 
be suitable for the precision attack on the factories but suggested that they could 
be of use in the area attack on the town.  Bufton also rejected Harris’s plan for a 
low level night attack saying that flak would render it costly and ineffective, 
reiterating instead, the call for an attack by day.  It is in this argument that it is 
possible to identify Bufton’s hand in the original Air Staff paper.  
Weather, Bufton agreed, could create difficulties for an attack scheduled to 
commence in daylight and be taken up the same night.  But, he argued, Bomber 
Command had to be prepared to exploit every opportunity offered rather than take 
avoiding action.  An attack on the normal scale, suggested by Harris, guaranteed 
nothing, affirmed Bufton.  It was his opinion that Schweinfurt called for an attack  
mounted by the combined bomber strength of Bomber Command and the United 
States Eighth Air Force.  Harris’s opposition, Bufton declared, was tantamount to  
 
overriding the Air Staff decision to treat this project as a single 
major operation, and would relegate it to the status of normal night 
operations.  All experience shows that this would not result in the 
achievement of the aim.45
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Baker, however, was not entirely satisfied with Bufton’s draft.  Firstly, he 
wanted greater emphasis placed on the importance of the planned attack and a 
better understanding of the possible losses.  Although figures of up to 200 aircraft 
had been mentioned, this was simply, he pointed out, to underline the vital nature 
of the target.  If tactical surprise was achieved, unduly heavy casualties would not 
necessarily be sustained.   Secondly, Baker wanted to reinforce the call for the 
attack to be carried out in daylight.  This would provide conditions that should allow 
total destruction to be completed in a single operation.  Thirdly, Baker toned down 
Bufton’s claim that Harris appeared to be “over-riding the Air Staff decision.”  
Baker agreed with Bufton that, despite his letter, Harris should be asked “to submit 
a plan for the operation on the scale and on the lines proposed in conjunction with 
the Commanding General Eighth Air Force.“46
In January 1943 Churchill, Roosevelt, and their chiefs of staff met in 
Casablanca.  By this time it had become clear that Germany had lost the initiative.  
Defeats at Stalingrad and El Alamein, and with Anglo-American forces having 
landed in North Africa, meant that the German Army was on the defensive.  Re-
entry to the Continent, long a dream of the British Chiefs of Staff, had become a 
possibility.   Where previously air power alone appeared to offer the way to victory, 
now other vistas could be identified.  Air power had now become just one, and not 
the only way to bring about the defeat of Germany.  Portal, at a preliminary 
meeting, agreed.  He proposed that it was now necessary to apply “the maximum 
pressure on Germany by land operations; air bombardment alone, was not 
sufficient.“47   Discussions at Casablanca thus centred on the best means of 
providing assistance to Russia, extending operations in the Mediterranean, and 
increasing the bombing pressure on German industries and people. 
On 4 February 1943 Harris and Brigadier General Ira Eaker, the American 
commanding the VIII (American) Bomber Command of the United States Army Air 
Force (USAAF), received a new Directive from Bottomley dated 21 January 
1943.48  It became known as the Casablanca Directive.  The preamble defined the 
role of the two Air Forces as  
 
the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 
industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale 
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of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed 
resistance is fatally weakened.49    
 
The targets were then listed in their order of priority as German submarine 
construction yards, the German aircraft industry, transportation, oil plants, and 
other targets in the enemy war industry.  Yet wide-ranging as this list was, the 
Directive continued with further objectives described as being of great importance.  
These were German submarine bases on the French Atlantic coast, Berlin, 
industrial targets in northern Italy, enemy morale, and the German day fighter 
forces. 
The Directive was welcomed by Harris.  In a letter to Portal on 6 March 
1943 he expressed his pleasure that the Air Ministry had categorically stated that  
 
the primary objective of Bomber Command will be the  progressive 
destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and 
economic system aimed at undermining the morale of the German 
people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally 
weakened.50    
 
His alterations were subtle but extremely significant.  By converting the 
phrase “your primary objective” in the Directive, which referred to both Air Forces, 
to “the primary objective of Bomber Command,“  Harris assumed responsibility for 
the continuation of the attack on morale by means of his area attack programme.  
By inference, the United States bomber force was responsible for the specific 
target systems listed in the Directive.  The Air Staff made no comment. 
Because the specific roles of the two Air Forces thus remained largely 
undefined, the bomber offensive of 1943, instead of being combined, became 
rather more a bombing competition.  One historian, Noble Frankland, maintained 
that 
 
The conflict in 1943 had the appearance of being between Sir 
Arthur Harris and the British Air Staff, but it was really a conflict 
between the R.A.F. Bomber Command and the U. S. Eighth 
Bomber Command.51   
 
 Frankland may well be correct. Nevertheless, it was a conflict that could and 
should have been terminated immediately by the Air Staff exerting the authority 
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which they possessed.  The fact that that authority was never enforced does not 
reflect well on Portal in particular. 
Portal, under the terms agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 
Casablanca, had been accorded the authority to provide the strategical direction of 
both RAF Bomber Command and the US Heavy Bombardment Units based in the 
United Kingdom and both Churchill and Roosevelt had been so advised.  The 
tactical direction, including the techniques and methods to be employed, remained 
the province of the respective commanding authorities, Harris and Eaker.  Portal  
was thus meant to be the master hand guiding the Strategic Bombing Offensive.  
Unfortunately, by permitting on several occasions the tactical decisions of Harris 
and Eaker to supersede his strategic desires, Portal allowed himself to become 
subordinated.  
The Casablanca Directive was accompanied by a paper from the MEW 
which detailed the priorities for air attack among the selected industrial targets.52  
The primary aim, it stated, was to apply the maximum interference with the supply 
of weapons and equipment to the German armed forces.  According to this paper 
the production of aircraft, guns and ammunition, tanks, submarines, and transport, 
required a military and not an economic appreciation.  However, the paper 
claimed, it was the economic and tactical considerations which identified to what 
extent and the way in which any particular production system could be affected by 
air attack.53   The most productive targets, the paper concluded, were those 
factories manufacturing components and heading this list were ball bearings.54
Staff in the Directorate of Bomber Operations were not slow in expressing 
their concern at the amount of freedom granted Harris in the matter of target 
selection within the terms of the new Directive.  Morley was one who made written 
comment.  His belief was that limitations to effective bombing imposed by the 
diminutive force available, its tactical efficiency, and the European weather 
conditions, required that attacks be concentrated.  Lack of concentration meant 
wasted effort.  His argument was that the target list provided was too general in 
nature.  For the offensive to be successful, Morley suggested, “[it] must be 
concentrated against the minimum number of primary enemy objectives.”55   Ball 
bearings, he continued, provide the “outstanding example of a true economic 
bottleneck.“56   Morley warned that the necessity to press home attacks might well 
mean heavy losses, but claimed that the results achieved would more than justify 
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the casualties.  Morley also pointed out that if Schweinfurt was to be attacked at 
night, then the matter was urgent before the limited hours of darkness prevented 
penetration into southern or central Germany.57  
On 23 May 1943 Bufton, who had, on 10 March been appointed the 
Director of Bomber Operations, vice Air Commodore Baker, renewed the calls for 
an attack on Schweinfurt.58  He reminded Bottomley of earlier correspondence 
emphasising the importance of the target and the urgent need for “one 
overwhelming day and night operation by British and American heavy bomber 
forces.“59  In order to emphasise the importance of Schweinfurt, Bufton also 
pointed out that a preliminary report from the American Enemy Objectives’ Unit 
(EOU), on 7 May, had indicated that by both distribution and weight the ball and 
roller engine bearings salvaged from crashed German aircraft between 1939 and 
1942 had been produced at either the three factories at Schweinfurt or one factory 
at Stuttgart.60   He requested that, subject to weather, every effort be made by 
Bomber Command to launch a night attack on the Schweinfurt facilities as an 
immediate follow-up to the proposed daylight raid by the Eighth American Air 
Force.  Morley, who had recently visited Bomber Command Headquarters and had 
discussed with Saundby the possibilities of such raid, reported that the Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief had been most impressed with the idea.  Saundby 
suggested that Harris might also now look favourably on the operation.61   There 
was nothing new in this proposal.  Indeed, the same facts had been presented on 
at least six previous occasions – all to no avail. 
Once again the Air Staff’s appeals generated little enthusiasm at Bomber 
Command.  Harris merely noted that he would not have talks with the Eighth Air 
Force until nearer the July moon period when there would be sufficient darkness 
for a successful night operation.  Bufton, however, was now working with a joint 
American/British team to implement the Casablanca Directive, and through his 
connections there, with Colonel Charles P Cabell and Major Richard D’O 
Hughes,62 he learned that an American attack on Schweinfurt was being 
considered for the “immediate future.“63   Bufton, in a note to Bottomley, contended 
that it was imperative that Bomber Command participated in the planned attack 
with Mosquito aircraft at the very least.64   Absolutely nothing happened. 
According to Douhet, target selection “and determining the order in which 
they are to be destroyed is the most difficult and delicate task in aerial warfare.“65  
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Once that selection has been made, he continued, it then simply becomes a 
matter of proceeding with their destruction as rapidly as possible without 
distracting diversions.66   On 10 June 1943 the Allied bomber force commanders, 
Harris and Eaker, received a new Directive.  In essence it was a repeat of the 
earlier Casablanca Directive but with two exceptions.  Target lists had been 
modified to take into account the increased threats posed by the Luftwaffe fighter 
forces, and the responsibilities of the respective bomber forces had been more 
closely defined.  This revised Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) plan provided 
for rapier-like, day-time thrusts by the Eighth American Air Force against selected 
precision targets, complemented by bludgeon-like blows to be delivered by 
Bomber Command in night area attacks against the same targets.     
This new order, which came to be known as the Pointblank Directive, had 
passed through several stages.  It was first discussed in Washington in May 1943, 
where it had been presented by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and received the 
approval of both Churchill and Roosevelt.  Next, on 3 June 1943, it appeared as a 
draft Directive for the bomber commanders before reappearing, in final form, one 
week later.  Its final form was the work of an unnamed committee with input from 
both American and British sources.  Bufton and Morley from the Directorate of 
Bomber Operations were both directly involved, by invitation, in its preparation.67   
While German fighter strength was first priority on the target list, ball bearings 
were defined as one of four primary objectives.  Particular emphasis had been 
placed on ball bearings in the early draft version but the sentence was omitted 
from the actual Directive.   
Like earlier Directives, the Pointblank Directive lacked precision and clarity.  
The use of such terms as ‘primary objective’, ‘priority objective’, ‘intermediate 
objective’, and ‘secondary objective’ – all without adequate definition – were 
invaluable let-outs when disagreements arose later concerning target priorities.  
The Air Staff, well aware that Harris was ever prepared to take advantage of loop- 
holes in Directives, must therefore bear a measure of responsibility for providing 
further opportunities for Harris to transgress.  He rarely required any second 
chance. 
Unfortunately the Pointblank Directive could not be fully implemented in 
June 1943 as the Eighth Air Force was still in the building process.  It had been 
decided that deep penetration of Germany required a force of not less than 300 
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bombers.  To deploy that number required a total of 800 bombers on first line 
strength.  But by 30 June 1943, when 944 bombers should have been available, 
only 741 had arrived.  Projections for September 1943 envisaged 1,192 bombers 
but, with revised estimates, it appeared likely that only 850 might have arrived.68  
Meanwhile the bomber war continued.  On 15 July 1943 Bufton, having 
learned that the Eighth Air Force was planning an attack against Schweinfurt on 
the first suitable opportunity after 17 July, wrote again to Bottomley.  His concern 
was that “Bomber Command may not co-operate as we would like them to if the 
operation is stages [sic] in the near future.“69   He asked that either Bottomley or 
Portal impress upon Harris the importance of Schweinfurt and the need for the 
planned operation to be as decisive as was possible.   
On 25 July 1943 Bottomley alerted Harris that the Eighth Air Force 
Schweinfurt operation was now imminent.70   He reminded Harris of the far 
reaching effects to be obtained from a successful operation and provided a note, 
prepared by Morley with input from the MEW, which he believed might be of value 
in crew briefings.  Bottomley also sent a copy of this letter to Eaker.   
If it had been the hope that operations conducted by Bomber Command 
and the Eighth American Air Force would, under the terms of both the Casablanca 
and Pointblank Directives, become more closely integrated, then, with regard to 
the first attack against Schweinfurt, they were to be bitterly disappointed. On 17 
August 1943 the Americans launched a two-pronged attack against Schweinfurt 
and the aircraft plants at Regensburg and suffered heavy losses.  There was no 
follow-up by Bomber Command.  The reason given for their non-participation, the 
validity of which could not be denied, was that the raid took place at the time of full 
moon.  Perhaps another equally valid reason was the shortness of the August 
summer nights.   This particular Schweinfurt attack could not be cited as a good 
example of an integrated strategic air offensive. 
Upon receipt of the MEW report on the effects of this raid, Bufton wrote to 
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Alec Coryton who, on 16 August, had replaced Bottomley as 
the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations).  This letter was to remind Coryton 
of the importance that both the Air Staff and the Directorate of Bomber Operations 
still attached to Schweinfurt.   Harris was understood to still be considering an 
attack on Schweinfurt and Bufton wanted to ensure that he was given every 
encouragement.  Bufton took the improvement in the defences at Schweinfurt as 
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indicative of the importance the Germans placed on the ball bearing industry.  In 
August 1942 there had been only a few light gun batteries.  One year later there 
were forty-four heavy guns, fifty-seven light guns, forty-nine searchlights, three 
decoys, and an extensive system of smoke screen generators.71
On 14 October 1943 Schweinfurt was again the target for American 
bombers.  This attack was more successful than the first but again they suffered 
crippling losses.  Harris and Bomber Command again abstained.  Bufton, aware of 
the criticism that might be directed at the Americans over the heavy losses unless 
the results were shown to be significant, intimated to Coryton that a congratulatory 
note be sent to the Eighth Air Force. It would, he suggested, “be most timely. It 
should congratulate the crews . . . and at the same time assure them that the 
importance of the objective was such that their heavy casualties were amply 
justified.“72 
On 30 November 1943 Bufton, in a further letter to Coryton, re-emphasised 
the importance of Schweinfurt as a target calling for Bomber Command’s attention.  
Following their heavy losses in two attacks on Schweinfurt, the Americans had 
shown reluctance to risk their bombers further, at least until such time as long 
range fighters were available for escort duties.  Harris had displayed even greater 
reluctance, but his excuse was that he considered the target as a panacea.  He 
provided other reasons, usually centred on the tactical difficulties that Schweinfurt 
presented.  Bufton, having been assured by Bennett, the Path Finder Force 
leader, that Schweinfurt would present no great difficulty, confirmed that he 
believed that Harris tended “to exaggerate the difficulties of finding Schweinfurt at 
night,“73   In concluding this letter Bufton confessed that he doubted that further 
letters  “to Bomber Command would serve any useful purpose.“74  He indicated to 
Coryton that Bottomley should attempt personally “to try to persuade the C-in-C to 
take it on at as early a date as weather conditions allow.“75
By November 1943 the Path Finder Force had, despite Harris’s non-
cooperation, become a sophisticated force.  It possessed the capability of finding 
and marking small, distant targets at night and even in ten-tenth cloud conditions 
could position sky markers for effective bombing of area targets.  With his 
Lancasters now equipped with H2S Bennett was more than ready to accept the 
challenge offered by Schweinfurt.   But Harris was preparing for his last throw of 
the dice to win the war his way and thereby show the experts how wrong they 
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were.  Berlin, not Schweinfurt, was his preference and it would prove a costly 
mistake. 
It was clear, following the Quebec Conference in August 1943, that Portal 
had abandoned the notion that bombing would win the war.  He now saw Bomber 
Command’s contribution as reducing the capacity of German industry and its 
armed forces to a point where an Allied invasion of Europe could neither be 
repelled nor defeated.  Harris, on the other hand, still argued that the war could be 
won through the intensification of the area bombing programme.  His paper to 
Churchill in November 1943, preceding the ‘Battle of Berlin’, claimed that with 
American support in that action the war could be won.  “We can wreck Berlin from 
end to end” he claimed, “if the U.S.A.A.F. will come in on it.  It will cost between us 
400 - 500 aircraft.  It will cost Germany the war.“76  
This particular letter from Harris to Churchill is significant because of the 
regret expressed by Harris at the failure of the American authorities to fall into line 
with Bomber Command’s plans.  With regard to the attack on Berlin, Harris rued, “I 
await promised U.S.A.A.F. help in this the greatest of air battles.  But I would not 
propose to wait for ever, or for long, if opportunity serves.“77    Later, he wrote,  
 
we must get the U.S.A.A.F. to wade in in greater force.  If they will only 
get going according to plan and avoid . . . disastrous diversions . . . we 
can get through with it very quickly.78 
 
It would appear from this letter that Harris saw victory as being achieved only 
through the extension of his area attack programme.  The plans prepared by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff, approved by Churchill and Roosevelt and his own 
Commander-in-Chief, were, apparently, of little relevance. 
By December 1943 it was becoming clear to the Air Staff that the continuing 
disputes with Harris over their call for an attack on Schweinfurt were in reality 
disagreements relating to fundamental questions of bombing policy.  Early that 
month Harris submitted a progress report on the achievements of his Command.  
It specified the acreage destroyed for each ton of bombs released compared with 
the acreage attacked.  These figures were then projected ahead to 1 April 1944 
and data extrapolated for the damage to be expected in built-up areas in thirty-
eight of Germany’s main centres of population.  It was Harris’s claim that if 
sufficient damage – he calculated between forty and fifty per cent – could be 
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created in the principal German cities, capitulation would follow.79   No account 
was taken of complementary damage to German industry.   
Harris’s review of the 1943 bomber offensive was passed to Bufton for 
comments.  In the meantime, on 17 December 1943, Bottomley had made another 
effort to impress on Harris the importance that the Air Staff and others (including 
the Secretary of State for Air), attached to the bombing of Schweinfurt.  Its 
wholesale destruction, reasoned Bottomley,  
 
is not something affecting the enemy’s long term condition; he is in 
such straitened circumstances already as a result of our attacks, 
that it will have a far more immediate effect than we had hoped for 
in the past.80  
 
Considering the importance that the Air Staff had placed on Schweinfurt 
over an extended period, together with the knowledge that Bomber Command had 
attempted nothing directly, Bottomley’s concluding remarks can only be described 
as insipid:  
 
We are, therefore, all hoping that you will be able to reach out to 
Schweinfurt at the earliest opportunity and that the development of 
the P.F.F. technique and equipment will enable you to make a really 
good job of it.81   
 
The plea, for it can only be regarded as such, fell far short of being a clarion call 
for action. 
Harris’s reply was explicit.  He made clear that he did not regard a night 
attack on Schweinfurt “as a reasonable operation of war.“82   He cited several 
reasons.  He argued that it was a small, heavily defended target, and would 
probably require several attacks to secure a satisfactory result.  He then got onto 
his favourite hobby horse relating to the question of ‘panacea’ targets.  He refuted 
figures of ball bearing production at Schweinfurt protesting that they had “always 
been exaggerated   . . . . At this stage of the war I am confident that the Germans 
have long ago made every possible effort to disperse so vital a production.“83
His conclusion was succinct.  If the target was important then he believed it 
was a task for the Eighth Air Force during the day.  “If they can set the place alight 
in daylight,” he ended, “then we may have some reasonable chance of hitting it in 
the dark on the same night.  Otherwise, I am not prepared to take it on.”84 
 178
In the meantime, Bufton had prepared, for Bottomley’s consumption, his 
critique of Harris’s 1943 report.  The main concern expressed related to Harris’s 
aim of creating maximum destruction of built-up areas per ton of bombs released.  
The implication was the continuation of area attacks.  As such, Bufton asserted, it 
was “a policy entirely divorced from that underlying the Combined Bomber 
Offensive Plan.“85   Because there had been a time lag in the build-up of the 
American heavy bomber forces, doubts were arising as to whether or not they 
could complete their defined tasks.  To assist the Americans, Bufton concluded, 
Bomber Command should attempt to destroy 
 
those plants which present the Americans, in view of the 
penetration involved, with their greatest tactical problems . . . this is 
a major issue upon which the Air Staff should extract from the C-in-
C, Bomber Command a clear statement as to his intentions.86      
 
Bufton supplied a draft reply for Bottomley and his major criticism was 
repeated almost word for word in Bottomley’s response to Harris on 23 December 
1943.  “Your proposals” Bufton asserted, and Bottomley copied,  
 
imply a continuation of area attack upon the largest and most 
densely populated centres, for this is clearly the method by which 
the greatest return in terms of acres destroyed for tons dropped is 
to be expected.  The attack of small centres of population which  
nevertheless contain vital industries, e. g. ball-bearing or fighter 
assembly plants, would, in terms of the policy implied in your Paper, 
prove uneconomical targets.  It is, however, a major principle of Air 
Staff policy that your efforts should, as far as practicable, be co-
ordinated with and be complementary to those of the Eighth Air 
Force.87  
 
Harris’s reply to this further call from Bottomley was addressed to the Under 
Secretary of State but gave no indication that he was prepared to yield to 
pressure, even that exerted by his superiors in the Air Ministry.  In his opinion, 
German economic life would be more disadvantaged by the destruction of 
workers’ housing in the larger cities than by attempting precision attacks on small 
factories in isolated towns.  He stressed that preparations for Overlord88 would be 
assisted more by the destruction of one-third of Berlin than by the ruination of 
Schweinfurt.  He also took issue with the phrase, used in the Pointblank Directive 
and repeated by Bottomley, concerning Bomber Command’s activities as being 
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“complementary to those of the Eighth Air Force.”  “I cannot understand the 
process of reasoning” he growled, “by which the 134,000 tons which Bomber 
Command has dropped on Germany in 1943 in connection with ‘Pointblank’ can 
be regarded as subsidiary to the 16,000 tons dropped by the Americans.“89
By December 1943 the question of Schweinfurt was reaching crisis point.  
Bufton, in an effort to bring the trial of strength to a conclusion, made yet another 
effort.  He enlisted the aid of Oliver Lawrence, the head of the Objectives 
Department in the MEW.  Admitting that Schweinfurt was not an easy target, and 
acknowledging that its destruction might possibly prove expensive in both effort 
and casualties, he asked Lawrence to provide irrefutable evidence of the vital 
importance of the Schweinfurt factories in relation to German fighter production.   
Lawrence was also asked to give an indication of the time interval to be 
expected, after the destruction of the factories, before fighter and other armament 
production would be affected.  Bufton was well aware that Harris placed little value 
in assessments provided by the MEW, so he suggested in  his letter that 
supporting opinions of American, Swedish and Swiss economic experts be 
obtained as further confirmation.  After stressing the urgency of the matter, he 
asked Lawrence to provide a “summary of evidence“90 at the earliest possible 
moment. 
In addition, Lawrence was also asked to provide an MEW opinion on the 
possible effects on German morale, and their economic and social structure, of 
further extensions to the area bombing programme.  Some, Bufton pointed out, 
have suggested it might bring about capitulation “if destruction was increased to 
between 40 and 50% of the fully built up zones of the principal German towns.“91 
The Air Staff, however, he continued, remain unconvinced, but would appreciate 
MEW’s opinion.  
Lawrence’s response was received at the Air Ministry within a fortnight.  His 
recommendation, supported by the MEW and the Economic Warfare Division of 
the United States Embassy, was that the ball bearing factories at Schweinfurt, 
Steyr and Canstatt, together with the town of Schweinfurt, should be accorded the 
highest priority for attacks by the strongest possible bomber forces.  Bottomley, in 
a letter to Portal on 12 January 1944, reminded the CAS of Harris’s disagreement 
over both the bombing policy he was required to pursue, and the foundations on 
which it was based.  The matter is urgent, asserted Bottomley, and further 
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arguments with Harris would be a waste of time.  Despite his personal 
antagonism, Harris must conform.  In Bottomley’s opinion, if Harris continued to 
disagree and the Air Staff failed to act, then it was an admission by the Air Staff 
that precision bombing by night or day of specific targets was totally ineffective.  A 
new plan would be required. 
Bottomley’s role in the Air Ministry decision making process was, of course, 
crucial.  As ACAS (Ops.), (until 15 August 1943 after which he became DCAS) he 
was largely responsible for the day to day aspects of Portal’s work.  He was both a 
Staff Officer and leader, receptive to ideas, and prepared to put them into action.  
He chaired the regular morning conferences at the Air Ministry with Heads of 
Departments and their Deputies, and all were aware that valid points raised would 
receive attention.  He worked closely with the Directorate of Bomber Operations 
and displayed great skill in having contending parties reach agreement.  According 
to Bufton, one officer vowed that Bottomley “plays the Air Ministry organ in a way it 
has never been played before.”92      Robin Neillands, in The Bomber War,  declared 
that there were many valid reasons to relieve Harris as AOC, Bomber Command, 
late in the war, and he nominated Bottomley as one of a small group of possible 
successors.93
Bottomley agreed that the tactical reasons advanced by Harris for not 
having bombed Schweinfurt were hard to refute.  He also believed that if Harris 
could come to accept that the ball bearing factories were worthwhile targets, they 
would be destroyed, if necessary, by a series of attacks.  Many raids had been 
attempted on targets of much less importance than Schweinfurt and failures were 
not unknown.  Provided Harris could set his mind to the task, then Bottomley 
thought the object was achievable.  In closing this letter Bottomley was quite blunt. 
“I now suggest” he concluded, 
 
we specifically direct the C-in-C to attack Schweinfurt in force on 
the first opportunity when he is satisfied that weather conditions 
are favourable and to continue to attack it as opportunity allows, 
until it is destroyed or until alternative directions are issued.94
 
Bomber Command, during 1943, had passed through an eventful period.  
No one, certainly not among the Air Staff, made any attempt to deny Harris the 
successes that had been achieved.  The force had grown significantly during the 
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year, particularly in the bomb carrying capacity, with increasing numbers of heavy 
bombers becoming available.  While Stirlings with their altitude limitations and 
Halifaxes with both altitude and mechanical problems continued to cause concern, 
Lancasters were more than proving their worth.  At the same time, both navigation 
and bombing equipments were becoming more sophisticated.   
Oboe, the precise bombing or target marking system, was first employed in 
December 1942.  The system was reliant upon ground based stations but was 
extremely accurate out to about 350 miles.  It could only be used by one aircraft at 
a time but had proved its accuracy on short range targets in Western Europe.  The 
self-contained, ground mapping radar, H2S, introduced in January 1943, provided 
both navigational and bombing information, without ground assistance and with no 
restriction on range.  In the hands of an experienced operator it was invaluable.  
Unfortunately it also had the disadvantage that its transmissions enabled German 
fighters equipped with Naxos95   to home on the transmitting bomber.  To achieve 
the best results with H2S it was desirable that transmissions be continuous, but the 
knowledge that by using ground mapping equipment they were revealing 
themselves provided a vast disincentive for RAF bomber crews. 
The composition of heavy bomber crews also changed about July 1942.  
Where previously observers had been responsible for both navigation and 
bombing, the responsibilities were now divided, with the navigator solely 
responsible for navigation while the air bomber was expected to assist the 
navigator, operate the radar equipment, and carry out the actual bombing.  
Despite the advances made and the successes achieved in the so-called 
Battle of the Ruhr between March and July 1943, the devastation in Hamburg in 
July and August 1943, the one-off success at Peenemünde also in August 1943, 
together with the increasing guidance provided by the Path Finder Force, Harris 
continued to view his force as being best equipped for area attack.  He persistently 
denied that it also possessed the capability of precision attacks on small targets. 
Although confirmation was hardly necessary, Harris, early in January 1944, 
provided further evidence that he was prepared to stand firm in his self-determined 
programme of area bombing.   “‘OVERLORD’ “he remarked as the opening to a 
lengthy paper,   
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must now presumably be regarded as an inescapable commitment 
and it is therefore necessary to consider the method by which our 
most powerful weapon, the heavy bomber force, can be brought to 
bear most effectively in support of it.96   
 
His conclusion was that the “best and indeed only efficient support which 
Bomber Command can give to OVERLORD is the intensification of attacks on 
suitable industrial centres in Germany.“   Any attempt to vary this programme and 
attack precision targets such as gun emplacements or communications would be 
an “irremediable error of diverting our best weapons from the military function for 
which it had been equipped and trained to tasks which it cannot carry out . . . it 
would lead directly to disaster.”97
In his letter on 12 January, Bottomley had clearly suggested to Portal that it 
was time to be blunt with Harris.  Harris, he had maintained, should be specifically 
directed to attack Schweinfurt  – a message, had it been sent, which left no room 
for denial.  Yet Bottomley’s next approach to Harris, on 14 January, was in the 
form of another Directive, an instruction more often ignored in the past than 
actioned, and was again in the form of a plea rather than an order.  After outlining 
the strategic policy agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Bottomley stressed 
the requirement for the closest co-ordination between the Eighth Air Force and 
Bomber Command.  With regard to Schweinfurt, the Directive continued,   
 
I am to request, therefore, that early consideration be given to the 
ways and means of destroying this target and that you attack it on 
the first opportunity when weather and other conditions allow, and 
that you continue to attack it until it is destroyed or until alternative 
directions are issued.98     
  
From the tone and sentiments expressed in Harris’s letter to Bottomley on 20 
December 1943, it was clear that a stronger word than ‘request’ should have been 
employed in the formulaic introduction.  In the initial draft prepared for this 
Directive, Bottomley did make one concession in his final paragraph.  “High 
priority” he concluded,  
 
must also be given to the destruction of those towns associated 
with the assembly of fighter aircraft, particularly Leipzig, Brunswick, 
Gotha and Augsburg.  These instructions are not, however, to 
prejudice the attack on Berlin to which you are already committed.99  
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In the actual Directive, however, the final sentence was omitted. 
In a letter on 19 January 1944 to Arthur Street, Under Secretary of State for 
Air, and to Bottomley, Harris gave a strong indication that it was going to take 
more than a request from the Air Staff to make him change his ways.  Schweinfurt, 
he reiterated, was a small, well defended target in an area where there were many 
similar small towns and therefore difficult to locate.  He claimed that Bomber 
Command lacked the bombing aids necessary to locate the target and cautioned 
that it would be unlikely that visual bombing markers could be placed accurately 
enough for the target to be hit.  Losses, he continued, would be heavy because 
the attack would have to take place in moonlight conditions.  He claimed that it 
was an ideal target for the American Air Force but that for Bomber Command “the 
destruction of Schweinfurt by night is tactically impracticable.“100  Harris concluded 
this letter by admitting that the intention to attack Schweinfurt, in moonlight, had 
been there for almost two years but conditions had never been exactly right, and 
that now  “all chances of a successful attack by my Command on Schweinfurt 
have all gone.“101
On the night of 21/22 January 1944 Bomber Command launched a heavy 
attack on Magdeburg.  Bufton, in a letter to Coryton, challenged Harris’s target 
selection. He reminded Coryton that the Directives of 10 June 1943 and 14 
January 1944 had both called for attacks against German fighter air-frame and ball 
bearing factories. In the latter Directive, both Brunswick and Leipzig had been 
nominated for area attack and they were both in the vicinity of Magdeburg so that 
weather conditions could not have been a factor in selecting Magdeburg, which 
had not been identified as a potential target.  “It now appears” remarked Bufton, 
 
that the Command is operating to a policy of its own and is 
disregarding both the policy and the precise instructions for its 
implementation . . . . I am forced to the conclusion that the selection 
of Magdeburg demonstrates clearly that Bomber Command does 
not intend to comply with the instructions from the Air Staff . . . I 
consider that the problem should be resolved immediately in order 
that the Air Staff may know where it stands.102
 
In a lengthy briefing paper for the Air Staff on 24 January 1944, Bufton 
rebutted the reiterated claims made by Harris as to the unsuitability of Schweinfurt 
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and its associated factories as targets.  He pointed out that the defences were 
insignificant when compared with Berlin, that it was closer than Berlin, and that the 
bombing aids provided, in the hands of competent operators, were capable of 
ensuring a successful strike.  Bufton admitted that weather was a critical factor but 
insisted that the target was so important that the attack could not be delayed until 
ideal weather conditions prevailed.  Risks, he asserted, had to be taken and, if 
necessary, the attack repeated.103   Although his assistance would probably not 
have been welcomed at Bomber Command headquarters, Bufton provided an 
attachment to this letter suggesting a route and techniques to be employed for a 
successful attack. 
Using Bufton’s appraisal as ammunition, Bottomley re-entered the fray on 
27 January 1944.  He brushed aside Harris’s objections and demanded that 
Schweinfurt be attacked at the first suitable opportunity.  “To await completely 
ideal conditions” he declared, “would not be justified.  I am to request therefore 
that you will now proceed with the execution of the instructions contained in the 
letter . . . dated 14 January 1944.”104
Finally, Harris complied.  Bomber Command launched its first attack on the 
ball bearing factories at Schweinfurt on the night of 24/25 February 1944.  Morley, 
who had asked to go on the raid as an observer but was refused permission, 
provided a special exhortation to be delivered at briefings.  Crews were told that 
the operation would be one of the major battles of the war.  Success could well 
mean an early ending to the conflict.  He called it “A perfectly timed rapier thrust at 
a tiny, but vital, point in his economic anatomy [which] may precipitate his 
collapse.“105   Given the time lapse since Schweinfurt was first identified as a 
significant target, the choice of words, “perfectly timed,” was not particularly 
judicious. 
Unfortunately the raid was not a success.  The Americans had launched an 
attack earlier on 24 February and Bomber Command followed up that night with 
723 heavy bombers and eleven Mosquitoes.  The attack was delivered in two 
parts, with a two hour interval, in an attempt to divert the German night fighters.  
As a diversionary measure it was reasonably successful.  Although twenty-two 
bombers were lost in the first attack, only eleven were missing on the second.  But 
the bombing was less satisfactory.  According to the Path Finder Force Monthly 
Summary for March 1944 
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target conditions were found to be clear and the Visual markers on 
the first attack had no trouble identifying and marking the aiming 
point.  Some Visual Backers-up however, tended to bomb short and 
quite an appreciable spread back, judging from crew reports, 
occurred to the S.W.106   
 
Undershooting, or creepback, was a problem of growing concern.  Too 
many crews, in their natural anxiety to release their bombs and clear the target 
area, were aiming at the first target indicator seen. 
This first attack by Bomber Command was followed by only one other major 
effort.  On the night of 26/27 April 1944 the town was attacked by 215 Lancasters 
and eleven Mosquitoes.  It was another failure.  The low level marking was 
inaccurate and strong winds badly disrupted timings at the target.107
Perhaps Harris had been correct.  Schweinfurt might well have been a too 
difficult target.  He, however, was not one to let the facts speak for themselves.  In 
July 1944 he drew Air Ministry’s attention to an item in the MEW’s weekly 
intelligence report relating to the German ball bearing industry.  Production, the 
MEW estimated, had fallen by fifty-four per cent. The report then claimed that if 
attacks were resumed, and imports from Sweden reduced, the chance existed that 
these efforts “may well eventually have an effect on German military 
capabilities.“108   Harris argued that further discussion was superfluous.  He 
expressed the hope that “the enthusiastic assertions of the past on this subject 
may in future be tempered with more discretion whenever targets of a like nature 
are urged upon us by the Ministry of Economic Warfare . . .  I trust” he concluded, 
 
that the MEW will be called upon to account for their overweening 
enthusiasm over the enemy’s ball bearing position, in view of their 
calculations as to the effects already achieved at so heavy a cost in 
life and effort.109  
 
In his post-war Despatch on War Operations, Harris was somewhat less 
than straight forward in his references to Bomber Command’s attacks on 
Germany’s ball bearing industry.  His words tend to give the impression that the 
war he waged was in accordance with the requirements specified in the Directives 
laid down by the Air Staff. “The directif [sic] of 10th June 1943, having assigned 
first priority to the joint attack of such targets by the R.A.F. and U.S. Eighth Air 
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Force” he asserted, “Bomber Command sent strong forces against Stuttgart, 
Kassel, Augsburg, Schweinfurt, Leipzig, Frankfurt, Magdeburg, and other centres 
upon which the aircraft industry depended.”110   No mention was made of the 
delaying tactics he employed, nor of the pressure that had to be applied before 
action was finally attempted. 
Harris waxed indignantly in Bomber Offensive over the same question.  
“Over another panacea target, ball bearings,” he declared, “the target experts went 
completely mad.“111   He then repeated many of the claims that he had made in his 
letters to the Air Staff.  The target was too small, too distant, Sweden was a 
supplier, and Germany had the industrial capacity of Europe at hand.  Moreover, if 
it was such a vital target, then it would either have been dispersed or gone 
underground.                  
When evaluating the merits or otherwise of attacks on the German ball 
bearing industry, it would be prudent to consider the opinion of Albert Speer, 
Hitler’s Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production.  Post-war, he admitted 
that he first became conscious of a potential bottleneck in the ball bearing industry 
in September 1942 and warned Hitler of the dangers.  It was Speer’s belief that 
had Harris abandoned his area bombing programme, and instead, concentrated 
on specific elements of the armament industry such as ball bearings, the war could 
have been largely decided by the end of 1943.112   Perhaps, however, even Speer 
had not been in possession of all the facts regarding the ball bearing position 
during the war.  Or, was he simply providing the answers his post-war 
interrogators desired? 
Later, when interviewed by Saward in preparation of his Harris biography, 
Speer covered much the same ground as had appeared in his memoirs.  Attacks, 
he believed, should have been repeated.  It was, he continued, one of his 
nightmares that ball bearings, one of the bottlenecks, could be destroyed. “The 
chance to do us harm at Schweinfurt was very high“113 was the conclusion he 
reached. 
Post-war investigations by British and American Bombing Survey Units 
have revealed that Speer’s fears were largely unfounded.  Germany possessed 
ample quantities of capital equipment, much unused factory space, a plentiful 
supply of labour and an efficient repair organisation.  Throughout the war German 
industry, except for the aero-engine and ball bearing factories, operated a single 
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shift work cycle.  In the latter case, only nineteen per cent of the employees 
worked a second shift.  With such reserves available, a considerable amount of 
superficial air raid damage was absorbed without interruption to the supply of war 
material.  The Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit concluded that  
 
the failure to recognise this very great reserve or machine tool 
capacity and machinery of all kinds was probably the major 
shortcoming of our  economic intelligence during the war.  Had the 
fact been appreciated . . . few would have been as sanguine as 
they were about the possible results of air attacks on centres of 
production or even on specific groups or factories themselves.114   
 
The official American history, The Army Air Forces in World War II, stated 
that, with regard to ball bearings, 
 
the original estimates, on the basis of which that industry had been 
selected for top-priority bombing, had been too optimistic. . . . Ball 
bearings . . . were too well cushioned in the production process: 
basic stocks were  too large, the pipelines in the aircraft industry 
too well filled, and the possibility of economy too great for even the 
most successful bombing of the bearing plants to affect final aircraft 
production appreciably.115  
 
Clausewitz has made clear that  
 
War is the province of uncertainty: three-fourths of those things 
upon which action in war must be calculated, are hidden more or 
less in the clouds of great uncertainty.116 
 
Nowhere is the proof of Clausewitz’s maxim better displayed than in the 
problems that arose over Schweinfurt and German ball bearings during the 
Second World War.  Schweinfurt in 1942 and 1943, in theory, provided a prime 
bottleneck industrial target and Harris erred in not accepting it as such. Whether it 
could have been destroyed by Bomber Command at that time, however, is another 
question. Perhaps, indirectly, also, Harris had been correct when he described 
Schweinfurt as another panacea because the authorities, British, American and 
German, were all unaware of the vast ball bearing stocks available within  German 
industry.  
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With the benefit of hindsight it can now be seen that Bufton and the staff in 
the Directorate of Bomber Operations were working on false parameters when 
they called for attacks on the German ball bearing industry.  Harris, for his part, 
refused to be diverted from his area bombing programme using as the excuse the 
inability of his force to create significant damage on small precision targets.  What 
must not be overlooked is that the bombing Directives were issued on the best 
advice and information obtainable at the time, and the targets nominated were 
strategic decisions made by the highest authority.  Harris was responsible for the 
tactical decisions as to how the nominated attacks were to be carried out.  It was 
not his place to decide that the selected targets were wrong.   
There are two unanswered questions.  Firstly, why was Harris permitted to 
delay his attack on Schweinfurt for so long, contrary to the wishes of the Air Staff?  
Secondly, would earlier attacks on Schweinfurt, Path Finder Force led and 
equipped with H2S, have achieved the results the Air Staff believed possible, and 
which Speer himself so greatly feared?  
Harris, rightly, because it was a tactical decision, had the responsibility 
every morning to decide which target would be attacked that night.  His primary 
tactical concerns were the weather conditions forecast for take-off, en-route, in the 
target area, and at bases in England when the bombers were due to return.  With 
variable and rapidly changing meteorological situations it often became a matter of 
an educated guess with many lives held in an uncertain balance.  His current 
Directive had nominated the targets he was expected to attack, frequently in their 
order of priority, but what he was required to attack and what he believed he could 
attack, often differed.  Cloud, of course, because the heavily laden bombers had 
comparatively low ceilings, provided many problems.  Cumulo-nimbus clouds, with 
significant vertical development, anvil tops around 40,000 feet in temperate 
latitudes, and providing high icing indices, were a constant worry.  Such clouds 
also provided destructive turbulence for outward bound aircraft carrying heavy 
bomb loads and often exceeding the maximum-all-up-weight limitations.   Cloud in 
the target area was also of concern because it determined not only whether or not 
a target could be attacked but also the type of attack to be employed.  
Wind was another weather element which occasionally created significant 
problems for the bomber forces.  Although jet streams had been identified as early 
as 1923, winds exceeding 100 knots around 20,000 feet still came as a surprise to 
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meteorologists and bomber navigators, even in 1944.  On the night of 24/25 March 
1944 Berlin was once again the target and forecast winds for the North Sea 
crossing were northerly at about thirty-eight knots.  When the bombers finally 
made landfall, outbound, most found that they were many miles south of the 
required track indicating that the wind had been much stronger than forecast.  It 
was later calculated that the wind had exceeded 100 knots but navigators who had 
found winds of that nature during the flight were neither believed by their captains, 
nor by authorities in England.  Consequently, the bomber stream was scattered, 
timing was disrupted, and, according to Middlebrook, there was “a great gaggle of 
more than 700 aircraft spread over a frontage of at least seventy miles, with any 
centre there might have been well to the west of Berlin.”117   Seventy-two bombers 
were lost that night which became known in various Bomber Command messes 
and crew rooms as the ‘Night of the Big Winds.’ 
Another factor which Harris had to consider in planning which target to 
attack was the phase of the moon.  A full moon and no cloud above medium levels 
usually meant that no distant German targets could be attacked.  Comparatively 
short-range targets became the order of the day.  Even then, they were not always 
successful.  On the night of 3/4 May 1944 Mailly-le-Camp, a German battle-tank 
depot and barracks south of Rheims in Northern France, was attacked by 362 
bombers.  Because of communications failure the Main Force was left orbiting the 
target waiting the call to bomb when they were engaged by Luftwaffe night 
fighters.  Forty-two Lancasters were lost. 
Harris also had to consider the time of the year in planning attacks.  During 
the summer months, because of the short darkness period, only rarely were long 
range penetrations of German territory attempted.   
Weather, for Harris, was not his only consideration.  He had early learned 
that if he sent his bombers to attack the same area or the same target night after 
night the defenders on the ground and in the air would be waiting.  In order to keep 
the efficient German night fighter controllers guessing it was necessary to vary the 
targets, launch diversionary raids, and make feint approaches to the German held 
coast in order to keep secret for as long as possible the actual Main Force target.   
Target selection was a very delicate balancing act and mistakes ─ 
Nuremberg on the night of 30/31 March 1944 was one ─ were made.  Although it 
was during the full moon period weather forecasts for this attack indicated that 
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high cloud would shelter the bombers on the way to the target but it was claimed 
the target would be in the clear for ground marking.   Early that evening a 
Mosquito reconnaissance report indicated that while the forecast cloud over the 
route appeared unlikely to develop, the target itself was cloud covered.  
Nevertheless, despite opposition from Path Finder Force Headquarters concerning 
the route and the weather, the raid was ordered and ninety-five bomber crews paid 
the price for this error of judgement.   
In March 1944 Harris attempted to clarify with Portal his understanding of 
the best role for Bomber Command in the months leading up to Overlord.  His 
Directives, including Pointblank, were issued on the understanding that Bomber 
Command’s attacks were to be largely complementary to those of the Eighth 
American Air Force.  Harris argued that the policy of attempting to follow a detailed 
bombing programme rather than according him the freedom to choose his target 
from the current Directive was wrong.  He continued,  
 
If I am instructed that I must attack any nominated target or 
selection of targets in Germany ‘as soon as possible’ or ‘whenever 
weather conditions permit,’ I am bound to lay on such attacks when 
weather conditions are doubtful for these targets rather than to 
choose other targets for which conditions are much more 
favourable.  Otherwise, I run the risk of finding afterwards that I 
could in fact, have attacked the programmed targets had I gambled 
on the weather . . . under these conditions frequent cancellations 
are inevitable.  The problem is not merely a geographical one.  It 
cannot be solved simply by giving me a large number of small 
targets widely distributed over Germany, since these can be 
attacked with prospects of success only in clear weather and the 
same difficulty arises.118   
 
Harris pointed out that in this situation cloud over the target, or other 
unforeseen developments, would mean that either the attack would have to be 
carried out with limited prospects of success or, alternatively, cancelled.  He 
reminded Portal that bombing attacks had become so complicated and required 
such extensive coordination that the provision of alternative targets and target 
selection must be made early.  He sought a Directive which gave him total 
discretion in target selection on any given night.  He added a proviso that,  
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when weather conditions, in so far as they can be predicted early in 
the day, give real prospects of success against nominated targets, 
these will be given preference over others where chances of 
success are equally good.119
 
Harris, on the occasions that he was questioned by Portal as to why a 
particular target had been attacked, frequently advised that it was because of 
weather conditions.  In this chapter, although the weather conditions in both 
Augsburg and Schweinfurt could have been expected to have been similar, Harris 
chose to attack Augsburg, a lowly rated target at greater range and therefore 
providing increased risk for a trial daylight low level operation, in preference to 
Schweinfurt, a target which the Air Staff had been according a high priority for 
some considerable time.  It provides one example of the problems that the Air 
Staff experienced in getting Harris to attack targets of their choosing rather than 
ones he preferred.  Augsburg was not an isolated example. 
One final observation is that Harris, by procrastinating, avoided for years, in 
the case of ball bearings, having to divert his forces from his area bombing 
programme.  He suffered no penalty.  It would appear that he saw it as a 
successful technique because he employed similar arguments and extended 
delays when the Air Staff, later in the war, demanded attacks on German oil 
facilities.  But that is another story to be discussed later. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Overlord – Before and After 
 
 By late 1942 it had become clear to most Allied political and military 
authorities, but not Harris, that final victory would not be achieved by the bombers 
alone but would ultimately require an invasion and subsequent continental military 
campaign.  The long term tasks for the Anglo-American strategic bomber forces in 
order to make Overlord possible, had been adequately, if somewhat loosely, 
detailed in the Casablanca and Pointblank Directives issued to the bomber force 
commanders in January and May 1943.  Under the terms of these Directives 
attention was directed not at ways of avoiding defeat but refocused on the efforts 
essential to prepare the way for final victory.  What is surprising is that little 
thought was apparently given, until virtually early 1944, as to what tasks the 
combined strategic bomber forces would be required to perform not only to make 
invasion possible but also to ensure that the subsequent military operations were 
successful.  The planners had faced a daunting task but their selection of the 
Transportation Plan, based as it was on the assumption that it would provide some 
assistance to the invading forces by preventing German reinforcements reaching 
threatened areas, appeared to some to provide an insufficient reason for the 
Plan’s acceptance. 
The stage had thus been set for disagreement and extended arguments.  
Opinions differed widely with, on the air side, Harris, Bufton, and General Carl 
Spaatz, Commander of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, all 
apparently operating from different song sheets.  Portal, aware that the world-wide 
prosecution of the war had reduced Britain almost to bedrock in both material and 
human resources, knew that an early end to the war was required.  However, he 
never exhibited great enthusiasm over the prospects offered in the Transportation 
Plan and his initial acceptance of it appeared reluctant.  It gave the appearance of 
a drowning man clutching at straws.  The Supreme Commander, General 
Eisenhower, also grew concerned at the lack of decision regarding the formulation 
of an air plan for Overlord and at one stage advised Churchill that unless positive 
progress was made shortly he would be offering his resignation. 
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Finally, in the arguments relating to the formulation of an air plan for 
Overlord, there is the political dimension.  Churchill was never greatly enthused 
about the prospects offered by an invasion of Western Europe.  He had long 
sought a Mediterranean solution to ending the Second World War with thrusts 
aimed at the Axis soft under belly.  Once Overlord became a reality his focus was 
directed at post-war political problems arising from the deaths of friendly civilians 
in the occupied territories at the hands of bomber forces preparing the way for the 
Allied armies.       
Although the various topics that have already been discussed in the on-
going disagreements between the Air Ministry and AOC Bomber Command have 
generally been considered in isolation, each was but a small part of an extremely 
large picture.  Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the protracted arguments 
and discussions, at the highest levels, as to the best employment of the strategic 
bombing forces both before and after the landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944.  
The Casablanca Conference of January 1943 had determined not only the 
strategic purposes in which the bomber forces would be employed, but also the 
broad lines on which Allied strategy would be based during the remaining war 
years.  The combined Allied staff that was formed became known as COSSAC.1 
Later in 1943, after General Dwight Eisenhower had been appointed Supreme 
Allied Commander, they were absorbed in the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).  In April the same year the planning and 
preparation commenced for full scale military operations on mainland Europe, 
sometime in 1944.  The initial plan for Operation Overlord, as the venture was 
called, was first presented at the Quebec Conference in August 1943 where it was 
endorsed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.  Three months later, at conferences in 
Cairo and Teheran, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek, approved 
military operations in 1944.  
By the end of 1943 Eisenhower had been named Supreme Commander, 
with Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder his Deputy.  Three subsidiary 
appointments were also made:  Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey was appointed Allied 
Naval Commander-in-Chief; General Sir Bernard Montgomery as Commander-in-
Chief, Twenty-First Army Group; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
as Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF).  Jointly this 
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group were charged with the enormous responsibility for the preparation of plans 
for the first phase of Operation Overlord. 
Leigh-Mallory’s appointment was unfortunate. He had been selected 
because of Portal’s initial belief that the major air contribution to Overlord would be 
the gaining of air superiority over the beachheads.  But Leigh-Mallory, as AOC 12 
Group during the Battle of Britain, had not performed well, showing himself to be 
an individualist and not a team player.  When No.11 Group, responsible for the 
defence of London and the south-east of England, called for support at the height 
of the battle, all too frequently Leigh-Mallory’s Group took too long to form up their 
‘big wing’ and the battle was often over before they arrived.2   Leigh-Mallory was 
also overtly ambitious. His declaration to Sir Keith Park, in February 1940, whom 
he was about to replace as AOC No. 11 Group, “that he would move heaven and 
earth to get Dowding removed from Fighter Command,”3   marked him as one to 
be watched closely by his colleagues.  Later, when appointed Air Commander, 
AEAF, he had visions of becoming the supreme air commander of both the 
strategic and tactical air forces. Moreover, as would later be discovered, his 
American peers found him so pompous that they found it difficult to assess his 
ability and they made little effort to understand him. His appointment would prove 
to be a matter of some concern among the senior Allied staff.   
One part of Leigh-Mallory’s problem was personal.  His austere manner and 
apparent lack of warmth alienated most of those with whom he came in contact – 
especially the Americans.  According to Zuckerman, who was far from being 
antagonistic, Leigh-Mallory was, at least to the Americans, “an unfortunate burden 
they had to bear or bypass; they regarded his appointment as unnecessary.”4   On 
occasions Leigh-Mallory could also display an obtuseness that even the British 
found difficult  He was isolated not only from the ‘Bomber Barons’ but also 
Eisenhower, Montgomery and Tedder.  According to Tedder, his weakness was 
“his desire to interfere with subordinate commanders.”5   Tedder pointed out to him 
that his job was not to control the forthcoming battles in the air because they were 
battles he was not equipped to fight.  His job was to control the commanders of the 
air forces involved.   
 
The Air Plan for Overlord was actually initiated in May 1943 with the issuing 
of the Pointblank Directive.  Although the primary mission statement of Pointblank 
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repeated that which had been in the Casablanca Directive, an additional sentence 
had been added.  Physical destruction and the weakening of morale were to be 
“construed as meaning so weakened as to permit initiation of final combined 
operations on the Continent.”6   The reduction of German morale either by military 
defeat or internal unrest had, for Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, become a 
basic requirement prior to the launching of a Second Front.7   Target selection for 
Pointblank comprised six specific target systems but was further broken down into 
seventy-six precision targets in three major elements of the German war machine: 
U-boats, Luftwaffe and its support services, and specific supporting industries.  
The principal aim was the reduction of German fighter aircraft strength; U-boat 
yards and bases; remainder of the German aircraft industry; ball bearings and oil.  
The pursuance of Pointblank requirements thus came to be used by both Harris 
and Spaatz as excuses for deferment of particular requirements for Overlord. 
The initial problem facing the Joint Planning Staff headed by Leigh-Mallory 
was that unless measures were taken beforehand, the German authorities had the 
greater capacity to concentrate their forces, using the network of European roads 
and railways, than did the Allies, who would be landing on open beaches.  Their 
first plan was therefore designed as an attempt to at least delay the movement of 
enemy forces attempting to reinforce the assault area in Normandy.  The aim was 
to force German reserve divisions, Panzer and infantry, to have to detrain at least 
a hundred miles from the battle area and thence proceed by road.  Target 
selection for this plan centred on railway targets about sixty miles from the 
Normandy beaches with additional targets outside that area to confuse German 
intelligence authorities.  No action was required immediately because it had been 
estimated that repairs could be effected within fourteen days so any bombing 
programme could not commence more that a fortnight before the assault.  A draft 
of this first plan was submitted on 30 December 1943.   
In the meantime, Professor Solly Zuckerman had been appointed as 
Scientific Adviser to Leigh-Mallory’s staff.  Zuckerman had only recently returned 
from the Mediterranean theatre where he had conducted a detailed investigation 
into the effects of bombing on communication targets in Corsica and Italy.  His 
report had been approved by the Air Staff and Leigh-Mallory was advised that 
future plans should largely be based on Zuckerman’s findings.   
In general terms Zuckerman claimed: 
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If the measure of success of air attacks on enemy rail and road 
communications is taken as the destruction of the means of 
communication, then the offensive carried out against rail targets in 
. . . . Southern Italy must be regarded as an outstanding success.8    
 
But his preamble also carried a warning.  Neither railway lines nor roads 
were ever completely blocked and the enemy was able to move within “the limits 
imposed by the capacity of the transport at his disposal.”9   Success was achieved, 
Zuckerman argued, not by the cutting of railway lines or the blocking of roads, but 
by the destruction of rolling stock, locomotives, and repair and servicing facilities.  
The damage created was sufficient to reduce locomotive and rolling stock 
availability below that necessary for the military requirements.  Destruction of the 
means of communication also had another benefit: it tended to lower civilian 
morale.    
In one section on special requirements in his Report, Zuckerman stated that 
both rail and road bridges were uneconomical and difficult targets.  During 
September and October 1943 no fewer than thirty-seven rail bridges were 
attacked in Italy but only seven were destroyed or damaged.  His finding was that 
500lb General Purpose bombs were insufficient to destroy bridges even when 
direct hits were secured.  If it was necessary to use either 1,000 or 2,000lb bombs 
then he considered bomb loads became uneconomical.  It must have been 
heartening for Zuckerman to receive advice from the Air Staff that similar findings 
with regard to bridges had also been given, in July 1943, after a meeting at the 
Ministry of War Transport.10   During the discussion at this meeting no mention had 
been made concerning bridges but in an appendix, added to the notes of the 
meeting, they were indicated as potential tactical but not strategic targets.11   
Harris, aware of the demands that could be placed on Bomber Command 
made an early attempt to pre-empt future requirements by confirming he identified 
his bombers as a war-winning force.  It will be remembered that in November 
1943, in a note to Churchill, he had claimed that with the support of the American 
Eighth Air Force, Berlin could be wrecked from end to end and Germany forced to 
surrender.12   A little over four weeks later, in a letter to the Air Ministry, he argued 
that it was possible his Lancaster force alone, could by 1 April 1944, bring “a state 
of devastation in which surrender is inevitable.”13   Despite the planning that had 
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already been undertaken, it is clear that Harris at this time was not concerning 
himself with an air offensive to make Overlord possible.  Rather, he still had in 
mind an offensive that would make it unnecessary.  
In response, Portal advised Harris that, for good or ill, the authorities were 
committed to Overlord.  He also reminded Harris that, as CAS, it had always been 
his view that the co-operation of the heavy bomber forces would best be achieved 
by placing “all or part of them ‘at the disposal’ but not ‘under the control’ ot the 
Supreme Commander.”14   Portal then added that he would define the tasks to be 
carried out by both Harris and Spaatz15   but that the methods they employed 
would be the responsibility of the individual strategic bomber force commanders.  
In order to have a clear idea of possible targets, and for the Supreme Commander 
to be aware of Bomber Command’s limitations, early liaison was essential.  Harris 
was advised that an early meeting with Spaatz and Leigh-Mallory was required. 
Harris’s response was typical.  He confirmed his willingness to discuss the 
problems with Spaatz and Leigh-Mallory but first he required confirmation of two 
points.  Would the general principles regarding the bomber offensive, embodied in 
both the Casablanca and Pointblank Directives, continue to apply?  He had used 
both as providing a carte blanche for his area bombing, and he remained 
convinced that a continuation of the offensive against Germany proper was 
essential.  In his opinion it was the only way to ensure that the Luftwaffe fighter 
forces were kept fully involved.  Secondly, he admitted he saw no problem for his 
heavy bomber forces with regard to pre-invasion, target selection.  However, he 
appeared less enthusiastic over the tactical targets to be attacked immediately 
prior to the invasion.  These required, he pointed out, the fortuitous coincidence of 
suitable weather conditions.  For this reason it was his hope that the chosen date 
for invasion would take possible weather conditions into account.16             
Portal, perhaps sensing reluctance in Harris, responded quickly.  He 
reminded his bomber commander that the Casablanca Directive had laid down 
that “when the Allied armies re-enter the Continent you will afford them all possible 
support in the manner most effective.”  Until that time, Portal continued, or until 
you are ordered otherwise, the broad aim applies.  At an as yet undecided date, 
Portal confirmed, Bomber Command’s primary object “will become the support, but 
not necessarily the direct support of Operation Overlord.”17
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Portal, however, weakened his case somewhat when he conceded that 
even though Overlord had become Harris’s first priority, that did not necessarily 
mean that his area offensive was no longer required.  In fact, Portal made clear, it 
should continue on as great a scale as possible.  Success or otherwise, however, 
would not be measured by the destruction created in Germany, but rather on the 
assistance provided Overlord. 
In closing this letter, Portal pointed out to Harris that during the preparatory 
period before the invasion, Leigh-Mallory would exercise operational control “in 
such a manner as to lend the maximum support to the strategical offensive.”18   It 
was not a reminder that Harris would have enjoyed reading.  Although nominally, 
Leigh-Mallory had responsibility for only the American and British tactical air 
forces, the reminder must have caused alarm bells to sound for Harris that it would 
not all be smooth sailing. 
On 13 January 1944, Harris, perhaps in an attempt to prevent what he saw 
as a misuse of the strategic bomber forces, issued a lengthy memorandum.  
Although the extract has been quoted in the previous chapter, its relevance is such 
that it can bear repetition.  His first sentence set the tone.  It was almost a lament.             
“‘OVERLORD’“ he conceded,   
 
must now presumably be regarded as an inescapable commitment 
and it is therefore necessary to consider the method by which our 
most powerful weapon, the heavy bomber force, can be brought to 
bear most effectively in support of it.19    
 
Without qualification, he confirmed that he considered his Command’s task 
was to continue the destruction of Germany’s industrial cities.  Operations, he 
claimed, were limited by the aircraft in use, and the complex nature of the 
operational techniques required to overcome increasingly sophisticated German 
defences.  Day operations were impossible because his crews lacked the 
necessary training, and the aircraft were deficient in both ceiling capability and the 
defensive armament essential for such activities.  Even with the Path Finder Force 
and the navigation and bombing aids they possessed, Gee, Oboe, and H2S, target 
location still depended heavily on weather conditions.  As for army support 
operations, Harris claimed that, at best, they could not be relied upon because it 
took a minimum of seven hours from the time a target was selected until the first 
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bomber was airborne.20   Harris’s judgement was that the best employment for 
Bomber Command in support of Overlord would be the continuation of area 
bombing. 
In his cover note to Portal, Harris claimed that both Montgomery and Leigh-
Mallory, “expressed general agreement.”21 It is not known whether or not 
Montgomery approved, but in fact, Leigh-Mallory was not happy with the stance 
adopted by Harris.  His opinions were set out on 27 January 1944, in tabular form, 
in an appendix to Portal’s reply.  The first column of the three column table 
detailed the limitations that Harris believed would prevent his bombers from 
fulfilling the pre-invasion bombing programme envisaged by the planners.  The 
second column contained Leigh-Mallory’s comments while the third column was 
completed by comments made by the Air Staff, prepared by Bufton.22
Leigh-Mallory first made the point that he did not understand why targets in 
the invasion area should be more difficult than industrial cities in Germany.  He 
argued that because the targets were at reasonably short range, the increased 
accuracy of both Gee and Oboe should enable bomb aimers to deliver telling 
blows.  He also admitted there were valid reasons for continuing the attacks on 
German cities, but called for the diversion of the bomber force, in whole or in part, 
at least in the preparatory phase of Overlord.  “The failure of Operation Overlord” 
he argued, “would result in far graver repercussions than a temporary cessation in 
the bombing of German centres.”23
Harris, in the meantime, perhaps sensing that his case required support, 
wrote again to Robert A Lovett, the American Assistant Air Secretary.  It was an 
expression of his concern at the possible diversions Bomber Command would 
have to accept if it was to fulfil Overlord requirements.  Harris made clear to Lovett 
that he was convinced that Bomber Command’s priorities must continue to be 
Germany’s major industrial centres including Leipzig, Magdeburg, Brunswick, and 
in particular, Berlin.  Harris admitted that his worst fear was that diversions to 
panacea, Overlord, or Crossbow 24   targets, would mean  
 
that we shall fail to  finish the job this spring . .  .  . by the autumn, 
the defences will be so powerful that we shall be unable to get 
through them except at a much higher cost . . . I see no reason why 
the Germans should not then carry on a defensive war for a very 
long time.25   
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Any idea of co-operation for the attacks of precision targets in the preparatory 
phase of Overlord appeared far from Harris’s plans. 
Lovett delayed his reply, primarily in the hope that he could provide a more 
positive response.  His answer, in March, was: “the hell with trying to explain the 
problems to the kibitzers.”26   He agreed that the Allied command structure had 
become complicated, but he believed that if Spaatz and Harris were able to 
continue their bomber offensive, he had no particular concerns.  His major worry 
was that once ground forces become involved, as had happened in the 
Mediterranean, “the bottom falls out of an orderly strategic air program and almost 
hysterical use is made of airpower in haphazard attempts ‘to help the boys on the 
ground’ ”27   
Portal responded to the Harris Memorandum and the comments of Bufton 
and Leigh-Mallory late in January 1944.  Generally, he agreed with his Air Staff’s 
comments.  The commitment to Overlord, he reminded Harris, was irrevocable.  
Bomber Command, he insisted, 
 
will wish to help to the utmost, even if this means trying new 
technique [sic] and tactics against the kind of targets which you 
rightly consider to be outside the scope of normal night bomber 
operations . . . . the tasks that Bomber Command will be asked to 
perform will be reasonable and practicable.28
 
On 10 January 1944 the tentative plans drawn up by COSSAC planners 
were discussed at the first meeting of the Allied Air Forces Bombing Committee.  
This Committee had been established to assist Leigh-Mallory in determining a 
policy for use by both British and American strategic bomber forces in support of 
Overlord.  In effect, it became, the Operations Planning Section of his 
Headquarters.  Air Commodore Kingston-McCloughrey, Deputy Chief of 
Operations for the AEAF was appointed Chairman, and it had as members 
Professor Zuckerman, E D Brant of the Railway Research Service (RRS), and 
representatives from Air Staff Plans in the Air Ministry.  It was empowered to co-
opt other members from a wide range of sources including the Directorate of 
Bomber Operations.  The defined tasks were: to advise Leigh-Mallory on suitable 
targets; the relationship between the bombing force available and the specific 
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commitments and priorities to be accorded particular target systems; and the 
amount of effort to be applied in order that the commitments would be met.29
The Committee met again on 11 and 13 January and discussed the 
suggestions of Captain C E Sherrington, Head of the RRS, and Brant, concerning 
potential targets within the continental rail network.  Unfortunately, although both 
knew a lot about the European rail system, they knew nothing about bombing, or 
the effectiveness of bombing against particular elements of a rail system.30   
Brant’s argument, that no matter what effort was expended against rail centres in 
both France and Belgium, there would always be alternative routings available, did 
not engender any great confidence in the railway plan.   At the third meeting, on 13 
January 1944, the leaders of the United States Strategic Air Force were first 
introduced to what eventually became known as the Transportation Plan. 
Leigh-Mallory, to this point, had taken no part in discussions relating to the 
Transportation Plan.  But time was running out.  On 18 January 1944 he was given 
a paper to consider: ‘Operation Overlord – Delay and Disorganisation of Enemy 
Movement by Rail.’31   It had been prepared by Zuckerman, now working in Air 
Plans in AEAF, and confirmed the thirty-three railway centre targets in northern 
France and Belgium suggested by Brant.  It also added another thirty-nine railway 
targets in Germany.  In essence, this paper made the point that considerable risks 
would be run if it was considered that all rail links leading towards the landing 
areas could be either cut, or blocked, by bombing.  A better target, the paper 
suggested, would be railway servicing centres.  They covered large areas and 
their destruction would seriously reduce motive power.32
The plan produced by Zuckerman for the preparatory phase of Overlord 
was based on that which had earlier been successfully employed for operations in 
Sicily and southern Italy in 1943.  But why should a plan prepared for a long, 
narrow, mountainous country, be able to be successfully transferred to a broad, 
flat area such as in north-west France?  In 1943, from Rome to Salerno, there was 
but one standard gauge, double track, electrified railway line.  Paralleling that line 
was another from Rome to Naples, standard gauge, double track.  The destruction 
of repair facilities and marshalling yards on those lines, to provide blockages for 
troop movements, had been a comparatively simple task, readily achieved.   
But the French and German rail systems were not only better organised but 
also better equipped and thus provided a more difficult target.  Additionally, 
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marshalling yards in the Italian rail network had been of little importance because 
of the parallel track system while in both France and Germany, because of the 
complex rail structure, they were of vital importance in the organisation and 
loading of trains.  Furthermore, the rail system was essential in Germany because 
the extensive inland waterway system had become overloaded and coastal 
shipping was impossible.  But, as Zuckerman acknowledged, even massive 
destruction in marshalling yards will only delay movement of one train by a matter 
of hours.  Could the destruction required in north-west France be sufficient to 
delay the movement of reinforcing Panzer forces to the Schwerpunkt ?  
Zuckerman claimed it would.  His argument, in view of his rejection of both bridges 
and marshalling yards as profitable targets, was perhaps, somewhat 
misconceived.   
Zuckerman’s plan, however, although still not completely thought out, was 
more broadly based.  His consideration of rail targets envisaged not only the 
restriction of military movement but also the reduction of civilian economic traffic.   
His goals, although they conflicted with the important rule of war relating to 
concentration, were both short and long term.  The short term and immediate aim 
was to restrict the movement or German reserves to the battle area in Normandy.  
His long term aim was the paralysis of the German economy and as such was in 
line with the lines being pursued by both Harris and Spaatz.   Unfortunately, his 
advocacy of a target system considered anathema by both Harris and Spaatz 
meant that the bomber commanders and the planner held opposing views.  
The following day, 19 January, Portal called a meeting attended by Harris, 
Spaatz and Leigh-Mallory.  At this meeting it was agreed that the objectives 
defined in Pointblank should remain unchanged.  German aerodromes and the 
fighter forces they supported, together with the industries upon which they relied, 
remained the first priority targets.  In view of the broad agreement reached in the 
Air Ministry as to the need for a specific bombing plan prior to the landing in 
Europe, the unanimity was surprising.   
By late January 1944 it had been made very clear that Harris was standing 
firm.  He continued to argue that the war would be won by the continuation of area 
bombing.  Counter proposals were rejected.  Early in January, Zuckerman visited 
Harris in his home, believing that the invitation was to discuss earlier air operations 
in the Mediterranean.  Instead, Harris delivered an harangue on what he saw as 
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unsatisfactory staff changes in the American Air Force.  Next morning, Harris 
posed one question. Were coastal defences suitable targets for strategic 
bombers?  According to Zuckerman, his confirmation that they were, was not the 
response required.33   The subject was not mentioned again.  Zuckerman had 
unwittingly rendered himself persona non grata with Harris.  It was all explained, 
early in April 1944, in a spiteful letter that Harris wrote to Lovett in Washington. 
Harris’s concern was that he believed he had uncovered a plot by 
Zuckerman to divert Bomber Command’s aim.  “Our worst headache” he 
lamented, 
  
has been a panacea plan devised by a civilian professor whose 
peacetime forte is the study of the sexual aberrations of the higher 
apes.  Starting from this sound military basis he devised a scheme  
to employ almost the entire British and U. S. heavy bomber forces 
for three months or more in the destruction of targets mainly in 
France and Belgium . . . . Fortunately, Tedder has entirely sound 
ideas about the importance of strategic bombing and there is no 
fear that he will agree to its being abandoned in favour of slogan 
and panacea warfare even if others should try to revise the monkey 
fancier’s plan in its original form.34
 
The initial air plans for Overlord were thus largely based on what were seen 
as Army requirements.  Firstly, the forces had to be safely transported to the 
Normandy beaches and a landing made.  If those forces were not to be 
immediately ejected it was essential that the large German reserves, Panzer and 
infantry divisions, be prevented from speedily reinforcing the beach and landing 
area defenders.  Railways were identified as the key for the rapid movement of 
both German reserve forces and essential supplies.  The first plan thus envisaged 
the cutting or blocking of those lines leading to the assault area.  A total of sixteen  
significant points were identified within a radius of approximately one hundred  
miles from the landing beaches.  The plan appeared economical; it would not 
interfere largely with Pointblank; the required bomb lift would be reasonable; and it 
was a task well within the capabilities of the bomber forces. 
There were, of course, problems. Successful interdiction required that all 
the selected targets be destroyed.  One line left open rendered the plan worthless 
and the assault forces at great risk.  Additionally, bombing attacks on the selected 
targets had to take place as close to the selected landing day as possible because 
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rail repairs could be effected rapidly.  Significant attacks, such as operations 
against the sixteen nominated targets would mean that the landing area would be 
identified by the German defenders and thus impose increased risks for the 
landing forces.  Plans could not be made to attack the selected targets 
immediately prior to D-Day because of the weather factor.  Visual conditions were 
essential if success was to be achieved and in Europe weather conditions could 
never be guaranteed.  Weather is not a factor to be gambled upon and thus the 
plan simply left too much to chance.  With D-Day tentatively set for May, time was 
beginning to press and positive decisions were required.  They would not be 
reached early. 
Meanwhile, by the end of January 1944, Bufton was becoming increasingly 
concerned at Harris’s continued opposition to the plans being considered for 
strategic bomber operations prior to D-day.  In a note to Bottomley and Portal, he 
posed three questions.  Did they believe that Harris, by a continuance of an area 
bombing programme, could bring the war to a successful conclusion by 1 April 
1944?  Was it accepted that the maximum efforts were being made to reduce 
Luftwaffe effectiveness?  Does area bombing, even by employing the entire 
bomber force, provide the most immediate and maximum assistance to the 
planned invasion either side of D-day?  His own response was a categorical 
denial.  If nothing is done, Bufton declared, the Air Staff would be “unable to meet 
the severe criticisms that will be levelled . . . if ‘OVERLORD’ is wholly or even 
partially unsuccessful.”35
In another note to Bottomley, Bufton requested an appointment with Portal.  
Bomber Command, he asserted, appeared to be following an agenda of its own 
making.  By so doing it was disregarding not only the policies but also the 
instructions determined by the Air Staff.  Bufton acknowledged the seriousness of 
his allegations, but confirmed that, in his opinion, Air Staff instructions were being 
ignored.  Such a situation, he continued, should not be tolerated in the months 
ahead – months that required the closest possible co-operation.  Harris, he 
implored, must be required to give a categorical assurance that he will carry out  
“both in letter and in spirit, the policy laid down”36  in Air Staff instructions.  
But Harris was not alone in his opposition to the transportation plan.  
General Spaatz, the United States Strategic Air Force Commander, joined in the 
opposition.  He saw no justification for the diversion of his strategic bombers from 
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their Pointblank targets to another target system that he regarded as of dubious 
value.  An acceptance of the plan, he argued, placed at risk the winning of air 
supremacy so vital to the success of planned landings on continental Europe.37
Spaatz’s opposition was largely based on his fear that the planned invasion 
would fail and that blame for that failure would be nailed to his door.    Like Harris 
he believed that bombing could win the war and he wanted to be the bomber 
commander whose air power wrecked the German economy and thereby be 
acknowledged as the winner in the bombing debate.   There was also another 
string to the bow of his desire.   The Army Air Force for too long, he believed, had 
been constrained by Army and Navy influences and, like so many of his fellow 
officers, he sought organisational autonomy.38      
On 22 January 1944 the Allied Air Force Bombing Committee held its sixth 
meeting, under the chairmanship of Leigh-Mallory, to consider a second draft of 
the paper, ‘Delay and Disorganisation Of Enemy Movement by Rail,’39   prepared 
by Air Plans in AEAF Headquarters.  Discussion centred mainly on the need to 
destroy large rail servicing centres and the timing of these attacks, rather than 
merely attempting to cut rail links.  Zuckerman suggested that attacks begin at the 
earliest possible moment, but he was reminded by the Chairman, Leigh-Mallory, 
that an early beginning to the bombing programme might mean that any damage 
created could well be repaired before the landings took place.  Captain C E 
Sherrington of the Railway Research Service, argued, on the grounds that repairs 
after an effective attack would take at least three months to make good, that 
attacks should be carried out between forty-five and seventy days prior to the 
landings.   
The Army representatives at the meeting were not greatly enthused.  Major 
General P G Whitefoord warned that at first sight it was not apparent to him that 
the plan would provide any great assistance to the armies in the critical early 
stages of the battles, immediately after the landings. It was his opinion that at least 
three or four weeks would elapse before such bombing would influence the military 
situation.  German reserves of ammunition, food, and oil, in dumps along the 
coastal zone, he cautioned, were sufficient for ten days’ fighting. Finally, in a 
somewhat grudging acceptance, Whitefoord conceded that “the plan did appear to 
meet the Army’s requirement in the main.”40
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On 1 February 1944 the plan was presented to Eisenhower.  Apart from 
some target boundary changes to protect cover plans for the invasion, he found 
the plan acceptable.  Leigh-Mallory objected to these changes because they 
meant that the electric railway systems between Paris and Le Mans, Tours and 
Bordeaux, were exempt from attack.  These lines carried the bulk of the heavy 
traffic from Paris to the western seaboard, and Leigh-Mallory argued that the 
restrictions imposed by Eisenhower left a large gap open to uninterrupted rail 
movement.  His criticisms were effective and, subject to the proviso that attacks on 
the electrified railway sections were carried out early in the bombing programme, 
the geographical restrictions were waived.  
By early February 1944 staff at the Directorate of Bomber Operations were 
also becoming increasingly concerned. Their worry was that the conclusions being 
drawn from Zuckerman’s report on air operations in Sicily and Italy could be 
misinterpreted if it was attempted to apply them to the vastly different conditions 
applicable in north-western Europe.  Germany, it was believed, had few divisions 
in reserve to reinforce those already serving in France.   Thus, the creation of a 
railway desert might well mean that the strategic bomber forces were being 
employed in attempting to counter a non-existent threat.  Moreover, French 
marshalling yards were most often located on the outskirts of cities.  Large scale 
attacks therefore involved the potential for heavy civilian casualties.  The paper 
concluded that   
 
it viewed with concern any document which can be read as giving 
Air Staff approval to the proposed plan at this stage.  The plan itself 
has not been received.  When it is received the Air Staff, it is 
suggested, should consider it with the utmost care.41
 
Many authorities were called upon to express opinions concerning possible 
targets for the embryonic transportation plan.  The Ministry of Home Security was 
one.  Their assessment was that railway marshalling yards were uneconomic 
targets.  Destruction required considerable effort for very little return.  With regard 
to the relative value of the destruction of locomotive sheds and servicing facilities 
compared with the destruction of bridges, the paper was much less emphatic.  
That was a decision, the paper made clear, that would have to be made by 
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authorities given more time to consider the problem than had been given to the 
Ministry of Home Security.42
By mid-February it was becoming clear to Leigh-Mallory that, by his 
continued disagreements with the ‘Bomber Barons,’ he was becoming isolated 
from the aims of the Transportation Plan.  He called a meeting at his 
Headquarters, ostensibly to consider the latest draft.  In reality, it was an attempt 
by Leigh-Mallory to gather support from higher authority for his plan. Neither 
Eisenhower nor Portal had yet become fully committed, and Tedder, still sitting on 
the fence, appeared his last hope. 
Early in the meeting, Leigh-Mallory lost further ground when Spaatz claimed 
that the plan showed an inadequate understanding of the Pointblank requirements.  
Leigh-Mallory’s claim, that the German fighters would be tempted into the air in 
defence of railway targets, was rejected by Spaatz.  He declared that he was not 
prepared to enter into any agreement to limit his targets: certainly not one at cross 
purposes to his current Directive. 
Harris was typically dogmatic.  The plan, he protested, was based on a 
fallacy.  He refused to accept the proposition that rail communications could be so 
disturbed as to prevent military movements.  He also rejected the notion that 
lessons from the Italian campaign could be transferred to a north-western Europe 
situation.  So bitter was his opposition that he even offered to provide “a written 
guarantee that the proposed plan for interrupting the railroad communications 
would not succeed and that the Army would then blame the Air Forces for their 
failure.”43
Tedder, however, threw Leigh-Mallory a life-line.  On Tedder’s suggestion, it 
was agreed that a Joint Planning Committee be established with members drawn 
from Bomber Command, the American Strategic Air Forces, and the AEAF.  Their 
task was to draw up a plan to suit the capabilities of the forces involved.44
Later in February supporters of the Transportation Plan suffered another set 
back.  In a wide-ranging note to Bufton, the Director of Intelligence, previously a 
supporter of the Plan, expressed concern at the arrangements under 
consideration.  He agreed that as a scheme for the destruction of railways, the 
plan was admirable.  But he admitted to having increasing doubts whether such an 
offensive would make an effective contribution to Overlord. His argument was that 
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the original, modest plan had become so enlarged that the primary purpose had 
become submerged in the desire to create destruction.45
Bufton was spurred by this communication to express to Portal his 
uneasiness at the plans being made for the employment of the strategic bomber 
forces in Overlord.  Firstly, the projected Joint Planning Committee, he believed, 
had not been properly established, and had been given no specific terms of 
reference.  His argument was that until the Committee was given approval to 
operate independently, and call upon its own selected experts for advice, no 
planning progress was possible.  He advised Portal that he intended calling a 
meeting with nominated railway experts, within a few days, to discuss the 
Transportation Plan.  If the meeting agreed that the Plan was deficient in any way, 
then the employment of the heavy bomber forces would have to be reconsidered.  
In such a case a new plan would be required.  Portal was invited to attend.  His 
presence, Bufton pointed out, would enable Portal to balance the soundness or 
otherwise of the present plan against the need for an alternative.46  
Tedder was also having doubts.  In a letter to Portal he admitted:  
 
I am afraid that having started as a confirmed optimist I am steadily 
losing  my optimism as to how this is all going to work out . . . . the 
so-called ‘Committee’ has shown no signs so far of producing any 
constructive results.  I am more and more being forced to the 
unfortunate conclusion that the two strategic forces [Spaatz and 
Harris] are determined not to play.47
 
No such meeting took place.  Instead, Leigh-Mallory convened and chaired 
a meeting on 25 February 1944 with twenty-four participants, including six railway 
experts.  Bufton attended, but Spaatz, Major General James H Doolittle (the newly 
appointed Eighth Air Force Commander), Harris, and Tedder, were all missing. 
According to Zuckerman the meeting was not well controlled and he described it 
as “extraordinary.”48   It was a case, he believed, of the blind trying to lead the 
blind, because some of the participants had never even seen the AEAF plan.  
Bufton’s part in the proceedings was centred on his attempts to promote the 
usefulness of bombing attacks against bridges and viaducts.  He also confirmed 
that he believed that efforts devoted to the attrition of locomotives had to be 
considered a long-term project. 
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The day after the meeting, Bottomley, who had not attended, provided a 
short summary for Portal.  He had obviously been briefed by Bufton.  The meeting, 
he protested, had clearly changed nothing.  He continued: 
 
While it was agreed that the execution of the plan could have little 
or no  effect on the movement of strategic reserves to the battle 
area, the issue was confused by the Air C-in-C’s contention that he 
had to consider the  problem in terms of a period of six or nine 
months after the assault had taken place.49   
 
The difficulty, Bottomley continued, was that a bombing programme to create 
conditions of benefit to Overlord for up to nine months after the assault phase 
required an enormous and early diversion from the present Pointblank 
programme.  He supported Bufton’s call for an appropriately established 
committee, under Portal and Eisenhower, to consider the problems.  
Churchill, who had been becoming increasingly concerned at the non-
appearance of a widely accepted air plan in support of Overlord, finally intervened.  
Although in his own six volume work, The Second World War, he was noticeably 
reticent on the subject, to many others, including Eisenhower, he frequently 
displayed his increasing impatience.50    In order that firm decisions could be 
taken, and an end put to procrastination, Churchill suggested, on 29 February, that 
Eisenhower should be placed in full command of all forces committed to Overlord.  
Tedder, he advocated, should prepare an outline air plan agreeable to 
Eisenhower, and be empowered to employ the air forces assigned to Overlord in 
the manner required by Eisenhower.51   Tedder’s suggested empowerment was, 
no doubt, a pre-emptive strike to end Leigh-Mallory’s efforts to secure control of 
the strategic bomber forces which Churchill had long opposed.   
Eisenhower, however, evinced no great enthusiasm.  He, apparently, was 
still to be convinced that the British were totally committed to Overlord.  His 
concern was such that, on 3 March 1944, he wrote in his diary, and informed 
Churchill, that if agreement was not reached soon he would “simply have to go 
home.”52  He had good reason to be concerned.  
The vexations expressed by Eisenhower were long standing.   In November 
1943  Leigh-Mallory, on a visit to Washington, had warned Portal:   
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there seems to be a very considerable distrust of the Prime Minister 
over here, rising out of a feeling that, while he has agreed to the 
European plan which is represented by ‘OVERLORD,’ he is in fact 
making no serious efforts to implement that undertaking.  I 
understand that the President and General Marshall feel this very 
strongly . . . . if [General Marshall] does not get a firm undertaking 
that we are going to throw the maximum resources into 
‘OVERLORD’ he will go to the Pacific, and the American forces will 
go with  him.53   
 
Harris was equally dogmatic.  Early in January 1944 he rejected any 
suggestion that his bomber forces should be diverted from his area bombing 
attacks on German cities.  In his view  
 
the bomber offensive is sound policy only if the rate of destruction is 
greater than the rate of repair.  It is hard to estimate the extent to 
which Germany could recoup industrially in say a six month’s break 
in bombing.54  
 
His conclusion left no room for doubt as to the part which he felt Bomber 
Command should play in Overlord.   “It is thus clear” he asserted, 
 
that the best and indeed the only efficient support which Bomber 
Command can give to OVERLORD is the intensification of attacks 
on suitable industrial areas in Germany . . . when the opportunity 
offers.  If we attempt to substitute for this process attacks on gun 
emplacements, beach defences, communications or dumps in 
occupied territory we shall commit the irremediable error of diverting 
our best weapon from the military function, for which it has been 
equipped and trained, to tasks which it cannot carry out.  This might 
give some specious appearance of ‘supporting’ the army, in reality it 
would be the gravest disservice we could do them.  It would lead 
directly to disaster.55
 
Later in January 1944 General Montgomery had also signalled his 
opposition to the broad front plan in preparation for Overlord.  His comments, 
quoted in the minutes of the First Supreme Commander’s Conference, could not 
have been reassuring.  He cautioned that  
 
in view of the enemy’s strength and rate of build-up, it was essential 
that we obtain a quick success . . . As at present planned, he did 
not consider that ‘OVERLORD’ was a sound operation of war.56
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Moreover, Spaatz also had not given up hope in his struggle for 
independence.  On 5 March 1944 his Headquarters produced their ‘Plan for the 
Completion of the Combined Bomber Offensive.’57   The preamble was a refutation 
of the Transportation Plan.  The completion of this plan, according to the paper, 
would take twelve months.  Even then, any significant advantages it might have 
achieved, would be too late to assist the invasion.  The alternative offered, 
speedily dubbed the Oil Plan, selected for attack the petroleum industry with 
emphasis on petrol, followed by other targets involved in the German fighter 
industry.  Transportation targets were nominated as targets of last resort, to be 
attacked only when primary targets were not available due to adverse weather 
conditions. This plan, Spaatz claimed, would assure air supremacy for the assault, 
reduce fuel supplies, and provide tactical air support.58
Harris, pursuing his independent line, perhaps following Spaatz’s lead, also 
refused to yield.  Possibly he was buoyed by a letter from Lovett in Washington,59 
quoted earlier in this chapter, who confirmed that he supported the lines being 
followed by both Spaatz and Harris.  He wished them both well in overcoming what 
he considered was a complex system of command.   
On the same day as the American Oil plan was presented, a new draft of 
the Transportation plan appeared.  It offered two alternatives.  Plan A listed a total 
of seventy-six targets – thirty-two in western Germany and forty-four in north-west 
France.  Plan B, the alternative, listed seventy-eight targets – six in Germany and 
the remainder in either northern France or Belgium.  Although trial attacks on rail 
targets in France and Belgium had been ordered by Portal on 27 February, none 
had yet been carried out.60   The problem was that little had been done to obtain 
the necessary clearances to attack nominated targets.  With the potential for 
heavy civilian casualties, Portal believed that War Cabinet approval would be 
required.  Only twenty-eight  targets had been cleared.   
Initially, Bottomley supported the American Oil Plan.  It appeared, he 
asserted, to be the best plan presented to exploit the successes already gained in 
the Pointblank programme.  In addition, it prepared the way for success in 
Overlord, appeared likely to produce Rankin 61 conditions, and provided the most 
assistance to Russia.62   As for the AEAF plan, Bottomley cautioned, it was 
satisfactory for the attrition of Germany’s rail facilities, but would provide no 
appreciable effect on military effort for an indefinite period.   
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Two days later Bottomley wrote again to Portal with details of a meeting 
held in his office on 13 March 1944.  Tedder, Bottomley, Coryton, Bufton, and four 
others attended.  Discussion centred in the relative merits of the Transportation 
versus the American Oil Plan.  Tedder opened proceedings by saying that it was 
his intention to prepare a plan by which the strategic bomber forces would best 
assist Overlord.   To his mind, he declared, the American oil plan was too largely 
based on optimism.  But the meeting agreed that if Germany could still meet her 
minimum rail requirements, even after the implementation of the Transportation 
Plan, then an alternative must be accepted. Somewhat surprisingly, in view of 
Tedder’s opinion of the American Oil Plan, it was then confirmed that, subject to 
some modifications, it remained an acceptable alternative.63    
Although it would appear that he had not figured prominently in the latest 
discussion in Bottomley’s office, Bufton had not been idle.  Aware of the possible 
abandonment of the Transportation Plan, coupled with the fact that the American 
Oil Plan was the only viable alternative, he produced a plan of his own.  Portal, he 
knew, was being pushed into a corner without an exit.  An early, firm decision was 
required.  It would be totally unsatisfactory if a plan of little merit was accepted 
simply because there was nothing else on offer.  His Air Staff paper was entitled 
‘Note on the Employment of the Strategic Bomber Forces prior to ‘Overlord’.’  The 
success of Overlord, he argued, depended upon total air superiority over the 
Luftwaffe fighter force.  Progress had been made, he continued, but the targets 
selected for attack must be those which the enemy felt compelled to defend.    
Bufton’s nominated targets were aircraft repair depots, factory airfields, aircraft 
storage areas, aerodrome facilities, and personnel in those areas.  Bufton agreed 
with the Americans and their selection of oil as an additional target system.  He 
called for the immediate attack of twenty-seven targets within the German oil 
industry.64 
Portal was in a quandary.  With only just over two months before the launch 
of Overlord, nothing had been decided concerning the employment of the strategic 
bomber forces in the coming struggle.  Leigh-Mallory had requested clearances to 
allow attacks against transportation targets, but Portal was still not prepared to 
recommend to Cabinet that approval be given. The sticking point was the 
likelihood of heavy civilian casualties.  They could only be justified if it was the 
German transportation system that was identified as the target.  Portal’s 
 220
reluctance was largely based on the disturbing estimate of civilian casualties 
provided by RE 8 (Research and Experiments, Department 8), a branch of the 
Ministry of Home Security.  It was their initial pronouncement that the execution of 
the Transportation Plan would result in 80,000 - 160,000 French and Belgian 
casualties, one quarter fatal, that provided the stumbling block. 
Air Vice-Marshal Edgar Kingston-McCloughry, who served as Head 
Planner-Air Operations in the Headquarters, AEAF, places much of the 
responsibility for this estimate on Bufton’s shoulders.  Bufton, he claimed, had not 
only been grossly misleading in his briefing of the officials responsible for the 
figures, but had also not taken the trouble to become conversant with the 
methodology employed.  He had simply called in the head of RE 8, given him a list 
of targets, and told him the planners required an average of four strikes per acre in 
the railway yards.  What civilian casualties could be expected in the surrounding 
areas?65
However, as Kingston-McCloughry noted, casualty calculations were 
fraught with difficulties.  Had the population been warned?  Had there been 
evacuation from threatened areas? Casualty surveys in England had provided a 
standardised formula for the number of casualties per ton of bombs released, but 
calculations hinged on one question: what was the population density in the target 
area at the time of the attack?  Later calculations considerably reduced the 
number of civilian casualties to be expected.  That was a lesson still to be learned. 
Churchill, also, was becoming increasingly concerned.  Time was running 
out.  No decision had been made concerning pre-invasion bombing, and the 
estimates provided for civilian casualties in occupied France and Belgium were 
assuming frightening proportions.  What effects would that have on post-war 
relations?  Aware that Portal was still vacillating, and that a meeting was planned 
for 25 March, Churchill advised Portal that he eagerly awaited the conference 
outcome. 
It was time to marshal the forces. Bufton, supported by the Director of 
Intelligence, nailed his colours firmly to the mast.   In a succinct note to Bottomley 
he averred that, in his opinion “The Transportation Plan will not produce any 
material effect upon the course of the OVERLORD battle in the critical period D to 
D+5 weeks . . . . as a target system . . . it has little or nothing to recommend it.”66
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War Office support for the Transportation Plan was also only lukewarm.  
The primary object, they insisted, must remain the destruction of the Luftwaffe.  If 
what they called the Railway Plan involved diversion from the primary target, they 
argued that it should not be approved.  The employment of any surplus strategic 
bomber effort, they added, should be based on studies completed by SHAEF and 
the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).  They suggested oil, tank production, tank 
depots, ordnance depots, motor transport parks, and radar systems, as possible 
targets.67 
Spaatz also reaffirmed his opposition to the Transportation Plan.  The 
primary aim, in his opinion, for which he claimed unanimous agreement, was the 
destruction of the German Air Force and the industry on which it relied.  Overlord 
required air supremacy, and the American plan fulfilled that requirement.  On the 
other hand, the Transportation Plan put as second priority rail transportation, and it 
was Spaatz’s opinion that this would achieve no worthwhile results.  Even five 
weeks after the landings, he claimed, German military rail requirements could be 
met by utilising only a fraction of the available rail capacity.  Oil was his 
recommendation as second priority target.   He concluded his note saying that the 
Americans should  
 
join with SHAEF, AEAF, and the Air Staff in producing a plan for the 
direct tactical support of OVERLORD.  This plan to provide for 
attacks in great strength upon communications and military 
installations of all kinds to assist to the maximum the initial phases 
of OVERLORD.68 
 
Harris, aware of the importance of the meeting planned for 25 March, also 
reiterated his opposition to the Transportation Plan. His plea was for a greater 
freedom of action in target selection.  Bomber Command, he declared, must, with 
minimum diversions, “use all the force they can bring to bear against targets in 
Germany with a view to reducing the enemy’s material power to resist invasion.”69   
He called for a Directive giving him full discretion as to target selection but was 
prepared to permit a proviso.  When forecast weather conditions “give real 
prospects of success against nominated targets, these will be given preference 
over others where chances of success are equally good.”70   The half promises 
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were a veil to conceal his wish to continue on his self-determined path of area 
attacks on German cities. 
Bottomley, despite his close relationship with Bufton, advised Portal that he 
could not support the Director of Bomber Operations’ recommendations.   It was 
his opinion that concerted attacks on enemy transportation and railway centres 
would provide immediate benefits for Overlord.  These attacks possessed the 
added benefit that they meant a continuation of the heavy attacks on Germany’s 
main industrial areas.  His words would have been music to Harris’s ears.  
Adoption of the Oil Plan, according to Bottomley, meant “we should certainly be 
very restricted from the point of view of weather systems for choice of attacks both 
by day and by night.”71
Tedder’s views on the matters to be discussed are somewhat surprising 
given his pessimistic note only two days earlier.72   In contrast, his latest appraisal 
was confident and wide-ranging.  It had also been long awaited.  Tedder 
acknowledged that Allied air power was enormous, but it was still essential that the 
target selected for attack was within the capabilities of both tactical and strategic 
air forces.  The oil plan, he believed, was a plan that provided long-term benefits.  
But, he claimed, there was no evidence that “the Oil plan can, in the short term 
available, seriously affect the enemy ability to meet the OVERLORD assault.”73  
Tedder continued:  
 
The Transportation plan is the only plan offering a reasonable 
prospect of disorganising enemy movement and supply in the time 
available, and of preparing the ground for imposing the tactical 
delays which can be vital once land battle is joined.  It is also 
consistent with POINTBLANK.  Since attacks on Railway centres 
have repercussions far beyond the immediate targets, attacks on 
such centres within the REICH will certainly assist in creating the 
general dislocation required for OVERLORD.  Moreover, since the 
Railway system is the one common denominator of the whole 
enemy war effort, it may well be that systematic attack on it will 
prove to be the final straw.74    
 
It was to prove to be, in the long term, a singularly prophetic pronouncement. 
The plan provided, he urged, for concentration, excellent bombing targets, 
and scope for flexibility.  He called for the current Pointblank Directive to be 
replaced by a new Pointblank/Overlord Directive nominating the Luftwaffe and 
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selected railway centres in Germany and Western France as the principal 
objectives.75
Although Tedder’s paper was only dated 24 March 1944, it must have been 
available earlier because, on the same day, Bufton produced a critique.  Every 
paragraph, except the first and third, was examined in detail.  Only the final 
recommendation, regarding the supervision, co-ordination, and preparation of the 
final plan, was accepted by Bufton.  His criticism was more of a call for all plans, 
other than that submitted by himself, to be rejected. 
Bufton’s opposition did not go unremarked by Tedder.  In 1947 Exercise 
Thunderbolt was held at RAF Station, Old Sarum.  The object was to provide the 
opportunity for senior officers of all Services to consider the direction and 
development of the air offensive from the Casablanca Conference, in January 
1943, to the end of the war.  Tedder was then Chief of the Air Staff and Marshal of 
the Royal Air Force.  Item 14 of the exercise was a simulation of the planners’ 
conference to discuss the air plan for Overlord. The day following the presentation, 
a discussion was held relating to the conference and Bufton was an early speaker.  
At the outset he admitted that he had been “one of the bitter opponents of this 
long-term transportation plan.”76   His first point was that he felt the demonstration 
the previous day had not painted a fair picture of actual events. 
To take a minor point first, Bufton began, yesterday it was stated that  
 
Bomber Command could not play any effective part in the oil plan; 
in fact, when the oil plan was launched Bomber Command’s initial 
task was the destruction of the ten synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr, 
which was a very great proportion of the oil plan, and they carried it 
out very effectively; and they could have carried it out very 
effectively before we got on to the Continent.  The other point was 
this.  It was stated that there were two alternatives, the oil plan and 
the Army interdiction plan.77     
 
At this point Tedder interrupted.  “May I take that one point on the question 
of fact?” he enquired.  “I understood what was said yesterday was that Bomber 
Command said that they could not take on the oil targets because they were small.  
That is my recollection.” 
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Bufton replied, “I thought they said until they could get . . .  “   He was not 
allowed to complete this sentence because there was another interruption from 
Tedder. 
Tedder demanded, “They said they could not do it.  Was not that historically 
correct?” 
Bufton responded to what had clearly been a sharp exchange, reminding 
Tedder that “they also said they could not hit the marshalling yards in France.”78   
He was then allowed to continue without further interruption. 
It would seem that had Tedder not interrupted, Bufton would have quoted 
the actual words spoken in the presentation qualifying the requirements for the 
destruction of the oil plants.  Harris, in his letter to Portal of 13 January 1944, had 
confirmed that the only effective employment for Bomber Command was the 
continuation of area attacks on German cities.  The destruction of small targets, 
including railway marshalling yards, was beyond the capability of his Command.  
Bufton never adhered to that view, and by his opposition had made an enemy of 
Harris.  It would appear that, by his opposition to the Transportation Plan, he had 
also made an enemy of Tedder. 
Tedder, perhaps, neither forgave nor forgot.  In his war memoirs he 
described Bufton as “an habitual non-conformist.”79   Perhaps his summation 
should be regarded as an accolade.  When did ‘yes’ men ever significantly 
advance initially unpopular causes? 
In summary then, in late March 1944, but prior to the meeting on 25 March, 
the question regarding the use to be made of the strategic bomber forces prior to 
D-Day remained unanswered.  The plan presented by Zuckerman and Tedder had 
many opponents but only two supporters.  The bomber commanders were in 
entrenched positions with both believing that bombing could win the war.  They   
argued that Zuckerman’s plan was a misuse of the enormous air power available.  
Both, it appears, were seeking ways by which their force could be seen as having 
won the war.  But time, for them, unfortunately was fast running out.  Spaatz, 
arguing that bombing German oil could win the war, believed that if the 
transportation plan was adopted he would be enmeshed in bombing rail facilities 
while Harris, not able to be controlled, would be seen as winning the war.  Portal 
was still undecided while the Supreme Commander, Eisenhower, remained on 
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tenterhooks.  Churchill, regretting the non-acceptance of his Mediterranean 
strategy, awaited the outcome of events increasingly nervously.    
In the Directorate of Bomber Operations Bufton, although appreciating the 
necessity of a target for the Allied bomber forces that would rouse the Luftwaffe 
fighters to its defence (and their destruction), had his own ideas of what that target 
should be.  He was not a supporter of any form of transportation plan.  Instead he 
sought the continuation of the attack of targets under the terms of the Directive 
issued on 17 February 1944.  Their listed order of priority was: German Air Force; 
Crossbow installations (German V-weapon launch sites); Berlin; Pointblank ; and 
targets in south eastern Germany.  In addition to this wide ranging list he 
suggested adding oil targets in the Ruhr, attacks on Luftwaffe depots, aircraft 
parks and repair facilities, and attacks on airfields. 
Bufton was hampered, however, by the fact that by 1943 one of his primary 
advisers, the MEW, appeared to have lost confidence in the bombing campaign.  
Its problems were compounded by the fact that the intelligence gathered could 
very easily be misinterpreted and, while the war had vastly expanded, intelligence  
sources still remained inadequate.  Very little concrete information was available 
for analysis.  Staff examined photographic reconnaissance material, press and 
other published data, prisoner of war interrogations, and information provided by 
travellers and diplomats, but the true state of the German economy remained 
hidden.  It was not until May 1944, when the Transportation Plan was well under 
way, that damage to land and telegraph lines caused the German authorities to 
increasingly utilise the vulnerable Enigma that the developing economic and 
industrial chaos in Germany was at least partially revealed.  Ultra decrypts 
exposed military, industrial and economic problems all causing severe difficulties  
for the German authorities. 
Meanwhile, preparations for Overlord continued.  Within the higher 
echelons of the Air Ministry Bufton’s suggestions were declared by Bottomley to 
be unacceptable.  Oil, he agreed, would be a target that would provoke the 
Luftwaffe, but equally, transportation targets in German cities would provide a 
similar response.  Oil, he argued, was a long term target and would not produce 
effective results in the short term.   On the other hand, he believed that attacks on 
railway centres would have immediate effects.  Bottomley urged the continuation 
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of area attacks on German cities because they created industrial devastation, 
dislocated transportation, and reduced German morale.   
American air plans for the pre-invasion bombing programme centred on the 
destruction of twenty-seven German synthetic oil facilities.  Spaatz argued that the 
German oil situation, reliant mainly on synthetic production, was critical.  If the 
synthetic plants could be destroyed Spaatz believed that the effects would be 
disastrous for the German war machine.  Battle field mobility would be reduced 
and the movement of reserves significantly slowed.  The defence of oil facilities 
would create air battles resulting not only in further attrition for the German fighter 
forces but also assist in the maintenance of Allied air superiority.  On the surface 
the American plan appeared attractive but it was identified (perhaps mistakenly) as 
a long term plan, and, for Overlord, time was not a commodity that could be 
wasted. 
There remained only the Transportation Plan, largely prepared by 
Zuckerman with Tedder’s support, based on an analysis of the operations and 
results achieved in campaigns in Sicily and Italy.  It required an extensive, wide 
ranging bombing programme aimed at crippling the railway system over a broad 
area and not merely the cutting or blocking of several lines.  Although it was 
known that line capacity in north-west Europe was extensive, it was also 
appreciated that the availability of heavy locomotives had been severely restricted 
because of their transfer to assist operations in Russia.  Attacks were therefore to 
be directed against servicing and repair centres in north-west France and Belgium 
and even extending into Germany.  Such an extensive programme, it was 
acknowledged, would require both diversion of the bomber forces and time to 
implement.  Initially, two alternative target systems were suggested: seventy-six 
centres from the assault area back to the Rhine; or seventy-four centres in 
Belgium and France together with six centres inside the German border. 
Churchill, perhaps influenced by his scientific adviser and éminence grise, 
Lord Cherwell, remained uncommitted.  Cherwell was a firm supporter of the 
prospects offered by the bomber offensive.  Churchill, wearing his military hat, but 
possibly regretting the diversion from his Mediterranean strategy, remained fearful 
of the prospects of invasion and would have eagerly accepted any other way 
which offered victory.  Wearing his political hat he became equally concerned 
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regarding potential post-war problems should there be heavy loss of civilian life in 
France or Belgium occasioned by preparations for invasion.   
But it was now late March, invasion was only two months away and still no 
firm and agreed plans had been decided.    
Much was expected of the crucial meeting at the Air Ministry on 25 March 
1944, under the chairmanship of Portal, with Eisenhower in attendance.  Among 
those present were Tedder, Leigh-Mallory, Harris, Spaatz and his Deputy, Major 
General Anderson, together with Generals Kennedy, McMullen and Crawford from 
the War Office, Bottomley and Inglis from the Air Ministry, Noble from Intelligence, 
and Lawrence from the MEW.  Tedder was invited to explain the nature of the 
bombing plan he had prepared.  According to Tedder, the highest priority 
remained the German Air Force, including ball bearings.  The question to be 
decided was which target system should be attacked with the strategic bomber 
effort remaining after the allocation of German Air Force targets.  It was a long 
meeting during which all the major protagonists sought support for their cause.  
The arguments they had previously delivered on paper were now given in person.   
Tedder made no great claim for his Transportation Plan and readily 
admitted that servicing centre and marshalling yard attacks would not mean total 
traffic blockage.  Eisenhower, somewhat clutching at straws, conceded that the 
greatest contribution the air forces could make to ensure the invasion forces got 
ashore and were enabled to remain ashore, would be that they “hinder enemy 
movement.”80  Considerable discussion followed this gambit before the meeting 
was given the opportunity to offer alternatives. 
Spaatz reminded the meeting that he had circulated his plan for oil attacks, 
and claimed that with both the forces and time available, attacks on the rail system 
would neither assist the course of the initial battle, nor prevent the movement of 
German reinforcements.  Attacks on oil installations, he believed, would force the 
Germans to reduce oil consumption in order to conserve supplies.  The oil plan, he 
continued, would weaken the German military on all fronts.  It would also force the 
German fighters into the air in an attempt to defend installations.  This, he 
asserted, they would do ”to the last fighter aircraft.”81
Portal then asked Oliver Lawrence from the Objectives Department of the 
MEW for his opinion of Spaatz’s oil plan.  It had been argued, Lawrence claimed, 
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that if USSTAF completed their plan of attacking 27 oil installations 
within  a period of three months then by the time a further three 
months was up the Germans would have had to institute a cut of 
25% in their present military consumption . . . . they had large 
stocks in the West so that the effect need not be immediate . . . . 
there would certainly be some effect noticeable in the West four or 
five months after the plan began.82
 
Lawrence’s pronouncement was seized upon eagerly by Portal who warned 
that it showed “conclusively that the oil plan would not help OVERLORD in the first 
few critical weeks.“83   It was, he conceded, a long term plan, well worth 
considering, and should again be examined, and possibly adopted, once the Allied 
forces were well established on the Continent.  Eisenhower agreed.  Then, albeit 
reluctantly, conceded “that it looked as though there was no alternative to the 
transportation plan.”84     
Field Marshal Smuts once cautioned that “it is the greatest mistake to 
imagine that it is the great victories that decide wars; on the contrary, it is the great 
blunders.”85   Eisenhower did not greatly blunder in accepting the Transportation 
Plan.  It was made on the advice of experts.  Unfortunately, it was advice lacking 
in vital particulars.  Although bridges were successfully attacked prior to D-day, 
they should have been on the programme from the beginning.  Mistakenly, their 
value as targets had been questioned.  The destruction in servicing, repair 
facilities, and in marshalling yards, did reduce the movement of German 
reinforcements, but they were not entirely prevented.   Entirely prevented was, of 
course, an unrealisable proposition but Eisenhower’s words that “it looked as 
though there was no alternative” was, it appears, a lukewarm acceptance of a plan 
on which so much depended.   His hope was that German reinforcements would 
be forced to move at a pace so reduced that they would be in no position to 
influence the struggle in the early stages of the invasion.  Although this aspiration 
would ultimately be fulfilled there were considerable risks involved: concentration 
on the Transportation Plan might well mean that reduction of the Luftwaffe, in 
accordance with Pointblank requirements, could not be achieved. 
Furthermore, Eisenhower, on 25 March 1944, had been presented with but 
two options: oil or marshalling yards.  In the case of oil there was a corollary: oil 
attacks would only partially have taken up the immense bombing effort available.  
The residual effort could have been employed in a systematic programme of 
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bridge destruction and the bombing of ammunition and supply dumps together 
with military and vehicle concentrations, as advocated by Bufton. 
Unfortunately, although the subjects of oil and the Transportation Plan had 
been under consideration for months, neither was fully discussed at the meeting 
on 25 March. With the bombing forces available in April 1944 perhaps the 
Transportation Plan could have been combined with an oil plan but it appears that 
the idea was rejected, without consideration, because of the desire to adhere to 
one of the long-standing principles of war, selection and maintenance of the aim.    
Conceivably, however, the critical error, outside Eisenhower’s ambit, was 
that made by the oil experts.  Their calculations, virtually throughout the war, were 
based on the amount of oil stocks the Germans had on hand, relative to the rate of 
military consumption.  What was not done was to calculate the effects of current 
losses on future, reduced production.  Had this been done then the somewhat 
bleak predictions of Lawrence would have produced a much enhanced picture, in 
a shorter time-frame, for reduced German military effectiveness.86  
Oil should have been the primary target, after the reduction of the German 
fighter forces, from a much earlier date.  Harris, never a supporter of the oil 
bombing strategy, did have the grace to admit, post-war, that “the offensive 
against oil was a complete success.”87   However, as will be seen in a later 
chapter, even in this instance he hedged his grudging admission.  But another with 
first hand experience of the Allied oil bombing was General Adolf Galland, the one-
time Commander-in-Chief of the German fighter force.  In his opinion  
 
the most successful operation of the entire Allied strategical air 
warfare was against German fuel supply . . . the fatal blow for the 
Luftwaffe . . . it is difficult to understand why the Allies started this 
undertaking so late.88
 
Portal, after deferring Spaatz’s oil plan, sought confirmation that the 
Americans would be able to complete their share of the Transportation Plan in the 
limited time remaining.  He was still clearly undecided.  His lack of commitment 
was indicative of the indecision pervading the minds of those responsible for 
determining the role of the strategic bomber forces in the initial stages of Overlord.  
Eisenhower, of course, had the final say.  In respect of the Transportation Plan, he 
suggested that “in default of any other alternative plan which would produce 
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greater results, he thought the present one should be adopted.”89   Later in the 
same meeting it was admitted that there had been no consultation with War Office 
Staff regarding the anticipated reduction in German military movements, should 
the plan succeed.  Eisenhower covered that point by confirming, “it was only 
necessary to show that there would be some reduction, however small, to justify 
adapting [sic] the plan, provided that there was no alternative available.”90   It 
would appear that the grounds on which some vital decisions were made were 
extremely weak.  Time was fast running out, but it would be another six weeks 
before Churchill’s final approval was grudgingly obtained so that the plans could 
be fully implemented. 
Concern was also expressed at the meeting on 25 March 1944 regarding 
the possibility of French civilian casualties, and Portal suggested that, as this 
would be a matter of consequence for the Government, Cabinet should be alerted.  
It was also decided that Tedder should produce a draft directive for the senior 
officers concerned with the implementation of the Transportation Plan.  This draft 
would then be discussed with the commanders and then referred to Eisenhower.  
Portal and Eisenhower would meet shortly after, reach a final decision, and agree 
upon the format of the directive to be issued.  But though it may have appeared 
that the path had been defined, neither Harris nor Spaatz was yet prepared to 
yield.   
As a result of the meeting on 25 March, the controlling authority for the 
Transportation Plan passed from Leigh-Mallory to Tedder, who was now 
responsible for both Pointblank and the strategic air operations in connection with 
Overlord.  It was a rearrangement much to Spaatz’s satisfaction as he could never 
have co-operated with Leigh-Mallory.  According to Kingston-McCloughry, Spaatz 
was satisfied with the outcome of the latest meeting, because he had been 
convinced that the Transportation Plan, coupled with the campaign against the 
Luftwaffe, provided scope for the best use of the strategic air forces.  This 
presumed satisfaction, however, is not always borne out in Spaatz’s letters.  
The first was written the day after the meeting.  In a note to Eisenhower he 
complained that the list of transportation targets he had received from Leigh-
Mallory was “a mess of potage.”91  It would result, he maintained, in the 
emasculation of the Eighth Air Force, and would relieve the pressure that had 
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been mounted against Germany. If there were political factors involved, he 
requested that he be informed.   He concluded: 
 
neither plan can guarantee decisive impact at the beaches in the 
early  stages.  However, we are sure that the impact of oil 
shortages will be felt just as soon as the reduction of railroad 
efficiency and will be more  cumulative, positive, widespread 
and lasting in its effect.92 
 
Bufton was next to take up the cudgels.  In a letter to Coryton (now ACAS 
[Ops]), he expressed his disappointment at the decisions made.  They had been 
influenced, he believed, by two misconceptions held by Portal, Eisenhower, and 
Tedder.  The first was that the railway experts in attendance supported the 
Transportation Plan.  They had not seen the plan prior to the meeting, Bufton 
claimed, nor had its aim been made clear.  Furthermore, the issue had been 
confused by Leigh-Mallory’s insistence that the problem had to be viewed in terms 
of a period of six to nine months, post-assault.93 
Secondly, Bufton questioned the argument put forward at the meeting that 
bombing rail centres in the preparatory phase would result in canalisation and, as 
a consequence, ease the tasks of the air forces in cutting the few remaining critical 
lines after the landing.  “All railway experts agree” he declared,  
 
that insofar as the re-establishment of through running lines is 
concerned a marshalling yard is the one place where this can be 
most rapidly accomplished.  This is confirmed by experience 
obtained in recent attacks.  Thus, even if the Plan is applied, the 
number of routes available to enemy traffic will to all intents and 
purposes be the same on D. Day as at present . . . . strategic 
attacks on railway centres will not reduce the task confronting our 
air forces when the tactical plan is launched.94   
 
Unfortunately, it seems that Bufton had mistakenly assumed that where the 
plan called for attacks on ‘railway centres’ that meant ‘marshalling yards’.  His 
misapprehension was doubly unfortunate in that marshalling yards in the French 
and German situation were vital elements in maintaining efficient rail traffic flow.  
The repair of lines to enable single track rail movement through marshalling areas 
is easy but the smashing of a marshalling yard prevented the loading and 
 232
organisation of freight trains.  Both rail centres and marshalling yards were critical 
targets in the Transportation Plan. 
On 29 March 1944 Portal advised Churchill that the Transportation Plan 
had been accepted as “the best way for the strategic bombers to pave the way for 
a successful OVERLORD.”95   Their primary target remained, however, the 
German Air Force.  A draft directive was enclosed for Churchill’s approval.  Once it 
was approved, Portal acknowledged that he would sign it on behalf of the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff and it would come into immediate effect.  But he added a 
warning:  the planned attacks on railway centres in occupied territories could result 
in very heavy civilian casualties.  Eisenhower was aware of the problem, Portal 
understood, and had suggested that warnings to move be given to those living 
near rail centres. 
This letter also made clear to Churchill that the Transportation Plan would 
not interfere greatly with Bomber Command’s assault on German cities.  It was 
certainly Harris’s understanding because he had been noticeably reticent.  It also 
must be remembered that at this time the ball bearing arguments were only just 
concluding; his Command had been badly mauled over the winter months in the 
Battle of Berlin; he was concerned at the lack of publicity afforded his Command; 
and he was about to begin another argument with Portal concerning Bufton and 
the formation of the Path Finder Force, one going back to 1942, and detailed in an 
earlier chapter.   
Early in April Churchill advised Eisenhower that the Cabinet was becoming 
increasingly concerned at the possibility of heavy civilian casualties following 
attacks on French railway centres.  He pointed out that the Defence Committee 
was to consider the matter that week, and that the Foreign Office would be in 
contact with their American counterparts.  Finally, he informed Eisenhower that he 
would be sending a personal telegram to Roosevelt. 
On 5 April 1944 a meeting of the War Cabinet Defence Committee was 
convened under Churchill’s chairmanship.  It was held in the Defence Map Room, 
an underground, bomb-proof room, now preserved in its war-time state as a 
monument and tourist attraction, with an entrance opposite St James’s Park.  It 
was a large meeting in a small room and, at times, the atmosphere must have 
been very tense.  As usual, with many of the meetings when Churchill was 
involved, (they were often called his ‘midnight follies’), it did not begin until 10.30 
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pm.   Among those present were Lord Cherwell, Zuckerman, Tedder, Leigh-
Mallory, senior naval and military commanders, various Departmental Ministers 
and Bottomley and Bufton.   
Churchill opened proceedings by reading from a briefing script prepared by 
Cherwell.  The meeting had been called, Churchill began, to consider the 
consequences of heavy civilian casualties as the result of pre-invasion bombing, 
and because serious misgivings continued to be expressed regarding the 
soundness of the Transportation Plan.  All were aware, he continued, that Leigh-
Mallory knew nothing about bombing, or the particular merits of the proposed plan.  
Although Churchill feigned not to know of Zuckerman’s presence, he declared that 
the plan was “the brain child of a biologist who happened to be passing through 
the Mediterranean.”96   At this point Portal remonstrated at the unfairness of the 
remark.  He pointed out that Zuckerman had done more than any other individual 
in the analysis of the effects of air operations.  Cherwell, no friend of Zuckerman, 
made a tentative attempt to recover his brief from Churchill, but the Prime Minister, 
after a glance around the room, continued his reading.  At the end he turned to 
Tedder and asked if he supported the plan.  Tedder admitted he did. 
“You don’t know a better plan?’” queried Churchill. 
“There is no better plan,” said Tedder. 
“I’ll show you a better plan,“ responded Churchill. 
Following this sharp exchange Zuckerman recalled that he “saw Tedder’s 
knuckles whiten as he grasped the edge of the table.  He knew better than I what 
the next few hours were going to bring.”97
The Transportation Plan, Churchill continued, had to be considered from 
two perspectives.  Firstly, was it militarily sound, and secondly, what were the 
political consequences of heavy French civilian casualties.  Portal weighed in at 
that point declaring that he not only supported, but was prepared to accept 
responsibility for the plan.  He admitted that he had not always been a supporter, 
but had been swayed by the arguments of Tedder and Zuckerman, and the results 
achieved in the Mediterranean theatre by the bombing of communication targets. 
Tedder then confirmed his support for the plan. He skated over the question 
of possible French casualties, rejected the oil plan, and conceded that supply 
dumps and military camps would be included in target lists for the tactical air 
forces nearer D-day. 
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Bufton, probably the most junior officer present, was then asked by 
Churchill to give his views.  He was introduced by Portal who advised that he was 
well aware that Bufton’s views were now utterly opposed to his own.  Bufton, he 
confirmed, was at liberty to give full range to his thoughts, but they were only 
applicable within the Map Room.  Beyond those four walls, he continued, Bufton 
was simply a member of his Air Staff and would apply the policy determined by his 
superiors. 
As a very junior officer among exalted company, Bufton soon made clear 
that he was not intimidated by the situation.  As Zuckerman noted, Bufton 
“certainly did speak freely.”98   His arguments followed closely those detailed in his 
alternative plan.  Surplus air effort, Bufton proposed, should be directed against air 
parks, factory aerodromes, repair facilities, operational night fighter aerodromes, 
large training centres, and ammunition dumps.  In his opinion there were sufficient 
targets in that grouping to occupy the spare bomber effort until such time as the 
strategic bomber forces were called upon to participate in the attack of key enemy 
communications. 
Discussion then centred largely on the question of possible civilian 
casualties.  Portal made the point that the original estimates may well have been 
in considerable error.  No allowance had been made for possible evacuations from 
threatened targets; earlier calculations had assumed that all bombs released 
would cause casualties; bombing effort was less than that originally 
calculated;99and civilians, only slightly injured, were excluded from the total of 
possible casualties.   
Churchill, in closing the meeting, indicated that no firm decisions were 
required at that stage.  It was surely a remarkable understatement with the 
planned D-Day now less than nine weeks away.  He affirmed that attacks on rail 
centres, where the risk to civilians was small, were to continue.  Tedder was also 
invited to discuss with Portal the possibility of revising his plan with a view to 
eliminating those targets of lesser importance where the risk to civilians was high.  
Tedder was then to advise Eisenhower the results of these discussions. 
It was, perhaps, after this meeting, that Bufton was told by Bottomley that 
the Prime Minister wished to speak to the ‘little Air Commodore.’  Churchill asked 
Bufton if he had recently been in any accident.  Bufton, somewhat surprised, 
rejected the suggestion and then asked the reason for the question.  Churchill, in a 
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humorous aside, then intimated that, because Bufton did not appear always to 
agree with his senior officers, there was always the danger he might get run over 
by a bus.  Aware that Bufton’s outspokenness could well place his appointment at 
risk, Churchill offered to make it an order that Bufton report personally to him once 
a fortnight to make certain that he had not been removed.  Bufton thanked him for 
his concern, but declined the offer.100
Bufton was not one to readily yield.  With no sign of a firm decision on pre-
invasion strategic bomber operations, and time passing, he made another attempt 
to sway opinion.  On 10 April 1944 he submitted a revised ‘Plan for the 
Employment of the Strategic Bomber Forces Prior to Overlord.’  His first point was 
that he believed that attritional attacks on seventy-eight marshalling yards would 
have no effect on Overlord within the period D-Day to D+5 weeks.  Secondly, he 
argued that acceptance of the Transportation Plan was based on the 
misapprehension that the canalisation achieved would have ‘some’ effect in the 
same critical five week period.  He admitted there might be benefits from attacks 
on marshalling yards, but argued they would not result in the canalisation of rail 
traffic. 
Bufton claimed that his alternative plan would provide greater and more 
direct support for Overlord in the first five weeks than would the attack on seventy-
eight marshalling yards.  He listed three target systems. First, he nominated the 
complete Luftwaffe operational maintenance system in France, Holland and 
Belgium.  Second, the purely military targets suggested by army authorities.  
These included military camps, ammunition dumps, motor transport, petrol dumps, 
and ordnance depots.  Finally, he provided a list of twenty-six road and rail 
bridges.  Their destruction, he claimed, would result in the canalisation of enemy 
traffic which was the non-achievable aim of the planned marshalling yard attacks. 
In concluding this paper, Bufton argued that its acceptance would very        
onsiderably reduce the likelihood of heavy civilian casualties.  Had this plan been 
available on 25 March, he believed, “consent to the Transportation Plan would not 
have been given.”101
On 12 April 1944 the Defence Committee held its fifth meeting.  It had been 
called to consider a letter from Portal recommending that the Transportation Plan 
be formally approved.  Portal’s letter included a revised target list, but excluded 
two targets in the Paris area where heavy civilian casualties had been anticipated.  
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He added a proviso that their attack might still have to be undertaken at the time of 
the initial landings.  His letter also contained revised data on the number of civilian 
casualties to be expected in completing the Transportation Plan.  These were now 
reduced to 10,500 killed and 5,500 seriously injured. The objective of the 
Transportation Plan, wrote Portal, was the progressive dislocation of the enemy 
controlled railway system.  It was the essential preliminary to the actual assault.  
He concluded: 
 
Only if the railway system feeding the Neptune102 area has already 
been carefully disorganised can it be hoped at the time of the 
assault effectively to interfere with the enemy’s movement and 
concentration, and so gain the time which will be a vital factor in the 
opening phases of the campaign.103 
 
Portal and Tedder were now clearly in full agreement because Portal’s 
conclusion was virtually a copy of a note that he had just received from Tedder.104
Although the Transportation Plan had still not been approved by Churchill 
and the War Cabinet, the administrative machinery had been set in motion and 
wheels were turning.  It had been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 
once Portal and Eisenhower had jointly approved the air programme for Overlord, 
control of the strategic bomber forces would pass to Eisenhower.  On 13 April, 
Portal advised Eisenhower that on the following day he was to assume direction of 
all Air Forces operating out of England.  Approval was still awaited for the attack of 
certain targets, he admitted, but the plan was generally agreed.  Spaatz was 
advised to seek future directions from Tedder, designated by Eisenhower as 
responsible for all air operations connected with Pointblank and Overlord.  Harris 
received a similar letter from Bottomley, couched in identical terms.105
The Directive issued to Harris and Spaatz on 17 April 1944 was a rambling 
document that lacked the precision evident in the paper issued by Tedder on 24 
March.106   Although drafted in the Air Ministry under Bottomley’s instructions, it 
had been issued on Tedder’s orders and pre-empted Churchill’s acceptance of the 
Transportation Plan. The copy for Bomber Command was issued over the 
signature of Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith (Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff), 
and counter-signed by Air Vice-Marshal James Robb, Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) at 
SHAEF.  It ignored the differences of opinion that existed between Tedder and 
Spaatz while at the same time providing tacit acceptance of the earlier views 
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expressed by Harris as to Bomber Command’s supposed limitations.   These 
views, it must be noted, had already been disproved by the outstanding successes 
achieved by Bomber Command in their experimental attacks on railway facilities at 
Trappes, Le Mans, and other targets in France.  Furthermore, Bomber Command 
had shown, when Oboe was available, it was a weapon of precision.  Portal had 
been vindicated in his refutation of Harris’s claim that his force was a bludgeon 
and not a rapier. To cover possible civilian losses in occupied territories, the 
Directive had included a specific paragraph.  “The political aspects of this plan, as 
affecting the French, “ it read, “will be kept under continuous supervision, with 
especial reference to the casualties to the civilian populations involved.”107
Perhaps the critical section of the Directive was contained in the sixth 
paragraph.  This made clear that  
 
the list of targets best calculated to achieve the primary objective 
will be passed to the Supreme Commander by the Air Ministry.  The 
list of targets chosen to achieve the secondary objective and the 
relative priorities . . . will be issued separately.108    
 
In other words, air operations were now under divided control.  Two separate air 
planning organisations existed side by side.  Tedder in SHAEF was responsible for 
planning strategic operations against communications, while Leigh-Mallory was 
responsible for tactical operations.  Meanwhile, the Air Ministry continued to be 
responsible for targets and priorities within the Pointblank programme.  
Opposition to the Directive came not as would be expected, from Spaatz or 
Harris, but from Churchill.  On 19 April the Defence Committee held its seventh 
meeting.  A possible catalyst was the criticism mounting in both the French and 
Belgian press of recent Allied bombing of transportation targets.  Although civilian 
casualties were lower than revised Allied estimates, and the German propaganda 
machine curiously reticent concerning the deaths of French and Belgian civilians, 
Churchill continued to express his doubts.  He took no pleasure from either the 
claim that large numbers of Germans had been killed, or that twenty-three of the 
seventy-eight listed targets had been attacked, at little or no cost.  
In closing the meeting, Churchill affirmed that he was prepared to support a 
continuation of the Transportation Plan for a further week.  In doing so, he 
admitted that the delay strengthened the case for attacks on railway centres 
because time was running out.  His decision did not meet with warm approval.  
 238
Instead, Air Staff members present, together with the First Sea Lord, were now 
joined by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in 
calling for a clear and unequivocal decision.  War Cabinet members continued 
their condemnation of the Transportation Plan, but the Chiefs of Staff argued that, 
having gone so far, it was impossible to turn back.109  
One week later, on 26 April, the Defence Committee met again. Zuckerman 
attended and has provided his views on Churchill’s conduct.  “I was used to the 
atmosphere of the meetings” he confessed, “with Winston seemingly amiable at 
the start but becoming increasingly hostile and domineering, with tension rising in 
the room as the meeting continued into the early hours.”110    Although the majority 
of Service chiefs and Ministers present urged that the Transportation Plan be fully 
implemented, Churchill still refused to give his approval.  He continued to have 
doubts concerning both the efficacy of the Plan, and the loss of French and 
Belgian lives that it entailed.  Three days’ later, on 29 April, Churchill wrote to 
Eisenhower suggesting that the Transportation Plan be abandoned.  He offered a 
compromise bombing programme for Eisenhower’s consideration. 
This alternative, according to both Kingston-McCloughry and Zuckerman, 
appeared to have been drafted by Cherwell under direction from Bufton.111   It was 
a reaffirmation of the plan he had submitted on 10 April.  A target list should be 
drawn up for this amended programme, Churchill urged, where not more than one 
hundred French lives would be lost during any one attack. 
Eisenhower’s response was measured.  Firstly, he consulted Leigh-Mallory, 
who confirmed his belief in the Transportation Plan.  Abandonment at this stage, 
he protested, would mean a greatly increased tactical problem when dealing with 
enemy mobility.  He also pointed out that attacks on naval targets, Army bases, 
and communications centres, would offer the potential for civilian deaths.  His final 
point was that too large a number of targets, scheduled for attack immediately 
prior to D-day, might well mean that adverse weather could prevent completion of 
the tasks.  
Eisenhower’s reply to Churchill, drafted by Tedder, was dated 2 May 1944.  
Tedder pointed out that civilian casualties were an integral part of the full 
employment of air power.  They had occurred during attacks on U-boat bases and 
factories, and would occur again when legitimate targets such as railway centres 
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were bombed.  Tedder’s note, very little changed when transcribed by 
Eisenhower, went on to say that the object was to so   
 
weaken and disorganise the railway system as a whole, that, at the 
critical time of the assault, German rail movement can be effectively 
delayed, and the rapid concentration of their forces against the 
lodgement area prevented.  Time is the vital factor during the period 
immediately following the assault.112 
 
Eisenhower, clearly, was not going to be moved by the possibility of French 
or Belgian civilian casualties because of his military requirements.  He asserted 
that he well understood the political implications of civilian losses during the pre-
landing bombing.  He also agreed, where possible, to modify the Plan to reduce 
the chance of civilian deaths.  This, however, could only be done to the extent that 
the Plan’s value was not reduced.  Furthermore, he continued, if it was acceptable 
in principle that targets in France could not be attacked because of the risk to 
civilians, then “the perils of an already hazardous undertaking would be greatly 
enhanced.”113   As far as he was concerned, Eisenhower concluded, the 
Transportation Plan was the only viable option. 
Perhaps because of Churchill’s support, but certainly from his own strongly-
held beliefs, Bufton, on 2 May 1944, produced his modified plan, first suggested 
on 10 April, for the employment of the strategic bomber forces prior to D-Day.114   
As far as the Luftwaffe was concerned, most targets were already identified in the 
prepared plans.  However, the Army representatives, when the revised plan was 
considered on 3 May, did not look with any great favour at the suggested military 
targets.  His bridge targets were much more favourably received, particularly by 
Brigadier-General Charles P Cabell, an American representative.  He offered to 
conduct an experimental attack on six bridges, but his offer was vetoed by Spaatz. 
At this same meeting on 3 May, Tedder took the opportunity to strongly 
attack Bufton’s plan.  He cited his experiences in North Africa where, he claimed, 
despite the delays and inconvenience caused by the destruction of forward repair 
facilities, the German Air Force had remained an effective fighting force.  Unlike 
Cabell, Tedder saw no value in substituting bridges for railway centres.  Bridge 
repairs, cautioned Tedder, could on average, be completed within fourteen days.  
For that reason, he concluded, it would be necessary to confine bridge attacks to 
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the fortnight period prior to the landings, if the planned landing areas were to be 
kept secret.115   
Tedder’s last claim was, of course, fallacious.  The pre-assault bombing 
programme was designed to prevent the enemy being able to identify the planned 
landing area.  Targets both inside and outside the effective operational areas were 
to be attacked to maintain the secrecy of the Normandy beaches.  For every gun 
emplacement attacked within the assault area, there were two others bombed that 
were outside.  Three bridges across the River Meuse, planned for the trial, were 
examples of the diversionary tactics employed. 
Churchill closed this meeting on a familiar note.  A paper was to be 
prepared to be sent to the American State Department advising that the 
Transportation Plan, considered essential to the success of the invasion, could 
result in the deaths of up to 10,000 French civilians.  Significantly, he did not use 
the revised number of civilian casualties that he had received.  He also advised 
that he would send a similar message to Roosevelt.  An assurance was to be 
sought from the American Government that they were prepared to acknowledge 
the joint responsibility for the actions planned.  Tedder was told to examine the 
plan to ensure that the number of civilians killed prior to D-Day did not exceed 
10,000. 
The invasion was now but a little over four weeks away.  Opinions among 
those responsible for the venture, however, remained bitterly divided.  Despite all 
the discussions at the highest levels no specific plan had met with unanimous 
approval.  Even the bomber commanders, Harris and Spaatz, disagreed as to the 
best employment for their forces in the forthcoming struggle.  Eisenhower and 
Portal had accepted Zuckerman and Tedder’s Transportation Plan merely on the  
grounds that it offered the prospect of providing limited assistance to the invading 
forces and that there appeared to be no alternative.  But even the Transportation 
Plan had its limitations and still required elaboration.   Many discussions that had 
taken place were based on faulty understandings of the requirements necessary 
for a successful campaign and an incomprehension of what the bomber forces 
could actually achieve.  Importantly, as far as the British forces were concerned, 
Churchill had still to provide his approval.  It was a fraught situation and time was 
running out.         
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The destruction of both rail and road bridges played a significant part in the 
results achieved by the Transportation Plan.  Zuckerman, in a speech in 1988, 
claimed that his focus for the Allied interdiction campaign had been to destroy 
enemy movement.  Whether that required the destruction of bridges, cutting 
railway lines, or the strafing of soldiers on foot, had not been his particular 
concern.  The aim, as he described it, was to destroy movement, 
 
interrupting it as far back as possible . . . the easiest and quickest 
ways.  But all those ways were relevant and in the OVERLORD 
plan of bridge cutting there was a coherent plan.  The 
OVERLORD plan . . . included the destruction of bridges but at the 
right time.116
 
 
Ultimately, of course, bridges had been included in the Transportation Plan, 
but their inclusion had not been at the instigation of authorities in SHAEF.  They 
were included very late in the proceedings and only after considerable argument. 
Zuckerman, in his Report on air attacks against communication targets in Sicily 
and southern Italy had argued: “Railway and road bridges are uneconomical and 
difficult targets, and in general do not appear to be worth attacking except where 
special considerations demand it in the tactical area.”117   Furthermore, as late as 
April 1944, in a paper prepared by the Enemy Objectives Unit of the United States 
Economic Warfare Department identifying twenty-six bridges as potential targets, 
neither Tedder nor Zuckerman were sufficiently provoked to respond.118
Bufton,on 2 May 1944, also nominated twenty-six bridges as targets but at 
a War Cabinet meeting the next day, with Bufton in attendance, Tedder evinced no 
particular interest.  In response to a suggestion by Cherwell relating to suitable 
targets to prevent enemy movement, Tedder pointed out that 
 
for every bomb that hit a bridge, a large number missed and misses 
were  of no value whatsoever.  On the other hand, in attacks on 
railway centres, every bomb which fell within the area of the centre 
did some damage of military value.  Furthermore, bridges could be 
repaired relatively quickly.119
 
The same day as Tedder also deflected suggestions that bridges were 
potentially useful targets, Zuckerman at a meeting at SHAEF Headquarters did 
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much the same.  The proposal was that railway bridges should be included in the 
Transportation Plan provided it was deemed technically practicable.  Zuckerman, 
less than enthusiastic, asserted that “the result achieved depended on the 
structure of the Bridge, and the type of bomb employed.  For this purpose nothing 
less than the 1,000lb bomb would be suitable, and preferably the 2,000lb 
bomb.”120
Colonel Richard D’Oyly Hughes, a former British army officer who had 
become an American citizen in the early 1930s, a founder member of the 
American Enemy Objectives Unit from 1942 to 1944, and senior target planning 
officer for the United States Air Forces, however, has provided another insight into 
the Zuckerman/bridge controversy.  Zuckerman, he protested, was driven by 
personal ambition and clearly 
 
no plan was of  any use to him  that was not obviously personally 
his . . . with no other planners participating . . . . What credit was to 
emerge he felt must be his alone.  Unlike the rest of us, who were 
only interested in the best plan, regardless of who participated in 
the making of it, Zuckerman was at all times prepared to sacrifice 
integrity for personal florification [sic].121
 
Hughes went even further.  Leigh-Mallory, he insisted, 
 
prodded by his Svengali, Solly Zuckerman, and with Air Marshall 
[sic] Tedder playing the part of the wicked uncle in the wings, 
advocated that for a lengthy period of time, both prior to and after 
D-Day, all strategic bombing, as such, should be discontinued . . . 
and that all this weight of effort be exclusively devoted to attacks on 
the railroad systems of France and Western Germany.122
 
Although Hughes had somewhat overstated the case, this led, he 
continued, to a bitter argument over air planning.  The disagreement was not one 
between British and American authorities as might have been supposed, but 
rather between United States Strategic Air Force Headquarters, Air Ministry, and 
Bomber Command, all in England, on one side and SHAEF Headquarters (British 
and American staff), in Europe, on the other. 
As we have seen, Eisenhower compromised: bridges and oil both became 
targets prior to D-day and provided invaluable returns.    
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In the meantime, Eisenhower, on 5 May, removed the embargo he had 
placed on a number of railway targets that appeared likely to create heavy loss of 
life among civilians living nearby.  But he also ordered that the first targets to be 
attacked were those where the lowest number of civilian casualties were likely to 
be incurred.  Targets where heavy civilian losses could be anticipated, were to be 
attacked last, and as close to D-day as was possible.  
On 6 May, Leigh-Mallory reviewed the progress of the Transportation Plan 
with senior air commanders.  His main purpose, it seems, was to goad the 
Americans into increasing their bombing effort.  Bomber Command, he pointed 
out, had attacked thirty-two of thirty-eight specified targets.  From a list of twenty-
three, the Eighth Air Force had bombed only eight.  As for the Tactical Air Forces 
and the American Ninth Air Force, they had attacked eleven of their seventeen 
allocated targets.  Leigh-Mallory also reminded those present that the British War 
Cabinet now accepted the necessity of bombing railway targets.  The last to be 
bombed would be those where high civilian losses could be anticipated. 
He also agreed that it would be worthwhile to employ medium and fighter 
bombers of the Tactical Air Forces in attacks on bridges.  Echoing Bufton, he 
suggested bridges over the Seine as potential targets, with others crossing the 
Meuse as diversions.  Leigh-Mallory admitted that bridges were difficult targets, 
and while he did not want to see wasted effort, he still considered the experiment 
to be necessary.  He was supported by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, the 
Commander of the Second Tactical Air Force (2nd. TAF).   
On 7 May Churchill telegraphed Roosevelt.  He pointed out to the President 
that although every care would be taken to prevent civilian deaths, both he and the 
War Cabinet were apprehensive of the effects that would be created in France as 
a consequence of pre-D-day bombing.  He called for an inter-Government 
agreement on the planned bombing programme, remembering that the slaughter 
would be among friendly civilians supportive of the Allied cause.  Churchill also 
had another concern.  He had, he considered,  
 
been careful in stating this case to you to use only the most 
moderate terms, but I ought to let you know that the War Cabinet is 
unanimous in its anxiety about these French slaughters, even 
reduced as they have been, and also in its doubts as to whether 
almost as good military results could not be produced by other 
 244
methods.  Whatever is settled between us, we are quite willing to 
share responsibility with you.123   
 
It could be inferred from this that Churchill remained unconvinced of the prospects 
for Overlord  and perhaps still hankered after the Bufton or other alternative. 
Roosevelt replied four days later. He admitted that he fully shared 
Churchill’s distress at the possible loss of French lives.  Equally, he appreciated 
that every endeavour would be made to minimise casualties.  Adverse French 
public opinion was to be guarded against, but not at the expense of reducing 
military effectiveness.  His conclusion was decisive.  “However regrettable the 
attendant loss of civilian lives is” he advised, 
 
I am not prepared to impose from this distance any restriction on 
military action by the responsible commanders that in their opinion 
might militate against the success of ‘Overlord’ or cause additional 
loss of life to our Allied forces of invasion.124
 
 
On 16 May 1944, three weeks before D-day, Churchill advised Eisenhower 
and the Chiefs of Staff that the War Cabinet had decided to let matters rest with 
regard to civilian casualties.  In a minute to Eisenhower and General Ismay for the 
Chiefs of Staff, he indicated that it appeared to him  
 
that we shall be able to keep well inside the 10,000 limit of French 
killed  before D-day.  Therefore I believe the Cabinet will be content 
not to press  this matter further . . . . The President’s message 
leaves the matter in the hands of ‘the responsible military 
commanders,’ and I suggest that the matter should be dropped.125
 
 
Although Churchill had told both the Chiefs of Staff Committee and 
Eisenhower that arguments over possible French casualties were at an end, he 
still kept the casualty numbers, forecast and actual, under constant review.  On 23 
May Tedder, in response to a question from Churchill, assured the Prime Minister, 
using German reports, that French casualties were about forty per cent lower than 
had been expected.  Churchill’s response was that the Transportation Plan should 
proceed, but that where possible the civilian populations should be warned of 
forthcoming attacks.126
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With time fast running out, approval had earlier been given to Bomber 
Command to begin limited marshalling yard attacks in March 1944.  The first was 
on the night of 6/7 March 1944 when 351 Halifaxes and six Mosquitoes bombed 
the marshalling yards at Trappes.  An early start to the programme was essential 
because some eighty marshalling yards and servicing centres had been 
nominated as targets for the three strategic bombing forces, with the prospects of 
weather always being a possible limiting factor.  Bomber Command was given 
thirty-seven  targets, and from the first attack on Trappes until the end of May 
1944, had carried out a total of fifty-four attacks on transportation targets.  
Indicative of the effort applied, just under thirty-nine per cent of the total bombing 
effort for the period was employed in bombing railway targets.127
These attacks were carried out by Bomber Command using Oboe, or the 
improved Oboe called Album Leaf, to provide ground marking.  The raids were 
controlled by a Master Bomber, and were remarkably successful: certainly to the 
surprise of Harris who threw himself enthusiastically into the programme.  Harris 
continued to operate seemingly willingly with SHAEF, but still resented what he 
identified as Air Staff interference.  Spaatz, however, continued to hold his forces 
in check.  But, despite their slow start, the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces played 
their part in the Transportation plan.  By 3 June 1944 Leigh-Mallory was able to 
state at the Fifth Allied Air Commander’s Conference that “the strategic phase of 
the Railway plan could now be considered complete and that the tactical phase 
had now begun – direct attacks on lines and rolling stock by fighter/bombers.”128   
Despite their earlier rejection by Zuckerman, Leigh-Mallory, and Tedder, 
road and rail bridges had become targets in the Transportation Plan by 7 May 
1944.  As recently as 1 May, Leigh-Mallory in a letter to Tedder, had confirmed 
that    
It has been suggested that 5 bridges over the River Seine should 
be destroyed by bombing, but in view of the heavy expenditure of 
effort that would be involved (6,000 short tons) and the fact that the 
lines could be cut at other points (e.g. embankments), for a smaller 
expenditure of effort, this commitment can be included . . . only if 
the effort can be spared from other essential commitments.129
 
The volte-face was occasioned by an experimental attack carried out on a 
road bridge over the River Seine at Vernon on 7 May 1944.  The successful attack 
was carried out by twelve P-47 Thunderbolt fighter/bombers each carrying two 
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1,000 pound bombs.  The photographs available the next day were proof enough 
that bridge attacks were a viable and economic proposition.  By D-day, eighteen 
road and rail bridges between Rouen and Paris had been destroyed, and a further 
three considered impassable.  Furthermore, twelve bridges over other rivers were 
either blocked or destroyed.130     
Oil, despite having been rejected as the primary target for pre-D-day 
bombing, also made an early return to the bombing programme.  On 17 March 
1944 General Arnold, Commanding General of the United States Army Air Forces, 
told Spaatz that he had no objection to attacks being launched against oil targets 
at Ploesti.  Aware that this permission cut directly across Overlord planning, 
subterfuges were employed.  Ostensibly, the attack launched on 5 April 1944 was 
directed at railway marshalling yards in the vicinity of oil facilities.  It was thus 
accepted as an attack on communications.  As the American Official history 
stated, “’incidental’ damage . . . occurred, and to a very encouraging extent.”131  
The oil question is considered in detail in the next chapter.  
Immediately prior to the D-day landings, anxiety was still being expressed at 
the possible failure of marshalling yard attacks to curtail enemy movement.  A 
report by the Sub-Committee of the Joint Technical Warfare Committee (the Ellis 
Committee) noted with concern that the tactical effects of the attack on marshalling 
yards would be much smaller than Professor Zuckerman predicted.132   The 
concern was that Zuckerman, a member of that committee, had used the power of 
veto to prohibit the publication of what had been an otherwise unanimous, official 
report.  Zuckerman was unable to reconcile himself with the report, and was 
invited to provide a minority statement.  The disagreements continued, and it was 
then decided the arguments would be re-examined post-Overlord.  
By 6 June 1944 of the eighty nominated Transportation targets fifty-one had 
been “damaged to such an extent that no further attacks were necessary until vital 
repairs had been made.”133   Another twenty-five targets, although severely 
damaged, still required additional attacks while the remaining four had received 
little if any damage.  The dominant force had been Bomber Command which had 
bombed thirty-seven targets while the Eighth Air Force, late in starting, attacked 
twenty-three and the Tactical Air Forces sixteen.  Spaatz, perhaps never totally 
committed to the Transportation Plan, somewhat reluctantly carried out the major 
portion of the task allotted to the Eighth Air Force but Harris, surprisingly, became 
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almost enthusiastic.  Much to his astonishment Bomber Command had been 
particularly effective and a creeping paralysis had spread over the rail network 
west and north of Paris. 
On 28 June 1944, Bufton added a fourth column to the table initiated by 
Leigh-Mallory on 27 January 1944 as proof, in his opinion, that Bomber Command 
had achieved more than Harris had believed was possible in the pre-invasion 
bombing, and even more than Leigh-Mallory had requested as essential for the 
success of Overlord.   Although the force had been developed as an independent 
strategic arm, he argued, this did not mean that its efforts should be restricted to 
the attempted destruction of industrial centres.  The specialised equipment 
provided, and the operational techniques employed, were designed to enable the 
force to place their bombs accurately on the target – any target.  Bufton rejected 
many of Harris’s earlier claims because, as part of the Air Staff’s long term plans, 
he now believed that Bomber Command was approaching, or had attained, the 
position where it could now carry out accurate precision bombing by night.134  
Harris, from the evidence of his later actions, however, appeared unable to accept 
that there was more to gain from precision attacks than there was from his area 
bombing of German cities. 
Before moving on to examine the post-invasion activities of the strategic 
bomber forces, mention must be made of the vital role played by the Tactical Air 
Forces before and after D-Day.  When the AEAF came into being in November 
1943 under Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory it comprised three 
components: a tactical arm, the American Ninth Air Force; the tactical arm of what 
had previously been known as Fighter Command but was now identified as the 
Second Tactical Air Force (2nd TAF); and the remaining squadrons of Fighter 
Command fitted into a new organisation called Air Defence of Great Britain.  The 
Second Tactical Air Force was made up of three groups totalling fifty-six 
squadrons of Mosquitoes, Bostons, Mitchells, Typhoons, Spitfires, Hurricanes, 
Mustangs and Austers.    Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham was appointed Air 
Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Second Tactical Air Force.  
Coningham had served in the Western Desert since October 1941 and in 
March 1943 had been appointed AOC, North African Tactical Air Force.  He had 
thus seen many Army commanders come and go and with them had suffered 
many set-backs.   Initially, the arrival of Montgomery as Commander of the Eighth 
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Army in August 1942 had appeared to Coningham to be a good omen.   The 
favourable  impressions faded rapidly however, and the fault was not necessarily 
one-sided.  Coningham had been the final authority in the desert for some time 
and he was not willing to readily abdicate that position to a newcomer.  Both were 
ambitious and to some extent publicity seekers.  When selecting his team for the 
invasion of Italy Montgomery observed that Coningham “is a dangerous man being 
of a highly jealous nature and not to be trusted to ‘pull’ in the team; he is out for 
himself.”135  Nevertheless, whatever his shortcomings, Coningham was well aware 
of what the army required of the tactical air forces and was well suited for his 
appointment to the Second Tactical Air Force for Overlord.   
The primary aim of the 2nd TAF was to achieve air superiority and thus 
allow ground support, bombing, and reconnaissance operations to operate freely 
while denying similar conditions for enemy air units.  As in the desert, the other 
task for Coningham’s force was to provide Army air support as and when required.  
Coningham early realised that although many of his pilots were fully conversant 
with the requirements of, and operationally experienced in, fighter combat, there 
were others totally unfamiliar with the requirements for air to ground operations.   
A rigorous training regime for air/ground gunnery, dive bombing, and the use of 
rocket projectiles, was immediately instituted.  Early in this training period 
Coningham had recourse to appeal to Eisenhower when he argued that his force 
was being called upon to provide fighter escorts for Spaatz’s heavy bombers while 
Eighth Air Force fighters sat on the ground.  Eisenhower agreed with Coningham 
but the outcome did not necessarily improve relations between Spaatz and 
Coningham.   
Coningham, like many others, also had his problems with Leigh-Mallory.  In 
May 1944 Leigh-Mallory sought to bring the medium bombers of the Tactical Air 
Force under his control.  Coningham objected.  His argument was that if 
Montgomery called for direct support which the fighter bombers could not provide, 
then the medium bombers would be required.  Divided control, he argued, was 
unworkable and he advised Montgomery of the potential problem.  Montgomery’s 
reaction was as Coningham anticipated.  Montgomery immediately made clear to 
Eisenhower that he was unable to deal with two air commanders whose roles 
clearly overlapped.  On 19 May 1944 Eisenhower ordered that Coningham be 
accorded “the necessary executive authority to implement all requests for air 
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action required by the Army and Leigh-Mallory was merely to exercise general 
direction of air operations.”136 
The ruling placed Leigh-Mallory in an invidious position.  Although nominally 
responsible for the success of the air plan associated with Overlord, he had been 
reduced to a position where he simply countersigned decisions made either by 
Tedder in the case of the heavy bombers, or Coningham in the case of the Second 
Tactical Air Force. 
Pre-invasion tasks for the Second Tactical Air Force, beginning in April 
1944, had focussed mainly on railway workshops, marshalling yards and bridges.   
By May the target list had broadened considerably to include coastal radar sites, 
airfields, night fighter director stations and locomotives and rolling stock on the 
French railway network.  Their wide-ranging efforts were an invaluable supplement 
to the work of the bomber forces.137 
On the night of 15/16 June 1944 the first flying bombs landed in London 
and it became clear that both the strategic and tactical air forces would have to be 
involved in an effort to counter the assault.  It was a worrying diversion and 
concern increased after the first heavily camouflaged launch sites had been 
overrun when it became clear that they could be built more quickly than they could 
be destroyed.  It had become essential that the narrow bridgehead be deepened 
for two specific reasons: firstly, to reduce the threat to London posed by the flying 
bombs and secondly, to provide sites for airfields for the Second Tactical Air Force 
to enable it to provide protection and support to meet the Army’s immediate 
requirements.     
For Montgomery, however, the airfields were not high on his priority list.  
The Luftwaffe had been singularly inactive and he saw no reason to distort his 
strategy merely to meet Air Force requirements.  Both Lee-Mallory and 
Coningham made clear that they resented the attitude that Montgomery had 
adopted and they identified it “as a further example of the Army’s tendency to 
regard the Air Force as an ‘auxiliary arm.’ “138  
Despite Montgomery’s later attempts to have Coningham removed, the 
Second Tactical Air Force performed notably in France and later in Germany, 
where their ‘cab-rank’ tactics provided significant moral and physical support for 
hard-pressed Army units.  Coningham believed that the priority for his force was 
the stopping of enemy movement.  Later, when his pilots were criticised for their 
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actions during the German withdrawal through the Falaise Gap, he was quick to 
their defence.  Their task, he argued, was to cause confusion and prevent an 
organised withdrawal. Interdiction and not destruction was the essential 
requirement and this, he claimed, they achieved.  An extensive investigation by 
Twenty-first Army Group scientists under Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, whose final 
report denigrated the rocket-firing Typhoon pilots, was rejected by one authority, 
supporting Coningham, who argued that 
 
The Army scientists found it difficult to recognise that the air forces 
were not so much concerned with destroying individual tanks or 
vehicles as with causing the maximum amount of confusion and 
terror among the enemy forces.  There is no doubt that they 
achieved these objects.139 
 
Following the establishment of the Allied forces in Europe, one of Air 
Commodore Bufton’s first concerns was that the strategic bomber forces should 
revert to the control of the American and British Air Staffs, as agents for the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff.  With Eisenhower in charge of the heavy bomber forces, 
Portal’s role had become purely advisory.  Bufton’s arguments were marshalled in 
a paper sent to Bottomley on 20 July 1944.140  
His first point was that from a practical point of view difficulties had arisen in 
ensuring that the priorities determined by the Air Staff, relating to strategic attacks 
and attacks on German V-weapon launch sites, were rigidly followed.  He argued 
that it was impossible for the Air Staff, lacking day to day control of the bomber 
forces, to effectively implement the agreed policies.  
Secondly, he cited difficulties within various Commands.  Bomber 
Command staff, Bufton suggested, were confused and uncertain as to who was 
actually in control.  Eisenhower’s Headquarters did not exercise close day to day 
control over strategic bombing requirements, neither did it possess the staff 
capable of fully comprehending the wider implications of such procedures.  
Tedder, he added, “recently expressed to me his concern at the dangers resulting 
from the Air Staff divesting itself of its prime responsibility in this matter.”141    If a 
new Directive is to  be issued, Bufton concluded, it is essential that it achieve 
maximum efficiency and  not harm American/British relations.  It is vital, he pointed 
out,  
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that the system we propose should be acceptable to the Americans 
and that they should not have imposed upon them a system which 
they might feel was ungenerous and not in tune with their present 
stature, efforts and achievements.142
 
With this note to Bottomley Bufton also included a draft paper, requested by 
Portal, for the Chiefs of Staff consideration, relating to the issuance of a new 
directive under which the control of the strategic bomber forces should revert to 
the CAS as agent for the Combined Chiefs of Staff.143   After the preamble, he 
cited as priorities for the strategic bomber forces based in the United Kingdom, the 
support of the land battle, Pointblank, and Crossbow.   Eisenhower’s direct 
concern, Bufton claimed, was the support of the land battle.  Where either 
Pointblank or Crossbow was concerned, operations were best conducted in 
accordance with priorities determined by the Air Staff.  It was not Eisenhower’s 
responsibility to have to take into account problems that affected the war as a 
whole; his concerns were the problems and planning for military operations in 
Western Europe.  The responsibility for determining the appropriate application of 
the strategic bomber effort, according to Bufton, properly rested with the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff.  
Bufton then turned his attention to what he saw as targets or target systems 
that were becoming increasingly important.  Oil, he argued, was such a target as it 
was vital to the German war effort.  Supplies were becoming critical.  If the 
deficiencies already being experienced could be exploited, then the enemy’s ability 
to wage war on three fronts might well be decisively affected.  If the strategic 
bomber forces were to be effectively employed, it was essential that their control 
was taken over by the Air Staffs equipped with the experience gained during two 
years of hard fighting.144
The concluding paragraph of this note related to the status of General 
Spaatz.  Since 1943 massive expansion had taken place in the American strategic 
bomber forces: they now included both the Eighth based in England and the 
Fifteenth in the Mediterranean.  To control and co-ordinate their operations, an Air 
Staff had been established similar to, and operating in parallel with, the British Air 
Staff.  The two Staffs worked closely together.  In order that the relationship 
become even closer, and to enable ideas to be more closely integrated, Bufton 
suggested that Spaatz be appointed to the British Air Staff as Deputy Chief of the 
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Air Staff (US).  This arrangement, he concluded, would fulfil two other important 
criteria.  The stature of the American element would be raised, and Spaatz, in 
Portal’s absence, would be able to function as the agent for the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff.  
At Bottomley’s suggestion, Bufton revised this note a month later, and it 
went forward, with only minor alterations, on 23 August 1944.145   The final 
outcome, however, was not as Bufton had envisaged. 
It will be recalled that under the terms of the Directive issued on 14 April 
1944 by which Eisenhower had assumed responsibility for the direction of the 
strategic bomber forces, it had been agreed that the command situation would be 
reviewed once the Allied armies were firmly established on the Continent.  The 
system had worked well.  Harris, despite his initial qualms, had co-operated 
wholeheartedly and effectively and appeared satisfied with the independence he 
had been granted.  Spaatz also seemed happy that the status quo should 
continue.  In September, Eisenhower and Spaatz transferred their advanced 
headquarters to Versailles.  Neither Eisenhower nor Arnold gave any indication 
that they were considering any alteration to the command structure. 
Others were less happy.  Churchill, Portal, and the Air Staff, were 
unanimous in their call for the control of Bomber Command to revert to the 
situation pertaining prior to 14 April.  Their principal argument was that under the 
existing arrangements they were unable to ensure that the laid down bombing 
priorities were being followed.  This particular claim has a somewhat hollow ring 
when one recalls the frequent appeals made by the Air Staff to Portal to insist that 
Harris be instructed to adhere more closely to the Directives that he had received.  
Late in August, Portal advised the Chiefs of Staff that he considered the time 
opportune for Eisenhower to relinquish his control of the strategic bomber forces in 
favour of the Chiefs of Staff.  It was agreed that the subject should be discussed at 
the forthcoming Octagon Conference to be held in Quebec in the second week in 
September. 
In August 1944 there was a further confrontation between the Scientific 
Advisers, Cherwell and Zuckerman, with Bufton caught in the middle.  In a note to 
Churchill, Cherwell, perhaps anticipating Bufton’s support, claimed that “recent 
experience had shown that railway and road bridges can be destroyed at a cost of 
150 to 200 tons of bombs.”146   He reminded the Prime Minister that there were 
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some one hundred major bridges between Paris and the Rhine and on his 
mathematics they could be destroyed using less than 15,000 tons of bombs.  
Broken bridges cause more delay that damaged marshalling yards, he insisted, 
and he hoped that SHAEF would bear that point in mind in their planning. 
Bufton agreed with Cherwell, confirming he also considered that “the figures 
of 150-200 tons of bombs per bridge would not appear unreasonable.”147   
Furthermore, he continued, although marshalling yard attacks had caused both 
delays and damage, it had not been “commensurate with the sorties flown, aircraft 
lost, and resultant battle damage.”148   On the other hand, he urged, “bridge 
attacks and rail cutting have achieved their primary purpose . . . with the result that 
reserves and supplies have reached the battle area late and in disorder.”149   
Bufton’s recommendation was that, on the basis of recent experience, future 
attacks should concentrate on bridges rather than on railway centres.  
Zuckerman, in a paper to Churchill concerning Cherwell’s minute and 
Bufton’s observations on that minute, partially agreed with Bufton but maintained 
that the case had been over-stated.  In his opinion, the limited use that had been 
made of railways was due primarily to the railway centre bombing both before and 
after D-day.  Additionally, Zuckerman conceded that the delay time for the “re-
establishment of through traffic over destroyed bridges is in general greater than 
that . . . through bombed railway centres.”150    His conclusion, nevertheless, was 
somewhat ambivalent when he contended:  
 
The value of further attacks of bridges can only be measured by the 
relative delay which their destruction will impose in the total haul 
over the route of which they form a part.  With the situation as fluid 
as it is now, it is therefore difficult to draw up in advance any rigid 
plan for attacks on specific bridges.151
 
While en route to the Octagon Conference in September 1944, Portal made 
clear to Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff that he believed it was time to reconsider 
the control of the strategic bomber forces.  His arguments followed much the same 
lines earlier suggested by Bufton.  With the Allied armies firmly established on the 
Continent, and the campaign going well, future calls for close support by the 
strategic bombers were growing increasingly unlikely.  It was thus a suitable time 
to return control to Portal and Arnold acting on behalf of the Combined Chiefs of 
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Staff.  In the event of an emergency in the land battles, the strategic bomber 
forces would be made available to intervene 
At Quebec, the British Chiefs of Staff proposed that Portal and Arnold 
assume control of the strategic bomber forces on behalf of the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff.  Portal’s representative would be Bottomley, based in London.  Spaatz, 
alternating between his headquarters in London and France, would fulfil the same 
function for Arnold.  The primary target systems suggested by the British Chiefs of 
Staff were the petroleum industry, ball bearings, the German tank industry, 
ordnance depots, and factories producing motor transport.  When, because of 
weather or other tactical considerations, attacks on these targets were not 
possible, then Berlin or other large industrial areas should be substituted.  
Additionally, targets in east and south-east Europe were advocated as a way of 
providing assistance to the Russian armies. 
The Directive proposed by the British officials was subjected to close 
questioning by Arnold.  He posed four questions.  Why was it necessary to remove 
control of the strategic bomber forces from Eisenhower, why had no mention been 
made of communication targets, who would make the binding decision in the event 
of a disagreement between Bottomley and Spaatz, and, finally, would the 
arrangements suggested make the best possible use of the enormous air power 
now available to the Allies?152
Portal’s response was interesting.  With regard to the first question, he 
pointed out that the major intelligence units and the authorities responsible for 
interpreting the results of bombing attacks, were both most largely based in 
England, and immediately available to the command structure.  Disagreements 
between Bottomley and Arnold, he maintained, could be referred to either himself 
or Arnold.  Moreover, it was his belief that the best use of the air power available 
required that it be removed from Eisenhower’s control.  It would, however, remain 
immediately available should it be required for any crisis in the land battles.  
Furthermore, Portal’s response to the question concerning communication 
targets must have been of concern to many of the authorities at the meeting.  
They, he argued, were the primary concern of the medium bomber and 
fighter/bomber forces, and not of the heavy bombers.  Had he forgotten, or was he 
not aware of the many successes (and losses) of the heavy bombers in the weeks 
before D-day?  Did he now consider that approval of the Transportation Plan had 
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been a misapplication of the force available?  Whatever his reasoning, he was 
going to be shown the error of his ways by the successes gained by the heavy 
bombers in their attacks directed against German transportation targets as the war 
continued. 
At this point, however, Portal’s interest had turned to German oil facilities.  
He had become aware that Tedder was anxious to carry out a campaign against 
German communications and he feared that Tedder would accord it priority over 
the oil attacks that appeared to be producing useful results.  Change in the 
command structure was therefore necessary in order to regain a measure of 
control. 
Arnold was converted.  Perhaps he sympathised with the British desire to 
have Bomber Command controlled by the Air Staff.  Or, was it that he perceived 
Spaatz’s increased stature as an advantage?  For whatever reason, he accepted  
the British proposals.153   On 16 September a Directive was sent to Bottomley and 
Spaatz defining the new command structure.  They, in turn, prepared a Directive 
that, on 25 September 1944, was sent to Harris and the Generals commanding the 
American Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces  
This new Directive, effective immediately, began: “executive responsibility 
for the control of the strategic bomber forces in Europe shall be vested in the Chief 
of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, and the Commanding General, United States 
Army Air Forces, joinly. [sic]”154   The overall mission for the Strategic Air Forces 
remained “the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 
industrial and economic systems and the direct support of land and naval 
forces.”155   Target priorities were listed as, firstly, the German petroleum industry; 
in joint second, German rail and waterborne transportation systems, tank 
production plants and ordnance depots, and motor production plants and depots. 
Neither Eisenhower nor Harris was wildly enthusiastic about the changes 
that had been made to the command structure.  The Supreme Commander was 
the more easily placated.  Once he was assured that any calls made for 
assistance from the heavy bombers would be answered immediately, he accepted 
the inevitable.  Harris was less easily persuaded.  His working relationship with 
Eisenhower had been relaxed and he railed at what he saw as the loss of his 
freedom of action.  He resented a return to the system where Staff Officers in the 
Air Ministry could exert a measure of supervision.  He sought clarification of the 
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chain of command from the Under Secretary of State for Air. Was he to take 
orders from Bottomley, Spaatz, or Tedder?  Secondly, were his instructions to be 
broad outlines, or were they to be detailed briefings for specific bombing 
attacks?156  
Harris was assured that the Directives he received would not be issued in 
the name of any particular staff officer, but would be issued on behalf of the Chief 
of the Air Staff.  Furthermore, they would be general and not specific instructions. 
Harris accepted these assurances and only asked that the original memorandum 
be amended to say that he was directly responsible to Portal. 
The return of Harris to the supervision of the Air Staff in September 1944 
marked also a return to the disagreements and conflict that had typified their 
association up to April of the same year.  While at Tedder’s beck and call Harris 
had cooperated willingly on demands made for his strategic bombers but 
otherwise was very much allowed free rein.  In other words, when not required to 
attack targets nominated as assistance to the Allied armies, he simply pursued his 
primary target, German cities.  The quarterly returns issued by Bomber Command 
Headquarters provide a clear picture. 
For the period April to June 1944, thirty-eight per cent of Bomber 
Command’s  bombing effort went on attacking railway targets; twenty-two per cent 
on coastal batteries and seventeen per cent on targets in Germany ─ the 
euphemistic expression to cover area attacks on German cities.157   From July to 
September 1944, Army support and transportation received thirty-five per cent of 
the bomb tonnage released, V-weapons twenty-five per cent, cities twenty per 
cent, and oil eleven per cent.158   Following his return to the Air Staff control, and 
with fewer calls for the services of the strategic bombers, Harris, virtually ignoring 
the requirements of the Directive of 25 September 1944 which had accorded first 
priority to the German petroleum industry and second priority to rail and 
waterborne transportation systems, resumed his offensive against German cities.  
In the last three months of 1944 German cities received fifty-three per cent of the 
bombers’ efforts, rail and water transport fifteen per cent, and oil fourteen per cent.  
The figures clearly show where Harris’s main interests were concentrated.159 
Noble Frankland has also made clear that after the middle of 1944 there 
were occasions when there was some choice between area attacks on towns and 
precise attacks on oil and communication targets.  His expressed regret was that  
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When Lord Portal believed that oil production was being under-
bombed, Sir Arthur Harris believed that devastated cities were 
being allowed too much recovery time and Lord Tedder thought that 
the death grip on communications was being relaxed.  There was 
justice in all these points of view.  That none was prevailed over the 
others was tragic.160 
  
Confirmation of Harris’s lack of interest in transportation targets is that in his 
Despatch on War Operations he provided only eleven lines relating to the 
disruption of communications in Germany.  It is also noteworthy that for Harris the 
devastation of German rail facilities rated lower in his estimation than the ruin  
created in Germany’s inland waterways.  He admitted that the destruction of rail 
facilities “had a far reaching effect on military supplies and distribution of coal” but 
argued that the cutting of the Dortmund – Ems and Mittelland canals “was perhaps 
the telling blow.”161    What Harris appears to have ignored, and what Alfred 
Mierzejewski has made clear, is that the German transport system was dominated 
by the rail network which carried three quarters of all freight and ninety per cent of 
the coal to more places, faster, and more often than canal barges.  Only one tenth 
of all freight was carried on the canal and inland waterway systems.162   
Harris’s obsession with German cities as his primary target, exemplified by 
the Blue Book records he maintained, is confirmation of his non-recognition of the 
abilities possessed by his bomber crews and proven in their transportation attacks 
carried out as preparation for Overlord.  By 1944, Bomber Command was capable 
of carrying out accurate precision attacks on worthwhile targets deep in Germany.  
The Path Finders were a refined and potent Group more than capable of creating 
conditions for devastating attacks on previously safe targets.  Germany had lost its 
early warning radar stations and the establishment of both Oboe and GH stations 
on the Continent had vastly extended the range at which precision targets could 
be identified, marked, and destroyed.  Nevertheless, it is clear from Bomber 
Command’s own records that cities, at least until the night of 14/15 April 1945 
when Potsdam received the attention of 500 Lancasters and twelve Mosquitoes, 
remained the cynosure of Harris’s eyes. 
Over the last few months of the war Harris remained as intractable as ever 
and his disagreements and disobedience concerning oil targets, which will be 
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discussed in the next chapter, more than matched the differences he had with the 
Air Staff relating to transportation targets. 
Post war, Churchill, despite having spent a lifetime debating and arguing 
over what could or could not be achieved by the proper employment of air power, 
said or wrote very little concerning Bomber Command.  His apparent total rejection 
of Bomber Command, coupled with his failure to acknowledge their achievements 
or reward the leaders, is a slur on the memory of the 55,000 who gave their lives 
and adds nothing to his own stature. 
Saundby, naturally, waxed lyrical later with regard to the attacks on German 
communications.  He claimed that  
 
Although the scope of Allied air operations and the choice of targets 
were determined by tactical considerations, the blows against 
Rundstedt’s supply lines nevertheless brought about a further 
substantial fall in economic traffic in Western Germany.  The 
attacks East of the Rhine, highly concentrated in time and space, 
against every type of railway installation, gave the coup-de-grâce to 
economic traffic operating in the Saar and Cologne regions . . . . 
The two chief waterways in the Dortmund-Ems and Mittelland 
canals, were cut by bombing in September 1944 and, by repeat 
attacks whenever necessary, were kept out of action until the end 
of the war.163 
 
When such wide-ranging and grandiose claims are made for a bombing 
campaign which from October to December 1944 only consumed fifteen per cent 
of Bomber Command’s enormous power for transport targets and fourteen per 
cent for oil, one is forced to enquire how much earlier could the war have been 
won had the total power available been expended against the same two target 
systems, detailed as priorities, in Harris’s Directive? 
The Americans, although they had entered the war strongly declaring their 
intention to bomb only military targets had, by 1944, to radically revise their plans.  
Their doctrine, based on a strategic daylight precision bombing campaign aimed at 
the destruction of the German economy with a minimum of collateral damage to 
either civilian lives or property, had not achieved the desired results.  There had 
been two critical miscalculations: they had underestimated the quality and 
effectiveness of the German air and ground defences and overestimated their own 
abilities.  Moreover, they had been too largely unaware of the losses the bomber 
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forces would sustain (prior to the employment of long-range fighter escorts) and 
they appeared to have been totally ignorant of the very limited number of days 
throughout the year in Europe when weather would provide conditions suitable for 
visual bombing. 
Although the escort problem was solved efficiently by the employment of 
Mustang, Thunderbolt and Lightning fighters, the weather problem drove the 
American strategic bomber commanders down a path they had long and publicly 
eschewed.  Their adoption of the radar bombing device H2X, which the RAF had 
called H2S, although it allowed them to bomb through the overcast, severely 
reduced their accuracy.  When half the ground was covered by cloud less than half 
of the bombs released fell within a one mile circle centred on the aiming point and 
ninety-six per cent fell within five miles.  When the ground was totally obscured, 
only one in twenty bombs released fell within the one mile circle and only sixty per 
cent within five miles.164  The American solution was to either increase the 
numbers of aircraft employed in an attack or increase the frequency of attack. 
During the last year of the war the American bomber forces concentrated 
very largely on oil and transportation targets.  Although the oil attacks provided 
reduced collateral damage, located as they usually were away from built up areas, 
the transportation targets were normally associated with a city and civilian losses 
were heavy.   These attacks, employing H2X, would have been described by the 
RAF as area attacks but they were entered in the American records as precision 
attacks on the German transportation system.  Contrary to the British experience, 
the American politicians, as we saw with Roosevelt and the railway bombing prior 
to Overlord, refused to interfere with what they viewed as a military problem to be 
overcome by military measures.   
Although he had initially accepted the proposals for Thunderclap, the attack 
on German civilian morale, Spaatz later argued that it had been part of a plan for 
the Americans to have to bear part of the blame for the more critical features of the 
area bombing campaign.  Berlin, he was prepared to admit, could be a target, but 
then added, 
 
I personally believe that any deviation from our present policy, even 
for an exceptional case, will be unfortunate.  There is no doubt in 
my mind that the RAF want very much to have the U.S. tarred with 
the morale bombing aftermath which we feel will be terrific.165  
 260
 
Eisenhower, however, followed a more pragmatic line.   He readily admitted 
that he was “always prepared to take part in anything that gives real promise to 
ending the war quickly.”166    On Eisenhower’s instructions, Spaatz ordered Major 
General James Doolittle, the field commander of the Eighth Air Force, to prepare 
his force for an indiscriminate attack on Berlin under the provisions of 
Thunderclap.167  
By late 1944 transportation targets had, for the Americans, become second 
priority.  Spaatz provided no instructions regarding the possibility of collateral 
damage but with the poor weather experienced it is clear that even if the 
Americans did not cross the line between an area and a marshalling yard attack, 
they certainly approached it very closely.   
The transportation bombing campaign carried out by the Americans and 
Bomber Command, indirectly, with its area attacks on German cities, played a vital 
part in the destruction of the German war economy.   The Deutsche Reichsbahn, 
the German railway system, pre-war, was up to date, well run, and, as the primary 
element of the country’s transport system, served the country and people 
efficiently and speedily.  Nevertheless, by 1943 it had become inadequate 
because of territorial expansion, shortage of wagons, and the dispersal of industry 
in an effort to avoid air attack.  The extensive rail network had proved to be 
incapable of meeting the demands placed on it by a war the magnitude of which 
had been grossly underestimated.168 
By January 1945 the bombing of the German rail system ─ marshalling 
yards, servicing centres, bridges, tunnels, locomotives and rolling stock ─ 
combined with the loss of the inland waterway system due to mining and bombing, 
together with the strains that had been imposed on a rail system struggling to cope 
with the ill-fated Ardennes offensive, destroyed the Reichsbahn. 
Ruination of the Reichsbahn produced a comprehensive coal famine which 
created factory closures, a shortage of weapons, and the recognition, at least by 
Speer, the German Armaments Minister, that further struggle was pointless.  By 
the end of February 1945 the accumulation of British and American incendiary and 
high explosive bombs on German cities, industry, oil, and transportation targets, 
had secured the collapse of the German economy.169 
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Speer, in mid March 1945, advised Hitler that “The final collapse of the 
German economy can therefore be counted on with certainty within four or eight 
weeks . . . . After this collapse, even military continuation will become 
impossible.”170   The war, if not yet officially, was over.  The strategic air offensive, 
although not perfect and not providing adequate proof of pre-war theorists’ visions, 
was in the end, decisive.  The throttling of the German economy and the 
enormous damage created in her cities had produced chaos.  One authority took it 
further: “Even without the final ground invasion, it seemed, the Germans could not 
have continued the war.”171 
Eisenhower’s relinquishment of the direct control of the strategic bomber 
forces in September 1944 was not the only command change late that year.  On 
13 October Bottomley and Spaatz established a committee to provide advice on 
the appropriate priorities for strategic targets.  Prior to Eisenhower assuming 
control of the strategic bomber forces this task had been the responsibility of the 
Joint  Target Intelligence Committee.  The new advisory group, called the 
Combined Strategic Target Committee (CSTC), held its first meeting at the Air 
Ministry on 18 October 1944.172   At the insistence of Spaatz, the numbers on this 
committee were kept to a minimum with others invited as required.  The 
Chairmanship was to alternate between the Director of Bomber Operations in the 
Air Ministry and the Director of Operations for the American Strategic Air Forces.  
The duties of the new committee were to recommend suitable targets for strategic 
bombers and to determine appropriate priorities between various target systems.  
It was also to advise when it was considered that variations were required to the 
current Directive and was to make recommendations regarding calls made by the 
War Office, Royal Navy, or Eisenhower’s Headquarters, for assistance from the 
strategic bomber forces. 
Another significant and possibly overdue change was made on 15 October 
when the Allied Expeditionary Air Force was disbanded.  It was replaced by an Air 
Staff in Eisenhower’s Headquarters under Tedder. Leigh-Mallory, whose position 
had long been invidious, was posted to command the Allied Air Forces in south-
east Asia.  In the event, he never took up his new appointment because he was 
killed in an air crash in France while on his way out east. 
The new command structure at Eisenhower’s Headquarters, and the return 
of the strategic bomber forces to the British Air Staff and Spaatz, were still not the 
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ideal arrangements.  Too often national interests took precedence over the 
demands of international military co-operation.  Nevertheless preparations for the 
sixth winter of war were under way. 
Perhaps the Transportation Plan attacks, followed by the extended 
communications bombing programme, took longer than was desirable to achieve 
victory, but Eisenhower was fulsome in his praise. “Long before we landed in 
France” he declared, 
 
the heavy bombers had begun their task of destroying the centers 
of production upon which the  enemy relied, and the  fruits of 
this effort were evident immediately the land campaign began . . . 
these strategic blows at the heart of German industry . . . continued, 
and the task was also undertaken of cutting the supply lines which 
linked the factories to the fronts . . . . Allied superiority in the air was 
. . . essential to our victory . . .  and enabled us to prepare and 
execute our own ground operations in complete security.173 
 
Although the relevance of this lengthy chapter to the Harris/Air Staff 
confrontations may not appear to be strikingly obvious, the undertones are 
pertinent to the arguments that took place over a long period.  Initially, Harris 
argued that Bomber Command should play no direct part in Overlord except the 
continuation of the area assault on German cities.  He was unable to identify any 
target or target systems which he believed would provide a better return than the 
bombing programme he had largely followed since February 1942.  When it was 
suggested to him that Bomber Command should undertake precision bombing 
attacks on the French and Belgian railway systems, he was quick to deny his 
Command possessed the capability to be effective.  When pressed, he agreed to 
trial attacks and later expressed considerable surprise that his bombers could be 
so accurate and create such destruction.   It was Bufton’s opinion, presumably 
when Oboe was employed, that “Bomber Command have demonstrated their 
ability to achieve an accuracy and concentration on small targets far exceeding 
that which can be achieved by American heavies by day.”174     
The lesson to be learned was that raids employing Oboe target marking 
largely meant that the target would be destroyed.  Of course, in June 1944, the 
ground stations of the Oboe system were based in England which meant that 
targets deep in Germany were out of range.  Later, as the Allied armies moved 
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forward, additional Oboe units and GH stations were established on the Continent 
and thus there were now few German targets that could not be accurately 
attacked.  Did Harris accept this fact?  He did not.  Area bombing of German cities 
continued to be his primary aim when he was provided the opportunity.  While 
serving under Eisenhower, Harris, very much, had been operating under less 
stringent supervision than that provided by the Air Ministry but he nevertheless  
totally fulfilled all Eisenhower’s requirements.  When required, he attacked the 
specifically nominated targets, and it must be acknowledged that Bomber 
Command’s contribution to the success of Overlord and the land campaign that 
followed was very significant.   But, while serving under Eisenhower, when given 
the opportunity to select targets, Harris largely redirected his attention to 
Germany’s industrial cities.      
On 25 September 1944 Harris was advised that under the terms of the 
Directive issued on that date executive responsibility for the control of Bomber 
Command was to be vested once again in Portal’s hands.  Harris, effectively, had 
been returned to the Air Ministry fold and over the next three months he made very 
clear that he was sternly intent on plugging the gap that had developed in the city 
attack programme by his enforced concentration on Overlord, Pointblank, and 
Crossbow, and subsequent ground battles in Europe.  Portal was very much left 
lamenting.  Despite his earnest entreaties that German oil be the preferred target, 
fifty-three per cent of Bomber Command’s effort in the period October to 
December 1944 (inclusive) was again directed at her cities.  Oil received only 
fourteen per cent.175 
As early as 1 November 1944 Harris claimed that  
 
over the past eighteen months Bomber Command has virtually 
destroyed 45 of the leading German cities.  In spite of invasion 
diversions we have so far managed to keep up and even to exceed 
our average of 2½ cities devastated a month . . . . Are we now to 
abandon this task?176    
 
Harris, in opposing oil attacks, employed two main arguments.   The first, 
and in some cases it was difficult to refute his claims, was that weather and other 
tactical reasons, dominated target selection.   His second, more open to criticism, 
was that  
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in adopting the Oil Plan we sought a panacea.  We shall fail and we 
are failing in our object for the reasons . . . that Germany being on 
the defensive, on interior lines and served by a close network of 
excellent roads and railways, will maintain the vital defensive 
essentials in fuel and transport in spite of all we can do to prevent 
her by air attack on oil. 177   
 
In other words, Harris was claiming not only that the oil targets could not be 
attacked but also, even if they could be bombed successfully, it was a waste of 
effort.  It was typical Harris obfuscation: if his first argument was valid, the second 
was superfluous.   
The arguments between the Air Staff and Harris, despite apparent gaps, 
were on-going.  In this chapter, although it was never mentioned, Schweinfurt 
featured prominently until at least April 1944 and oil had been introduced into the 
bombing equation even prior to the D-Day landings and became yet more 
prominent subsequently.   Overlord  had meant that the relationship between the 
Air Staff and Harris had, of necessity, to undergo change.  Harris, for his part, may 
have been relieved to have been under less rigid scrutiny but Portal, early in the 
disruption, had become anxious to fully restore the status quo.  Both were shortly 
to discover that nothing had changed ─ the arguments would continue. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Oil Targets 
 
In any consideration of the relationship between Portal, the Air Staff, and 
Harris, the disputes relating to the bombing of German oil targets are crucial.  It is 
arguable that had these targets been bombed as the Air Staff frequently enjoined, 
then the war would not have continued into 1945.  In the earlier chapters 
concerning incendiaries versus high explosive bombs, the formation of the Path 
Finder Force, Schweinfurt, and the pre-Overlord bombing requirements, it has 
been shown that although Harris employed obfuscation and blatant delaying 
tactics, he ultimately at least gave the appearance of having obeyed the Air Staff’s 
orders.  Unfortunately, in the case of the PFF as we have seen, Harris agreed to 
its formation but immediately began the establishment of a PFF to his design and 
not that required by the Air Staff.   In the case of German oil he employed the 
same tactics but added to them by arguing with his superior Portal, until  
eventually, as will be seen later in this chapter, it was Portal who yielded, 
acknowledging that they would wait until the end of the war to see who had been 
correct.  
The central characters in this chapter are, of course, Portal and Harris but 
what must not be overlooked was the critical role played by the man caught in the 
middle, Bufton.  He was employed by Portal not only to refute Harris’s arguments 
but also provide, in draft form, the written responses. Despite the differences of 
opinion that had arisen between Portal and Bufton relating to pre-Overlord 
requirements, Bufton clearly continued to be an Air Staff member in whom Portal 
placed implicit trust.  The oil story reveals character blemishes, misjudgements, 
mismanagement, failure to act decisively and one is left to lament, what might 
have been?    
One lesson learned, and accepted by Germany after the First World War, 
was that a significant element of that conflict had been the victory of the petrol 
engine over the steam engine.1  Future wars would therefore require an expanded 
and sustained oil supply system.  But Germany was oil-poor; less than ten per 
cent of requirements were locally produced.  The oil planning staff, established by 
Hitler’s National Socialist Party, recognised the potential problems and set about 
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production expansion; development of a synthetic oil industry; vastly increased 
importation of oil products; and the construction of underground storage facilities.   
Although expansion of a synthetic oil industry had begun in 1935, 
commercial interests, in the main, steered clear of the project because of the 
enormous capital costs and uneconomic plant operation.  However, the Four-Year 
Plan of September 1936, under the stewardship of Hermann Göring, had, as one 
of its primary aims, state-aided, increased indigenous synthetic oil production.  
The basic ingredient was the plentiful supplies of German bituminous, or black 
coal, found in the Ruhr, and lignite, or brown coal, from central Germany.  
Two different processes were involved. The more important, the Bergius 
hydrogenation process, involved forcing hydrogen into the split molecules of coal 
to produce liquid oil molecules.  This was a vital production source for Germany 
because, by the beginning of 1944, these plants produced almost forty-seven per 
cent of all her oil products.  Even more importantly, they supplied almost the total 
oil and high grade petrol needed to keep the Luftwaffe operational.  The process 
was extremely flexible, thus outputs of various oil products were readily changed 
to meet varying demands.  The three main Bergius plants were located at Leuna, 
ninety miles south-west of Berlin, Pölitz, seventy-five miles north-east of the 
German capital, and later, a new plant at Brüx, in Czechoslovakia. The combined 
outputs from Leuna and Pölitz contributed more than a third of the total Bergius 
yearly production.2
  The other process to produce synthetic oil was known as the Fischer 
Tropsch method.  This involved breaking up coal using steam to obtain molecules 
of hydrogen and carbon monoxide.  The resultant was then synthesised by a 
complicated process to produce the final oil products.  These were normally either 
high grade petrol or diesel oil. 
Unfortunately for Germany, five-year production estimates vastly exceeded 
the synthetic oil industry’s capacity.  Steel for construction and skilled labour were 
both in short supply.  In June 1938, a revised Four-Year Plan was introduced, 
which, because of the Göring connection, came to be called the Karinhall Plan.  
Revised production figures were established, with a target date of 1942-43.  The 
aim was to produce, annually, 13,835,000 tons of oil products.  Had that target 
been achieved, roughly 1,153,000 tons monthly, then with a peace-time, monthly 
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consumption of 670,000 tons, the oil ledger would have been considerably in 
credit.   
The figures require close examination.  Peace-time monthly consumption 
included 437,000 tons of imported oil.  Estimated war-time consumption, including 
both civil and military requirements, totalled 689,800 tons per month.  After the 
outbreak of war Germany’s total oil imports, with Russia and Romania being the 
only providers thanks to the British blockade, Germany’s total oil income was 
reduced to only 455,000 tons per month.3   The oil ledger would thus be in debit 
necessitating recourse to strategic oil reserves.  It is therefore easy to understand 
Hitler’s somewhat unusual exhortation to his generals, in May 1939: “Everybody’s 
Armed Forces and Government must strive for a short war.”4
War, however, came earlier than Germany had planned.  As a 
consequence, Germany went to war in 1939 with both her oil reserves and 
production in a parlous state.  There was the expectation that production would 
increase from new oil fields discovered in north Germany; the hope that Austrian 
and synthetic production would increase; and the misguided belief that industrial 
expansion and production would continue, unaffected by enemy action. Admittedly 
synthetic production doubled between 1936 and 1939, but the 1939 output was 
still forty-five per cent under the projected production.5   What is more, Germany’s 
oil problems had been recognised by oil authorities in England. 
Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War the Air Staff drew up a 
series of plans, Western Air Plans, for the employment of Bomber Command in 
the event of war with Germany.  They were divided basically into those that could 
be described as defensive, and those that were, by their nature, offensive.  One of 
the major considerations had been the need to provide no provocation that would 
cause the Luftwaffe to launch an all-out assault on British targets.  Thus, at the 
outbreak of war, in order to avoid placing German civilians at risk, the only 
possible targets for Bomber Command were units of the German navy.  Their 
other activity was widespread leaflet dropping.   
Defensive measures, it had been appreciated, would not secure victory. 
Offensive plans were also necessary, either in response to German actions or in 
the effort to defeat the enemy.   Plans had also been prepared for unrestricted 
warfare on German targets.   One such plan was Western Air Plan 6 (WA 6), later 
revised to WA 5c, the attack on German war resources of oil.   
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The first draft of the oil plan was received at Bomber Command on 1 July 
1939 and a revised version twenty-four days later.  The Air Staff plan was based 
on the assumption that the German oil situation, lacking natural resources, was 
one that very easily could become critical.  One estimate was that supplies were 
sufficient for only six or seven months’ intense activity.  After that, if it became 
possible to totally cut off oil imports, it was believed that Germany would only be 
able to meet twenty per cent of her oil requirements from internal sources.  The 
outline plan was to “reduce Germany’s war resources of oil as rapidly and as 
completely as possible.“6   No specific plans were made for attacks on German 
domestic oil fields because unless the facilities – derricks, reservoirs, pumping 
stations, and power plants – were concentrated, the targets would be too small.  
The focus, instead, was on imported oils and domestic oils in refineries.  A list of 
thirty-two possible targets was prepared.  These were broken down into fourteen 
refineries (eight for imported oil and six for domestic oil), sixteen plants for the 
production of synthetic oil, and two tank farms.7             
Target selection for Bomber Command during the Second World War, as 
described in Chapter Two, involved many agencies but in addition to those already 
described there was also the Oil Committee.  As a Cabinet advisory body it 
exerted considerable influence.  First established in 1928 under the title of 
Industrial Intelligence Centre, it was responsible for the on-going review of 
Germany’s oil supplies.  Renamed the Lloyd Committee in 1939, its task was to 
consider ways to prevent oil reaching Germany, examine the current and future 
German oil requirements, the effects of bombing, and the provision of advice on oil 
bombing strategy. The Oil Committee reported directly to the Hankey Committee 
which had been established at the same time.  In early 1942 the Enemy Oil 
Committee was set up in Washington and an MEW employee in the British 
Embassy was accorded accreditation.  Next, in March 1942, the Hartley Technical 
Sub-Committee on Axis Oil was established, replacing both the Lloyd and Hankey 
Committees.  In July 1944 a Joint Oil Targets Committee was formed to study the 
German oil situation, advise on target priorities, and assess bombing 
effectiveness.  Finally, on 18 October 1944, after oil had become the primary 
target of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO), the newly formed Combined 
Strategic Target Committee (CSTC), under the alternate chairmanship of the 
Director of Bomber Operations and the Director of Operations, United States 
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Strategic Air Forces Europe, with a sub-committee, the Joint Oil Targets 
Committee, was made responsible for oil targeting. 
The members of the CSTC were representatives from the authorities in 
Bomber Operations and Intelligence Directorates in the Air Ministry; Operations 
and Intelligence Directorates in the American Strategic Air Force Europe; Enemy 
Branch of the Foreign Office and MEW; Enemy Objectives Unit in the United 
States Embassy and representatives from the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied 
Expeditionary Air Force. 
The terms of reference for the CSTC were clearly defined.  It was 
responsible for advising the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff and the Commanding 
General of the American Strategic Air Force on target priorities and the priorities to 
be established between different target systems.  It was also to advise on any 
need that may arise, at any time, for a major change to the current directive.  
Finally, it was the responsibility of the CSTC to consider and make 
recommendations on proposals submitted by the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force, Admiralty or the War Office, involving the employment of the 
strategic bomber forces. 
The CSTC was also required to issue, on a weekly basis, priority lists of 
strategic targets to be attacked under the current directive, and to submit, when 
necessary, joint proposals to meet specific situations as and when they might 
arise.  In order to assist their deliberations, working committees on oil, Army 
support objectives and the Luftwaffe, were also formed.8
During 1940 a veritable plethora of Directives were issued to Bomber 
Command, at least seven of which nominated oil as a target.  The frequency with 
which new Directives appeared indicates that there was no overall master plan for 
the employment of Bomber Command.  Rather, it was being called upon simply to 
plug gaps as they appeared.  In several instances the impression was given that 
the Air Staff, rather than Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, the Air Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, were running the bomber war. 
Bomber Command’s offensive in 1940 and 1941 against targets in the 
German oil industry was a signal failure.  Despite the optimistic hopes held of the 
crucial state of German oil supplies, together with the belief that Bomber 
Command could locate and destroy the sources of supply, refineries, and the 
holding tanks, Germany’s oil reserves continued to expand.  On 15 January 1941 
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a new Directive was issued which claimed, tentatively, that  “On the assumption 
that our present scale of air attack on the enemy’s oil plants is maintained, their oil 
position may be causing them grave anxiety by the Spring of 1941.“9   Clearly, the 
intelligence available to the British authorities relating to Germany’s oil position 
had serious shortcomings.   
Naturally the communiqués issued following attacks on German oil 
refineries and synthetic oil plants provided graphic details of the damage they 
were supposedly sustaining.  Churchill, recently appointed Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defence, in a radio broadcast on 19 May 1940, assured the British 
people that  
 
In the air ─ often at serious odds, often at odds hitherto thought 
over whelming ─ we have been clawing down three or four to one 
of our enemies and the relative balance of the British and German 
Air Forces is now considerably more favourable to us than at the 
beginning of the battle . . . . At the same time, our heavy bombers 
are striking nightly at the tap-root of German mechanized power, 
and have already inflicted serious damage upon the oil refineries on 
which the Nazi effort to dominate the world directly depends.10 
 
In a speech on 21 September 1940, the Minister of Economic Warfare, Dr 
Hugh Dalton, declared that ninety per cent of Germany’s synthetic oil production 
and eighty per cent of her refineries had been “hammered with devastating            
effect.“11   His claim was, of course, a gross distortion but morale would not have 
been bolstered by an awareness of reality.  Truth, at that time, was simply another 
commodity that had to be severely rationed. 
In January 1941 the War Cabinet accepted Portal’s argument that Bomber 
Command was capable of creating sufficient damage to German synthetic oil 
plants to provide decisive effects on the course of the war.  In the Directive of 15 
January 1941, German synthetic oil plants became the primary aim.  In a letter to 
Peirse, Portal ordered that “Everything else is to be subordinated to it until we 
either achieve success or admit failure.“12  
 Just over a month later, Peirse advised Portal that despite oil targets being 
first priority, in the thirty-three operations carried out be Bomber Command since 
the beginning of the year, only three were exclusively against oil.13   Portal’s 
response was an indication that he had somewhat lost faith in the current bombing 
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programme.  Public opinion, he suggested, was moving away from oil and was 
calling for mass attacks on industrial centres.  The British people apparently, were 
seeking revenge. The Air Staff, he continued, are now working on a new review.  
He admitted that he did not know what the answer would be, but, he concluded, 
”even if we have to give up oil, we have the consolation of not having wasted 
much on it since the Cabinet decision.“14
Early in 1941 Air Commodore Baker, Director of Bomber Operations, began 
to voice his opposition to plans that had as their primary objective a quick end to 
the war.  Germany, it was accepted, could not win a long war but, at the same 
time, it was impossible for Great Britain to win a short one.  He was firm in his  
assessment that, as far as Bomber Command was concerned, the bombing 
policies employed had always appeared to seek the quick answer.  The attacks on 
German oil had been too few in number and too inaccurate to achieve a 
worthwhile effect.  The moment had passed, he asserted, for the destruction of 
German oil to provide the way to victory.  He continued,  
 
With the entry of the Germans into Roumania, and the consequent 
German control of the oil industry . . . coupled with the almost 
complete interference with the oil plan due to recent bad weather, 
the task of seriously restricting Germany’s oil supplies has assumed 
such proportions as to be probably beyond the capacity of our  
bomber force. If this is so it is not acceptable as our principal aim.15
 
Russian oil, and its possible availability to Germany either through 
conquest, or trade following the Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, had been of 
concern to Britain and France since 1940.  In that year planning was started for 
possible air attacks on the giant Caucasian oil fields.  On 24 April 1940 
Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, advised his War Cabinet that, although 
the military authorities were to continue planning, the operation had been 
deferred.16
In August 1941 the plan was revived. The fear now was that Germany 
might gain complete control of the Caucasus oil industry either through conquest, 
or by means of an armistice which might well be imposed upon Russia.  But they 
were plans with little hope of fulfilment.  The initial force employed, based in Iraq, 
was to be four Blenheim Mark IV squadrons together with two Hurricane 
squadrons.  Additional aerodromes were to be constructed in northern Iraq for five 
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heavy bomber squadrons for later hot weather operations.17  Although apparently 
not clearly identified by British authorities, the tentative plans also imposed 
enormous risks.  According to Sir John Slessor,  
 
The feature of these discussions which, in retrospect, really makes 
one’s hair stand on end is the air – not perhaps of complacency but 
of acceptance – with which we faced the prospect of enlisting 
Russia among our enemies.“18   
 
By July 1941 oil as the target for Bomber Command was also falling into 
disfavour with the Directorate of Plans in the Air Ministry.  The difficulties of target 
identification at night had been much under estimated, they asserted, and the 
numbers of aircraft which claimed to have attacked had always been too small to 
produce an effective result.   In a note to Portal, the Deputy Director warned:  
 
However attractive oil targets in Germany may be now, or in the 
future, economically, they are unsatisfactory targets tactically and 
will remain so until such time as, either our equipment or the 
strategical situation permits our bombers to operate over Germany 
by day in large numbers.19
 
Despite the contents of this letter, and his earlier admission of his 
dissatisfaction with the oil bombing programme, Portal added a note to the Deputy 
Chief of the Air Staff through the Director of Plans, ordering that a heavy scale 
attack be launched against Gelsenkirchen, an oil city in the Ruhr, “at the first 
suitable opportunity.”20  An attack had been made on the Nordstern and Scholven 
synthetic oil  plants in Gelsenkirchen on the night of 14/15 March 1941 but this 
latest instruction from Portal was seemingly ignored, because the next attack did 
not take place until the night of 25/26 June 1943.  
Indicative of the uncertainty and disagreements which existed among the 
higher echelons of policy makers in 1941, is the memorandum by Lord Hankey 
appealing for a continuation of attacks against German oil targets.  He first called 
for attacks on Romanian oil targets as a boost for the Russians, but then turned 
his attention to targets in Germany.  He repeated the claim of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, that the destruction of the nine synthetic oil plants, comparatively large 
targets, “would reduce Germany’s internal production of oil by 83 per cent.“21 
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Under the terms of the Directive issued to Bomber Command on 14 
February 1942 and inherited by Harris, area attacks aimed at the morale of the 
German work force had become the primary target for bomber crews.  
Nevertheless, spasmodic efforts continued to be made to effect the resumption of 
attacks on elements of the German oil industry.  A memorandum by Oliver 
Lawrence of the MEW, ’Night Bombing as an Instrument of Economic Warfare,’ 
warned against any tendency for planners to become engrossed with technical 
and operational problems to the detriment of economic strategy.22   Lawrence’s 
memorandum was followed by a paper from Colonel Oliver Stanley, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, who had been directed by the Cabinet to make an enquiry 
into the possibility of attacking German oil supplies.  His summation was that with 
the limited bombing force then available, the synthetic plants in Germany and the 
oil fields at Ploesti in Romania were in no danger.23 
Oil targets, only a primary target for a limited time, were thus largely 
removed from target planning.  But in September 1942 Bottomley attempted to 
draw Harris’s attention to the importance of the synthetic oil plant at Pölitz.  Harris 
was instructed  to add this target to the list that had been issued in the 14 
February 1942 Directive.24  
Harris responded vigorously.  Pölitz, he complained, was an unwanted 
diversion.  Now, he continued,  
 
the ‘oily boys’ choose this moment yet again to emerge with their 
fairy stories about oil . . . Two years ago we were assured that by 
knocking out  the oil plants we could win the war . . . . it is at this 
juncture that . . . the ‘oily boys’ re-assert that if we flatten Poelitz . . . 
then we have got ’em . . . I simply don’t believe a word of it.25  
 
It was a bitter letter in which Harris raged on about the various panacea mongers 
trying to distract him from his efforts to flatten the German cities. 
In January 1943 German oil targets made their reappearance as potential 
targets for Bomber Command in the Casablanca Directive.  The war had turned in 
the Allies’ favour and it now appeared time to begin a softening-up process in 
preparation for a return to the Continent in 1944.  Oil was accorded fourth priority 
behind U-boat construction yards, the German aircraft industry and various 
transportation targets.  Bufton had provided considerable input into the 
 284
Casablanca Directive but it is evident from notes prepared in the Directorate of 
Bomber Operations that staff there still held little hope for a successful bombing 
campaign against oil.  They appreciated that the bulk of Germany’s oil supplies 
came from Ploesti, backed up by increasing production from synthetic refineries in 
Central Germany and the Ruhr.  It was their opinion that until German imports of 
crude oil from Romania could be substantially reduced, attacks on synthetic plants 
should be held in abeyance.26 
There were, of course, other valid reasons why attacks on oil installations 
were considered unprofitable.  Firstly, Harris refused to accept that his crews had 
the equipment necessary to locate and accurately bomb small precision targets.  
Secondly, Bomber Command was encountering improved enemy defences –
particularly night fighters.  It was for this reason that the German aircraft industry 
had appeared as the second priority target on the current Directive. 
In April 1943 the Air Staff agreed that attacks against oil should be deferred 
until the land war in North Africa had ended and the Path Finder Force had gained 
further experience with the use of H2S and Oboe.  They were also concerned that 
the hours of darkness in spring and summer were insufficient to guarantee 
success.  Although short range targets were available, they argued that “it will not 
be possible by the attack of the synthetic oil plants alone, to deny to Germany the 
minimum quantity of oil necessary to have a major effect on her operations and 
strategy.“27        
In June 1943 the Pointblank Directive was issued.  Oil still held fourth 
position but this time following ball bearings.  Again the argument was repeated, 
that German supplies of petroleum and synthetic oil products were barely sufficient 
to meet the enormous demands. Russian sources, of course, had long dried up, 
but the argument now was that if Ploesti and the synthetic plants in Germany 
could be destroyed, then Germany would be in a parlous condition.  However, the 
major thrust of Pointblank was to attempt to bring about a reduction of strength of 
the German day and night fighter forces. 
The following month, Air Commodore Bufton, Director of Bomber 
Operations since March 1943, reconfirmed his preference for the elimination of 
factories in Germany producing fighter aircraft. He specified those located at 
Regensburg and Wiener Neustadt.28 Their destruction, by American heavy 
bombers based in North Africa, the Directorate believed, was a pre-requisite 
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before attacks on either Ploesti or the synthetic oil plants in Germany could be 
considered.  What was feared was that a partial success at Ploesti could engender 
American demands to ignore Pointblank and bring oil to the forefront.  At this stage 
of the war the Directorate’s argument was that enemy fighter strength posed a 
greater threat to the bomber offensive than the possible gains to be made by any 
destruction of German oil facilities.29
Bufton’s arguments were supported by the MEW.  Their belief was that no 
matter what destruction was achieved at Ploesti, any reduction in supply would fall  
 
last of all on the G.A.F., and more particularly on its fighter force.  
Even if the operations should be so successful as to produce an 
effect on the  enemy’s supply of aviation fuel, it would represent a 
very indirect method of attacking the enemy’s fighter strength, an 
infinitely less direct and certain method than the attack on key 
aircraft factories.30   
 
Many of the arguments offered by Bufton and Morley were included in a 
letter by Bottomley to Major General Ira C Eaker, Commanding General, Eighth Air 
Force, calling for the deferment of the attack on Ploesti.31  
Bufton was also asked to prepare a draft signal along the same lines as 
Bottomley’s letter, to be sent to the Royal Air Force delegation in Washington.  
Within this signal calling for the postponement of operations against Ploesti, 
Bufton quoted a message from Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, the newly 
appointed AOC Middle East Command, to the equally newly appointed AOC 
Mediterranean, Air Chief Marshal Tedder.  Douglas confirmed that he had studied 
the plans for further attacks on Ploesti under the code name Tidal Wave, and 
discussed the problems directly with the unit commanders involved.  It was his firm 
opinion that 
 
a sufficient degree of destruction is most unlikely repeat unlikely to 
be achieved by a single low level attack.  Our present assessment 
is that after one successful low level attack at least 5 further 
successful high level attacks will be required to achieve desired 
results.32
 
Early in November 1943 Geoffrey Lloyd, Secretary for Petroleum, 
addressed a minute to the Prime Minister.  It was his considered opinion that 
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Germany’s oil situation was approaching crisis point.  Bufton, after reading this 
minute, agreed that if the information it contained could be confirmed, then a very 
strong case existed for concentrated attacks to be made against German oil 
targets.  It would, however, require a diversion from the offensive against the 
German fighter industry.  The danger was that any failure to reduce the threat 
posed by German fighters could mean that operations against any class of target 
might be prejudiced.  Bufton made it clear that he believed the battle hung in the 
balance.  In an effort to swing the balance in the Allies favour, he opted for the 
continuation of the attack against the fighter aircraft industry.  If the threats from 
Luftwaffe fighters could be reduced, then the way would be opened for attacks on 
other elements of the German economy of which oil was, perhaps, the most 
important.33
Bufton also provided his view of the other options.  If it was decided that oil 
should be the primary target, then Bufton suggested that it would be best if 
operations were limited to Ploesti.  Raids against that target, he advocated, should 
be the responsibility of the Mediterranean based air force.  He pronounced himself 
against any notion of giving oil a higher priority than the enemy fighter and aircraft 
component factories for the bomber forces based in the United Kingdom.  He 
believed that oil targets within range of British based bombers were tactically 
difficult, heavily protected, and would be an uneconomic diversion.  Bufton 
concluded:  
 
our primary aim must remain the G.A.F. fighter force.  If the Axis oil 
position is confirmed to be as critical as is suggested, it might well 
be attacked on second priority.  Any resulting reduction in Axis oil 
supplies would increase the difficulties of the G.A.F. and thus 
hasten the time when a greater proportion of the bomber effort 
could be diverted to oil objectives.34
 
At the end of November 1943, after a further examination of the Lloyd 
minute, Bufton confirmed again with Bottomley that he had found nothing in the 
paper to cause him to change his mind regarding bombing priorities.  His opinion 
remained that the German aircraft industry, particularly the fighter area, should be 
attacked before consideration was given to oil targets.  Nevertheless, with the 
German oil position assessed as critical, and with heavy bomber bases available 
in southern Italy, he agreed that an attack on Ploesti, provided it was without 
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prejudice to the attack of German Air Force targets, “would have a considerable 
effect on Germany’s oil supplies.”35
Thus, at the end of 1943, an air of indecision still hung over the question of 
German oil targets.  Certainly for the first two years of the war they had been 
beyond the means then possessed by Bomber Command because the crews were 
largely incapable of locating small targets by night and there were insufficient 
aircraft for the many tasks requiring attention.  Bomber Command expansion was 
still slow; insufficient consideration had been given to the urgent demands for 
refined navigation and bombing equipment; and diversions of the bomber effort 
were a frequent occurrence.  Bomber Command, developed as an offensive 
weapon, had been largely employed on defensive activities.  Similar conditions 
had continued into 1943 and by now it had become all too evident to hard-pressed 
crews that German night fighters and the extensive defensive network employed 
by the Luftwaffe was reaping a heavy and barely sustainable toll.  
Two aims had been developed for Bomber Command by 1943, although 
only one remained constant and that was the attempt to lower German morale 
through the incidental suffering caused by the attack of one specific element of 
Germany’s war-making capacity.  The latter, of course, had been shown to have 
been a variable quantity and had passed through many stages from oil to 
communications, back to oil, but by 1943, under the terms of both the Casablanca 
and Pointblank Directives was focussed on the U-boat and German aircraft 
industries.  In 1941 bomber losses had averaged 2·5 per cent of all sorties flown 
but by 1942 this figure had increased to four per cent and was threatening to 
continue to rise.  Should the average loss rate exceed five per cent (and German 
night fighter production was expected to double in 1943), then the promised 
Bomber Command expansion would never occur.  Bufton had not been alone in 
the recognition of the threat posed by the enemy fighter forces.   
By March 1944, however, Bufton was having second thoughts. But before 
committing himself to a plan proposed by the Americans, to accord oil top priority, 
he called on the Director of Intelligence in the Air Ministry and Lawrence in the 
MEW, to provide their independent views.  He admitted that he had opposed any 
suggestion of increasing the bombing effort against oil on at least two occasions in 
the preceding six months, but was now prepared to consider changes. 
Considerable progress had been made, he believed, in reducing the effectiveness 
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of the German fighter forces.  In these circumstances the American heavy 
bombers’ ability to penetrate to oil targets would have been greatly enhanced. “We 
think” he confirmed, “the time has come when the attack of oil will be fully justified 
if the prize is sufficient to warrant the task being undertaken.“36
  The following month detailed Target Information Sheets were issued by the 
Air Intelligence Branch concerning the synthetic oil producing plants using the 
Bergius process at Leuna near Merseburg, and Pölitz, near Stettin.  Brief details 
were also given on another twenty plants employing the same process.37
On 25 May 1944 Oliver Lawrence of the Enemy Branch of the MEW, who 
had spoken against an oil target bombing programme as a pre-Overlord tactic as 
recently as 25 March,38  produced a paper extolling the virtues of oil as a target.  
His conclusion was based on three assumptions.  Firstly, that Overlord had been 
successfully launched and that a bridgehead had been established capable of 
withstanding German counter attacks; secondly, that night attacks against German 
targets would be limited to an area in the quadrilateral bounded by Wesel, Hamm, 
Aachen and Cologne; thirdly, that the primary objectives of the bomber forces 
should remain as in the Pointblank Directive.39   
Within the designated area, Lawrence listed ten synthetic oil plants 
estimated to produce eleven per cent of the Axis oil requirements.  Because of the 
damage already created by the Americans at Ploesti, and at German synthetic 
plants,40  it was believed that an average of one month’s supply had been denied 
to the German authorities.  This equated to a deficit of 65,000 tons per month, or 
five per cent of current consumption.  With the opening of the Second Front and 
the resumption of the Russian offensive, it was calculated that military 
consumption of oil products would increase by 150,000 tons per month.  If further 
damage could be created, then the increased deficit would so eat into the normal 
fuel reserves that military supplies would have to be reduced, thus causing a 
significant loss of operational capability. 
Lawrence’s conclusion was unequivocal:   
There is no question that at the present time the destruction of the 
major synthetic oil  plants in the Ruhr would do more to 
embarrass the enemy’s military operations than the destruction of 
any other targets in this area . . . The attack of at least four major 
synthetic plants . . . . therefore demands the most serious 
consideration as a primary objective . . . No other target system 
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accessible in this area offers the same prospect of rapid and 
decisive results.41
 
Bufton was converted.  Intelligence sources suggested that the German 
reactions in the air, and in the increased flak defences, indicated their fears 
created by the attacks on oil.  The Americans were calling for a combined plan.  
They would bomb plants in central and northern Germany by day leaving Bomber 
Command to attack, by night, the more heavily defended and difficult to locate 
refineries in the Ruhr.  Bufton was aware that the attack of precision targets in the 
Ruhr was a departure from what hitherto had been current policy: but he also 
believed there was ample justification.  With summer approaching, the short nights 
would confine Bomber Command’s operations very largely to the Ruhr and 
Rhineland areas.  Because of the devastation already created in this region, city 
centres no longer provided profitable targets.  There were four major oil plants in 
the area, all within range of the Oboe bombing and marking system, the accuracy 
of which had been well displayed on previous occasions in the Ruhr.  Finally, 5 
Group in Bomber Command had recently developed a low level marking technique 
that offered the chance of improved bombing results.  Although the risks in heavily 
defended areas were appreciated, the prospects of success, Bufton pointed out, 
warranted an investigation as to whether or not the system could be employed in 
the Ruhr.42   
Bufton recommended that Bomber Command be invited to assess whether 
or not the four major plants were considered viable targets.  If it was decided that 
they could be attacked successfully, he declared, they should be given first priority 
in the Ruhr/ Rhineland industrial complex.  From the results obtained, a decision 
could then be made whether to extend the scope of the oil offensive.43  
On 3 June 1944 Bottomley actioned Bufton’s suggestion.  He asked Harris 
for his  views  
 
as to the possibility of launching successful attacks against firstly 
the four major synthetic oil plants, and secondly the six remaining 
plants, and as to whether you could undertake these attacks as 
soon as the “Overlord” situation permits the attack of purely 
strategic targets.44    
 
An early reply was requested. 
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It is hard to imagine that Bottomley’s request was well received.  Harris had 
much on his plate.  On 14 April 1944 the direction of the American and British 
bomber forces had passed to General Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme 
Commander, in preparation for Overlord.  Eisenhower had delegated responsibility 
for strategic bomber matters to the Deputy Supreme Commander, Air Chief 
Marshal Tedder.45  Harris thus had a new master; he was no longer answerable 
directly to Portal.  Despite his initial opposition to the bombing programme in 
preparation for the landings on the continent, Bomber Command crews had been 
kept fully occupied in attacking transportation targets in Belgium, north-west 
France, and the Aachen area in Germany.  The arguments relating to this 
campaign are fully discussed in the previous chapter.      
Harris had long argued that should the bomb tonnage dropped on Germany 
fall below 10,000 tons per month, then war production would inevitably increase.  
Should the bombing of Germany cease entirely, he claimed, war production would 
return to normal within five months.46   In the period April to June 1944 pre-
invasion bombing consumed 69·4 per cent of Bomber Command’s effort.  Only 
17·4 per cent had been devoted to targets in Germany.  Although these figures 
meant that 14,015 tons of bombs had been aimed at targets in Germany in April, 
the figures for May and June were only 8,547 tons and 4,902 tons.47   
Despite all the distractions, Harris, in a note to Sinclair on 13 June,48  
accepted Bottomley’s request of 3 June and also advised Air Vice-Marshal 
Bennett of the Path Finder Force Group that the ten synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr 
were to be added to his list of Precision High Priority Targets.  “There is plenty of 
evidence now” he informed Bennett, “that the enemy is concerned with his oil 
position and these plants produce nearly a third of his total synthetic production.“49   
Perhaps he saw this new programme, because of the collateral damage that might 
be created, as a way  to the resumption of area attacks.  
Four attacks were carried out by Royal Air Force heavy bombers against oil 
targets in June 1944.  Two involved about 300 aircraft, while the other two were by 
smaller forces averaging about 130 aircraft.  In addition, there were six other 
attacks involving only Mosquitoes.  A further six attacks were carried out by 
Mosquitoes during the first five nights of July.  Bufton, in a note to Portal, warned 
that  
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Not only because of the intrinsic importance of these plants, but 
also in the interests of the prestige of the R.A.F. vis-a-vis the 
Americans, I consider it of extreme importance that Bomber 
Command should achieve success against the Ruhr plants without 
delay.  The urgency of the task is such that the Americans must 
destroy them if Bomber Command do not.50  
 
Later in July, following further attacks on oil targets by Bomber Command 
and the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, Bufton was even more positive.  “Oil 
targets” he asserted, 
 
are highly vulnerable to bombing . . . . our attacks are having a high 
rate of success . . . . the Axis oil position is steadily becoming more 
acute . . . . to exhaust the German strategic reserve . . . we should 
make every endeavour to put out of action simultaneously as many 
synthetic plants and refineries as we can . . . . all possible effort 
should be directed to the widespread destruction of the sources of 
Axis oil production over the next 30 days.51
 
Bufton was not alone in his assessment of the damage being done to the 
German oil industry by Allied bombing.  Albert Speer, the German Armaments 
Minister, in reports to Hitler in June and July 1944, drew his leader’s attention to 
the dangerous oil situation which he believed was developing.  In June he called 
for a reduction in flying hours to conserve supplies; strict measures to control 
consumption of carburettor and diesel fuel in the Wehrmacht ; increased fighter 
and flak protection for the synthetic plants, even at the expense of the cities; as 
well as improved smoke screen units for the fuel plants and the dummy plants that 
had been erected to mislead bomber crews.52
One element of the oil offensive section of the Combined Bomber Offensive 
often over-looked, but which should not be ignored, was the part played by the 
American Fifteenth Air Force and 205 Group, Royal Air Force, operating from 
Italian bases near Foggia from early 1944.  They served under the generic title of 
the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force (MASAF), commanded, from January 
1944, by Lieutenant-General Ira Eaker.  The American element was a large 
establishment comprising sixty Liberator and twenty-four Flying Fortress 
squadrons, plus many fighter squadrons.  No 205 Group was small, consisting of 
nine squadrons – six Wellington, two Liberator, and one Halifax.53
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Their tasks were wide-spread, covering enemy rail communications in 
Hungary and Romania in order to provide assistance to the Russians on the 
Eastern Front, industrial targets in Southern Germany and Austria, shipping and 
port installations in Italy, oil refineries, and mining the River Danube.  
Unfortunately, General Sir Harold Alexander, C-in-C Allied Armies in Italy, 
considered that the MASAF, with a bombing programme that appeared to bear no 
direct relation to his own military operations, was “more a liability than an asset.”54   
The supply problems the force created placed an enormous strain on his already 
scarce shipping capacity.  But, what Alexander had to remember, was that one of 
the reasons for launching the invasion of Italy had been not only to secure bases 
from which a bombing campaign could be initiated against targets in the Axis soft 
under-belly, but also to enable the air forces to provide closer support for his 
armies.  
The first operation by 205 Group against oil was on 8 April 1944, when 
mines were laid in the River Danube.  The Danube, of course, was a river vital to 
the German economy.  It provided not only for the transfer of agricultural produce, 
but also was a strategic route to the Balkan flank of Germany’s Eastern Front.  It 
was also Germany’s life-line for the importation of Romanian oil.  The barges 
involved in oil transhipment would each carry a load equivalent to one hundred 
ten-ton rail wagons and were thus an important target.  Mining was carried out at 
low-level, in moonlight conditions, by both Wellington and Liberator aircraft.  
Between April and early October 1944 a total of eighteen operations were 
completed; 1,382 mines were laid, each weighing 1,000 pounds.55
In May 1944, contrary to General Alexander’s dismissive opinion, MASAF’s 
efforts were directed primarily against “technical targets in support of the Allied 
offensive against Rome.”56   In June, however, the concentration turned again to 
oil.  Refineries in Trieste, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Romania, became the targets 
for both Air Forces.  One notable feature of these attacks was that the two 
elements of the MASAF co-operated; night raids by 205 Group were often 
preceded by day strikes by the Fifteenth Air Force.  Thus it accorded closely with 
the requirements laid down in the Pointblank Directive of 14 May 1943 which had 
called for a joint United States/British air offensive.  Without specifying Bomber 
Command’s major effort, the instruction noted that “when precision targets are 
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bombed by the Eighth Air Force in daylight, the effort should be complemented by 
R A F bombing attacks against the surrounding industrial area at night.”57 
From the beginning of April 1944 to the end of August 1944 the Fifteenth 
American Air Force carried out a programme of major bombing attacks on targets 
in the Mediterranean theatre.  Many were against oil targets and, by June 1944, of 
the sixty odd refineries within 700 miles of Foggia, twenty-nine had been 
bombed.58    During the same period 205 Group also carried out a series of 
bombing attacks, several complementary to American attacks, and many relating 
to oil ─ either mining the Danube, or striking at facilities.  Operations were 
intensive and, during June 1944, 205 Group operated on twenty-two nights 
dropping 2,000 tons of bombs and distributing 20,000,000 leaflets for the loss of 
thirty-four crews.59   Indicative of the difficulties and the strength of the defences to 
be overcome in the Mediterranean theatre, while Eighth Air Force losses in June, 
July and August 1944 totalled 842 heavy bombers, the Fifteenth Air Force (half the 
size of the Eighth) suffered an even higher ratio of losses.60  
By July 1944 oil targeting had become streamlined.  Oil experts had been 
added to the Allied Central Interpretation Unit at Medmenham and this unit 
reported daily to the Directorate of Bomber Operations and the Intelligence staffs 
at both Air Ministry and the equivalent American authorities.  Thus, within twenty-
four hours of an aerial reconnaissance of potential oil targets, their status was 
confirmed and the appropriate target selections completed.  In addition, the Joint 
Intelligence Sub-Committee was instructed to prepare, each fortnight, their 
appreciation of the results of the attacks on oil and their assessment of future 
requirements. 
Accurate and up to date information on the oil and fuel situation in Germany 
was also available, at this stage of the war, from Signals intelligence.  This 
resulted from the interception, analysis, and decoding of messages passed 
between German units on supposedly safe lines.  This source included Enigma 
transcripts and material passed on diplomatic lines between the Japanese 
ambassador in Berlin and his superiors in Tokyo.  The distribution of this 
information was, however, kept within narrow bounds to prevent the Germans 
learning that many of their codes had been broken.  Portal was privy to at least 
some of this information and presumably some filtered down to Bufton.  Harris did 
not start receiving Ultra material until 7 June 1944.61   
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One example will suffice to demonstrate the vital nature of this material.  An 
Enigma message on 5 June 1944 between Luftwaffe High Command and the First 
Parachute Army based in France was intercepted, decoded, and in Portal’s hand 
only two days’ later.  The message advised of a shortage of aviation fuel caused 
by Allied bombing.  All units, except those engaged in flying training, or operations 
against the enemy, were advised that their expected allocation of general aviation 
fuel for June would not be available.  Furthermore, no decision had been made 
concerning either the fuel allocation for July, or the date on which it could be 
expected.  To meet immediate defence requirements, it had been found necessary 
to draw supplies of aviation fuel from that earmarked as part of the strategic 
reserve for the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht).  
Portal, in a note to Churchill concerning this signal, declared that he 
regarded it as 
 
one of the most important pieces of information we have yet 
received . . . . I think that there is little doubt that in the light of this 
appreciation the strategic bombers should be turned over to 
synthetic oil plants as soon as Overlord can spare them . . . . I shall 
suggest that we should wait a little and then choose a period of fair 
weather to concentrate the whole force on these targets.62
 
In August 1944 Bufton, who had access to the weekly reports issued by the 
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, increased his calls for a 
greater concentration of bombing on German oil targets.  The claimed critical 
shortage of oil fuel in Germany was sufficient confirmation for him that any further 
reduction in supplies could well precipitate military disasters for Germany on both 
her Western and Eastern fronts.  The evidence provided in the latest report 
showed, he contended, that “there may be no way of so rapidly bringing enemy 
resistance to an end as an immediate intensification of our air attacks upon his oil 
supplies.“63   He called for an overriding priority to be accorded oil targets for both 
the British and American heavy bomber forces.  Area attacks by Bomber 
Command on cities, he argued, had little effect on German oil supplies and the 
effort could be much better employed.  Germany, he suggested, had no shortage 
of either aircraft or crews but further attacks against oil targets would severely 
restrict their activities. 
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Bufton also drew Bottomley’s attention to a paper produced by the Working 
Committee of the Joint Oil Target Committee.  This paper claimed that, provided 
the Russians were able to cut off German oil supplies from Romanian, Polish and 
Estonian sources, and even assuming that there were no further bombing attacks, 
Axis oil supplies for September 1944 would only reach forty-eight per cent of the 
total oil requirements.  Furthermore, the paper next insisted that “the Strategic Air 
Forces now have an opportunity within the next few weeks of bringing the war to 
an end through the attack of enemy oil supplies alone.“64    Bufton was in full 
agreement.  He advised Bottomley that he thought that a special direction should 
be given to the Strategic Air Forces to this effect and offered to prepare a paper in 
consultation with his American opposite number.  
Bottomley agreed that the time appeared opportune but reminded Bufton 
that the bomber forces were still under Eisenhower’s control.  Only after the 
current Directive had been revised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff could the 
action suggested by Bufton be considered.  Bottomley also rejected Bufton’s time 
frame regarding the early end to the war.  Instead, he suggested the wording 
should be that  
 
we are presented with an exceptionally favourable opportunity in 
the next few weeks of imposing on the enemy a critical situation in 
his war economy which if exploited to the full may prove decisive to 
our efforts.65
 
At the end of August 1944 Speer addressed another report to Hitler 
concerning the severe shortages in liquid fuels to be expected in September, and 
the damage done to the entire German chemical industry by Allied bombing.  
These reports possibly provide a more accurate picture than some of the material 
that appeared in his post-war books.  In 1944 Speer had but one master to 
appease.  By 1969 he was trying to satisfy not only the German people, but also 
his American and British masters.  His August 1944 report noted that there was 
only one hope.  If the Allied air raids on the facilities were not resumed for three 
weeks, the chance existed for the German fighter forces to recoup and prepare to 
face the next onslaught.  Flak defences by themselves were not enough.  If the 
Luftwaffe can successfully be expanded and revitalised, he asserted, it could be 
“the beginning of a new air force or it will mean the end of the German air force.“66      
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Throughout September 1944 Bufton continued his calls for even greater 
attention to be paid to targets within the German oil industry; “efforts” he asserted, 
“should be intensified to exploit this spreading crisis.“67   A fortnight later he was 
lamenting the disappointing bombing results achieved in the period 10-14 
September. These, he admitted, could be attributed to improved German 
defences, indicative of the seriousness with which the Germans viewed their 
deteriorating oil position.  Every advantage must be taken on every fine day or 
night and there must be no let-up. “If any diversion of effort from oil targets is 
permitted,” he concluded, “ the enemy may be enabled by his desperate measures 
of economy in consumption, and in the repair and protection of his productive 
installations, to escape breakdown.“68
By July 1944 concern was being expressed by Portal and Bufton over the 
divided control of the strategic bomber forces.  The arrangement had been that 
once the Allied forces were firmly established on the Continent their direction 
would be reviewed.  Portal acknowledged in one paper that “new developments 
have arisen which make it desirable that the direction of the strategic bomber 
forces should revert to the Chief of the Air Staff acting as agent for the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff.“69   Eisenhower, however, appeared in no particular hurry to vary 
the control arrangements.  Late in August, in a signal to the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff, he had insisted that there would be no change in the current system of air 
control.  Despite his possible opposition, on 16 September 1944, as detailed in the 
Overlord chapter, the status quo ante was restored, Portal and the Air Staff 
resuming direct control of Bomber Command.   
The reversion of authority may have appeared simple but in reality there 
were problems, also considered earlier in Chapter Six. The decision was taken 
primarily because Eisenhower had moved his Headquarters to France and 
therefore close co-operation with the Air Staff was difficult.  Although the 
Americans, perhaps not surprisingly, had not sought changes, the decision was in 
accordance with the desires of both the Air Staff and Churchill himself.  A feeling 
had developed, certainly in the JIC and the Directorate of Bomber Operations, that 
for too long the designated bombing priorities were being ignored by Harris.   
On 25 September 1944 Harris and General Spaatz received their new 
Directive.  They were informed that after due allowance had been made for 
weather and tactical possibilities, their first priority target was the German 
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petroleum industry with special emphasis on petrol and associated storage 
facilities.  Second priority was the German rail and waterborne transportation 
systems, tank factories and storage areas, ordnance depots, and finally, motor 
vehicle factories and storage areas.  Their overall mission remained “the 
progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and 
economic systems and the direct support of the land and naval forces.“70    Morale 
as a specific target, which had disappeared after the Directive of 10 June 1943, 
was again not mentioned. 
An examination of the Bomber Command Quarterly Review for the period 
July - September 1944 confirms the Air Staff’s concern that too little of Bomber 
Command’s enormous effort had been concentrated on oil targets.  Army support, 
transportation, ‘V’ weapons, airfields, ports and ships, and sundry other targets 
had taken up no less than sixty-nine per cent of the total bombing effort.  Industrial 
cities, which meant area attacks, had taken up twenty per cent, while oil received 
only eleven per cent.71   
Perhaps it was time that the direction of Bomber Command came more 
under the control of the Air Staff.  Unfortunately, the change of master did not 
necessarily imply that there would be vast changes in the targets attacked.  As 
Harris pointed out in a post-war interview, not even Portal appreciated “the 
difficulties of finding any particular place in the dark and hitting it . . . What you 
should have attacked was a very different thing to what you could attack at any 
particular moment.“72
Bufton, however, was unrelenting in the pressure he applied in an effort to 
increase the bombing of oil targets.  In a note in October 1944, addressed to 
A.S.P.1, he stressed the deteriorating position that Germany was finding herself in 
because of air attacks over the past few months:   
 
Unimpeachable evidence is received daily of the very great effect 
which  the resulting oil shortage is having upon the enemy’s ability 
to conduct military operations . . . . the Strategic Bomber Forces 
could make no greater contribution to the Allied land offensives, not 
only on the Western Front, but equally on the Russian and Italian 
Fronts than by preventing the enemy’s oil production rising above 
its present level or, if possible by reducing it.73    
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He admitted that winter flying conditions would make the tasks facing the bomber 
crews more difficult.  For that reason, he argued, it might be necessary to apply 
the entire visual bombing effort against oil targets.   
Concurrently with the pressures he was applying for an increase in the 
bombing effort against oil, Bufton was also attempting to appease those still calling 
for attacks upon communications.  Tedder, the Deputy Supreme Commander, was 
perhaps, the foremost.  On 30 September 1944 a meeting was held at the Air 
Ministry, chaired by Bufton, to consider the best means of employment for the 
Allied Air Forces for an operation code-named Hurricane.  Colonel Maxwell, one of 
the American participants, explained that it was his belief that Bottomley and 
Spaatz’s call was for an all-out blow against Germany in the immediate future.  
There were two essentials.  It had to be a maximum effort and there was the 
requirement to select a particular target system.  In Maxwell’s opinion that target 
should be oil.74
Group Captain Lucas, from Tedder’s Headquarters in France, disagreed.  
He argued that oil provided a limited number of targets and because of this 
limitation the operation was rendered susceptible to weather.  A better option, he 
suggested, would be rail communications.  By attacking a wider range of targets 
the strength of Allied air power would be displayed to a larger German audience. 
Bufton protested that it was somewhat short of the mark to claim that oil 
only provided a limited number of targets.  There were ninety on the current 
priority list and their wide distribution meant that vagaries in the weather could be 
well covered.  Oil, he claimed, must have overriding priority.  There was only a 
limited amount of visual bombing available, insufficient to permit attacks on both oil 
and transportation systems. 
But Bufton was well aware that widespread attacks on oil did not meet the 
call for a demonstration of Allied air power that had as its main features 
concentration in both space and time.  Only the Ruhr offered this prospect.  He 
proposed that the whole of the Eighth American Air Force, on the first fine day, 
should attack oil targets in the Ruhr.  Bomber Command, at night, would attack 
previously undamaged selected areas in major industrial cities in the Ruhr.  At the 
same time, the Tactical Air Forces would attack rail communications surrounding 
the Ruhr.  The next day, weather permitting, the same programme would be 
repeated.75   It is clear from the minutes of this meeting that Bufton’s plan was one 
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that provided minimum interference with current bombing policy.  After further 
discussion, it was agreed that a plan along Bufton’s lines would be prepared for 
consideration by the Allied Air Staffs. 
A Directive for Hurricane I and Hurricane II was issued to Harris and Spaatz 
on 13 October 1944.  The second plan, an American afterthought, provided for 
precision attacks against a wide range of targets right across Germany.76   In 
modified form, Hurricane I was carried out against Duisburg on 14 October and the 
same city was bombed again the same night.  Essen was attacked on the night of 
23/24 October 1944 and thirty-six hours later received another pounding.  The 
Directive was eventually cancelled on 19 January 1945.77   By this date it had 
become apparent to the Air Staff that the continued concentration on Ruhr targets, 
where enormous damage had already been created, was not going to reduce the 
increasing threat posed by the Luftwaffe fighter force and particularly its jet 
production, training, and operational facilities. 
On 25 October 1944 Tedder, having viewed a German document detailing 
the success of Allied bombing of German communications, issued a paper giving 
his opinion as to how air power should be used to bring the war to an early end.  
The primary target, he insisted, should be the German road, water, and rail 
communications.  Oil, he attested, was the key to road and air communications 
and thus his selected target systems were interlocked and interrelated.  He called 
for a concentration on targets in the Ruhr and claimed that  
 
a coordinated campaign against the communications system of 
WESTERN GERMANY such as I have outlined would rapidly produce 
a state of chaos which would vitally affect not only the immediate 
battle on the West Wall, but also the whole German war effort.78
 
During October 1944, with winter approaching, concern was being 
expressed in several quarters that German oil production might well increase 
because weather conditions could prevent damaging bombing attacks.  At the 
Chiefs of Staff meeting on 17 October 1944 a report from the Joint Intelligence 
Sub-Committee was considered which stated that there “was further 
unimpeachable evidence of the enemy’s critical oil situation.“79   The question was, 
with the likelihood of deteriorating weather as winter approached, whether oil 
production could be kept down to the twenty-five per cent of the pre-attack level 
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that had been achieved during the preceding September.  One main hope was 
that increasing losses of German-held, oil-bearing territory, in conjunction with the 
declaration of war by Romania on Germany, her former ally, on 23 August 1944, 
could well counterbalance any improvement in local production due to reduced 
bombing.  The main need was to concentrate the oil offensive on the Ruhr area 
which had become the “most important oil producing area available to the 
enemy.“80   On 18 October 1944 the CSTC, under the chairmanship of Bufton, 
held its first meeting.  Bufton seized the opportunity to warn the members that, on 
the evidence available, there was a “danger of falling behind in the essential task 
of restricting the enemy’s oil supplies for October to the September level.”81  
On 30 October, Morley, now working in SHAEF, reminded Tedder that the 
Ruhr, with forty per cent of the synthetic oil resources available to Germany, 
remained the critical area.  In the past, he noted, all too often, the respective 
Bomber Commands have done  “no more than pay only partial heed to the agreed 
aim under cover of ‘operational limitations.’“82   
With a darkening cloud about to develop over the Portal/Harris relationship 
it is time to take stock of the force available to AOC-in-C Bomber Command at the   
end of October 1944.  Very considerable expansion had now taken place and, 
although the improved performance MkIII Halifaxes continued in the front line, 
Lancasters dominated among the heavy bomber squadrons.  During October, 
November and December 1944 no less than eleven additional Lancaster 
squadrons were added to Bomber Command’s front line strength. Moreover, the 
Path Finder Force was now a finely tuned weapon despite Harris’s efforts at its 
emasculation by the removal of two Lancaster and one Mosquito squadron in April 
1944, ostensibly on temporary loan to No 5 Group under Cochrane.  In addition, 
following the establishment of Oboe and G-H stations on the continent, the 
effective precision range of the bomber force had been significantly increased.  
Many small targets previously beyond Oboe and G-H range could now be 
accurately attacked rather than being treated as area targets.  Harris, 
unfortunately, obsessed with his vision of the destruction of German cities, and 
apparently unwilling or unable to accept the accurate bombing which his crews 
were now capable of, appeared largely to continue to believe that area bombing 
provided the path to victory.  He was wrong. 
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By late 1944 all of Germany was under threat from the Combined Bomber 
Offensive.  The Path Finder Force (PFF) employed several target marking 
systems largely dependent on the weather conditions forecast for the target.  
Newhaven ground marking meant that the target was located by H2S equipped 
Blind Illuminator crews who, six minutes before the attack was due to start, 
illuminated the target area with sticks of flares.  Visual Marker crews, by the light of 
these flares, then selected the precise aiming point and marked it with salvoes of 
target indicators (TIs) for the benefit of Main Force crews.    
Parramatta, or blind ground marking using H2S, was employed when 
conditions were expected to be unsuitable for visual marking, but when it was 
believed that the ground markers would be visible. Normally this system was only 
employed against large targets such as Berlin.  The Backers-up crews then had to 
assess the mean point of impact (MPI) of the red TIs released by the Primary Blind 
Markers, and mark that point with green TIs for the Main Force.  Should Oboe be 
employed in either Newhaven or Parramatta attacks then the prefix “Musical” was 
added to the name of the attack.  In Musical attacks a Master Bomber and a 
Deputy were employed to assess the accuracy of the markers, define the aiming 
point, remark the target if necessary, and control the raid.   
The final, rather inaccurate PFF method was called Wanganui sky marking, 
employed when cloud obscured the target.  Sky marker flares were released by 
PFF aircraft, normally using H2S, and they burned red with green stars or green 
with red stars.  Main Force aircraft flying on the heading given at briefing, aimed to 
hit the centre of the flares ─ the theory being that provided the bombing aircraft 
was on the precise heading, with zero wind on the bomb sight, that the flares had 
been accurately placed, then the bombs would strike the target. 
On 1 November 1944, in a letter to Harris, Bottomley advised him that “the 
maximum effort is to be made to maintain and, if possible, intensify pressure on“83  
the enemy petroleum industry and Germany’s oil supplies.  An enclosure with this 
letter, Directive Number 2, was issued to the Strategic Air Forces in Europe.  The 
German petroleum industry was accorded first priority and communications, 
especially those in the Ruhr, second.84
Responding to Bottomley the same day, Harris fired the first of his 
broadsides in what was to become an increasingly bitter paper war with his 
superior, Portal.  It appears that two events triggered his reaction: he had been 
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upset by Tedder’s paper and he also resented Portal’s enquiry as to why he had 
seen fit to launch an area attack on Cologne on the night of 31 October/1 
November.  He dealt at length with Tedder’s paper.  He rejected any suggestion 
that the war had not been shortened by Bomber Command’s area attacks.  
Furthermore, he argued, had there not been so many diversions it would have 
been even more shortened.  He admitted the need to compromise over the 
question of how best to assist the armies and at the same time continue an 
effective bombing programme.  But, Harris insisted, the targets suggested by 
Tedder were the very targets his bombers were already attacking.  
The major difficulty in building up the bombing offensive into a cohesive 
pattern, Harris complained,  
 
is the number of cooks now engaged in stirring the broth.  During 
the last few weeks every panacea monger and ‘me too expert’ to 
many of whom we had already (we hoped) given the quietus in the 
past, has raised his head  again.  The Tirpitz has got within range 
and the Admiralty has resuscitated a U-boat threat.  The ball-
bearing experts have again become vocal . . . and even the nearly 
defunct S.O.E. has raised its bloody head and produced what I 
hope is now its final death rattle ─ ‘BRADDOCK’.“85
 
With regard to Cologne, Harris provided eight reasons for yet another area attack.  
He then reminded Portal that in the previous eighteen months Bomber Command 
had virtually devastated forty-five of the sixty major German cities.  Why, he 
questioned, should the task be left incomplete?  He also provided a list of ten 
cities, including Dresden, yet to be destroyed.  Furthermore, he concluded, the 
destruction of Berlin and Hanover still remained to be completed.  
Bufton was asked by Portal to comment on Harris’s reasons for attacking 
Cologne rather than oil targets in the Ruhr and he provided the ammunition for 
Portal’s somewhat placatory reply.  All he required, Portal pointed out, was one 
good reason for the recent heavy attacks on Cologne.  When eight were provided, 
considerable doubts were raised that all were equally good.  Harris’s claims 
regarding weather were rejected by Portal and, in his opinion, Gelsenkirchen, at 
an equivalent distance and in the same approximate area, would have been a 
better choice.  Gelsenkirchen would have been selected, suggested Portal, “if the 
greater importance of the Ruhr and its oil had been fully recognised.“86
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When he came to complete his reply to Harris’s letter, Portal had even more 
ammunition.  Overnight Harris had launched 749 aircraft, in clear weather, against 
Bochum, yet another non-oil target.  Why, questioned Portal, was Bochum chosen 
and not Gelsenkirchen?  The latter had a large relatively undamaged built-up area 
and two high priority oil targets.  Portal insisted that he did not want to give the 
impression that he was either interfering or criticising but, at the risk of being 
dubbed, “another panacea merchant,“87 there were several questions to which he 
required answers.  He admitted that it was not an easy letter to write but his belief 
that the offensive against oil gave the best prospects for victory in the short term, 
required that Harris was aware of what was at stake.  “Having risked your wrath 
already” he continued, 
 
and in pursuance of my strong desire that we should understand 
each other may I ask you to let me know why you think I am wrong 
on this particular point.  It may be of course be that you are relying 
on G.H.88  by day for the destruction of oil and that you intend to 
concentrate on area attacks by night even in clear weather.  If you 
tell me this is so it will enable me to follow your operations much  
more intelligently though I do not say now that I should agree with 
the policy without further study . . . . I feel that the whole war 
situation is poised on ‘oil’ as on a knife edge and that by a real 
concentration of effort at this time we might push it over on the right 
side.89
 
Harris responded immediately. In a three page letter he claimed that he fully 
appreciated both the urgency and the effectiveness of the oil plan.  His constant 
endeavour, he protested, was to obtain the best results possible from every sortie.  
However, he continued, 
 
oil targets are small and usually outlying . . .  we have always 
regarded it as virtually fruitless to attempt to attack them unless one 
can get a visual by day or a visual on ground markers laid by Oboe 
or G.H. at night.90  
 
Oil is my preferred target, he averred, but only when conditions in the Ruhr offer 
good prospects for a successful attack.   
He admitted that he was unaware of all the intelligence sources used by the 
Target Committee regarding Germany’s oil production, but questioned the very 
precise production percentages provided.  His expressed hope was that the 
 304
figures were correct and that the results would justify the losses experienced in 
attacks that “may prove to have been more frequent than necessary to fulfil the 
required purpose.“91
Harris pleaded that weather conditions were the reason for not having 
attacked Gelsenkirchen.  It was a difficult target to locate, he pointed out, and in 
problematic cloud and visibility conditions offered few prospects of success.  
Recent photographs of the oil plants in the city, he continued, showed no signs 
that they were again in operation.  His understanding of the Directive was that oil 
plants were to be put out of commission and kept unserviceable but not 
necessarily totally destroyed.  He warned:  
 
 If in fact the intention is now to go on flogging them even while they 
are temporarily dead horses until they are utterly destroyed, that 
puts a different complexion on the matter and opens up a vista of 
additional losses and loss of effort in every direction which I 
seriously doubt whether we can stand in the light of the reductions 
now taking place in the training output on the one hand, and the 
tremendous calls for increased bombing effort on the other.92  
 
The suggestion by Portal that the vital importance of the oil war had been 
misunderstood, was rejected by Harris.  His Operations Room staff, Harris pointed 
out, had standing orders that any oil plants in the Ruhr that showed signs of 
resuming production were to be immediately brought to his notice.  He then sought 
clarification.  Were oil targets to be obliterated, and thereby increase bomber 
losses and required effort, or were they simply to have their productive capacity 
brought to a standstill, and kept in that state?  
On receipt of this latest letter from Harris, Bufton was again brought into the 
discussion.  Portal requested him to comment on the correspondence recently 
received from Harris concerning the bomber offensive.  Bufton’s examination was 
thorough: his comments ran to over three pages.  His first criticism was Harris’s 
statement that he aimed to achieve “the best overall effect out of available 
sorties.”93   In Bufton’s opinion his aim should surely have been to “get the best 
effect on oil.“94
Bufton admitted that non-oil targets might at times offer better prospects for 
success, but he considered it essential to strike a balance. Where that balance 
was struck depended upon where Harris placed oil in his order of priority. Area 
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attacks on German cities, as discussed in Harris’s letter of 1 November, appeared, 
Bufton claimed, to hold a “magnetic attraction“95  for the bomber leader.  It was this 
attraction, argued Bufton, that may have been more influential in Harris’s target 
selection than the weather and tactical difficulties that he had offered as excuses.   
The techniques for bombing oil required development, was Bufton’s argument, but 
he did not believe that development would be achieved by concentrating on area 
targets. 
As far as the figures for German oil production were concerned, Bufton was 
only able to say that no pains had been spared in order to make them as accurate 
as was humanly possible.  Many agencies, he confirmed, had contributed.  Bufton 
totally rejected the suggestion made by Harris that there might well have been 
more oil attacks than were necessary.  In my opinion, he attested, “our attacks at 
present are less frequent than necessary to fulfil the required purpose.“96
Bufton also rejected the claim made by Harris that Gelsenkirchen was a 
difficult target to locate.  Crew reports following the daylight attack on 6 November 
indicated that it had been successful.  Additionally, there were no valid reasons 
why Oboe attacks on Gelsenkirchen should be any less successful than those on 
Essen or Dortmund.  Bufton also contradicted Harris’s claim that photographs of 
the oil facilities at Gelsenkirchen, taken on 28 October, showed no signs of 
industrial activity.  On the contrary, Bufton continued, 
 
Assessment of cover taken on 28th October showed resumption of 
production to be imminent at Nordstern.  At Scholven repairs had 
been making rapid progress and the plant was expected to start up 
in one or two weeks.97
 
An attempt was also made by Bufton to clear up the doubts that Harris 
entertained as to the main aim of the attacks on oil.   Harris had asked whether the 
bombers were to obliterate the targets or simply stop production.  Production, 
Bufton believed, had to be kept at the lowest practicable level.  During the summer 
it had been possible to obtain photographic intelligence and carry out attacks 
virtually at will.  Output was thus limited by comparatively small attacks against a 
wide range of targets. These attacks forced the Germans to improve their repair 
organisation and this had enabled the facilities to return quickly to production.  If 
attacks continued at the same weight, then, in order to keep production down, it 
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was essential that they be made more frequently.  With winter weather providing 
worse flying conditions, photographic evidence was not always readily available to 
determine when particular targets required attention. Neither waiting for 
photographic evidence, nor missing the opportunity for an attack, was acceptable, 
Bufton affirmed.  “We should aim ‘at complete destruction‘ with the hope of 
preventing production for two to three months.“98
Bufton then drafted a reply to Harris for Portal’s consideration.99   Indicative 
of the understanding that had been reached between Portal and Bufton is the fact 
that the draft was accepted by Portal with only the most minor of alterations.  
When it is appreciated that the letter was over four pages in length the degree of 
commonality between them is remarkable.  Portal made no changes of fact, 
opinion, or suggestions, in his reply.  Only in seven places did he see fit to alter 
Bufton’s wording and even then the alterations were purely cosmetic.  He did, 
however, add one extra sentence, not drafted by Bufton, a placatory message: 
“With best wishes for your continued success.”100  
The Portal/Bufton response to Harris was dated 12 November 1944.  Portal 
made clear that he accepted the enormous difficulties that Harris faced in 
determining the target to be attacked, and confirmed that the final decision rested 
with Harris.  Portal, however, was at pains to point out that he felt it to be his 
concern, and his duty, to ensure that Bomber Command lost no opportunity for 
attacking priority targets specified in the current Directive.  He sought Harris’s 
assurance that the apparent magnetic attraction of German cities was not 
deflecting him from the designated priority targets. 
Portal rejected the claim made by Harris that extended operations in the 
Ruhr would result in enormous increases in Bomber Command’s loss rates.  He 
used Bufton’s figures.  With Allied forces now established on the Continent, it 
meant that much of the extensive early warning systems that Germany had 
possessed had been lost.  Now, enjoined Portal, is the time to strike at oil facilities 
in the Ruhr,  
 
before the enemy can resolve his early warning difficulties.  It will be 
time enough to change when heavy casualties do in fact 
materialise.  We should if we can secure the maximum impact on 
the Ruhr itself, and the quickest direct and indirect effect upon the 
Ruhr oil.101  
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On the following day, 13 November 1944, Bottomley also wrote to Harris. 
His letter covered very similar ground to Portal’s letter and called for the winter 
bombing programme against oil targets to be stepped up.  Attacks were to be 
repeated against oil targets as the opportunity offered, regardless of whether or 
not the degree of damage from an earlier raid had been assessed.  Bottomley 
extended the range of oil targets to be considered because he introduced Leuna, 
Pölitz, and the refineries at Harburg, into the bombing equation.102
Concern was also expressed in November by the Joint Intelligence Sub-
Committee responsible for oil, at the lack of photographic evidence of actual 
damage created at the oil targets attacked.  Too many unknown factors were 
having to be used in their calculations.  Despite this, their summation was that the 
operations of the German Army and the Luftwaffe were both being limited by oil 
shortages.  Although this assessment was extremely satisfactory, the paper 
continued, the current crisis in German oil supplies was entirely due to the 
bombing successes gained in the summer and early autumn.  They estimated that 
by September 1944 German oil supplies had fallen to 23·5 per cent of the pre-
attack level.  They expected that production would have been stepped up during 
October and November but were hoping that recent blind bombing had gained 
some successes.  The success of the attacks on enemy oil as a decisive war 
operation, they insisted, still hung in the balance.  They also sounded a warning:  
“Nothing less than the maximum possible effort of the Allied bomber forces is likely 
to prove adequate to the task in the difficult conditions of winter.”103
For once, Harris made no immediate response to either the Portal or the 
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee communications.  When he finally replied, on 24 
November 1944, rather than provide explanations, he went off at a tangent.    His 
opening paragraph related to the strength and disposition of the German night 
fighter forces.  Careful attention to tactics and radio counter measures, he claimed, 
had been the only means by which losses had been kept within bearable limits.  
Harris then came to the nub of the matter.  Losses could only be kept within 
sustainable limits, he believed, provided Bomber Command was not required to 
concentrate on one particular area of Germany or on “a narrow range of 
specialised targets.“104
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According to Harris, an acceptable casualty rate would be of the order of 
three to four per cent.  Within that range, during 1942 and 1943, aircrew had a 
twenty-five per cent chance of surviving their first operational tour but only an 
infinitesimal chance of completing a second.  During these years Bomber 
Command was the only military arm able to strike directly at Germany and 
therefore losses had to be endured.  It was Harris’s argument, in late 1944, that it 
was unreasonable to expect crews to continue to face such daunting odds, odds 
that were higher than other Commands within the Royal Air Force, and higher than 
those faced by the other Services.105
Harris also argued that the Directive under which he was operating was too 
restrictive.  He made a special plea to be allowed to retain a certain freedom of 
action.  To keep German fighter controllers in doubt required that two or three 
different targets had to be identified as being at risk.   If only one area or one 
target was the focus, heavy losses could be anticipated.  He then made the 
astounding claim that  
 
human nature being what it is, crews get bored by continually 
attacking one area and it is hard to maintain that extra bit of 
keenness and enthusiasm which may make the difference between 
a mediocre and a first-class attack.106   
 
 With unseen and violent death a constant companion during every moment while 
over Germany, it is hard to imagine any bomber crew member ever becoming 
bored. 
Although no written evidence has been located to confirm that Bufton was 
asked to comment on this letter from Harris, the fact that he prepared the draft 
response is sufficient to show that he remained totally involved.  His draft was just 
over four pages long, and once again the changes made by Portal were minimal, 
and purely verbal. The import of the Bufton/Portal response was that concentration 
of the bombing attack was essential and in the short term the targets were oil and 
communications.  Harris was reminded that the German loss of their early warning 
system together with the electronic counter measures supplied by No 100 Group, 
should mean that bomber losses remained within sustainable limits. Portal added 
a hand- written end comment to Bufton’s draft: “Agree as slightly amended.”107
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Portal’s virtual total acceptance of Bufton’s draft confirms that, at least by 
late 1944, both had adopted pragmatic attitudes with regard to possible casualties.  
Bufton’s draft noted Harris’s expressed concern at the possibility of loss rates 
rising to the levels experienced in the 1942-1943 period, but his response was 
unequivocal.  Acceptable loss rates, at any time, he argued, must 
 
depend upon the general situation existing at that time.  If we 
assume that the war is likely to continue only for another few 
months, and if, by concentrating our effort where it hurts the enemy 
most at relatively high cost rather than attacking important targets 
at lower cost, we can help to shorten it, then I think we should if 
necessary be prepared to sustain a loss rate of 3% to 4%.  We 
could not I think turn aside from an opportunity merely on the 
grounds that it might involve casualties higher than those normally 
accepted by other Commands. . . our readiness to accept 
casualties must be determined only by the value of the strategic 
prize to be gained.108 
 
Harris’s response, slightly sarcastic in tone, was dated 12 December 1944.  
He advised Portal that his Operational Research Section (ORS) had concluded 
their own feasibility study of the oil plan, and had calculated the effort required to 
satisfactorily complete the task in Western Europe.  He reminded Portal of their 
accuracy on previous occasions.  They had pointed out, he insisted, “ that it would 
take three times the effort estimated by the ‘expert’, Mr Solly Zuckerman, to knock 
out the French marshalling yards and that was precisely what happened.“109   My 
ORS, continued Harris, has estimated that it will require approximately 9,000 
sorties per month to knock out the forty-two synthetic oil and benzol plants, crude 
refineries, and finishing plants in the west of Germany.  Weather was the primary 
limiting factor and, because many of the plants were small, there was little 
prospect of success should cloud exceed more than three tenths’ cover.  Only 
Oboe or formation GH attacks on short range targets, offered any chance of 
success. 
Very detailed weather records had been maintained by Bomber Command 
over the preceding five years, Harris observed, and they showed that during 
December, January and February, there would be, on average, only eight days 
and eight nights each month when clear conditions could be expected.  Of these, 
only just over six would be correctly forecast.  There was also the problem of 
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moon conditions.  Approximately one quarter of the clear nights would be 
unsuitable for deep penetrations because the moon would be close to full, and the 
bombers would become easy prey to German night fighters.  Another problem with 
weather was that, although conditions over Germany may have been suitable, 
forecasts for the home bases may have caused operations to be cancelled.  In 
these circumstances it was reluctantly accepted that there would only be three or 
four nights each winter month when the possibility existed for a successful attack 
of an oil target in central Germany.  With regard to day attacks, it was believed that 
they could possibly be made on about six or seven days each month. 
According to Harris, the conclusion reached by his staff was that under 
these conditions the twenty-seven oil targets in Western Germany could receive a 
sufficient weight of attack to keep them out of commission, but would require at 
least 2,600 sorties each month.  Those targets located in central Germany were a 
more difficult proposition.  To keep them out of commission would require the 
assistance of the Eighth Air Force.   
It was the final paragraph of this letter that particularly caught Portal’s 
attention. The MEW had become Harris’s target.  They always overstated their 
case, protested Harris, and no sooner have the identified targets been attacked 
than  
  
more and more sources of supply or other factors unpredicted by 
MEW  have become revealed.  The oil plan has already displayed 
similar symptoms.  The benzol plants were an afterthought.  I am 
quite certain  that there are dozens more benzol plants of which we 
are unaware and when and if we knock them all out I am equally 
certain we shall eventually  be told by MEW that German M.T. is 
continuing to run sufficiently for their purpose on producer gas, 
steam, industrial alcohol, etc., etc.  However we should be content 
if we can deprive them of adequate supplies of aviation  fuel.  
That in itself will take enough doing.110  
 
Once again this letter was referred to Bufton for comment.  His response 
covered nine and a half pages.  His first comment was that he believed that Harris, 
in his closing paragraph just quoted, was attempting to suggest that Bomber 
Command’s attacks on oil targets beyond the Ruhr should be limited to Leuna and 
Pölitz.  If that was the case, Bufton argued, then Harris was clearly endeavouring    
“to throw doubt . . . upon the soundness of the oil plan.”111     
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Bufton then proceeded to examine the letter almost sentence by sentence.  
The ORS figures, the effort required by Bomber Command, and the problems of 
weather, he noted, should be accepted without question.  He reminded Portal that 
it had never been the intention that Bomber Command should attempt to carry out 
the oil plan unaided.  Tactically, and in the effort required, it was beyond their 
present capability. The Eighth Air Force had already made a major contribution to 
the oil programme, and it was expected that their assistance would continue.  That 
being the case, the figures provided by Harris were largely irrelevant.112
Bufton also pointed out that the major proportion of German oil production 
came from a limited number of plants.  The eleven synthetic plants in central 
Germany provided seventy per cent of Germany’s motor and aviation fuel.  Their 
immobilisation would be a major contribution towards bringing an early end to the 
war in Europe.  Bufton also expressed his disappointment that Harris appeared to 
be trying to restrict Bomber Command’s targets beyond the Ruhr to only Leuna 
and Pölitz.   While they each produced 50,000 tons per month, another synthetic 
plant at Brüx, in the Sudetenland, produced 56,000 tons per month.  If Leuna and 
Pölitz could be immobilised, then Bufton believed Bomber Command should direct 
its attention to Brüx – a difficult target, he admitted, for the American Fifteenth Air 
Force.  
It was the final paragraph of Harris’s letter that gave Bufton, as it had Portal, 
most cause for concern.  This, he acknowledged, was simply a continuation of the 
on-going argument that Harris continually raised claiming priority for his area 
bombing programme, rather than the selective attack policy determined by the Air 
Staff.  The fact that earlier selective target system attacks had not always been 
successful, Bufton complained, was not because of the  
 
inaccuracy of the original appreciation, but in the failure of the 
bomber forces to complete the effective attack of the system 
concerned within the time period necessary to outpace the efforts of 
enemy industry to provide alternative capacities.113
 
To reach a decisive position in the case of oil, Bufton continued, required all the 
major producers in the Ruhr, Central and Eastern Germany to be simultaneously 
put out of action.  From the very beginning it was essential that attacks were 
delivered in rapid succession, and thus prevent the development of German 
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countermeasures.  If Harris lacked either enthusiasm, or remained unconvinced of 
the importance of the task, Bufton asserted, the oil plan would fail.  He then turned 
his attention to the particular examples quoted by Harris as panaceas. 
Bufton denied the claim made by Harris that benzol plants had been added 
to the target list as an afterthought.  Their non-inclusion in the early days of the oil 
offensive, Bufton pointed out, was due simply to the fact that they were considered 
less significant producers than synthetic plants and refineries.  Had attacks on 
these latter facilities failed, then the oil plan as a whole would have had to be 
reconsidered.  In those circumstances, the question of benzol plants would not 
have arisen.  Bufton admitted that there were more benzol plants in existence than 
were listed in the current target lists, but claimed that those that had been named 
were considered the largest and therefore provided the best targets. 
Once again the long draft prepared by Bufton was accepted by Portal and 
sent to Harris with only minor changes of phraseology, and one additional 
paragraph.  The addition by Portal was to express his delight that bomber losses 
at Leuna and Pölitz, contrary to Harris’s forebodings, at least in the first attacks, 
had been minimal.  “I fully realise” he continued, 
 
that we may not escape so lightly next time (and this makes one 
regret that, probably for good operational reasons, the attack on 
Pölitz was so relatively weak) but I am convinced that these two 
targets with Brux, are of such overriding importance that losses up 
to 5 or even 10% in successful attacks would be well worth while.114   
 
 
This Portal/Bufton response first took issue with Harris over his apparent 
assumption that the oil offensive was the sole responsibility of Bomber Command.  
By basing both his assumptions and arguments of the effort required in such 
circumstances, Harris was told that he had provided a totally false picture.  The oil 
targets in central Germany were not solely the responsibility of Bomber Command 
and, therefore, the calculations made by Harris as to the force required for their 
destruction were totally misleading.  Harris was reminded that the Eighth Air Force 
would continue to attack oil targets, particularly those in central Germany, at every 
available opportunity. 
Portal then expressed his pleasure at Harris’s claim that Bomber Command 
would be able to deal with the twenty-seven oil targets in West Germany by 
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employing only 2,600 sorties a month.  This, he noted, was less than seventeen 
per cent  of the average number of bombing sorties each month over the 
preceding six months.  As such, it seemed a remarkably small expenditure for a 
potentially very good return, if it meant the virtual destruction of a primary target 
system. 
A further attempt was then made by Portal to convince Harris of the vital 
importance of the oil offensive. The primary task facing the allied strategic bomber 
forces was, he confirmed, “ to put out and keep out of action the 11 synthetic 
plants in Central Germany.“115   Their production, Harris was reminded, provided 
seventy per cent of the total German requirements for aviation and motor fuels.  It 
could mean an early end to the war.  No opportunity over the winter months was to 
be missed.  If the job could be completed over winter, Portal attested,  
 
strategic bombing will go down to history as a decisive factor in 
winning this war.  On the other hand, if by any weakening of 
determination or any reluctance to implement the policy which we 
have laid down our grip on the oil position is relaxed, the vast effort 
we have expended against oil will have been largely fruitless . . . . 
We must therefore press on with our oil  policy, not only because 
we hope to gain immense advantage by it, but because we can ill 
afford now to discard the insurance in all fields which its 
continuation represents.116
 
Portal then proceeded to express his extreme disappointment that Harris 
continued to regard the oil plan as yet another panacea.  While that situation 
pertained, Portal argued, “you will be unable to put your heart into the attack of 
oil.“117   It appeared to Portal that both Leuna and Pölitz had been only reluctantly 
accepted by Harris as targets, and that he was unwilling to consider further oil 
targets in Central Germany.  Portal affirmed that he had been hoping that Harris 
would have been eager to accept any opportunity to attack refineries in Central 
Germany because that would have confirmed Bomber Command’s participation in 
probably the most profitable bombing policy of the war.  He cited the refinery at 
Brüx as an additional target to be considered.  
Criticism of Harris continued in Portal’s next paragraph.  Harris, he 
declared, by his expressed doubts on estimates provided by MEW, implied that he 
had no faith in any bombing programme that called for attacks against a particular 
target system.  To be successful, such attacks had to be concentrated in time, and 
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wide ranging.  Destroying half the factories concerned in any particular target 
complex did not mean that the campaign had been successful.  “If we had tried 
harder in our attacks on ball-bearings” Portal added, “I have little doubt that the full 
effects forecast by the M.E.W. would have been achieved. “118
Perhaps to soften the criticism, Portal then observed that he was pleased 
that Harris had shown a greater press-on spirit with the attacks on oil targets.  But 
he also issued a warning.  Harris was told that if he allowed his  
 
obvious doubts . . . to influence . . . conduct of operations I very 
much fear that the prize may yet slip through our fingers.  
Moreover, it is difficult for me to feel that your staff can be devoting 
its maximum thought and energies to the accomplishments of your 
first priority task if you yourself are not wholeheartedly in support of 
it.119
 
In closing what Portal admitted had been a very frank letter, he reminded 
Harris that because Bomber Command had achieved so much in the oil campaign,  
 
it would be a tragedy if, through any lack of faith or understanding 
on your part, the R.A.F. Bomber Command failed to take the 
greatest possible share in the supreme task of driving home our 
attacks on enemy oil.120
 
Despite the pressures being applied to Harris by Portal, along the lines 
defined by Bufton, the Director of Bomber Operations was clearly not fully satisfied 
that all was being done that should be done in the offensive against German oil 
targets.  This was confirmed, late in December, by a note Bufton addressed to the 
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations), Air Vice-Marshal Williams, who had 
replaced Coryton in August 1944.  Bufton suggested that a possible reason for the 
apparent loss of interest in the oil campaign was the pressure being applied from 
Eisenhower’s Headquarters for an increased effort to be made against German 
communications.  According to Bufton the bombing offensive was at a critical 
phase.  The balance of power of the offensive capability of Bomber Command 
against the defensive qualities of the Luftwaffe fighter force was delicately poised.  
Although the German fighter force numbered 2,000 aircraft, the number able to be 
deployed at any particular time was limited by the shortage of oil.  However, he 
continued, by spring there could be “2,500 fighters which may well play a fully 
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active part in opposing our operations if the oil campaign is not pushed home with 
unfaltering determination.“121
Bufton included an addendum in his note to Williams, emphasising the 
importance of Pölitz as a target, and criticising the fact that the previous night a 
force of only 207 Lancasters and one Mosquito had been sent to such a vital 
target.  Harris himself had claimed, in his letter of 12 December 1944, that 350 
aircraft would be required for the night attack of oil targets.  “It is now nearly two 
months” Bufton observed,  
 
since Bomber Command was asked to give special consideration  
to the attack of Leuna and Pölitz.  This period has, we believe, been 
used to considerable advantage by the enemy as far as Politz is 
concerned. It would have improved our position considerably if it 
had been attacked earlier.122
 
Two days later Bufton addressed another note to Bottomley and Williams 
on the same subject.  He provided several reasons for what he viewed as a falling 
off of interest in the oil offensive.  Heading the list was Harris’s letter of 12 
December  expressing  doubts as to the soundness of the oil policy.  The Evening 
Standard of 21 December had also raised the same point.  Next, the Americans 
had produced a plan called Clarion that aimed at disrupting German 
communications and morale by a widespread bombing campaign.  If it was 
accepted, Bufton warned, it would be at the expense of the oil offensive.  There 
had also been a number of demands from SHAEF for communication attacks in 
the Leipzig area to be increased.  The same source was also applying pressure for 
an over-riding priority to be accorded to direct support operations.  Frequently, he 
noted, they related to some form of communications.  Finally, Bufton claimed that 
in the view of the CSTC, the Weekly Intelligence Summaries issued by SHAEF 
were misleading.  They tended to concentrate on the favourable effects produced 
by attacks on railways in particular, but ignored those that had been less 
successful.   In conclusion, Bufton declared:  
 
I am afraid that while oil may nominally remain first priority it may in 
fact take second or third priority as a result of the Deputy Supreme 
Commander’s enthusiasm for communications, his now close 
association  with General Spaatz, who I believe has always been 
inclined to favour a  communications policy, the power which the 
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Deputy Supreme Commander has of diverting the effort to direct 
support on an over-riding  priority when he considers this to be 
necessary, and finally a tendency  which has already shown 
itself, to attempt to combat the G.A.F. by attacks  on airfields 
rather than by limiting  its  supplies  of  fuel  (fighter  production  is 
probably now invulnerable to systematic attack).123
 
The next barrage in the war of words, four packed pages, was delivered by 
Harris just after Christmas. His tone was increasingly belligerent.  As had become 
normal in the oil controversy, Bufton was given this letter, and his comments 
requested.  He annotated Harris’s letter at length.  Next, he prepared a 
comprehensive memorandum for Portal covering both the main arguments and 
some isolated points raised by Harris that Bufton considered required a response. 
Despite Harris’s claim that he was pursuing the oil plan to the best of his 
ability, it was Bufton’s belief that he was a non-believer in its efficacy.  This fact 
was borne out clearly in this latest letter from Harris.  “I am afraid” Harris affirmed, 
“that nothing will disillusion me of the view that the oil plan is . . . another 
panacea.”124   A later comment was that although he was doing his “utmost to 
push this plan to the conclusion sought . . . the basis of the plan is wrong in light of 
all the factors involved, and its pursuance is, and will prove to be, chimerical.“125   
In another paragraph he admitted that he did “not believe we shall achieve our 
object in the oil plan.“126  
Notwithstanding his expressed opposition to the oil plan, Harris attempted 
to convince Portal that he was wrong to suggest that because he held this view, he 
would be unable to concentrate on the oil offensive programme.  Harris admitted 
that he left no stone unturned to put his contrary views across, but claimed that 
once the decision was made he “carried it out to the utmost and to the best of my 
ability.“127   Harris expressed regret that Portal should have doubted him, but then 
reminded the CAS that he would be surprised if he had any examples to support 
his case.  Harris argued that he “could certainly quote precedents in the opposite 
sense.“128  A riposte, available to but unused by Portal, would have been to remind 
Harris of first, his procrastination over the Path Finder Force, and later, its partial 
emasculation in April 1944, at a time when the force should have been expanding.  
In a later paragraph, Harris acknowledged that he regretted that Portal 
believed the Bomber Command staff were not devoting their maximum thought 
and energy to the oil plan because of the views held by their Commander-in-Chief.  
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“I do not give my staff views” thundered Harris.  “I give them orders.  They do and 
have always done exactly what I tell them.“129   In a hand-written comment beside 
this paragraph Bufton noted: “This is rot. Of course they must know his views. 
Surely he does not pretend to run the whole bomber offensive single-handed!”130
Bufton in this instance was correct in assuming that Harris’s staff well knew 
his views but he was wrong to believe that they were significantly involved in 
running the war.  Harris ran the Bomber Command Headquarters’ side of the war 
very much single-handed and his staff were alert to the fact that attempts to 
interfere would produce dire consequences.   To retain a position in Bomber 
Command headquarters very clearly demanded that one toe the party line.131   
In his twelve page report to Portal, Bufton was slightly more diplomatic than 
his hand written comments had been.  He did admit that Bomber Command had 
done well in some of the attacks that had been carried out.  But these results, 
Bufton argued, may have been sufficient to convince Harris that he was doing his 
utmost to pursue the oil offensive.  However, knowing Harris’s views, Bufton was 
unable to accept that Harris could ever appear enthusiastic about the offensive, 
and his attitudes would have been readily identified by his staff.  Motivation was 
never enough if it was purely a matter of obedience to orders, Bufton observed.  
He concluded, total satisfaction regarding the oil offensive will only be achieved 
when we are completely satisfied that “the C-in-C and his staff are united in 
enthusiasm for it.“132  
The MEW had also come in for very strong criticism in Harris’s letter.  He 
had written that he had “no faith in the M.E.W. because of their past record (their 
amateurish ignorance, irresponsibility and mendacity.)“133   These accusations  
were partially deflected by Bufton, who pointed out the apparent confusion in 
Harris’s mind over the part played by the Ministry in the matter of target selection 
and bombing policy.  They had been involved in the calls for attacks of the ball 
bearing industry but were not the final arbiters.  As far as oil was concerned, the oil 
industry itself continually insisted on the benefits to be gained from attacks on oil 
facilities.  Bufton detailed the various authorities that had been involved over the 
years, and the wide-ranging advice received before the importance of oil as a 
target was fully accepted.   
The main thrust of this letter from Harris to Portal concerned the on-going 
argument relating to the validity of the oil target policy, its practicability, and 
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Harris’s determination that area attack was the only war-winning policy.  With 
regard to the first point, Bufton claimed that the soundness of the policy was 
confirmed by the German reactions to the bombing campaign supported by an 
unceasing flow of confirmatory intelligence.  Defences had also been vastly 
increased, and specialised repair teams had been made immediately available to 
attempt to rectify damage in order that some production would be achieved before 
the plants were again attacked.   
With regard to area attacks, Harris had asserted in another letter that  
 
All Germany openly bemoans it as their worst trial.  We know that 
on more than one occasion they have nearly collapsed under it.  As 
the programme nears completion we chuck it all up – for a 
panacea.134  
 
Bufton agreed that area attacks had been of some value.  Morale had been 
weakened, and additional strains had been placed on the German work force.  
However, the effects were long term, and with Hamburg as an example, even in 
the most heavily hit cities, recovery was still possible.  In Hamburg’s case, 
production was largely restored to its previous level within about four months of 
the fire storms of July 1943.  Bufton, in a hand-written comment on Harris’s letter, 
noted that the first two sentences quoted above, were pronouncements that 
originated from the MEW.   Harris, despite his antagonism to that organisation, 
readily accepted them because they favoured his own policy.  
The Portal response to Harris, yet again in words largely provided by 
Bufton, was extremely blunt.  The intent was to convince Harris of the soundness 
of the oil plan.  Despite Harris’s assertions to the contrary, Portal maintained that 
he believed that the oil attacks would have been pressed home “more certainly if 
they were backed not solely by your loyalty but by your sense of enthusiasm as 
well.“135   Harris was then taken to task for his interpretation of the part played by 
the MEW in target determination.  He was advised that any proposal that could 
involve a change in bombing policy was rigorously examined by the Royal Air 
Force and American Air and Intelligence staffs as well as British and American 
technical experts.  Harris was also informed that his savage berating of the MEW 
“was an unworthy and inexcusable travesty of our conduct of the war to suggest 
that our policy is determined on that basis. “136
 319
Portal did concede that area bombing over an extended period, provided it 
was of sufficient weight, might conceivably have forced German capitulation.  It 
was Portal’s belief, however, that German counter measures would have 
prevented area bombing from being carried out to any decisive conclusion.  In 
order to maintain the offensive, Portal stressed, it was essential to adopt precision 
attack methods and oil, in this situation, provided the most worthwhile target 
system.  This eight page letter from Portal concluded with an exhortation: 
 
The energy, resources and determination displayed by the enemy 
in his efforts to maintain his oil production must be more than 
matched by your determination to destroy it: and your determination 
matters more than that of all of us put together!137
 
Between Harris’s letter of 28 December 1944 and the Bufton-inspired 
response by Portal on 8 January 1945, there was a further letter from Harris on 29 
December 1944.  The first part of this letter related to the question of the oil target 
at Brüx.  Harris had agreed that he regarded it as a feasible proposition and was 
adding it to his list of oil targets.  He pointed out that because it had been bombed 
twice in December, it would be placed last on the list of nine major oil plants on the 
priority list. 
The second part of Harris’s letter concerned discussions that he had had 
with Bottomley concerning requests from Eisenhower’s Headquarters for attacks 
on transportation targets.  These, Harris pointed out, had been requested by 
SHAEF as cover for urgent Army support: few of which had anything to do with the 
Army situation.  They are, he complained, “a poorly disguised prosecution of the 
Zuckerman transport plan.“138   The frequency with which such calls are being 
made, Harris continued, means that that day’s work has to be centred on them.  
SHAEF, he concluded,  
 
are inclined to look around for things for us to do, rather than, as 
they should do, call upon us only in the last resort to do essential 
attacks which they cannot do within their own resources.  I think 
that you should take this matter up with Tedder, and impress upon 
SHAEF that we are not looking for work. 139  
 
Portal’s response to this letter was again an almost exact copy of the draft 
supplied by Bufton.140   Changes made were again only of the most minor order; 
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they were restricted to sentence construction and not to matters of either fact or 
suggestion.  Portal expressed his pleasure that Brüx had been added to the target 
list, and agreed that the requests for attacks on transportation targets mentioned 
by Harris were a matter of concern.  Bottomley, Portal explained, had already 
discussed the matter with Tedder, and had been assured that all requested 
transportation attacks had been essential for the support of critical land operations.  
Portal acknowledged that it was a matter that required close and constant 
attention. 
Early in January 1945 the Joint Intelligence Committee produced a further 
analysis of the effects of Allied attacks on the enemy oil situation.  The Combined 
Chiefs of Staff had taken note and were agreed that the aim should now be “not 
merely at reducing production to the September level . . . but at reducing it to a 
very much lower figure by keeping out of action simultaneously all major producers 
. . . in January.“141   The Combined Chiefs of Staff identified it as a task well within 
the capacity of the Allied bomber forces but they added a proviso.  The job had to 
be undertaken with the “energy and enthusiasm displayed by the enemy in 
repairing his plants.“142
On 15 January 1945 Directive No. 3 was issued to the Strategic Air Forces 
in Europe.  The petroleum industry remained as first priority followed by the 
German lines of communication and then tank factories.  Harris was provided for 
because the Directive also noted that if weather conditions prevented attacks on 
the priority targets, blind bombing techniques could be employed against important 
industrial areas.  German jet aircraft had also become of concern.  Although they 
had not been included in the priority list, the Luftwaffe and “primarily its jet 
production, training and operational establishments, now become primary 
objectives for attack.“143   In addition, direct army support, the enemy U-boat 
organisation, and Special Operations Executive tasks, all remained as targets. 
Portal waited ten days for Harris to reply to his letter of 8 January 1945.  
When it finally arrived it could not have been received with any degree of 
enthusiasm by anyone in the Air Staff.  Harris had closed his previous letter 
reminding Portal that he felt very strongly about his position in the bomber war and 
the protracted arguments relating to area versus precision attacks.  On this latest 
occasion Harris boiled over.  He offered his resignation. 
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Firstly, he attacked Portal for having suggested that he had failed to discuss 
matters of policy with his staff and was attempting to run the bomber war single 
handed.  On matters of policy, Harris reiterated that his staff received orders.  
They were not invited to discuss such affairs.  Tactical matters were handled 
differently.  According to Harris, frequent discussions took place, opinions were 
invited, and there was a wide exchange of views.  He expressed surprise at 
Portal’s criticism because he had noted no inclination on Portal’s part,  
 
or anywhere else in the Air Ministry for that matter, to discuss with  
me, or even to consult me beforehand upon such matters as the 
strategic policy applicable to my force, or to take me into confidence 
or consultation thereafter.144
 
Next in his letter, Harris attacked Portal for having abandoned regular 
Commanders-in-Chief meetings.  He claimed it was not his fault that they were not 
in more regular contact.  He pointed out that when Bomber Command was placed 
under Eisenhower he had made daily visits to Eisenhower’s Headquarters to 
obtain situation reports.  After SHAEF moved to France the visits, weather 
permitting, continued on at least a weekly basis.  
Harris then resumed his attack on policies that had called for Bomber 
Command to be diverted to targets that he regarded as panaceas.  The term, he 
professed, was not used contemptuously, but was rather the only fully descriptive 
one available.  Ball bearings, molybdenum, locomotives, and the Möhne and Eder 
Dams were all campaigns and attacks that achieved nothing.  In the case of the 
dams raid, it provided only an unequalled display of gallantry and skill both in flying 
and technical ingenuity, but it incurred insupportable losses.  Strategic targets 
falling within the category Harris labelled as panaceas, were those where it was 
believed vital bottlenecks had been identified.  If success was to be obtained on 
these targets, their destruction had to be swift and complete.  With regard to 
German fuel requirements, Harris argued, they required very little 
 
for the essentials with which to continue the fight defensively.  It is 
those last essentials which I know will be so extremely difficult to 
find, deprive her of, and to keep her deprived of.  It is no good 
knocking out 75% of something if 25% suffices for essentials.145    
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The problem with oil targets, Harris added, was that new ones were 
appearing on bombing lists faster than old ones were being destroyed.  The 
danger arises, he warned, should we abandon area attack, which has created vast 
destruction “in favour of a type of attack which if it fails to achieve its object 
achieves nothing.  Nothing whatever. “146
Harris was by now vigorously riding his favourite hobby horse.  He warmed 
to the task.  The oil plan pursued in 1940, he reminded Portal, was 
 
grotesquely unrelatable to facts or to practical possibilities.  As to 
this second edition, it is another attempt to seek a quick, clever, 
easy and cheap way out.  It will prove to be none of these things . . 
. We pursue a chimera and we will not overtake it.  The oil policy 
will not succeed.  If it fails, the enormous force diverted will achieve 
virtually nothing.  It is for such reasons that I am glad to have no 
share of responsibility for a decision which I am convinced is utterly 
wrong.  Those are my views on oil.147
 
Had Harris been aware of the communication sent by Speer to Hitler on 19 
January 1945 then perhaps his antipathy toward the oil plan would have been 
radically revised.  This communication, fifth in a series on the critical German oil 
position, confirmed the significant and lasting effects that had been created by air 
attacks on the hydrogenation plants and oil refineries.  Speer pointed out that only 
by exhausting the small oil reserves had it been possible to marginally increase 
supplies to the Wehrmacht  during the period October to November 1944.  Further 
attacks in January added to the problems.  Repairs had been made more difficult 
by the destruction of machinery and technical equipment already in short supply.  
Speer identified night bombing as having been more effective that the day raids 
because of greater accuracy and the use of heavier bombs. His summation was 
that even if, during the first quarter of 1945, there were no further  attacks on either 
the repair work or the plants themselves, oil production would not reach the 
theoretical figures forecast in the final quarter of 1944.148 
Unfortunately Harris was not privy to Speer’s correspondence.  He closed 
his letter to Portal on a bitter note.  The latter, he bemoaned, had intimated that 
he, Harris, had been disloyal and had failed to carry out the laid down policies.  
This suggestion was flatly rejected.  He admitted that although he had no faith in 
some of the policies, and had voiced his opposition, once decided, he provided 
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every worth while effort no matter how impracticable he considered the plan to 
have been.  The situation had become one of  
 
heads I lose tails you win, and it is an intolerable situation.  I 
therefore ask you to consider whether it is best for the prosecution 
of the war and the success of our arms, which alone matters, that I 
should remain in this situation. “149
 
No evidence has been found among the Bufton Papers to indicate that he 
was asked to comment on this latest letter from Harris, but the fact that he had 
been intimately involved in the earlier correspondence would make it unusual if    
he had been excluded.  Portal’s reply was dated 20 January 1945.150   He 
expressed his regret that he had failed to convince Harris of the soundness of the 
oil plan.  The Germans were short of oil, he added, and current production 
forecasts fell short of the estimated requirements for even a static defence.  
Furthermore, the Russian advances in south-eastern Europe indicated that there 
could well be difficulties with further supplies from that area.  In spite of the fact 
that only thirteen per cent of Bomber Command’s effort had been directed against 
oil targets during the last four months of 1944, Portal admitted that he was well 
pleased with the results.   
With regard to Harris’s claim to have been ignored in policy discussions, 
Portal acknowledged that he was prepared to accept a more senior representative 
from Bomber Command at the meetings, if that was what Harris required.  What 
he was not prepared to accept, Portal observed, was any objection raised by 
Harris relating to the selection of officers for duties in the Air Ministry.  Although 
neither Bottomley nor Bufton had been specifically criticised, Portal was at pains to 
express his satisfaction as to their devotion to both the interests and successes of 
Bomber Command.  Portal called for any suggestion that Harris may have in order 
that a greater degree of co-operation could be achieved between the Air Ministry 
and Bomber Command.    
A propos panaceas Portal virtually admitted defeat, conceding that the 
argument was not worth pursuing further and that they must agree to differ.   Both 
had reached entrenched positions.  Portal recognised the value of area attacks, 
but noted that for them to be decisive required a more vastly expanded bomber 
force than would be available in the foreseeable future.  On the other hand, oil 
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provided a target system which, if successfully attacked, could mean an early and 
successful conclusion to the war.  In Portal’s opinion, Harris regarded the oil plan 
as having failed because, despite the efforts of his Command, the war still 
continued.  This, Portal made clear, was a false assumption.  The oil plan 
succeeded as soon as German resistance to an Allied offensive on either the 
Eastern or Western Fronts was affected by oil problems.  Despite this guarded call 
for at least a slight expansion of the effort directed against oil, Portal ended this 
paragraph by expressing the hope that there would be enough punch remaining in 
Bomber Command to flatten some of the German cities named by Harris in his 
letter.  One of those named cities had been Dresden.  
In his conclusion, Portal expressed his regret that Harris had felt that he 
was being accused of disloyalty.  Portal assured him that he was mistaken.  His 
loyalty was taken for granted.  To question either Harris’s memory, or his 
interpretation of facts, was not to imply disloyalty.  Portal closed this letter:  
 
I willingly accept your assurance that you will continue to do your 
utmost to ensure the successful execution of the policy laid down.  I 
am very sorry that you do not believe in it but it is no use my 
craving for what is evidently unattainable.  We must wait until after 
the end of the war before we can know for certain who was right 
and I sincerely hope that until then you will continue in command of 
the force which has done so much towards defeating the enemy 
and has brought such credit and renown to yourself and to the Air 
Force.151
  
The reply made by Harris on 24 January 1945, other than admit that he had 
totally misunderstood Portal’s meaning, and that Bomber Command would do its 
utmost to implement the policy determined, did very little to resolve an 
unsatisfactory situation.  It did mean, however, that Portal was not forced to seek a 
replacement for Harris as AOC Bomber Command.   Such a disruption, at this 
stage of the war, could have had several unpleasant repercussions, one of which 
might have been a drop in the morale of bomber crews.  Notwithstanding possible 
problems, it was a step that should have been taken.  Harris’s removal could have 
been engineered so that it would not have been seen as either a demotion or 
punishment. His retention left the Royal Air Force in a somewhat invidious 
situation.  The man supposed to implement the policy determined by the Air Staff, 
Harris, had largely ignored Portal’s oil plan yet retained his position.  His power, 
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apparently, had been increased because it now seemed that he was invulnerable 
to external pressures.  Correspondingly, Portal’s position was weakened.  He had 
given the impression that disobedience at the highest levels would be overlooked, 
at least until the end of the war.  
Harris’s response to Portal pursued similar lines to those he had been 
following in earlier correspondence.  Bombing policy was one example.  While his 
own input was either ignored or given too little weight, he considered that policy, 
on too many occasions, appeared to have been decided by either junior officers or 
by civilian committees.  Harris admitted that he was not entitled to determine 
policy, but claimed that when alternatives were only under consideration, his voice 
should have been heard.  He knew the limitations of his Command, and he 
believed that he could have advised on which policy seemed to offer the best 
returns.   
Harris’s next focus was on the question of the selection of staff officers to 
work in the Air Ministry.  He readily admitted that it was a matter outside his own 
jurisdiction.  His prime concern, he insisted, was the establishment and 
maintenance of good relations between his Command and the vital department of 
the Directorate of Bomber Operations. Bufton was his immediate target.  Harris 
lamented that, despite all his efforts, he had found it impossible to get things on a 
proper footing.  He admitted it was Portal’s decision whether or not Bufton 
remained, but he wanted Portal to appreciate that if Bufton stayed difficulties 
would persist.  As far as Harris was concerned, Bufton  
 
appears to ignore what is a major and essential part of his job, 
namely, to press forward the interests, urgent requirements and 
doctrines of Bomber Command . . . while spending much of his time 
trying to run my Command . . . . he makes no serious attempt to 
consult or agree with me or my staff.  It may be just a matter of 
personalities.  But it does not work, and  is therefore deplorable and 
a great handicap. 152 
 
Bottomley, asserted Harris, was a different matter. His name should not be 
coupled with that of Bufton.  “I have the greatest personal regard and admiration 
for Bottomley” Harris continued, “who is always most helpful. Where Bomber 
Command’s interests and affairs are concerned I should be sorry indeed to see 
him leave his present appointment.“153 
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Harris himself, however, gives the lie to this last statement in his Bomber 
Offensive.  There he describes the appointment of Bottomley as DCAS as 
unfortunate.  Bottomley was junior to Harris in the Service (as Harris had reminded 
Portal in his letter of 18 January), and,  
 
as a staff officer could not constitutionally exercise control of a force 
in the field or issue order [sic] direct to a Commander in the field. 
This was got over, after a fashion, by evolving a formula; orders 
given to me were supposed to come from Portal through the 
D.C.A.S. who was thus only acting as Portal’s staff officer. . .  the 
natural result was a multiplicity of  directives  embodying one change 
of plan after another and so cautiously worded at the end with so 
many provisos and such wide conditions that the authors were in 
effect guarded against any and every outcome of the orders              
issued.154  
   
Furthermore, in his interviews with his biographer Dudley Saward, Harris 
had, on several occasions, ranked Bottomley with those others in the Directorate 
of Bomber Operations whom he perceived as at the least obstructionists.   In one 
tape he described Bottomley as “doing his damnedest to discredit me in the hope 
of getting my job.“155   In another, Harris alleged that the staff in the Directorate of 
Bomber Operations were “behind all our troubles with the Air Ministry – always 
trying to run the show . . . without the responsibility.  I am sorry to say . . . that 
Norman Bottomley was always whispering things in Portal’s ear.“156   
At the very least, Harris’s assessment of Bottomley, in his letter of 24 
January, was markedly at variance with the judgement he delivered in later years 
when interviewed by Saward.  Either the antipathy he had displayed towards the 
Air Staff during the war years had developed into bitterness with the passage of 
time, or he was insincere in his protestation of ‘personal regard and admiration’ for 
Bottomley. 
Next, Harris turned his attention to considerations which he believed were 
necessary in order to meet Bomber Command’s most urgent requirements.  He 
suggested the resumption of regular meetings at the Air Ministry that included the  
American bomber commander.  Major General Carl (‘Tooey’) Spaatz, the 
Commander of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, an ardent 
supporter of the Oil Plan, was also perceived by Harris to be a problem. According 
to Harris, Spaatz was a “weather cock”.  Every time we meet, declared Harris, he 
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is pushing yet another bright idea, often in conflict with what he had suggested 
only the previous day.  Policies agreed upon would be opposed by Spaatz at the 
next meeting with Eisenhower when he would suggest, “doing something else, or 
everything else, or anything else but.”157   Spaatz, Harris protested, imagined 
himself to be “running the show as a one-man band, except insofar as the British 
occasionally make a few noises off. “158 
Before closing his letter, Harris made another plea for his area bombing 
policy to be better understood.  A further determined effort, he believed, would 
ensure the destruction of the majority of the remaining cities in eastern Germany, 
would thereby increase the pressure on Berlin, and would mean the end of 
Germany.  He conceded that it was difficult to get American support for his area 
bombing programme, but then repeated his claim that Bomber Command, alone, 
could achieve the desired aim.  His one regret, he continued, was that the policy 
his force had pursued for three years should now be subjected to a unwarranted  
change of horses in mid-stream.  To attempt to deprive the enemy of oil, he 
claimed, meant that the bomber force was being used defensively when victory 
was about to be won by its offensive use against German cities. 
This letter ended with an apology.  Harris confirmed that he accepted, 
without reservation, that he had misinterpreted Portal’s words when he complained 
that he had been charged with disloyalty.  He declared that he regretted the 
disagreement that had arisen between them, and assured Portal that Bomber 
Command would do its utmost to carry out the laid down policy. 
Bottomley was given access to this latest letter from Harris and provided 
some notes for Portal for his consideration in formulating a suitable response.159    
These notes bear the hallmark of Bufton although nowhere is his name mentioned.  
They strongly make the point that bombing policies were never determined by 
junior officers.  Harris was also firmly reminded that he had been fully consulted 
when the original combined bomber offensive was under consideration, and again 
when the Directive for Overlord was being discussed.  It was also pointed out to 
Harris that the Directive of 25 September 1944, the oil directive, was only issued 
after discussions between himself, Spaatz, Tedder and Bottomley.  Minor changes 
had taken place with regard to this latter Directive, but Harris was reminded that at 
all times he had been at liberty to either criticise or suggest amendments in the 
light of what he saw as possible tactical, or other limitations. 
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Perhaps, suggested Bottomley, Harris’s criticisms were directed at the 
actions of the Combined Strategic Target Committee, whose task it was to 
determine the relative priorities of the targets within the approved target systems.   
Here we see the hand of Bufton.  Bottomley’s notes made clear that it was both 
impracticable and inappropriate for Harris to be consulted directly on the question 
of individual targets.  Bomber Command was represented on the Committee, and 
it was Harris’s responsibility to ensure that his representative there could either 
authoritatively advise on the matters under consideration, or refer them directly to 
Harris for his opinion.  In any case, Bottomley explained, the minutes of the CSTC 
meetings were very detailed, and were circulated to Harris and the various bomber 
commands for their consideration and, if necessary, criticism. 
The other main point made in Bottomley’s notes related to the call from 
Harris for the resumption of regular Commanders’ Conferences.  He agreed that 
such meetings could do nothing but good.  However, they would have to be held 
without the presence of Portal.  Portal exercised his authority under the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff jointly with Arnold and, for him to appear alone could be interpreted 
as an undue exercise of that shared authority. 
Bottomley’s two main points were fully accepted by Portal in his response to 
Harris on 25 January 1945.160    The wording was almost identical.  Portal offered 
to resume his regular but unofficial weekly talks with Harris on mutually agreed 
days. However, Portal also took issue with Harris over his interpretation of 
offensive air power.  Harris, he affirmed, regarded the destruction of German 
industry, thus producing an armament shortage, as a highly offensive action.  On 
the other hand, the destruction of German oil, without which the enemy 
armaments could not be employed or the war effort continued, appeared to be 
regarded by Harris as a purely defensive policy.  “Still” Portal concluded, “it is not 
worth bothering about somewhat academic arguments, at any rate on paper.“161
Apart from his involvement in the Portal/Harris dispute over oil, in January 
1945, Bufton had pointed out to Bottomley that the Air Staff’s plans for the 
employment of the Allied bomber commands were all too frequently side-tracked.  
In theory, the two Air Forces operated under a basic directive that provided both a 
common direction and aim.  It was Bufton’s opinion that while Bomber Command 
and the American XVth Air Force together with 205 Group operating from Italy, 
were doing well in the oil campaign, the VIIIth American Air Force was not.  Its 
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efforts too often were being directed against such targets as jet aircraft, tanks, 
communications, bridges, and oil, without achieving significant successes in any 
area.  “Its strategical accomplishment” he observed, “is being subordinated to 
tactical expediency instead of its tactical methods being bent on strategical 
requirements“162
Many of the criticisms made by Bufton in the note just mentioned, were 
repeated in comments he made to Williams later the same month.  Blame for the 
situation that had arisen was placed on the excessive control exercised by 
Eisenhower’s Headquarters.  This, coupled with Spaatz’s close contacts with 
SHAEF and the Army Commanders, had meant that requests for direct support 
operations from either of these areas, always received priority.  Thus, long term 
strategic aims were subordinated to the immediate short-term tactical needs of the 
armies.  Oil, asserted Bufton, “should continue to take precedence over everything 
else. “163  
Although it is impossible now to know the figures on which Bufton based his 
judgements, perhaps to provide a balance, some of the figures later available 
should be examined.  To say the least they are extremely contradictory.  The 
Bomber Command Quarterly Review for October-December 1944 provided a table 
that showed area bombing, in that period, had taken up the majority of Bomber 
Command’s efforts.  It had consumed fifty-three per cent of the bombing effort.  
Rail and water transport had taken up fifteen per cent, enemy troops and defences 
thirteen per cent, while naval and other targets provided five per cent.  Oil, the 
primary target according to the current Directive, was accorded only fourteen per 
cent  of the total effort.164 
Did Bufton have those figures available when he made his assessment that 
Bomber Command’s efforts against oil were going well?  Would he have 
expressed satisfaction at those figures?  Did fourteen per cent amount to Bomber 
Command having made a major contribution to the oil programme?  Admittedly, 
Bomber Command’s strength had increased enormously since the same quarter in 
1943, when the total tonnage of bombs dropped had been only 40,070.  The figure 
for the same period in 1944 was 163,000 tons.  The vital statistic, however, must 
surely be that only fourteen per cent of the effort went into attacking oil targets.    
As further evidence of the conflicting nature of the evidence available, the 
bomb tonnages dropped on oil targets in another file provide an illuminating but 
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disturbing comparison.  The figures for Bomber Command October - December 
1944 were 3,653, 13,030, and 5,109 British long tons.  The figures for the Eighth  
Air Force over the same period were 8,139, 27,447, and 6,953 long tons.165   Had 
these figures been available to Bufton he would have been hard pressed to 
sustain his argument relating to his supposed failure of the Americans to press 
home the attack of German oil.  The reduced figures for the December attacks can 
be well understood when it is remembered that in mid-December, under cover of 
appalling weather conditions, the Germans had launched their surprise offensive in 
the Ardennes.   
By early January 1945 concern was being widely expressed at the 
increasing bomb tonnages being dropped on non-oil targets.  Cherwell, in a note 
to Churchill, claimed that three times as great a weight of bombs had fallen on 
communication targets during the last quarter of 1944, as had been directed 
against oil targets.  He agreed that some attacks against bridges and supply lines 
could be justified, but declared that bombing railway marshalling yards and 
locomotive depots was a waste of effort if it was aimed at the long term attrition of 
German communications: “Even a part of the weight directed against railway yards 
would cause a notable fall in German oil supplies. “166
Churchill, having been prompted by Cherwell, reminded Portal of the 
importance of bombing oil targets.  He closed his minute:  “I trust they will not be 
neglected in favour of the long-term attrition of German communications, about 
which I have always had doubts.”167   In response the same day, Portal confirmed 
that he and all of the Air authorities were fully agreed that oil was to continue to be 
given top priority.  “The bombing of communications” he  concluded, 
 
is only justifiable at this time either to delay the departure of 
divisions for Russia, to turn the scale in a critical situation in the 
West, or when weather conditions prevent the attack of first priority 
targets. 168
 
Despite the pressures applied, the problem remained.  Communication 
targets continued to receive what many thought was undue attention from the 
Allied bombing forces.  To help solve the apparent impasse, Bufton appealed to 
Oliver Lawrence of the MEW, not always a supporter of the oil plan.  He reminded 
Lawrence that at the last meeting at SHAEF, Tedder had stressed the importance 
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of dislocating the main centres in the Ruhr.  Tedder, backed by Brigadier Foord, 
claimed that benzol plants should only be regarded as last resort targets.  They 
argued that there was so little petrol being used by the enemy on the Western 
Front that it would require an enormous bombing effort to produce appreciable 
effects. 
Bufton was adamant.  He believed that the oil bombing programme had 
brought the possibility of a decisive result within a measurable distance.  He saw 
no benefit to be gained by attempting to differentiate between oil, gasoline, or 
benzol, as target systems.  All, he attested, were of equal importance to an enemy 
in straitened circumstances.  Bufton reminded Lawrence that the wider picture of 
the war had always to be kept in mind.  Total immobilisation of the enemy forces 
was the aim.  As well, the attack on oil provided many side benefits.  Indirect 
damage to industry, communications, and morale, were always adjuncts to heavy 
bombing raids, important factors not to be overlooked.  Lawrence was reminded 
that some in Eisenhower’s headquarters held somewhat parochial views.  As both 
he and Lawrence were members of the CSTC, Bufton advocated that they “must 
judge the issue from the overall aspect. “169
In mid-March 1945 Bufton still found it necessary to bring to the attention of 
Air Vice-Marshal Williams, ACAS (Ops), that he considered that the Eighth 
American Air Force was not always adhering to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
Directive with regard to their attacks on oil targets.170   According to Bufton’s 
information, the Eighth Air Force on 15 March had launched 1,256 heavy bombers 
against two targets deep in Germany.  The targets attacked were the railway 
marshalling yards at Oranienburg (sixteen miles north of Berlin), and the 
Headquarters of the German High Command at Zossen (twenty-four miles south 
of Berlin).  Meteorological forecasts for these raids suggested fine clear weather in 
the target areas with light winds at bombing levels.  Similar conditions were 
forecast for Ruhland, Bohlen, and Misburg, all prime oil targets.  
Bufton believed that a great opportunity had been missed to immobilise 
three of the four first priority targets and, by doing so, the Americans had ignored 
their Directive.  For their part, the Americans claimed that the attack on Zossen 
was at Russian request, and was therefore a gesture of collaboration.171  Bufton 
then pointed out that the actions on 15 March were not an isolated example.  On 
22 February, when widespread attacks on German communications were made, 
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oil targets had been largely ignored.  He then quoted actions on 13 March.  
Although 1,256 American heavy bombers were briefed to attack sixteen specific 
targets, only two were oil refineries, and they only received the attention of sixty-
eight and seventy-seven Fortresses respectively.  Such derelictions, declared 
Bufton, would have but one result.  The enthusiasm and determination of the 
crews of Bomber Command, with regard to what they saw as the primary target 
system, would be undermined.  
This note was closed by Bufton pointing out that it appeared to him that the 
Eighth Air Force was attempting to spread its wings over too many targets.  Many 
were relatively unimportant.   Perhaps the intention, he suggested, was to largely 
avoid heavily defended areas and thereby achieve good operational results.  Such 
actions, Bufton concluded, were carried out at the expense of strategic 
considerations and incurred the risk of the offensive against oil losing its impact.  
Bufton called upon Williams to suggest to Portal that he and Arnold reaffirm the 
need for all Air Forces to adhere even more rigidly to their laid down priorities, as 
prescribed in the current Directive.    
In June 1945, with the European war now over, the Working Committee 
(Oil) of the CSTC issued their final bulletin.172   It was a full review of the air 
offensive against enemy oil supplies covering the entire war.  It began by declaring 
that the offensive against oil, launched by an inadequate Bomber Command in 
1940, was conducted with commendable enthusiasm but achieved very little 
success.  It then posed the question that in view of later successes, what might 
have been the course of the war if Bomber Command had been capable, in 1940, 
of effectively attacking the German and Italian oil industries, as they then existed: 
their synthetic oil industry still under construction, lacking the crude production and 
refineries of Romania and Hungary, and without the substantial stocks that were 
later looted from overrun territories in the west. 
This bulletin made no strenuous claims for successes in the oil bombing 
policy.  Nor did it attempt to evaluate the contribution that the oil offensive made in 
bringing about the unconditional surrender of the German forces.  Harris, in his 
Despatch on Air Operations, was equally reticent.  Oil received two small 
paragraphs, twenty-eight lines in all, only two lines longer than the section relating 
to the bombing in support of the crossing of the Rhine in the final stages of the 
conflict.  Runstedt’s offensive in the Ardennes was accorded sixty-nine lines. 
 333
In summation the oil offensive, although it played a vital role in Germany’s 
defeat, could have been even more effective had it been conducted in accordance 
with the Air Staff’s wishes and orders.  German armies in the field, apart from the 
abortive Ardennes offensive, appear to have suffered little from oil shortages but 
the Luftwaffe was badly affected.  Training was severely reduced so that, largely 
as a result of the oil shortage, Luftwaffe crews went into combat less well prepared 
than their Allied counterparts. From July 1944 to the end of the war, flying time for 
German student pilots, prior to joining operational units, averaged 125 hours; for 
British and American trainees in the same period the average was slightly over 
350 hours.  Of even greater importance is that while German pilots only received 
about twenty hours training in operational aircraft, Allied pilots averaged 130 
hours.173  
Fuel problems coupled with a reduced number of flying instructors and 
manpower shortages resulting from the transfer of Luftwaffe personnel to fight 
futile infantry battles, also meant that many of the aircraft produced in 1944 
remained on the ground lacking both fuel and trained crews.  From 1939 to 1943 
German aircraft factories produced 23,508 fighter aircraft; in 1944 alone a further 
25,285 were completed.174   
Area bombing was allowed to consume too large a proportion of both 
bomber Command’s manpower and material resources for too little return in either 
economic or industrial destruction.  Certainly German industry ground to a halt but 
that was not because of area bombing attacks on cities.  That particular problem 
for Germany had been created by the many successful attacks on communication 
facilities which so disrupted the rail system that the coal on which industry relied, 
could not be delivered.  By failing to reel in his headstrong bomber commander, 
Portal must thus be identified as possibly being at least partially responsible for 
having prolonged the war.     
Another who must bear his share of criticism is Prime Minister Churchill.  
The   support he provided Harris played an important part in the prolongation of 
the area bombing campaign.  Moreover, his sharp note to Sinclair on 26 January 
1945 demanding attacks on the East German cities is indicative of the interest he 
continued to maintain in area attacks. It also provides verification, if that is 
required, that Churchill retained the ultimate authority and influence in all military 
affairs concerning the British establishment.  His ultimate rejection of Bomber 
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Command, its leader, and its crews, following the bombing of Dresden in February 
1945, does nothing but make him a lesser man. 
Although this chapter has dealt at length with the serious differences of 
opinion between the Air Staff and Harris regarding target priorities over the winter 
of 1944/45, it must be made clear that Bomber Command provided a significant 
and vital contribution to the oil offensive in that period.  From October 1944 to April 
1945 Bomber Command dropped a total of 78,906 short tons of bombs on oil 
targets while the Eighth and Fifteenth American Air Forces only dropped a total of 
70,526 short tons.175   Not only did Bomber Command release a greater total 
weight of bombs but their individual bombs averaged 660 pounds while the 
American bombs only averaged 388 pounds.176   It must also be emphasised, the 
heavier the bomb, the greater the damage created.  Additionally, the bombs 
released at night employing PFF methods by Bomber Command were aimed more 
accurately than those dropped by the Eighth Air Force using H2X.177   Oil was the 
priority during this period and Portal had stressed that it was so important that, if 
necessary, risks had to be taken.  Bomber loss rates both by day and night 
operations at this time were only of the order of one per cent but Portal made clear 
that losses of  
 
up to 5% or even 10% in successful attacks on LEUNA, POLITZ 
and BRUX would be well worth-while . . . it was worth paying a high 
price to put those particularly important plants well and truly out of 
action for a long period.178 
 
For his part, Harris had argued that although he had no faith in the oil 
policy,  
 
I have not failed in any worth-while efforts to achieve even those 
things which I knew from the start to be impracticable, once they 
had been decided upon.  In this decision on oil I was given no prior 
opportunity to present my views.  But I have in fact risked, luckily so 
far with success, weather conditions which I would not have faced 
in ordinary circumstances.179 
 
Unfortunately, from October 1944 to 8 May 1945, the figures provided  by 
Bomber Command are proof that insufficient efforts were made, or perhaps, not 
enough risks taken with the weather, in the effort to destroy Germany’s oil 
resources.  During those slightly over seven months, oil targets received twenty 
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per cent and Germany’s industrial cities forty five per cent of the total bombing 
effort.180 
Perhaps Harris’s failure to take the extra risks and press home the attack 
on oil more fully, had the result Portal had suggested in November 1944 when he 
advised Harris 
 
In the light of all available  intelligence I feel the whole war situation 
is poised on “oil” as on a knife edge, and that by a real 
concentration of effort at this time we might push it over on the right 
side . . . if we give anything away . . . the Germans may get into 
quite a strong position in the air and hold it long enough to prolong 
the war by several months at least.181 
 
It was an assessment with which Webster and Frankland could later find no 
reason to disagree.182 
The surprising element relating to Bomber Command’s part in the oil 
offensive over the winter of 1944/1945 is that the limited efforts made produced 
such significant  damage.  What would the results have been had Harris been able 
to provide the extra pressure that Portal and the Air Staff had called for in the 
attack of German oil facilities? 
In the final analysis concerning German oil, Harris yielded.  In Bomber 
Offensive, although he continued to claim that area bombing should never have 
been given up, he acknowledged that  
 
the offensive against oil was a complete success . . . but I still do 
not think that it was reasonable, at that time, to expect that the 
campaign would succeed; what the Allied strategists did was bet on 
an outsider, and it happened to win the race.183
 
The admission may have satisfied Portal, but it does not answer the 
question of why no firm action was taken against Harris when he was blatantly 
ignoring the instructions issued by his Commander-in- Chief.  I suggest that there 
will never be a clear answer.  However, there is one fact that cannot be denied: 
Portal allowed a subordinate to flagrantly and repeatedly ignore the requirements 
regarding German oil clearly and repeatedly spelled out by the Air Staff.   By so 
doing he not only allowed a question to be raised as to his leadership qualities, but 
also thereby weakened his position as leader.  
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Chapter Eight 
 
Target - Enemy Morale 
 
On 1 September 1939, following the German invasion of Poland and with 
the British Government having threatened war unless the German forces 
withdrew, President Roosevelt made an appeal to the nations.  He requested that, 
should total war eventuate, the  
 
armed forces shall in no event and under no circumstances 
undertake bombardment from the air of civilian populations or 
unfortified cities, upon the understanding that the same rules of 
war- fare shall be scrupulously observed by all their opponents.1 
 
The appeal was welcomed and approved by both Britain and France while 
Hitler, making no reference to withdrawal from Poland, advised that the Luftwaffe 
would attack nothing but military objectives.  Despite these tacit agreements the 
Second World War very shortly confirmed that in modern conflicts no distinction is 
made between combatants and non-combatants, or between military and non-
military objectives.  Cities became battlefields and the inhabitants found 
themselves in the front line.  Morale had thus become a target.  Morale, however, 
is a nebulous quality and its measurement in absolute terms is thereby rendered 
difficult.  A capable commander is well able to measure the morale of his particular 
unit or squadron but can only describe it in general terms such as excellent , very 
good, good, poor or bad.  Considerable efforts were devoted by both Allied and 
enemy intelligence agencies throughout the war in an effort to determine the 
opposition’s morale but unfortunately the assessments made by Allied authorities, 
on several occasions, that German morale was on the verge of collapse, were 
wildly in error.  On the whole the German people remained stoic and steadfast in 
their support of their leaders despite the calamities they nightly suffered.   The long 
held belief, that a nation’s morale could be broken by bombing, was found, in the 
Second World War, to have been faulty.    Furthermore, the outcome of an attack 
directed at the morale of an enemy people depends not only on the form of 
government in that country but also on the disposition of the populace.  In a 
democracy the government might well be induced to seek a peaceful solution 
 347
either from public pressure or from governmental benevolence ─ a desire to 
reduce suffering.  But Germany in 1939 was a police state in which protest was 
streng verboten.  Control was so rigidly enforced that even in 1945 one stood as 
much chance of being executed by the authorities for preaching surrender as of 
being killed by Allied bombing.  At least, when bombed, one was only subjected to 
the laws of chance rather than those of an authoritarian society.2 
Nevertheless, every act of violence directed at the enemy in a war situation 
is an attack on morale.  Morale is influenced by many factors ─ what happens to 
those family members closest to you and by what happens to your workplace and 
your home.  The loss of water supplies, the destruction of city transport facilities, 
the lack of fuel to heat the home, all contribute to influencing an individual’s 
morale.  One point, however, often overlooked, is that bombing rather than 
lowering morale may, in certain circumstances, have the opposite effect.  Stephen 
Possony argued that  
 
bombing has an ambivalent nature.  At certain places and times, it 
may produce positive and at others negative morale reactions.  
Bombing may sometimes actually strengthen the opponent’s 
morale, ─ at least on the behavior, if not on the verbal level.3 
 
Unfortunately, the selection of morale as a target for Bomber Command 
was not a considered action.  It was forced on the authorities because it had been 
learned that the targets requiring attention simply could not be located.  But the 
city in which the particular factory operated could usually be found and therefore 
that city was bombed in the hope that among the destruction created would be the 
ruins of the particular factory.  Churchill had defined the parameters as early as 
October 1917 when, discussing an earlier British air offensive, he made clear that  
 
Our Air offensive should consistently be directed at striking at the 
bases and communications upon whose structure the fighting 
powers of his (the enemies) armies and his fleets of the sea and of 
the air depends.  Any injury which comes to the civil population from 
this process of attack must be regarded as incidental and 
inevitable.4  
 
Furthermore, when the Inter-Allied Independent Air Force heads of agreement 
concerning the constitution of the force were set down on 26 October 1918, the 
 348
object was defined as “To carry the war into Germany by attacking her industry, 
commerce and population.”5 
 Although Trenchard later, in 1928, had admitted the illegitimacy of bombing 
a city solely to terrorise the civilian population, he quoted an exception.  He argued 
that  
 
It was an entirely different matter to terrorize munition workers (men 
and women) . . . Moral effect is created by the bombing in such 
circumstances but it is the inevitable result of a lawful operation of 
war ─ the bombing of a military objective.6 
 
Indeed, the RAF had exhibited few qualms of conscience when bombing civilians 
during their policing operations in the Middle East and on the North-West Frontier 
of India during the 1930s, so it is little wonder that Harris, in 1942, simply did not 
accept that he had any need to exercise restraint.  His aim, as defined in the 
Directive he inherited and as he made clear on many occasions, was to create 
death and destruction in the German cities regardless of who died or what was 
destroyed.  German morale was his target and thus it became a war waged 
against minds ─ “the nerve centres of the man-in-the-street.”7
 Harris, of course, as befitted a disciple of Trenchard, was steeped in the 
belief of the value of the bomber as a morale lowering agent.  During the 1930s 
the British people had grown to fear the threat posed by bombing aircraft ─ the 
surrounding seas, dominated by the Royal Navy, no longer provided the protection 
to which they had long been accustomed.  Moreover, the Government had made 
clear that “in the next war the enemy would attempt to undermine civilian morale 
by an all out bombardment.”8   Public fears were greatly enhanced by what they 
read in their papers concerning the events in Abyssinia in 1935 and in both China 
and Guernica in 1937, in combination with the increasing threat posed by a militant 
Germany.  In 1938, the editor of Aeroplane called upon the public to  
 
face facts and try not to be hypocrites.  Over and over again people 
in Parliament bring up this business about not bombing civilians in 
time of war.  Why not face the fact that in time of war there are no 
civilians?9  
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Enemy morale however, rather than being an incidental target, had, from an early 
date in the Second World War, become the primary but unadmitted aim of the 
bombing offensive.  At first it was not viewed necessarily as providing the way to 
ultimate victory and no one attempted to clarify how a possible breakdown of 
enemy morale might lead to unconditional surrender.   No answers were provided 
to the many questions such as: what is required to create a breakdown of morale?; 
whose morale must be broken?; could a country’s morale be broken?; is it 
necessary to break the national morale or, would the collapse of local morale be 
sufficient?; or what amount of bombing is going to be required to bring about 
collapse?  No answers were provided for any of these and other questions 
regarding morale because nobody ever thought to enquire.  Morale bombing, at 
least until the Directive of February 1942, was, despite the primary role it was 
playing, an accidental and incidental part of the strategic bombing offensive and 
remained largely beyond the general public’s knowledge. 
Harris, however, unable to accept that the pre-war bombing doctrine had 
failed, refused to adapt to the new requirements late in 1943, and throughout his 
tenure as AOC-in-C Bomber Command relentlessly pursued the area/morale 
bombing path.  His actions, while confirming his doggedness, also testified to his 
inability to readily change or recognise when modifications to the bombing plan 
were urgently required. 
From an early stage in the conflict, as far as some in the Air Staff were 
concerned, the gloves were off.  On 18 September 1940 Air Vice-Marshal Sholto 
Douglas, the DCAS, advised Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, the CAS, that 
Portal, then AOC-in-C Bomber Command, was planning to launch an attack on 
Berlin the next night.  Portal’s plan was that the bombers would release their 
bombs on the centre of Berlin although the only identifiable military targets in the 
area were the German War Office and the Air Ministry.  He requested approval for 
the attack.  Douglas opposed Portal’s suggestion and called for an early decision.  
Newall minuted a reply the same day declaring, “Put some in the middle on 
‘Railway Communications’ ─ don’t mention War Office or Air Ministry.”10   It was a 
subterfuge that would be long maintained and later adopted by the Americans to 
enable them to bomb targets obscured by cloud. 
Although extravagant claims were made for the success of the bomber 
offensive during 1940 and 1941, it was not until August 1941 that the Butt Report 
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revealed the true state of affairs.  Targets were not being found and very little 
damage was being created.  It would appear, however, that perhaps some in the 
Directorate of Bomber Operations were already aware of the true facts.  Although 
they had been long time supporters of the principle and efficacy of area bombing, 
in August 1941 they produced a paper which claimed that, with the navigation and 
bombing equipment then available, it was not possible to create either significant 
or lasting damage to key industrial targets.  The focus of attack, the paper 
demanded, must be the German people in their homes and at their work places.  
Competent observers, the writer urged, “are unanimously of the opinion that the 
German people cannot, and will not, stand up to really heavy concentrated and 
sustained attacks.”11   Similar sentiments were expressed a month later when it 
was claimed,  in an unsigned paper, that the Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the 
“weakest point in the German war machine is the morale of the civil population and 
in particular of the industrial workers.”12
The Directive that Harris inherited on becoming AOC, Bomber Command, 
on 22 February 1942, provided him with a wide range of industrial targets in 
western, southern, and northern Germany.  It also required him to attack the 
morale of the German people.  Issued on 14 February 1942, it lifted conservation 
measures in place over the winter, and advised that “the primary object of . . . 
operations should now be focussed on the morale of the enemy civil population 
and in particular, of the industrial workers.”13   The plan accorded him considerable 
latitude in target selection but Harris’s problems were the limitations in the 
numbers of aircraft and crews available, their tactical efficiency, and the need to 
overcome the vagaries of European weather.  Area bombing and the destruction 
of enemy cities and the people therein offered Harris, so he believed, the way to 
total victory.  He entertained no doubts: it was an opinion which never wavered, at 
least during the war.14
Harris was encouraged to pursue the policy laid down in the Directive 
because of his belief that the forces under his control lacked the ability to carry out 
an effective precision bombing programme.  But the then Group Captain Sydney 
Bufton, for one, with some experience of bombing operations, viewed area 
bombing as but a stepping stone to a more efficient system.  The first of the new 
aids, Gee, was coming into use and others, such as Oboe and H2S, were in the 
pipeline.  These bombing and navigational aids, together with the formation of a 
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target finding force, were sufficient for some to hope that the more productive 
precision bombing would come into its own in the near future.  
Early in April 1942, Lord Cherwell, Churchill’s scientific adviser, produced 
his de-housing paper for Churchill.  He painted a picture showing that “about one-
third of the German population would be turned out of house and home . . . There 
seems little doubt that this would break the spirit of the people.”15   Cherwell’s 
paper, however, was another example of wishful thinking.  It merely provided 
confirmation for believers in the area bombing policy that they were on the right 
track.  Pre-war, it had become accepted doctrine that bombers were capable of 
delivering a knock-out blow.  That notion largely died early in the war although 
many continued to believe that Bomber Command was continuing to create 
considerable destruction, at least until the fallacy was exposed by the Butt Report 
in August 1941.    Cherwell’s paper resurrected hopes; hopes which in Harris’s 
case were adhered to long after more efficient systems had become available. 
As far as controversial matters between Harris and the Air Staff were 
concerned, much of 1942 was taken up with arguments relating to the use of 
incendiary versus high explosive weapons, and the controversy surrounding the 
formation of the Path Finder Force.  But Harris was also concerned about morale 
in Bomber Command.  In March 1942 he expressed his concern to Portal at the  
 
spate of largely ignorant and uninstructed chatter against our 
bombing policy and against general efficiency and co-operativeness 
of the Royal  Air Force . . . put out by interested parties in the other 
Services, by certain Members of Parliament with axes to grind and 
other influential people.16
  
Thus, Harris’s organisation of the three 1,000 bomber raids in late May and 
June 1942 was a master stroke.  With an average crew and medium and heavy 
bomber aircraft availability of only 34617 it required a supreme, and risky, effort.  
The actions of his bomber crews on these three nights secured the strong support 
of both Churchill, which virtually lasted until the bombing of Dresden in February 
1945, and of Portal.  It also raised morale within his Command and gained wide 
public support for the area bombing offensive.  Cologne was the most successful 
of the three attacks but, although considerable damage was created, the city 
returned largely to normality within three months.  Nevertheless, the perception of 
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some Service and civilian observers was that area bombing was a potential war 
winner.  Unfortunately, the raids were aberrations, but while the true facts 
remained unknown, it was the perception that mattered.  
During 1943 the primary mission for both the American and British bomber 
forces remained “the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German 
military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the 
German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally 
weakened.”18   So, although subsidiary Directives may have varied target aims, 
ranging between oil, ball bearings, U-boats, transportation, and industrial targets in 
northern Italy, Harris remained authorised, and required, to attack German 
civilians.   
In November 1943  Air Ministry Intelligence, in conjunction with the Political 
Warfare Executive, produced an eight-page appreciation of the effects of Allied air 
attacks on German morale for the period 15 July to 15 October 1943.  Its 
summation for Harris and his supporters must have made heartening reading.  
“Fear of air attack” it asserted, 
 
has been the dominant preoccupation of a large part of the German 
civilian population, and has contributed to produce a situation in 
which fear of the consequences of continuing the war is becoming 
greater than fear of the consequences of defeat. 19   
 
The paper suggested that, although there had been no general break in morale, 
further military defeats and the extension of the bombing over winter, “may 
exercise a decisive influence on conditions inside Germany,” 20
By late 1943, however, other influences were at work.  Within the Air Staff 
there were those, including Bufton, who believed that it was high time, with the 
increased availability of improved navigation and bombing aids coupled with the 
leadership provided by the Path Finder Force, to return to precision bombing 
attacks.  There were also those who, Harris claimed, were deliberately writing 
down the bomber offensive.  His concern was that the British people were not 
being told the truth.  Area bombing, as seen by Harris, was not the destruction of 
particular factories, but rather the killing of Germans or the rendering of them 
homeless and destitute.  The aim of the Combined Bomber Offensive, he 
advocated in a letter to Sir Arthur Street the Under Secretary of State at the Air 
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Ministry, should be clearly, publicly, and unambiguously stated.  “That aim” he 
continued, “is the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers and 
the disruption of civilised community life throughout Germany.”21   Acreages of 
housing devastation, he concluded, is infinitely more important than the factory 
damage by-products.  Grotesque as these words may now seem, they were the 
authorisation, and the orders, that he had received from higher authority, whatever 
euphemistic terms they may have employed.   
Harris, in initiating this exchange, was endeavouring to bring to the attention 
of the British public the true facts of the area bombing programme, sanctioned by 
the Chiefs of Staff, War Cabinet, and Churchill, and implemented by Bomber 
Command.  One of his concerns was the morale of his bomber crews.   If they 
were to read that Bomber Command was carrying out area attacks on cities while 
the Americans were doing precision bombing employing H2X on marshalling yards 
in those same cities, he feared their morale would fall.  The use of such words 
gave the appearance that Bomber Command was attempting to do the same job 
as the Americans but doing it less well.  In fact, with the weather conditions 
experienced in Europe in the winter of 1943/1944, both Bomber Command and the 
Eighth Air Force were heavily reliant on radar to carry out any bombing at all.  
Harris, of course, was arguing that a spade should be called a spade.   Long after 
the end of the war Richard G. Davis made clear that the Eighth Air Force’s use of 
the term ‘marshalling yards’ “undoubtedly served as a euphemism for city areas.”22 
 In his response, Street, reconfirmed the wording of both the Casablanca 
and Pointblank Directives and pointed out that neither required, nor enjoined, 
direct attack on German civilians.  He reminded Harris that the public were well 
aware that large areas of German cities were being destroyed by Bomber 
Command.  Nevertheless, he continued, ”It is . . . desirable to present the bomber 
offensive in such a light as to provoke the minimum of public controversy and so 
far as possible to avoid conflict with religious and humanitarian opinion.”23   Public 
protests, he asserted, would hamper the government in the execution of their 
policy.  They might also affect bomber crew morale.  Therefore, the emphasis 
given in the publicity relating to the bomber offensive would not be altered. 
 Needless to say, such a bland refusal did not meet with Harris’s approval.  
His first point was that he was seeking increased emphasis on, rather than casual 
references to, the bomber offensive, which, he declared, was largely responsible 
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for ground successes on the Russian front.  Secondly, he denied that he had ever 
suggested that direct attacks on German civilians were part of Bomber 
Command’s policy.  Street’s reply, added Harris, implied  
 
that no German civilians are proper objects for bombing.  The 
German economic system, which I am instructed by my directive to 
destroy, includes workers, houses and public utilities, and it is 
therefore meaningless to claim that the wiping out of German cities 
is ‘not an end in itself but the inevitable accompaniment of an all out 
attack on the enemy’s means and capacity to wage war’. . . the 
cities of Germany . . . are literally the heart of Germany’s war 
potential . . . That is why they are being deliberately attacked.24    
‘ 
 In concluding his response to Street, Harris sought confirmation that the 
policy that Bomber Command was carrying out, the elimination of entire German 
cities, was considered both necessary and legitimate by the Air Council.  He called 
for uncertainties to be  
 
dispelled forthwith by an authoritative and unequivocal statement.  It 
is not enough to admit that devastation is caused by our attacks, or 
to suggest that it is an incidental and rather regrettable concomitant 
of night bombing.  It is in fact produced deliberately and our whole 
P.F.F. and navigational technique is primarily designed to promote 
it.25
 
 Harris attacked Street again in February 1944.  His complaint related to 
attitudes he had perceived in both official documents, and in the public press, 
relating to German morale in bombed cities.  He rejected the claim that the 
inhabitants of bombed cities had simply become apathetic.  Were such views to be 
widely held, Harris declared, the inference could be drawn that further bombing 
directed against morale would be a waste of time.  His understanding was that    
 
incontestable evidence derived from Most Secret sources exists to 
show that the continuance and probable intensification of the 
Offensive is regarded in the highest Nazi circles as something 
which, in the absence of unpredictable errors by the Allies, will 
certainly ensure a German defeat comparatively quickly by 
producing a collapse of morale as well as of production on the 
Home Front.26   
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 Harris quoted no authority for his confidence in declining German morale 
but his ‘Most Secret sources’ may well have been decrypts of intercepted Enigma 
messages.  Hinsley  regarded the inference drawn by Harris as perfectly 
legitimate.  His opinion was that “it does not seem unreasonable to infer, from 
these reports that by the middle of February the bombing had brought Germany to 
a crisis of morale which she had barely survived.”27   Unfortunately, Hinsley then 
weakened his case somewhat by noting that the critical messages from Japanese 
sources in Berlin to their superiors in Tokyo were not decrypted until May.  By that 
time the JIC had concluded that a collapse of German morale, prior to D-day, was 
most unlikely. 
In reply, Street agreed that  
 
The fact that the attack on the German war economy involves the 
destruction of industrial cities is not in dispute . . . Nor has any 
attempt been made to disguise from the public the fact that your 
Command’s attacks are aimed at the destruction of vast acreages 
of industrial cities.”28    
 
Street did, however, point out that “The destruction of a German city which does 
not contain any military installations or any war production or organisation potential 
would not fall within the terms of your directive.”29
Harris, in closing this particular correspondence, acknowledged that he was 
 
relieved to find therein explicit recognition of the fact that Bomber 
Command’s attacks aim deliberately at the destruction of vast 
acreages of German industrial cities . . . . any civilian who produces 
more than enough to maintain himself is making a positive 
contribution to the German war effort and is therefore a proper 
though not necessarily a worth while object of attack . . . . I regret, 
however, that it is still considered inexpedient to recognise fully the 
strategic importance of results achieved . . . . Such recognition 
would, no doubt, be embarrassing to those who have already 
decided that the War can only be won by more hazardous and 
costly methods, but this hardly seems an adequate reason for 
withholding it.30
 
 As frequently happened, Harris had enjoyed the last word in a 
correspondence war.  What is perhaps remarkable is that it took place in such 
critical times.  Over the same months that he was arguing semantics, Harris was 
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involved in arguments with Portal regarding oil targets, and with Bufton concerning 
ball bearings and Schweinfurt.  In addition, Bomber Command was heavily 
involved in the Battle of Berlin, which could hardly be claimed as a victory, and, 
looming, was the forthcoming invasion of the Continent.  
 Harris excepted, there were few who at the end of 1943 were claiming that 
the strategic bombing offensive had been a success.  Although bombing strength 
and capability had increased significantly, the results being achieved fell far short 
of the claims made, pre-war, for a strategic bombing offensive.  Heavy losses were 
not the only problem; factories were found to have been harder to destroy than 
had been appreciated; intelligence relating to the true effects of bombing was 
meagre; and bombing accuracy had suffered because of weather conditions and 
the increasing strength of German defences, air and ground.  The following 
seventeen months of war were to provide an enormous growth in Allied air power 
but Harris identified no requirement to change his targets.  German cities and the 
morale of their inhabitants remained his focus. 
 Harris’s call for clarification and confirmation of his Directive was justified 
because in 1943 and 1944 dissent was being expressed on the Home Front at the 
conduct of the bomber war.  Not everyone accepted that the killing of civilians was 
a necessary part of the conflict.  Area bombing meant that in some districts of the 
attacked city, destruction of both military and non-military installations would be 
complete.  Air Ministry spokesmen became adept at providing pseudo-legal 
opinions that the accidental damage to non-military buildings was both justified 
and rendered acceptable by the fact that the destruction of the military target had 
been achieved. 
 Dr George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, made a stand against current 
bombing policy in the House of Lords on 9 February 1944, when he reminded the 
House that many actions taken during a war, and found acceptable, are supported 
by arguments that are readily demolished once the war has ended.  He closed his 
speech asking: 
 
How can they (the Cabinet) fail to realise that this is not the way to 
curb military aggression and end the war? . . . we who, with our 
Allies, are the liberators of Europe, should so use our power that it 
is always under the control of law.31 
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 In March 1944 the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence), Air Vice-
Marshal Inglis, produced a nine page paper concerning the effects of Allied attacks 
on German morale covering the period 1 November 1943 to 1 March 1944.  A 
major focus was the fifteen heavy (and costly) attacks on Berlin over the winter 
months.  The lack of unity in the views expressed by Nazi Party officials and 
individuals, the paper intimated, made it extremely difficult to forecast the possible 
course of events.  The summation was that, although German morale had been 
reduced, 
 
It is unlikely that active opposition will develop as a major threat to 
the Home Front.  While the possibility of a sudden overthrow from 
below cannot be excluded, the evidence at present available 
favours the view that the process will be one of gradual 
disintegration on the Home Front.  The decline of civilian morale, 
while most important, would thus not be the direct cause of a 
German collapse.32
  
On 5 July 1944, at a meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff, German morale was 
considered from a different perspective.  It was their opinion that “the time might 
well come in the not too distant future when an all-out attack by every means at 
our disposal on German civilian morale might be decisive.”33   Their 
recommendation to the Prime Minister was that the method to be employed for 
such an attack should be considered and preparations made.   
 The Air Staff responded with a wide-ranging but unsigned paper.  Berlin, 
they suggested, would provide a suitable target for a massive attack with the 
aiming point the heart of the Government quarter.  In their opinion 
 
Berlin is in the strictest sense a military objective and we should be 
fully justified in attacking it in the manner suggested, particularly in 
view of the German attitude in relation to their Flying Bomb attacks 
on London. Furthermore, there is every chance that a considerable 
direct moral effect would be produced in such circumstances on the 
German Government.34
 
 Although the Air Staff’s deliberations covered the strafing of civilian targets 
or attacks on smaller towns of 20,000 inhabitants, they finally agreed that Berlin 
would be the ideal target for a massive air assault.  Even in conditions of total 
cloud cover it could still be hit using radar, and it was the centre of government, 
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communications, and administration. The comparative failure of the winter 
offensive against Berlin was ignored because, although 48,000 tons of bombs had 
been dropped over a considerable period,  
 
Many of the attacks have however been aimed at specific    
objectives on the outskirts of the city and much more concentrated  
destruction could have been achieved if an aiming point in the heart 
of the ‘Government quarter’ had been chosen.35    
 
 The proposed operation was to be called Thunderclap and as originally 
perceived was not intended to either significantly reduce industrial output or create 
total chaos in the German social structure.  The bombing, as defined in the Air 
Staff paper, was aimed at influencing “the minds of high German political and 
military authorities to propose organised surrender rather than a prolongation of 
the war.”36 In other words it was designed to bring about an organised surrender 
by a display of Allied air power that left no other option. 
 In a reasoned paper on 1 August 1944,37  Bufton, the supreme champion 
in calling for a return to precision bombing, showed that he was not going to be 
caught up in any hysterical call for an attack on morale.  Although it is possible he 
had been involved with earlier papers prepared for the Air Staff on the question, 
none have been located.  In this latest paper he examined the principles to be 
followed to gain the maximum effect on German civilian morale by a concentrated 
bombing attack.  He admitted that except in cases such as Hamburg in July 1943, 
when exceptional meteorological conditions pertained,38 overall bombing effects on 
German civilian morale had been disappointing. He reasoned that  
 
 to provoke a state of terror by air attack, the attack, when 
launched, must be of such density that there is created in the mind  
 of the individual the conviction that if he is in the area to be 
attacked his chances of escaping death or serious injury are 
remote.39 
 
 He warned, however, that to increase the high explosive content of bomb 
loads at the expense of incendiaries, risked falling between two stools.  Material 
destruction would be reduced and the density of attack so attenuated that the risk 
of death to individuals on the ground would be so lowered that the attack would fail 
to produce any significant impact on morale.  In order to have an impact on morale 
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it was essential, he argued, that it was made only when “conditions are favourable.  
The attack should be launched at maximum intensity, on a short term basis, in the 
manner best calculated to affect morale.”40 
 Berlin, Bufton agreed, provided the ideal target.  It possessed the political 
and traditional associations, had a large working population drawn from all regions 
of Germany, and was the premier headquarters for the Wehrmacht.    However, he 
cautioned, Thunderclap should not be launched until  
 
 The state of morale in Germany is considered to have deteriorated 
sufficiently; or when the need for retaliation demands.  The 
effectiveness of such an attack might be increased by bringing in 
the 15th Air Force [and] Following it up at night with an all 
incendiary attack by Bomber Command, on the heaviest scale, on 
the remainder of the city.41  
 
Bufton’s inclusion of the 15th Air Force in the proposed Thunderclap operation is 
somewhat surprising because, while they continued to operate from bases near 
Foggia, Berlin was outside their range.  However, in a note to Bottomley on 22 
January 1945 he indicated that “The attack on Berlin by U.K. based bombers 
might be supplemented by a simultaneous attack from the Mediterranean on 
Breslau or Munich.”42 
 Late in August 1944, with the strategic bomber forces still operating under 
the authority of Eisenhower and Tedder, Bufton, who apparently had had a change 
of mind, again broached the subject of Operation Thunderclap.  Its main purpose, 
he affirmed, was to  
 
precipitate the capitulation of the German High Command.  If the 
operation should succeed in curtailing the duration of the war by 
even a few weeks it would save many thousands of Allied 
casualties and would justify itself many times over.43    
 
 Thunderclap, Bufton confirmed, aimed at the total destruction of the 
administrative and government centre of the German capital.  The calls for 
revenge occasioned by the flying bomb attacks were forgotten; the Allied armies 
were building up even if apparently stalled; and Montgomery was preparing for 
Operation Market Garden.44   Notwithstanding Bufton’s enthusiasm, Thunderclap 
was temporarily shelved.  Perhaps the moment had been missed.  Who knows 
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what might have happened had Thunderclap taken place on 20 July 1944, at the 
time of Hitler’s attempted assassination? 
 Bufton’s apparent sudden conversion to the support of Thunderclap was a 
significant departure from his long-held view that the destruction of precision 
targets was the path to victory.  Unfortunately, no material has been located that 
provides any convincing reason for his change of mind.  Morley, perhaps provides 
two reasons in a letter he wrote in October 1944.  As a postscript, he had 
admitted,  
 
You will no doubt be surprised to hear Sydney B and myself 
proposing area bombing, but we believe the stage if [sic] set ‘just 
right.’  Things are bad inside Germany and we are proposing true 
morale bombing, that is 2,000 tons of H.E. per square mile not 100 
to 200 tons as of old containing 50% of more of incendiaries  . . .  
If we do not win this war in the next 60 or so days trying to get oil 
down, in the winter, we may be faced with a considerably stronger 
G.A.F. next Spring!45
  
 Perhaps Bufton, late in 1944, had come to believe that the Allies now 
possessed the bomber strength capable of delivering the blow envisaged by Portal 
in his Note of 3 November 1942.  In this Note Portal had described the destruction 
and death that he believed a heavy bomber force of between 4,000 and 6,000 
heavy bombers could create to Germany and its people.46   Terraine, in The Right 
of the Line, was severely critical of what he described as the “fearful proof of faulty 
Intelligence and wishful thinking to misguided strategy. . . . One thing emerges 
with absolute clarity: this was a prescription for massacre, nothing more nothing 
less.”47  
 Bufton, in a letter to a friend in 1987, was equally critical of what he 
believed was Terraine’s misinterpretation of Portal’s Note.  He argued that  
the intention was to use the force in the attack of specific precision 
targets . . . the Pathfinder Force had been formed just over two 
months earlier with that in mind.  However, to convince the Chiefs 
of Staff, the arguments used in Portal’s paper had to be virtually 
unassailable as to fact . . . The projected effects on Germany of a 
4,000-6,000 bomber force was a mathematical scaling-up on a 
bomb tonnage basis.  It was never the intention to bash houses 
and kill civilians, but knock out key industrial targets . . . I know 
because I wrote the paper!48 
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 Another possible reason for Bufton’s apparent conversion is that by late 
autumn 1944 there was widespread fear that should Germany survive the winter, 
victory might be harder to achieve in the spring and summer of 1945 than 
appeared possible in October 1944.  Thus, in order to prevent Germany’s survival, 
any plan that offered the possibility of early victory warranted close examination.  
His conversion displays the flexibility he possessed with regard to the best ways of 
conducting the bomber war ─ he was adaptable. 
 Another indication that perhaps Bufton was not wedded firmly to any belief 
in Operation Thunderclap is that although there was discussion at the second 
meeting of the C.S.T.C. concerning the preparation of a “plan under which the 
Strategical Bomber Forces could best contribute to ending the war within 60 
days,”49  the subject was not discussed in any of the next twenty-six meetings. 
Bufton’s opinion expressed at this second meeting was that the  
 
continued and indeed intensified attacks on oil targets would prove 
by far the most effective way in which the Strategical Bomber 
Forces could contribute to breaking German resistance within the 
next few months.50
 
  American support for Thunderclap can best be described as ambivalent.  In 
August 1941 when drawing up Air War Plan Division Number One (AWPD/1), 
Spaatz, Arnold, George C Marshall (the US Army Chief of Staff), Henry L Stimson 
(Secretary of War), and President Roosevelt, unanimously approved a bombing 
programme which had, as fifth priority, area attacks on urban districts in German 
cities.  Admittedly there was a proviso.  This was that “Only when the industrial 
fabric of Germany began to crack should the AAF turn to area bombing of cities for 
morale purposes.”51   The term ‘area bombing’ later became anathema to several 
American bomber commanders.  Arnold, for one, aware of American public 
opinion following the second Schweinfurt attack, approved bombing through cloud 
using H2X (the American equivalent of the British H2S).  It amounted to approving 
area attacks but he insisted that they be described employing such euphemistic 
terms as ‘overcast bombing technique’ or, ‘bombing through overcast.’52
 Eisenhower, perhaps more au fait with the requirements of total war, 
displayed greater understanding.  He admitted that he was prepared “to take part 
in anything that gives real promise to end the war quickly.”53   He also offered 
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Spaatz a limited promise by asserting that “The policies under which you are now 
operating will be unchanged unless in my opinion an opportunity arises where a 
sudden and devastating blow may have an incalculable effect.”54  Eisenhower, 
however, was flexible.  Early in September 1944 he instructed Spaatz to have 
Major General James Doolittle, the Eighth Air Force Commander, prepare his 
force for an indiscriminate attack on Berlin when ordered.  No recognisable 
opportunity would have appeared to have arisen so perhaps this latest instruction 
from Eisenhower was an expression of his concern at the stalemate that appeared 
to have developed on the Western Front. 
 Senior American Air Force officers in Europe including General Laurence 
Kuter, the USAAF Assistant Chief of Air Plans, and Generals Spaatz and Eaker, 
together with General H H Arnold in Washington, all went to considerable lengths 
to avoid being coupled with Bomber Command in area attacks.  They hoped that 
their protestations of attacking military, rather than civilian targets, would receive 
wide commendation.  Their claims, however, all too often differed widely from their 
practice.  American bombing was also carried out by units ─ when the formation 
leader released his bombs, the group he was leading released theirs.  As  a 
consequence their bomb distribution was widespread, unlike Bomber Command 
where each bomb load was aimed individually.  In Europe, the frequent American 
H2X attacks on targets identified as communications centres were, in reality, area 
bombing of German cities and were significantly less accurate than the blind 
bombing carried out by Bomber Command.  Likewise, in the Pacific theatre, 
General Curtiss LeMay waged a remorseless area bombing campaign against 
Japanese cities, totally ignoring his radical departure, at least from American 
European doctrine.  He pulled no punches.  Of one attack, he noted, “If the war is 
shortened by a single day, the attack will have served its purpose.”55   
 As a result of the unwillingness of the Americans to participate in 
Thunderclap ─ denounced as “terroristic” by the Psychological Warfare Division of 
SHAEF56 ─ coupled with the disagreements between the Air Staff and Harris, a 
slight blurring appears to have developed between Thunderclap and another 
operation under consideration, Hurricane.   This latter operation was not 
developed with the intention of providing a final, shattering blow to German 
morale.  The purpose was rather to select a vital German target system and then 
employ the maximum effort of the Strategic Bomber Forces to deliver a massive 
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blow.  It was to be a display of Allied air power.  Morale, despite the obvious 
linkage, was but an incidental target. 
 Under the terms of the Directive issued to Spaatz and Harris on 25 
September 1944, the German petroleum industry had been accorded first priority.  
In second priority were the German rail and water transport systems, tank 
production plants, and motor transport production plants and depots.  Harris had 
operated under similar Directives previously but remained aware that he had been 
provided every opportunity to continue his assault against German cities and their 
inhabitants.   
 On 30 September 1944 Bufton chaired a meeting to consider the 
immediate employment of Allied Air Forces in Operation Hurricane.  Although it 
was generally agreed at the meeting that oil provided the best target system, the 
American representatives and their British counterparts differed as to how it should 
be attacked.   The Americans were anxious to spread attacks across Germany, 
while Bufton, in particular, wanted both Commands to concentrate on Ruhr oil 
targets.  In his summation, Bufton suggested that “the Ruhr appeared to be the 
only place where the concentration in time and space required for the proposed 
operation could be effected.”57     It was agreed that the Americans would attack 
Ruhr oil plants while Bomber Command concentrated on “selected fully built-up 
areas in the Ruhr cities which had not as yet been appreciably damaged.”58   The 
aim was to display to the enemy the massive air power that the Allies now 
possessed.  Enemy morale, clearly, was still considered to be a target. 
 Harris, however, who had not participated in the 30 September meeting, 
had no desire for his bombers to return to the Ruhr.  As far as he was concerned 
the Ruhr was no longer a target as its cities were included among the forty-five 
that he described as having been destroyed.  He admitted that, because of 
diversions during the previous six months, some necessary but others avoidable, 
the German cities had been granted considerable breathing space.  Now is the 
time, he advised Churchill, that “We should . . . get on and knock Germany finally 
flat.  For the first time we have the force to do it.  Opportunities do not last for ever 
and this one is slipping.”59 
Churchill agreed with what he described as Harris’s “very good letter” and 
declared that he was “all for cracking everything in now on to Germany that can be 
spared from the battlefields.”60 
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 Inglis, however, was opposed to any operation directed at German morale.  
His argument was that even further weakening of enemy morale would not 
necessarily lead to a shortening of the war.  He did agree, however, that an attack 
on the Ruhr would intensify German administrative problems.  He expressed one 
reservation.  Because of damage already created, and the industrial dispersal that 
had occurred, he was not entirely convinced that the Ruhr still formed an important 
part of the German industrial machine.  His final point was that further area 
bombing could create political problems in the post-war era.  He even envisaged 
the majority of Germans possibly preferring the Russians, who had not bombed 
them, to the Allies, who had!61 
 This latter suggestion, and the possible consequences, were rejected by 
Bufton who asserted that he was not empowered to argue policy taking into 
account the post-war effects of any operation.  He observed that it was somewhat 
late in the day to have to consider German attitudes regarding strategic bombing.  
Operation Hurricane, he noted, was to focus Bomber Command’s attention on one 
specific area, employing high explosive bombs rather than incendiaries, but was 
not otherwise attempting to establish any new form of area attack.62 
 Early in October 1944, Group Captain Morley, who had earlier worked with 
Bufton in the Directorate of Bomber Operations but was now with Tedder in 
SHAEF, wrote to one of his American opposite numbers.  Morley confirmed that 
he supported concentrated bombing in the Ruhr area.  It was, he claimed, 
preferable to dispersal of effort.  Conditions in Germany are bad, he continued, 
and we are hoping to make them worse.  This latest proposition, he argued, was 
true morale bombing.  “We are” he concluded, “out for short not long term effect 
and we must concentrate our mighty combined air strength and superiority in 
SPACE as well as TIME.63  
 On 13 October 1944 a Directive was issued to Harris, Spaatz, and Tedder, 
outlining special operations Hurricane I and Hurricane II.  The first called for a 
maximum effort assault, in visual conditions, by British and American bombers 
against objectives in the densely populated Ruhr.  Hurricane II provided for 
maximum effort assaults, again in visual conditions, against precision targets – oil 
was specified – in Germany.  Both operations were designed to “demonstrate to 
the enemy in Germany generally the overwhelming superiority of the Allied Air 
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Forces in this theatre.”64   As such, they were clearly designed to be attempts to 
reduce German morale. 
 According to Robin Neillands, Operation Hurricane was first implemented 
on 14 October 1944 in a heavy daylight attack on Duisburg by RAF Bomber 
Command.65   However, it is now impossible to differentiate this attack from all the 
other area attacks carried out by Bomber Command against German cities at this 
stage of the war.  It certainly did not fit the criteria as set out in the Directive for 
Operation Hurricane as the Americans did not participate, neither was the raid in 
visual conditions.66   Another RAF historian noted that this attack “most closely 
resembled” the planned Hurricane attacks, but went no further.67   Later in October 
Operation Hurricane joined Thunderclap on the shelf, but neither was completely 
forgotten.  
 With the war continuing into 1945, and following the failure of the German 
Ardennes offensive combined with Russian successes on the Eastern Front, it 
appeared to some an opportune time to reconsider the possibility of implementing 
Thunderclap.  Morley, at Tedder’s Headquarters, was among the first.  In January 
he called for an immediate reconsideration of the plan.  “That this operation is an 
attack on enemy morale” he observed, “needs no apology.”68   
 The following day Bufton made the same appeal to Bottomley.  In 
forwarding the Thunderclap file to the DCAS, he suggested that with the Russian 
advance showing no signs of losing momentum, the launching of such an attack 
would at least provide the appearance that there was an integrated plan for both 
Eastern and Western Fronts.  There was a strong chance, he argued, that  
 
if the operation were launched at a time when there was still no 
obvious slackening in the momentum of the Russian drive, it might 
well have the appearance of a closer coordination in planning 
between the Russians and ourselves.69 
 
Were the German authorities to accept such an inference, Bufton asserted, a 
heavy attack on Berlin, supplemented by attacks on Breslau and Munich from 
Mediterranean based bombers, “would greatly increase the moral effect of both 
operations.”70   His argument was that any delay, or should the Russian advance 
lose its impetus, or should the Germans stabilise the front, would mean missing 
the psychological moment. 
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 Bufton, as the alternate chairman of the C.S.T.C., was ideally placed to 
pursue the question of either Hurricane or Thunderclap at their regular meetings, 
but apparently declined the opportunity.  Instead, as noted earlier, in the following 
twenty-six meetings, concentration was centred largely on the targets nominated 
in the current Directive.   
 Portal, perhaps somewhat overborne by the forthcoming Yalta 
Conference, responded negatively.  The moon, he pointed out, was in the wrong 
phase, and it would therefore be necessary to wait for darker nights.  Moreover, 
the winter weather conditions made it unlikely that the bomber forces would be 
granted four nights in quick succession to carry out effective attacks.  “It is 
certainly not worth while” he argued, “to undertake large scale bombing of 
communications in the hope of delaying the West-East passage of German 
reinforcements to the Eastern Front.”71   But, he added, subject to the proviso that 
oil and other agreed target systems were not neglected, a big attack should be 
carried out against Berlin, accompanied by attacks on Dresden, Leipzig, and 
Chemnitz.  Additional attacks, he continued, should also be carried against “any 
other cities where a severe blitz will not only cause confusion in the evacuation 
from the East but will also hamper the movement of troops from the West.” 72  
 Early in 1945, Portal, of course, was operating under considerable strain.  
Harris was riding one of his favourite hobby horses and a lengthy, and at times 
acrimonious, correspondence between himself and the CAS was under way.  Oil 
was the prime topic, but Harris was also arguing that he should have a greater say 
in determining bombing policy.73   On this occasion he received short shrift from 
Portal who concluded, “I feel it would be quite inappropriate and indeed 
impracticable for you to be consulted directly in the examination of individual 
targets.”74 
 The British Joint Intelligence Committee supported Bufton’s view that this 
was the appropriate moment to implement Thunderclap.  Their acceptance of the 
operation was not because they believed that it would have any direct bearing on 
German morale, but rather because it would considerably assist the Russian 
offensive.  They saw it as creating confusion, interfering with reinforcement of the 
Eastern Front, and confounding both the German military and administrative 
machinery.  As the attack on Berlin is to be “primarily for morale and psychological 
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effect it is important that it should be delivered with that aim in mind and not 
spread amongst the outlying suburbs.”75  
 On receipt of Portal’s note of 26 January 1945 suggesting heavy attacks 
on Berlin and other cities in Eastern Germany, Bottomley, who was acting CAS in 
Portal’s absence, telephoned Harris.  The latter confirmed that a heavy attack on 
Berlin was planned once the moon had waned and also offered no objection to his 
bomber force undertaking operations against Eastern German cities because, up 
until now, they had been little affected by his area bombing campaign.   Chemnitz, 
Leipzig and Dresden were seen as legitimate communication targets.  Attacks on 
them would also create administrative problems because these cities were all 
trying to come to terms with an enormous influx of refugees from both east and 
west.  
 Despite Bomber Command having at least temporarily drawn back from an 
immediate Thunderclap-weight assault on Berlin, the Americans continued with 
their planning.  Their motives have never been clearly explained.  Certainly there 
had been pressure from the Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, but 
perhaps it was the desire to display to the Russians the enormous air power that 
America now possessed.  Alternatively, it could have been in response to some 
oblique call from the Russians to provide an effective diversion to remove pressure 
from the hard-pressed Russian forces.  Perhaps, also, some consideration may 
have been given to possible post-war problems and the need to display to Russia 
that America was not a force to be ignored in the future.    
 On 30 January 1945 Doolittle, the Eighth Air Force Commander, advised 
Spaatz that his force was prepared for Operation Thunderclap.   Spaatz, who had 
earlier opposed Thunderclap, had now become, in the case of Berlin, a fervent 
supporter.76  Doolittle was the one now questioning the need to bomb a city where 
there were no military targets in the vicinity of the nominated aiming point ─ the 
city centre.  He reminded Spaatz that “The chances of terrorizing into submission, 
by merely an increased concentration of bombing, a people who have been 
subjected to intense bombing for four years is extremely remote.”77   Spaatz 
remained adamant and instructed Doolittle that Berlin was to be attacked 
“whenever conditions do not repeat not indicate possibility of visual bombing of oil 
targets.”78  
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 Spaatz’s motives have never been clearly defined.  He sought publicity for 
the Thunderclap attack on Berlin and stressed the need to display that it was an 
effort to disrupt the flow of reinforcements to the Russian Front as well as increase 
administration confusion in Berlin.  Nevertheless, it might, in Spaatz’s mind, have 
had an element of an attack on morale because, despite Doolittle’s request to be 
allowed to attack important rail targets in Berlin, Spaatz had insisted that the 
centre of Berlin was the aiming point.  Perhaps he still harboured at least a slight 
belief that the American Air Force could carry out a coup de main sufficient to 
create conditions in Berlin where the authorities believed that there was no option 
but to surrender. 
 Berlin was attacked on 3 February 1945 by more than 1,000 American 
heavy bombers and the centre of the city was bombed using visual methods.  
Bomber Command provided no follow-up. 
 In the meantime Churchill had again become involved in the bombing 
question.  His concerns may have been both military and political.  Politically, he 
may have considered it desirable to display to Stalin, at Yalta, the strength of the 
Anglo-Russian alliance.  On the other hand, he may have wanted the Russian 
leader to be fully aware of the enormous capability of Allied air power.  On 25 
January 1945 he had a discussion with Sinclair, the Secretary of State for Air.  
Sinclair’s understanding was that he had been asked what air plans had been 
made to harass the Germans in their retreat from Breslau.  His response to 
Churchill, following a discussion with Portal, was cautious. He concluded: “the 
possibility of these attacks being delivered on the scale necessary to have a 
critical effect on  the situation in Eastern Germany is now under examination.”79 
 Churchill’s response, the same day, was sharp and to the point.  He 
protested: 
 
I did not ask you last night about plans for harrying the German 
retreat from Breslau.  On the contrary, I asked whether Berlin, and 
no doubt other large cities in East Germany, should not now be 
considered especially attractive targets.  I am glad this is ‘under 
examination.’  Pray report to me  tomorrow what is going to 
be done.80  
  
 In reply, the next day, Sinclair assured Churchill that every effort would be 
directed against Berlin, Dresden, Chemnitz, and Leipzig, “subject to the overriding 
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claims of attacks on enemy oil production and other approved target systems 
within the current directive.”81   Harris, he concluded, “has undertaken to attempt 
this task as soon as the present moon has waned and favourable weather 
conditions allow.”82 Bottomley contacted Harris the same day.  He reminded 
Harris of their telephone conversation the previous day relating to the projected 
attacks on industrial areas in eastern German cities.  He informed Harris that 
Portal was opposed to an attack on Berlin on a Thunderclap scale, because he 
doubted that it would be successful.  Instead, Harris was advised that he was to 
carry out  
 
one big attack on Berlin and related attacks on Dresden, Leipzig, 
Chemnitz or any other cities where a severe blitz will not only 
cause confusion in the evacuation from the East but will also 
hamper the movement of troops from the West.”83 
 
  
 In effect, this was a direct order to Harris.  The Directive under which he 
was then operating, Directive No 3 for the Strategic Air Forces in Europe, dated 15 
January 1945, simply stated that oil was the first priority, and communications the 
second.84  Should  weather  prevent  attacks  on  these targets, then attacks were 
to be delivered against industrial areas, employing blind bombing techniques, if 
necessary. 
 On 31 January 1945 Bottomley advised Portal, who was then in Malta 
preparing for the Yalta Conference, of the decisions made.  The preamble to his 
signal is interesting because it could be interpreted that responsibility for the 
decisions was being side-stepped.  “You will wish to know” Bottomley advised, 
“that following your talk with Spaatz and myself and as a result of discussions with 
Tedder, we have arrived at the following order of priorities for Strategic Air Forces 
to meet the present situation.”85   The generic ‘we’ employed by Bottomley was not 
identified. 
 The other point of note in this signal is that it also varied the target priority 
order.  While oil remained first, Berlin and two or three cities in east Germany, 
including Dresden, had moved to second priority.  Communications were now 
third.  With regard to Berlin and eastern German cities, the requirement was for 
heavy attacks which “will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the 
 370
East and hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts.“86    The 
enigmatic ending to this sub-paragraph, had a sombre ring:  “You know the 
intentions of Bomber Command.”87   Clearly, enemy morale remained firmly in 
many British sights; it offered, they believed, a way to bring the war to an end.  
Meanwhile, the Americans continued to be somewhat ambivalent.    
 On the night of 13/14 February 1945, Dresden was attacked by 796 
Lancasters and nine Mosquitoes.  The next day, the railway marshalling yards in 
Dresden were attacked by 461 B-17s of the American Air Force.  These two 
attacks have often been misinterpreted as being part of Operation Thunderclap.  
They were not.  For the Royal Air Force it was simply a continuation of the area 
bombing programme, long accepted and encouraged by the Government, Service 
chiefs, and the general public.  It was also a positive response to the demands of 
Churchill himself, who had specified eastern German cities as targets worthy of 
Bomber Command’s attention.  The forces of nature combined again on this 
occasion, as they had at Hamburg, and a fire storm engulfed Dresden creating 
casualties that remain a debating point.  Churchill speedily removed himself from 
the developing and on-going controversy.   
 No further official correspondence has been located referring to attacks on 
German civilian morale dated after the Dresden raid.  There was, however, very 
considerable analysis, criticism, and commentary, relating to the attack, which has 
been on-going.88   Churchill, on 28 March 1945, his political hat now firmly in 
place, issued possibly his “least felicitous”89 Personal Telegram of the entire war.  
Addressed to General Ismay for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Portal, it 
declared:  
the moment has come when the question of  bombing German 
cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under 
other pretexts, should be reviewed . . . .The destruction of Dresden 
remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing.  I 
am of the opinion that military objectives must henceforward be 
more strictly studied in our own interests rather than that of the 
enemy. 90    
 
Oil and communications targets, he concluded, required greater attention rather 
than “mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.”91 
Bottomley contacted Harris the same day.  Churchill’s note, he argued, mis-
interprets the purpose of our attacks on industrial areas in the past and appears to 
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ignore the aim given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their directives which have 
been blessed by the Heads of Governments.92   
 Because the matter was to be considered by the COS, and the Defence 
Committee, the next week, Harris’s views were requested. Although he had not 
seen the telegram, Harris was not impressed.  The quoted passages were, he 
protested,  
 
abusive in effect, though doubtless not in intention . . . to speak of 
our offensive as including ‘mere acts of terror and wanton 
destruction’ is an insult both to the bombing policy of the Air Ministry 
and to the manner in which that policy has been executed by 
Bomber Command.  This sort of thing if it deserves an answer will 
certainly receive none from me, after three years of implementing 
official policy.93  
  
Despite his disclaimer, Harris then continued, for just over three pages, to justify 
his actions.  His Directive, he insisted, could only be carried out by the destruction 
of industrial cities.  He cited five letters confirming his interpretation of his 
Directive:   
 
We have never gone in for terror bombing and the attacks which we 
have made in accordance with my Directive have in fact produced 
the strategic consequences for which they were designed and from 
which the Armies now profit.94  
 
Have we now completed our task, he asked?  Until I am so informed, he warned, 
the strategic bombing of German cities will continue.  What about Japan?  “Are we 
going to bomb their cities flat” he questioned, “or are we going to bomb only 
outlying factories and subsequently invade at the cost of 3 to 6 million casualties? 
We should be careful of precedents.”95
On 29 March 1945, at a Staff Conference, Churchill agreed to withdraw his 
minute of the previous day.  The Chief of Staff to the Ministry of Defence, 
Lieutenant- General Sir Hastings Ismay, was instructed to redraft the minute, “in 
less rough terms,”96  for Churchill’s consideration.  On 1 April a revised version of 
Churchill’s minute appeared.  It was certainly couched in more acceptable terms.  
It concluded, “We must see to it that our attacks do not do more harm to ourselves 
in the long run than they do to the enemy’s immediate war effort.”97
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 Later the same month, on 5 April, Portal and the Chiefs of Staff sent a 
message to Churchill, defining future policy.  Bombing of industrial areas, simply to 
create destruction or disorganisation, would end, he was told.  However, the 
current Directive, providing for area bombing, would remain unchanged.  Churchill 
was advised that “Any ultimate political or economic disadvantages of area 
bombing necessitated by these operations should be accepted.”98   He initialled 
the paper, without comment. 
 The British attack on German morale was initially directed primarily against 
the German industrial labour force.  Had they decided to lay down their tools or 
desert their work benches, then neither Hitler nor his enforcers could have done 
anything and the war for Germany would have been lost.  Unfortunately, the British 
authorities who decided on an attack on German morale made two basic mistakes.  
They under-estimated the resilience of the German people, and they over-
estimated the destructive capability of their bomber force. 
 During the Second World War aerial bombs were a much less 
discriminating weapon than they have since become.  Unless total population 
evacuation had been accomplished in the German cities, it was inevitable that 
women and children would die.  Their presence and their consequent deaths, 
whether deliberate or the incidental accompaniment to all-out war, was one 
element identified by Harris that would assist in attaining victory.  His was not a 
unilateral decision.  He had won Churchill’s sustained support with his Operation 
Millenium in May 1942 but the Prime Minister, even then, had already cleared the 
way.   In a radio broadcast earlier that month he informed the German people that 
the RAF intended to bomb every city in which vital industries supplying the 
German war machine were established.  He warned the German people that their 
only escape was to “leave the cities where munition work is being carried on, 
abandon their work and go out into the fields and watch the home fires burning 
from a distance.”99   His inference was, keep working and you will be killed. 
German morale was accepted by Harris as a viable and susceptible target.  
Thus Harris employed area bombing to attack the German national will perhaps 
rather more than the publicised reason ─ the destruction of the industrial and 
military complexes which provided the means of making war. 
Harris was steadfast in his continuation of area bombing throughout the war 
and increasingly resented any attempt by what he called ‘panacea mongers’ to 
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divert either him or his aims.  He also grew increasingly critical of what he called 
the Air Ministry’s failure to publicly acknowledge what he claimed was the true aim 
of the area offensive.  His letters to Street were both pungent and frequent.  In 
December 1943, it will be recalled, Street had advised him that that public 
utterances were designed to not provoke public controversy and to avoid conflict 
with religious and humanitarian opinion.100   As far as Harris was concerned this 
definition, for such a serious matter, clarified nothing.  He made clear that German 
cities and everything and everybody in them who provided any assistance to the 
German war effort were targets for Bomber Command.  He demanded that the 
truth, unpleasant as it may be to some, be told.101  
As early as April 1942, it will be remembered, Harris had claimed that it 
would be necessary “to kill a lot of Boche before we win this war.”102   Perhaps 
these were the parameters he employed when he launched his area attacks on 
Dresden on the night of 13/14 February 1945; Pforzheim on the night of 23/24 
February 1945; and Würzburg on the night of 16/17 March 1945.  With regard to 
Dresden, Harris never displayed any evidence of contrition.  The outcry that 
eventually erupted, he believed,  
 
could be easily explained by any psychiatrist.  Actually Dresden was 
a mass of munition works, an intact government centre, and a key 
transportation point to the East.  It is now none of those things.103   
 
 He made no specific comments concerning either Pforzheim or Würzburg 
although one claim that in Pforzheim “almost every house was a small workshop 
engaged on war production”104  was surely at least debatable.  What were the 
people making, and where were the military units who required what had been 
made?  
  Post-war, Harris claimed one victory.  “Bombing” he argued,  
 
proved a comparatively humane method.  For one thing it saved the 
flower of the youth of this country and of our allies from being mown 
down by the military in the field as it was in Flanders in the war of 
1914-1918.105 
 
 It must also be acknowledged that Harris’s area campaign could never have 
been maintained without at least the tacit consent of both Portal and Churchill.  
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Harris was their chosen agent.  Portal, at least by 1944, had recognised that 
Bomber Command had become a potent weapon, better and more productively 
employed provided Harris could be convinced that it was capable of delivering 
accurate and destructive precision attacks.  Harris, however, remained 
unconvinced but Portal made no effort to replace him and this is a mark against 
his leadership abilities.  Churchill was a longer-term supporter of the area bombing 
campaign but even he, in February 1945, recognised the error of Harris’s way.  His 
failure to acknowledge even a modicum of blame marks him as a lesser man. 
 The last major raid of the war on a German city was delivered against 
Potsdam on the night of 14/15 April.  The aiming point was the city centre.  
However, the die had been cast.  Bomber Command received no invitation to 
attend surrender ceremonies; Tedder went as Eisenhower’s representative to 
Berlin, seen by Eisenhower as a largely Russian affair.  Churchill sent a personal 
message of thanks to Harris at the end of the war, but Bomber Command received 
no word of praise during Churchill’s victory speech; the efforts and sacrifices went 
unremarked.  Perhaps it was an indication of the regret that Churchill, as Minister 
of Defence, above Portal and the other two Chiefs of Staff, now had about the 
long, bitter, and costly, strategic air offensive.  It was an unworthy conclusion. 
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Chapter Nine 
 
Conclusions 
 
It has been argued in this thesis that disagreements between the Air Staff 
and Harris meant that much of the enormous power available to Bomber 
Command by 1944 was misapplied and, as a consequence, the war was 
prolonged into 1945.  Although many of the organisational and equipment 
deficiencies which had plagued the Command until early 1942 had diminished by 
the time of Harris’s assumption of authority in February of that year, many 
difficulties still remained: heavy bomber shortages was but one.  Nevertheless, 
although that particular handicap had also largely been overcome by 1944, 
European weather conditions continued throughout the war to place restrictions on 
bombing operations and frequently determined the targets that could be attacked.    
As Harris made clear, what may have been operationally desirable was not always 
tactically possible.  But, even so, by 1944 any remaining organisational and 
equipment deficiencies were largely subordinated by the differences that had 
arisen between the Air Staff and Harris, which Portal had allowed to develop, 
relating to bombing policy.  Harris’s inflexibility coupled with his inability or 
unwillingness to critically examine the aims and results of his self-determined area 
bombing programme, in combination with Portal’s failure to exert his authority, 
meant that Bomber Command implemented the bombing policy largely decided by 
Harris rather than that required by the Air Staff.    
It was this unwarranted dominance that Air Commodore Bufton fought so 
hard to overcome.  His battles with Harris over bomb loads, the Path Finder Force, 
Schweinfurt, Overlord, enemy morale, and oil, were in reality, Air Staff’s battles.  
His aim was to have the bomber commander follow the path determined by the Air 
Staff rather than that mapped out by Harris.  Bufton, as a trusted adviser to Portal, 
and occasionally Churchill, played a prominent role but he was never in a position 
to actually determine bombing policy.  He could advise, recommend, and suggest, 
but he could never order, and Harris’s failure to appreciate this fact was the cause 
of considerable rancour on his part.  No matter who signed the Air Staff paper 
addressed to Harris, many of them drafted by Bufton, Portal had the ultimate 
responsibility.  Portal, unlike Harris, accepted advice and on that counsel 
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determined bombing policy.  His decisions, however, as we have seen, were rarely 
unilateral. 
When Harris became AOC-in-C Bomber Command in 1942 he had a plan 
which he was confident would win the war: his bombers would blast and burn 
Germany’s leading cities, destroy the industry they contained, kill the populace, 
and so lower morale that German calls to end the carnage would be irresistible.   
Bomber Command in 1942 possessed very few options but the display that Harris 
provided with the 1,000 bomber attack on Cologne in May 1942 won him not only 
the support of both Portal and Churchill but also confirmed that Bomber Command 
remained a vital element of Britain’s armed forces.  By 1943, Portal, considerably 
less inflexible than Harris, had come to appreciate that other options were now 
available to Bomber Command.  His vision was that better results would be 
achieved by the employment of the bomber force as a rapier rather than the 
bludgeon perceived by Harris.  Portal’s bombing philosophy had changed; Harris’s 
remained constant and that was the root of all the problems discussed in this work.  
Portal identified many ways in which Bomber Command could assist in helping to 
achieve victory; Harris continued to argue that victory would come his way and 
that his was the only way.  Thus the stage was set for the arguments between the 
Air Staff and Harris, culminating in the oil differences in 1945, which so blighted 
relations between two elements of the Royal Air Force which should have been 
working in harmony.    
Successive chapters have examined in detail particular facets of the 
strategic bomber offensive.  Here it is necessary to summarise the relationship 
between Air Ministry staff, Sir Arthur Harris, and others involved in both strategic 
and tactical decisions relating to the bomber war.  In a conflict in an ideal world, 
the Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the War Cabinet, would reach agreement 
on the broad strategic objectives to be attained by the bomber forces.  Assuming 
that the Air Staff agreed that the bomber forces available were adequate for the 
task, these objectives would then be translated by the Air Staff, employing clear 
and concise bombing directives, into specific targets for attack by the bomber 
forces. Unfortunately, bombing directives, throughout the war, were an on-going 
cause for concern. After the problems of distribution and dissemination had been 
overcome they still, all too often, lacked precision.   
 383
Harris’s actions in relation to both the Casablanca and Pointblank 
Directives, issued in 1943, merit close consideration.  The broad aim of both 
Directives was “the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 
industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German 
people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”1   
The primary task for the Eighth Air Force, as defined in Pointblank, was the 
reduction of German Air Force fighter strength.  Bomber Command was to 
continue with the general disorganisation of German industry, but their operations, 
as far as practicable, were to be “complementary to the operations of the Eighth 
Air Force.”2   The next paragraph in the Directive detailed the tasks: devastation of 
air-frame, engine and component factories; disorganisation of industrial areas 
associated with these industries; destruction of aircraft repair depots, storage 
parks and of fighters on the ground.   
The intention of the Directive should have been clear to Harris.  He, 
however, chose to advise the Air Ministry, by subtle rewording, that Bomber 
Command’s primary objective was enemy morale.3   It appears that Harris’s 
contrived obtuseness went unnoticed by the Air Staff; in any case, no action was 
taken relating to his unauthorised revision of the Directive. 
Directives were, of course, the responsibility of the Air Staff and they must 
bear the responsibility for any looseness of wording which allowed the intention of 
the instruction to be avoided.  It was also the Air Staff’s duty to ensure that 
misinterpretations, accidental or deliberate, were brought to the attention of the 
responsible officer and corrections made. Harris on too many occasions was left 
unchecked. 
By 1943 of course, Harris was in a unique position.  Churchill, aware that 
Bomber Command was the only British military arm capable of significantly taking 
the war to the enemy, had become his champion.  Two factors were responsible.  
Firstly, Churchill, cognizant of military deficiencies, was anxious to forestall 
discussions relating to considerations for a second front.  Secondly, he had been 
won over, in the early summer of 1942, by the propaganda success achieved by 
Harris with his 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne. Chequers, Churchill’s residence, 
Bomber Command Headquarters at High Wycombe, and Harris’s residence, 
Springfield, in the village of Great Kingshall, were in close proximity.  The fact that 
they were almost neighbours enabled Harris to enjoy frequent and regular 
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personal contact with the Prime Minister.  Few have seen fit to criticise this 
relationship as improper, in the military sense, yet Harris, by making decisions 
without reference to his superiors in the Air Ministry, but doubtless encouraged by 
Churchill, was clearly short-circuiting military protocol. 
In his biography of Harris, Probert agreed.  His opinion was that “It was of 
course a highly unusual relationship cutting across all the conventional lines of 
command and responsibility.”4   However, he rejected the opinion of De Groot, 
Sinclair’s biographer, who claimed that “the Prime Minister essentially allowed 
Harris to wage a private war.”5   But others have demurred at Probert’s 
assessment.  Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McCloughrey believed that “His entree to 
the Prime Minister . . . gave Harris the power to bully and often to dictate to the Air 
Ministry.”6   Bufton was somewhat more restrained.  He commented:   
 
Bert Harris had ready access to the Prime Minister . . . and it is my 
belief  that with the support of Lord Cherwell he had some backing 
from the Prime Minister for his private war of city bashing.  This 
support did not last  for ever and was never overt support . . . but it 
strained relations with the  CAS, diminished confidence, and made 
it difficult for the CAS to keep too  tight a rein, except on major 
issues.7  
 
Although Churchill’s support for Harris fell away markedly during 1944, and 
ended abruptly following the Dresden attack in February 1945, his earlier apparent 
empathy with the AOC Bomber Command led some to believe that Harris had 
indeed been given a licence to wage a private war.  Perhaps Churchill had early 
recognised that Harris’s personality matched his own. Both were reluctant to take 
advice and responded angrily when they believed obstructions were being placed 
in their path. The effects of the Churchill/Harris relationship were long lasting.  
Perhaps, even by late 1944, Bomber Command had the capacity to bring an early 
end to the war, but the effort at that time was divided.  While the Air Staff argued 
for an all-out oil offensive, Harris largely continued with his area bombing 
programme.    Despite Portal’s best efforts, Harris persisted with his area bombing 
programme in 1945, and once again the opportunity to possibly bring the war to an 
early close was lost. 
The first major conflict that the Air Staff (in the form of Bufton initially) had 
with Harris, related to the formation of the Path Finder Force.  Harris was wrong in 
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opposing its formation, and he was guilty of disloyalty, at the least, when he 
admitted that he had deliberately worked against it from its inception.  No crew 
selection was made when it was formed; crews were simply transferred en masse.  
Hand picked crews were acceptable later in 5 Group, for 617 Squadron in 
particular, but the only priority the Path Finder Force enjoyed in crew selection was 
that they were allowed first choice in personnel graduating from OTUs.  The Path 
Finder Force was never given priority in the provision of new equipment; VHF 
radio equipment for air-to-air communication is but one example.  Finally, the 
transfer of three Path Finder Force squadrons (two Lancaster and one Mosquito) 
to 5 Group in April 1944, ostensibly on loan, was the means by which Harris 
achieved his aim, the establishment of another marking force in at least one other 
Group.  The transfer came at a time when Bomber Command was expanding and 
the Path Finder Force should have been encouraged to do the same.  Instead, 
under Harris’s stewardship, the PFF was reduced in size.  Thanks to Harris’s 
interference the grand plans conceived for the Path Finder Force were never 
allowed to come to full fruition.  They performed remarkably but Bomber 
Command’s overall achievements were reduced by Harris’s on-going opposition. 
From the beginning of Bufton’s tenure in the Directorate of Bomber 
Operations, it was always his aim that ultimately Bomber Command would be 
capable of solving the tactical problems associated with the attack of precise 
targets.  He had written many Papers on the subject and the Directives, from 14 
February 1942, he claimed, were framed with that ultimate intention in mind.  It 
was also Bufton’s belief that Bomber Command possessed the capability for 
precision attacks  
 
and could have done so had they wished.  They could have 
developed a low-level marking technique in 1942 had they had the 
vision . . .and given to the PFF the enthusiastic support and the 
overriding priority in the selection of crews which they later gave to 
617 Squadron . . . . But then the pass was fumbled.  The Pathfinder 
Force was formed ‘over the dead body’ of the Commander-in-Chief, 
and its activities were directed not to the attack of precise targets, 
but to the attack of cities.8 
 
The second confrontation related to the efforts made by the Air Staff to have 
Harris turn his attention the German ball bearing industry in the city of Schweinfurt. 
With two exceptions, Harris resisted all efforts throughout the war to get him to 
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direct his attention to Schweinfurt and ball bearings.  He identified the industry as 
a panacea and an unnecessary diversion from his area bombing programme. His 
excuse was that Schweinfurt would be virtually impossible to locate.  Eventually, 
after gentle persuasion had been seen to fail, Bottomley, on 17 December 1943, 
wrote another letter to Harris. He affirmed that  
 
All our own and the American economic and ball-bearing experts 
are unanimous in the opinion that the destruction of the Schweinfurt 
ball-bearing industries would constitute a deadly blow to Germany’s 
war economy.  We are . . . all hoping that you will be able to reach 
out to Schweinfurt at the earliest opportunity.9
 
Harris’s response to Bottomley’s letter was that “I do not regard a night 
attack on Schweinfurt as a reasonable operation of war.”10   It was a stern rebuff.   
With discussion and letters having achieved nothing, the Air Ministry turned 
to a Directive.  On 14 January 1944, Harris, with respect to Schweinfurt, was 
directed to “attack it in force on the first opportunity when weather and other 
conditions allow, and that you continue to attack it until it is destroyed.”11   Harris’s 
equally sharp reply to the Directive was that Schweinfurt presented “grave 
strategical and other objections.”12   His four page letter concluded that, although 
he had had Schweinfurt in mind for nearly two years, the opportunity to attack in 
conditions giving reasonable hope for success, had never arisen.  With the 
Schweinfurt defences having recently increased, Harris declared “all chances of a 
successful attack by my Command on Schweinfurt are gone.”13   
Harris’s denial finally exhausted Air Ministry patience.  In a letter from 
Bottomley on 27 January 1944, Harris was ordered to “proceed with the execution 
of the instructions contained in the letter . . . dated 14th January, 1944.”14    
Bomber Command carried out two attacks on Schweinfurt (February and 
April 1944) and early in July 1944, in a Weekly Intelligence Report, the MEW 
estimated that German ball bearing production had fallen by 54·5 per cent as a 
direct result of bombing attacks.  Harris in a letter to the Air Ministry on 8 July 
1944, seized this figure eagerly.  Such a reduction, he  protested,  
 
 could not have been otherwise than a fatal blow to the German war  
effort . . . . I trust that the MEW will be called upon to account for 
their overweening enthusiasm over the enemy’s ball bearing 
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position, in view of their calculations as to the effects already 
achieved at so heavy a cost in life and effort.15   
 
Geoffrey Vickers, Head of the Enemy Resources Department in the 
Economic Intelligence Branch of the MEW, responded strongly to Harris’s attack.  
He pointed out that in January 1944 ball bearings had been identified as an 
industry for attack where “success today will most affect the enemy’s power of a 
continued resistance.  It is thus recommended, not as a ‘panacea,’ but as the best 
practical objective for impairing the enemy’s ability to fight.”16   According to 
Vickers, a report by MEW on 5 June 1944 estimated that ball bearing production, 
since July 1943, was down to 71·5 per cent in January 1944, and 45·5 per cent by 
April 1944.  The slow decline from August 1943 to January 1944 was attributed to 
“the use of pipeline stocks, some substitution . . . and the relief afforded by 
diminished aircraft production.”17   
Vickers then referred Harris to a paper, German Weaknesses, no date 
specified, issued by the JIC.  This paper, he pointed out, described the shortages 
being experienced by the Germans in various types or weapons and equipment, 
including aircraft, tanks, and motor transport.  Vickers made clear that he would 
not, even with the latest figures to hand, alter any word of the appreciation 
provided by MEW in January 1944.  “I am driven to the conclusion” he affirmed, 
“that the C-in-C expects some result from industrial bombing other than that which 
we forecast.  If so he must not blame us if his expectations are disappointed.”18
Bomber Command’s efforts to influence German ball bearing production 
were too long delayed and insufficiently concentrated to produce significant 
effects.  Harris was probably correct, early in 1942, to claim that Schweinfurt was 
not a target that could be successfully attacked with the aircraft, bombing, and 
navigation equipment, then available to his Command.  He was also, perhaps, 
correct to claim that it would have been a difficult target in the short summer nights 
of 1943, although targets at longer range were bombed in that period and Bennett, 
the PFF leader, had agreed that his force was available to lead.  Two unsuccessful 
attacks on Schweinfurt in February and April 1944 were never going to close down 
the German ball bearing industry.  Maintenance of the aim and concentration, two   
vital elements of the principles of war, were never pursued in the case of 
Schweinfurt.  
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With regard to Schweinfurt, almost certainly the target most referred to by 
Webster and Frankland, Bufton consistently reiterated that the Air Staff made 
serious efforts to counter Harris’s objections and persuade him to launch an 
attack.  Ultimately, however, he admitted that “it was not the RAF style to control 
Commanders too closely, but in the end a direct order was issued on 14 January 
1944.”19  
Middlebrook, in The Schweinfurt – Regensburg Mission, taking note of 
Bufton’s opinion, was severely critical of Portal, claiming that he  
 
could have issued a direct order to Harris at any time he wished, 
but that was not the R.A.F.’s style to control commanders too 
closely and he did not issue that direct order until early in 1944. The 
ultimate responsibility for any failure by the R.A.F. to follow up the 
American attacks on Schweinfurt rests with Sir Charles Portal, who 
could have imposed his will earlier.20   
 
Well aware that Harris’s obtuseness and rigidity had been of serious 
concern to Portal, Bufton was quick to leap to the CAS’s support.  In his response 
to Middlebrook, he argued that the difficult decision Portal made to give Harris a 
direct order to attack Schweinfurt, was to his credit.  Bomber Command’s attack 
on the night of 24/25 February 1944, following the Eighth Air Force raid earlier the 
same day, had, Bufton contended, marked the starting point for the close 
cooperation required for the Combined Bomber Offensive.21 
Although possibly the jury is still out on the question of responsibility for the 
failure of the attack on the German ball bearing industry, two final points must be 
made.  Firstly, it has been suggested that Harris’s prolonged refusal to act, verged 
on insubordination.22   If that view is sustained, then Portal must bear a measure of 
the responsibility for the failure.    
Secondly, had attacks on ball bearings been pursued as diligently, from the 
time they were accorded priority, as area attacks on German cities, who knows 
what the results might have been.  Albert Speer, Hitler’s Munitions Minister, 
entertained no doubts.  Post-war, he averred that Harris was wrong when he 
claimed, in December 1943, that the industry would by then have been 
decentralised.23   It was still only under discussion in January 1944 and as late as 
August 1944 difficulty was still being experienced in “pushing through the 
construction work for the shift of ball-bearing production.”24   In April 1944, Speer 
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acknowledged, “the Allies threw away success when it was already in their hands.  
Had they continued the attacks . . . we would have quickly been at the last gasp.“25  
 But even ball bearings do not provide a clear-cut example for any allocation of 
culpability and must therefore remain a debatable question. 
The final target system that raised passions almost to fever pitch was 
German oil.  Guilt has been acknowledged.  Harris admitted that he had been 
opposed to the attack of oil because he believed that it meant a diversion of effort; 
it prolonged the  
 
respite which the German industrial cities had gained from the use 
of the  bombers in a tactical role . . . . In the event, of course, the 
offensive against oil was a complete success . . . what the Allied 
strategists did was bet on an outsider, and it happened to win the 
race.26    
 
Unfortunately, because of Churchill’s opposition, no truly independent, 
unbiased, and wide-ranging investigatory team was ever established by British 
authorities to consider the overall effects produced by the Combined Bomber 
Offensive.  Initial plans to form a broad-based British Bombing Research Mission 
were revised when Churchill, for unexplained reasons, prevaricated.  Tedder, in 
January 1945, described Churchill’s decision to limit the survey, as “scandalous, 
perverse, ‘personal and political.’“27   Instead, a small British Bombing Survey Unit 
(BBSU) was established with Air Commodore Pelly as Head, and Professor 
Zuckerman as Scientific Adviser and ultimately author of the final Report.  
Tedder’s promotion to CAS on 1 January 1946 meant that the primary wartime 
driving forces for bombing attacks on communications, Zuckerman and Tedder, 
were now in prominent positions to influence the findings of the BBSU.  Thus, “by 
default the final Report came to reflect the views of the wartime lobby which had 
most strongly favoured transportation bombing over other target systems.”28
By September 1944, when control of the bomber forces was relinquished by 
SHAEF and reverted to Portal and Arnold, oil had once again become a significant 
target.  The Air Staff, employing letters signed by Portal but largely drafted by 
Bufton, made strenuous efforts to convince Harris that if Bomber Command joined 
with the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and attacked oil, the war could be brought 
to an early conclusion.  Harris, however, persisted with area attacks on German 
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cities and from October to December 1944 (inclusive), fifty-three per cent of his 
bombing effort was directed at German industrial cities and only fourteen per cent 
at oil targets.   Then, over the winter of 1944/1945, he carried on a paper war with 
Portal, his superior.   Although the BBSU Report dealt at length with the oil versus 
transportation question the Air Staff, during that crucial period, were confronting 
yet another attempt by Harris to run the war his way.  Their primary concern was 
the continuation of his area bombing programme when they believed the best 
returns would have been obtained from attacks on oil targets.  No consideration 
was given in the Report as to whether oil or area attacks provided the best returns 
for the bomber efforts.  Somewhat lamely, the Report implies that Harris made 
every effort to fulfil Air Staff requirements for oil attacks, by agreeing with him that 
weather, during October, November, and December 1944, had provided only 
limited opportunities for visual bombing.   
The expression “somewhat lamely’ has been employed for several  
reasons.  Firstly, in order to prevent increased oil production, it had been decided 
by the Air Staff that maximum use of blind bombing procedures (enhanced by the 
siting of Oboe and GH stations on the Continent), together with greatly increased 
bomb tonnages, would have to be employed.  It had also been decided that 
instead of spreading attacks, every effort was to be made to create long-term 
destruction.  Two of the most important oil targets late in the war were Pölitz and 
Leuna but even when weather conditions improved during the second half of 
December 1944, Pölitz was  attacked only once (by 184 Lancasters from No. 5 
Group)  and Leuna not all.  Little effort appears to have been made to increase 
either blind bombing or repeated heavy attacks on oil targets as the heaviest raids 
in that fortnight were 523 aircraft against Duisburg and 470 aircraft against 
Cologne.  
Zuckerman’s BBSU assessment agrees closely with that reached by the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee’s Technical Sub-Committee on Axis Oil which, in March 
1946, noted:  
 
In the last three months of the year R.A.F. Bomber Command 
carried out 38 attacks on oil targets (20 by day and 18 by night).  A 
study shows that there were 7 other nights and 3 days when 
weather conditions might possibly have permitted attacks. . . . 
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Operations against other strategic target systems during this period 
were carried out on 35 days and 46 nights.29
 
Had Bomber Command gone the extra mile against oil, who knows what the 
result might have been.  Speer, in a note to Hitler in 19 January 1945, described 
how several oil plants had experienced prolonged shut down; that repairs had 
become difficult; that night attacks were more effective than day because heavier 
bombs were used; and that  
 
extraordinary accuracy [was being] achieved; therefore  even if the 
repair and production during the first quarter of 1945 were to 
proceed undisturbed, the planned production, which during the final 
quarter of last year seemed possible, can no longer be achieved.30       
 
Despite the condemnation of Harris for his failure to have his bomber force 
participate in the oil offensive as fully as Portal required, there is one important 
point to remember.  Portal’s difficulty was that because Harris had admitted to 
being unable to accept the validity of the oil plan, Portal found it hard to believe, 
despite repeated assurances, that Bomber Command’s attacks on German oil 
were being fully pressed home.  The weather during the last three months of 1944 
provided few opportunities for visual bombing but the figures shown above, from 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee, confirm that some considerable effort had been 
mounted against oil in difficult conditions.  The critical figure, however, is that 
during that three month period only fourteen per cent of the total bombing effort 
was directed against oil targets.  Had Harris launched one or two more attacks, or 
had some of the attacks been heavier, then perhaps what Harris had actually 
provided would have come closer to Portal’s requirements.  The gap between 
them was narrow and it was created by the European winter weather rather, 
perhaps, than any perception by Harris that the oil plan was invalid.  
Another question to be considered in any discussion concerning Portal and 
Harris is leadership.  Effective leadership is a fundamental requirement for any 
military service to be run effectively and efficiently.  Without positive leadership 
aims simply become pipe dreams.  Effective leadership, however, is not merely 
the product of a specific formula, because the requirements, as technology 
develops, are also in a state of flux.  Positive leadership requires strength of mind, 
because to be successful requires that opposition be overcome, or removed.  
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Portal’s leadership qualities were, perhaps, best displayed in his extended fight for 
resources.  He employed reasoned arguments, tact and diplomacy; prepared to 
yield when accepting the inevitable, in order to obtain the longer term benefits.  
Harris, on the other hand, was a leader cast in a different mould.  His narrowness 
of vision prevented him from seeing that there were other ways than his.  He 
brooked no contradiction.  Both were remote figures, but while Portal exerted 
authority employing judgement and perception, Harris relied upon bombast, and 
the ability to display the grand gesture.  Cologne and Hamburg in 1943 provide 
classic examples.  Berlin, in the winter of 1943/1944, was intended by Harris to be 
another symbol of the correctness of his arguments, but the campaign was a 
signal and costly failure.  Unfortunately, the facts revealed during that hard-fought 
winter did not register with Harris.  Morale was not going to be the Achilles’ heel in 
the German social structure.  
History has shown that leaders are not infallible.  True leaders will accept 
the lessons provided by failure, and become better leaders as a consequence.  
Portal’s leadership qualities were well displayed in his handling of the Churchill 
outburst following the bombing of Dresden in February 1945.  He may have felt 
anger and outrage but personified reason and calm.  His insistence that the 
Churchill Minute of 28 March 1945 be withdrawn was accepted by the Prime 
Minister, who then authorised Portal to submit a re-draft. 
Portal’s relations with his subordinate, Harris, unfortunately, do not display 
the same leadership qualities.  He spent many months of reasoned argument 
concerning the need for the formation of the Path Finder Force, and for an attack 
on the ball bearing facilities at Schweinfurt.   In the case of the Path Finder Force, 
Harris immediately set about reconstituting the force to his own design, yet Portal 
did nothing.  As a last resort in the case of Schweinfurt, Harris was ordered to 
comply with the Air Staff’s requirements.  When the attack was finally delivered 
Harris had been permitted to procrastinate to such an extent that it was too late to 
be effective no matter how much damage was created. 
With regard to German oil facilities, Portal reasoned and argued with Harris, 
but never went as far as ordering.  Instead, with final victory seemingly inevitable, 
he weakly conceded defeat, acknowledging, “We must wait until after the end of 
the war before we can know for certain who was right.”31   Harris’s post-war 
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admission that Portal had been correct was one of the rare occasions that Harris 
ever admitted to having been wrong. 
In general, those responsible for directly controlling the bomber war, the Air 
Staff and Group Commanders, were officers well known to each other over a very 
long period.  They were aware of each other’s weaknesses and strengths, and 
among them strong friendships had developed.  Harris, in the case of Coryton, 
showed that in order to achieve perceived needs, he was prepared to override 
friendship.  Coryton was replaced.  Likewise, Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse was 
removed from his appointment as AOC-in-C, Bomber Command, in January 1942, 
because the Air Staff, and Churchill, were dissatisfied with his performance.  
Portal, for whatever reason, in the case of Harris, was unwilling to take that final, 
crucial step.  According to Anthony Verrier, it was because of his desire to 
preserve amity that he allowed Harris to dominate.  Perhaps it was amity that 
Portal desired to preserve, but in attempting to do so he yielded the authority that 
he possessed as CAS.  His attempt at amity preservation, Verrier observed, 
“made him impotent when dealing with his subordinate.”32
Sebastian Cox has claimed that Harris was a “single-minded and forceful 
leader with an acute mind.”33   He was certainly single-minded, almost to the nth 
degree, while his forcefulness was regularly displayed in his wide-ranging, often 
pungent, correspondence.  His intellectual acuteness is, perhaps, more debatable.  
He was the authority who, in February 1941, as DCAS, claimed that Bomber 
Command had no need for any form of bombing or navigational aid such as the 
Knickebein beams employed by the Luftwaffe over England.  “Such aids” he 
argued, “are not indispensable to the successful prosecution of bombing . . . I 
would go further and say that they are not even really useful.”34   
His mind-set, (it could also be described as tunnel vision, regarding beams), 
perhaps explains his initial antipathy towards Gee.  Probert has suggested that 
Harris had become disillusioned with his Signals Staff who were full of promises 
but provided nothing.  Gee, apparently, was a typical example, “and the whole 
business left him in a state of complete despair.”35   However, Harris did eventually 
come to appreciate Gee as a useful navigational tool, providing a measure of 
concentration in bombing attacks, and a safer return to bases in the United 
Kingdom. 
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Employing a selectively abbreviated quotation from the Directive of 14 
February 1942, Sebastian Cox claimed that the Air Staff believed that Gee “would 
prove to be good enough as a bombing aid, once sufficient experience had been 
gained, to allow for ‘effective attacks on precise targets.’“36   The Directive had, in 
fact, been somewhat less positive and had included provisos. Trials by 
experienced Gee operators had shown that fixes had fallen about a desired aiming 
point in the form of an ellipse, measuring approximately twenty miles by two and a 
half miles, enclosing an area of about thirty-five square miles.  Thus, the Directive 
of 14 February 1942, drafted by Bufton, was both cautious and forward looking.  
He made clear: 
  
When experience in the employment of TR 1355 has proved that, 
under  favourable conditions, effective attacks on precise targets 
are possible, I am to request that you will consider the practicability 
of attacking first, the precise targets within TR1355 range and, later, 
those beyond this range.37    
 
 In other words, for the Directorate of Bomber Operations, Gee possibly 
offered prospects for the future as both a navigational and bombing aid but in the 
meantime they awaited proof.  The phraseology is also indicative of the desire of 
the Directorate staff for Bomber Command to return to the attack of precision 
targets as soon as possible.  
Cox’s contention may have been supported by some in the Air Staff but  
certainly not by those in the Directorate of Bomber Operations.  In December 1941 
Bufton intimated: “It may be found that ‘G’ is accurate enough to enable us to 
attack precise targets but until this has been proved in practice we should plan for 
area targets.”38   This belief was reconfirmed early in 1942.  In an unsigned paper, 
it was stated that Gee might enable Bomber Command to concentrate on specific 
key targets in the future, but in the meantime, “Gee can be more effectively 
employed in carrying out heavy, concentrated and continuous bombing of a few 
selected area targets in Western Germany.”39    Possession of Gee, it was hoped, 
would also enable the bombing force to concentrate their efforts.  Concentration 
would provide increased devastation.   
Harris’s narrowness of vision is perhaps best exemplified in his treatment of 
scientists, in particular those who attempted to interest him in projects hitherto 
 395
beyond his ken.  Navigational and bombing aids have previously been discussed, 
but perhaps Dr Barnes Wallis and his bouncing bomb, employed in the Dams Raid 
in May 1943, is worthy of examination.  Early in the matter, in a note to Saundby, 
Harris described the idea as 
 
tripe of the wildest  description . . . there is not the smallest chance 
of it working . . . At all costs stop them putting aside Lancasters and 
reducing our bombing effort on this wild goose chase . . . the war 
will be over before it works – and it never will.40
 
Harris, in Bomber Offensive, gave no hint of his initial antipathy towards the 
project, but Webster and Frankland made clear his deep-rooted opposition.41   
There is also a letter Harris sent to Portal in February 1943, expressing his 
deepest concerns relating to the Highball and Upkeep propositions.42   He 
complained:  
 
I cannot too strongly deprecate any diversion of Lancasters at this 
critical moment . . . . With some slight practical knowledge . . . I am 
prepared to bet that the Highball is just about the maddest 
proposition as a weapon that we  have yet come across.43
 
Portal, who like Harris was not initially convinced of the viability of the 
Highball and Upkeep projects, attempted to be reassuring.  He promised Harris 
that he would  
 
not allow more than three of your precious Lancasters to be 
diverted for this purpose until the full scale experiments have shown 
that the bomb will do what is claimed for it . . . . if Highball fails, 
Upkeep will be abandoned too.44
 
To conclude this résumé of Harris’s perceived deficiencies, note must be 
made of his inability to recognise, as late as January 1944, Bomber Command’s 
capacity for accurate precision bombing. His suggestion, in January 1944, was 
that the best contribution his Command could make to Overlord, was 
 
the intensification of attacks on suitable industrial centres in 
Germany as  and when the opportunity offers.  If we attempt to 
substitute for this process attacks on . . . communications . . . we 
shall commit the irremediable error of diverting our best weapons 
from the military function, for which it has been equipped and 
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trained, to tasks which it cannot effectively carry out . . . . It would 
lead directly to disaster.45
 
Harris repeated similar claims at a conference at AEAF Headquarters, 
Stanmore, a month later.  The claim made for the importance of rail 
communication attacks, he argued, “was based on a fallacy . . . he did not believe 
the rail communications . . . could be sufficiently interrupted by air attack to impede 
military movements.”46   He stated, also, that the claims made for Bomber 
Command’s precision when employing Oboe, were “completely inaccurate.”47   
Harris avowed that he was prepared to “give a written guarantee that the proposed 
plan for interrupting the railroad communications would not succeed and that the 
army would then blame the Air Forces for their failure.”48  
Late in March 1944 Harris wrote to Portal to make his position clear as to 
what he believed were Bomber Command’s requirements prior to Overlord.  The 
primary object, in his opinion, “will be to complete the destruction of the existing 
and prospective resources of the G.A.F.”49   He next proceeded to attack the 
instructions in both the Casablanca and Pointblank Directives.  They required that 
Bomber Command attack area targets associated with American targets, and, 
assuming that similar objectives would be outlined in an anticipated Overlord 
Directive, he wished to voice his protest.  He declared: 
 
I wish therefore to state most emphatically that . . . on the . . . 
evidence gained from attempts to conform to detailed Air Ministry 
programmes rather than Directives in recent months, this policy is 
mistaken.50 
 
Freedom of action was Harris’s requirement.  “I would ask” he pleaded, 
for a Directive which gives me full discretion as to what German 
target I shall attack on any given night, subject only to the proviso 
that, when weather conditions, in so far as they can be predicted 
early in the day, give real prospects of success against nominated 
targets, these will be given preference over others where chances 
of success are equally good.51 
 
The next day, at a meeting to discuss bombing policy prior to Overlord, 
Harris gave reluctant confirmation that Bomber Command would carry out precise 
attacks, using Oboe, on railway centres. There were twenty-six listed targets and 
he expressed his doubt, in the time remaining, that they could all be dealt with.  He 
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continued to oppose the transportation plan, and argued again to be allowed to 
continue his attacks on German cities.  They, he stated, perhaps sarcastically, 
“have some incidental effect on the enemy’s transportation system.”52   In the 
event, of course, transportation bombing, by both Bomber Command and the 
Eighth Air Force, played a very significant part in the success of Overlord and the 
land campaign that followed.  Unfortunately, from 25 September 1944 when Harris 
came again under the supervision of the Air Staff, his direction, when given any 
freedom of action, was largely focussed on German cities and to the end he 
continued to laud the success of his area bombing of those targets. 
Eisenhower, however, was unstinting in the praise he accorded Harris for 
the support that he and Bomber Command had given to the D-Day landings and 
subsequent land operations.  In a letter to General George C. Marshall, the United 
States Chief of the Combined Staff, he commented, 
 
You might be interested to know, in view of my earlier expressed 
fears that Air Chief Harris would not willingly devote his command 
to the support of ground operations, that he actually proved to be 
one of the most effective and cooperative members of this team.  
Not only did he meet every request I made upon him, but he 
actually took the lead in discovering new ways and means for his 
particular type of planes to be used on the battlefield.53  
 
 
The problems that arose between the Department of Bomber Operations 
and Harris were not necessarily all to be blamed on one side or the other.  
Perhaps Bufton was over-eager to have the bomber war fought the way he 
believed best; equally, perhaps Harris was a little unreceptive to new ideas, 
particularly from junior officers.  Sebastian Cox has argued that  
 
It was surely less than wise to contrive to have the Directorate of 
Bomber Operations staffed by a triumvirate not one of whom held 
the respect of the C-in-C of the Command they were required to 
work closely with. 54    
 
Presumably Cox had in mind Bottomley, Baker, and Bufton.  Ignoring the 
fact that Bottomley was either ACAS(Ops) or DCAS, and thus not employed 
directly in the Directorate of Bomber Operations, Cox’s argument must be 
rejected.  The only way to have satisfied Harris would have been to have staffed 
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the Directorate of Bomber Operations with ‘yes’ men.  Harris was notorious for 
confusing “advice with interference, criticism with sabotage and evidence with 
propaganda.”55   Others may well have found the three mentioned perfectly 
satisfactory, even in the highest appointments.  Portal certainly found them to be 
very acceptable subordinates. In the case of Baker, Harris’s claim to have 
threatened to resign if Baker was appointed as a Group Commander does him no 
credit.  It was an example of ‘bully boy’ tactics, and unworthy of a senior officer.  
Who, one must enquire, did Harris actually like? 
One, clearly, was his SASO, and later his Deputy, Air Marshal Sir Robert 
Saundby.  Saundby remained in situ, not because of his dynamic promotion of 
ideas, but simply because he never disagreed with his superior, and because he 
never made a decision without first having consulted Harris.  Saundby was so out 
of date operationally that he had come to believe, in 1950, that Bomber Command 
had gone to war in 1939, fully prepared.  He claimed that 
 
we had always doubted the possibility of daylight bombing, and we 
therefore before the war, backed it both ways.  Our heavy bombers 
were suitable for use at night and our crews were well trained in 
night operations.56   
 
Indeed! So the leaflet training flights were a waste of flying time!  It is no 
wonder that Bufton was recommending, early in 1942, that Saundby, his deputy, 
and the Group Commanders in 1, 3, and 4 Groups be replaced by officers with 
current night bombing experience.57   Unfortunately, Directorate staff could only 
advocate and in this particular instance their calls were ignored. 
Frankland, discussing Saundby, was cuttingly trenchant. As a 
conversationalist, he deemed him erudite and articulate, but, he continued, “I 
learnt to be cautious about his criticism and praise, which was the product of a 
two-faced attitude fostered by a fundamentally weak moral character.”58  
Harris may well have appreciated having Saundby as his deputy.  The latter 
knew better than to disagree with Harris, and thus the partnership was maintained.  
Saundby “smoothed paths and soothed friction.”59   Unfortunately, he was the 
wrong man to have as Harris’s deputy.  Harris required a sounding board; some 
one to challenge decisions; proffer alternatives; provide guidance; not one who 
always meekly agreed and fended off both critics and criticism.  Certainly it was a 
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partnership that worked; but it was not for the betterment of either Bomber 
Command, or the strategic bombing offensive. 
Although attention and argument, in relation to the bombing of German oil 
targets, has focused largely on whether or not the war might have been brought to 
an earlier close, even more pertinent challenges could have been raised 
concerning Harris’s position as Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command.  His 
removal would certainly not have passed without significant comment.  He had 
reigned supreme during some of his Command’s darkest times, and now, with 
victory almost at hand, was his deposition an appropriate move? 
What had Harris done when in a similar position?  His treatment of 
subordinates was ruthless.  His removal of the Air Officer Commanding 5 Group, 
Air Vice-Marshal Coryton early in 1943, has been described in detail in Chapter 
Three but it was done in a considerate manner and was never regarded as a 
punishment although doubtless to the individual concerned it was not a pleasant 
experience.  Portal, certainly by 1945, might, with advantage, have used Harris’s 
dismissal letter to Coryton as a draft for one he himself should have written to 
Harris.   
Equally, there were other examples of identified requirements for the 
removal of senior officers where action had been taken.  In November 1940, 
despite their achievements in the Battle of Britain, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh 
Dowding was replaced as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command  
and one month later Air Vice-Marshal Sir Keith Park was relieved of his 
appointment as AOC, No. 11 Group, Fighter Command.  Ignoring the 
controversies relating to the question of the employment of ‘big wings,” and the 
possibilities of vaulting ambitions, justification for their removal was provided by 
the length of time Dowding had served as AOC-in-C and the strains under which 
both had been placed during the closely fought and tense battle.60  
Churchill, however, raised the point that there were possibly other 
unwelcome forces at work in the Air Ministry.  In the spring of 1941 the Air Ministry 
released a pamphlet relating to the Battle of Britain but it included no reference to 
Dowding and Churchill was incensed.  He declared that  
 
The jealousies and cliquism which have led to the committing of this 
offence are a discredit to the Air Ministry and I do not think any 
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other Service Department would have been guilty of such a piece of 
work.61  
 
Within any military organisation procedures are crystal clear.  Lawful orders 
issued to a subordinate are to be obeyed.  It matters not whether it is a Lance 
Corporal to a Private, or a Marshal of the Royal Air Force to an Air Chief-Marshal, 
failure to obey is a military offence.  Harris’s failure to comply fully with the Air 
Staff’s requirements regarding oil attacks, although no specific order was given,  
could have been defined as disobedience or, at least, dereliction of duty.  His 
admission, in a letter to Portal on 28 December 1944, that “nothing will disillusion 
me of the view that the oil plan is, for reasons I have given . . . on many occasions 
elsewhere, another panacea,”62 was self-damning.    
Harris’s removal would not have been unique.  Whether he was ultimately 
right or wrong matters not a whit.  He had been presented with a lawful order, in 
the form of a Directive, which required compliance.  His inability, disinclination, or 
refusal, to fully meet the requirements detailed by his superior, demanded his 
removal.  As with Coryton, there was no necessity to announce his move as a 
punishment.  He could, for instance, have been posted to SHAEF, just as Coryton 
had been transferred to the Air Ministry as ACAS(Operations).  Harris could have 
been honourably retired on the grounds of ill-health (he had a chronic duodenal 
ulcer); and, after almost three years as AOC, Bomber Command, was clearly 
approaching the time when a rest was becoming essential, if his health was not to 
be permanently impaired.   Finally, Harris could have been transferred to provide 
operational experience for another senior officer, just as the AOCs of Numbers 1, 
4, and 5 Groups were posted early in 1945. 
Perhaps Slessor, indirectly, got to the nub of the matter in The Central Blue, 
when discussing the Casablanca  Directive.  This Directive, he pointed out, was 
not in fact a Directive, but even more importantly, was a policy statement on the 
future conduct of the war.  It accorded priority to the bomber forces for 
concentration on Germany.  The important objectives were listed, but it was left to 
Portal to decide when and to which target the pressure should be applied.  He 
continued,  
 
If subsequently, too much latitude was left to commanders-in-chief 
– if in particular Harris was not sufficiently closely controlled – the 
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blame for that cannot be laid at the door of the Casablanca 
directive.63  
 
What have others to say concerning Harris’s removal?  Probert, somewhat 
ambivalently, argued: “It is very hard to see what purpose would have been served 
had he been removed.”64   Surely what would have resulted was a concentration 
upon oil targets – the Air Staff requirement.  Clearly the attack upon enemy morale 
was not succeeding and the German people, no matter how much they resented 
the Nazi regime, were becoming ever more reliant upon that “regime to feed them 
to re-house them, to evacuate them, indeed to enable them to survive at all.”65   
Total concentration upon oil targets rather than upon German cities, morale, and 
oil, could possibly, as others have argued, have brought an earlier end to the war. 
Webster and Frankland perhaps struck a somewhat pessimistic note.  Their 
opinion was that “No other course at this stage of the war was open to Sir Charles 
Portal which would not have been a remedy worse than the disease.”66   But by 
allowing the disease to run its inevitable course, Portal himself became a victim.  
Every vestige of authority which he should have had over Harris was removed.  
Portal had placed himself in an impossible position. 
One who agreed with Webster and Frankland was John Terraine.  Portal, 
Terraine believed, became a victim of the aura which develops around apparently 
successful military commanders.  Harris had that aura.  However, it can be argued 
that had Harris’s transfer been handled appropriately, that aura need not have 
been disturbed.  By retaining the status quo, Portal lost his authority.  Terraine 
took the matter even further.  “For Harris and his Command” he observed, 
 
it meant that their prolonged and valiant effort would fall at the last 
under a shadow which, in future decades, would sadly diminish 
recognition of their high endeavour.  For amid the list of cities on 
Bomber Command’s agenda, awaiting the Harris treatment, was 
Dresden.67    
 
Harris was but one player in the drama concerning Dresden, and in fact not even 
the leading one.  But he was an easy target and upon him and his Command the 
post-war venom has been directed.  Public opinion is fickle. 
Max Hastings, however, believed that Portal should have taken positive 
action.  In his opinion, Portal “flinched from sacking his C-in-C, and having shown 
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his own weakness, had no further sanctions against him.“68   Hastings, however, is 
not always accident free when it comes to marshalling his evidence.  His claim that 
Speer was talking of the oil offensive when he asserted that “the Allies threw away 
success when it was already in their hands,”69 is incorrect.  Speer was actually 
discussing the offensive against ball bearings. 
Hastings, in a postscript to a letter to Bufton, advised him that in his book 
Bomber Command  he was going to “be hard on Portal for his unwillingness to 
sack Harris in the winter of 1944 re the oil plan,”70 so the book came as no 
surprise.  Nevertheless, Bufton was quick to Portal’s defence.  “Bert Harris” Bufton 
asserted,  
 
was by no means perfect as C–in–C Bomber Command, but then 
no man is ever perfect.  Before you say Portal should have sacked 
Harris in the winter of 1944 you must say who he should have put 
into Harris’s place.  If you can’t do this your argument is void . . . I 
personally would have put in an ‘operator’ like Basil Embry but he 
was otherwise engaged.71  
 
It might well be inferred from this correspondence that had Bufton been asked in 
1944 whether Portal should remove Harris, he was ready with his response and 
had a replacement in mind. 
Another who argued that decisiveness was required by Portal when dealing 
with Harris, was Mark Connelly.  He suggested that  
 
In not coming to a definite conclusion on what to do with a 
subordinate commander Portal may have been responsible for 
prolonging the war.  Portal should surely have been decisive . . . 
Portal should have sacked Harris.72    
 
Robin Neillands fully agreed with Connelly and bluntly.   With regard to the 
removal of Harris, he simply stated:  
 
To suggest that Portal should have removed Harris from Bomber 
Command will not be a popular thing to say, but, clutching the 
benefits of hindsight, perhaps Portal should have done so.  It would  
hardly have affected the outcome of the war, but it would have been 
a kindness to Harris, who had already been in the post far too 
long.73 
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In this discussion concerning whether or not Harris should have been 
removed many conflicting views have been examined, but from the evidence 
provided in this thesis it is clear that his removal, on several counts, could have 
been justified.  Perhaps Harris himself has provided the reason why he was not 
transferred.  “Portal” he admitted, 
 
was  an incredibly fine fellow but there were times when he was too 
much of a gentleman . . . that was his one failing . . . and . . . in 
those days it was no good being a gentleman.  You had to do 
whatever was necessary to get things done.74 
 
Bufton, despite Harris’s known dislike was, at times, prepared to be 
generous in his praise of Harris who, he admitted, had fended off those calling for 
bombers to tow gliders, bombers for Atlantic patrols and had successfully built up 
its strength.  His performance, nevertheless, would have been improved, Bufton 
claimed, had he accepted  and backed the PFF as his own from the beginning, 
and had attempted to follow, more closely, the spirit of the Air Staff and Chiefs of 
Staff Directives.  “At the end of the war” he continued, 
 
we, in Bomber Operations, had agreed amongst ourselves that we 
would have forgiven the C-in-C Bomber Command everything had 
he put an extra 15% of Bomber Command on precise targets.  
Perhaps we were too kind.75 
 
This thesis has been a story of conflict, not in the night skies over Germany, 
but in the corridors of power among the upper echelons of the Royal Air Force, 
and specifically between Portal and Harris, with many, on the Air Ministry side, 
playing leading roles.  All sides of the several disagreements examined have been 
fully aired and what should now be clear to all is that although ultimately decisions 
were reached, many of the difficulties remained because the determinations, on 
too many occasions, were never fully implemented.  German oil targets provide 
the classic example; Harris was permitted to disagree with Air Staff policy and 
Portal did nothing.  Webster and Frankland’s summation regarding the question of 
the attack on German oil was explicit: “All that can be said is that, if it had been 
possible to press home the attack earlier, there can be little doubt that the collapse 
of Germany would have come sooner.”76    
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In some cases, Schweinfurt for example, although Harris was ultimately 
forced to launch an attack, it was too late for it to be militarily effective.  The 
moment had well and truly been lost during twenty-two months of argument and 
disagreement.  With regard to the Path Finder Force, although Harris was finally 
made (‘coerced’ or ‘ordered’ has never been clarified) to comply with Portal’s 
instructions, he immediately set about the formation of a Path Finder Force in 
every Group.  This was not merely simple disobedience: it was subterfuge meriting 
instant dismissal.  Harris’s refusal to allow the Path Finder Force training time, 
priority in aircraft and equipment, and selection of the best air crews, while 
concurrently supporting Air Vice-Marshal the Hon. Sir Ralph Cochrane of 5 Group, 
is indicative of the disharmony existing between himself and Portal.  It was almost 
as if they were fighting different wars. 
These are but three examples which confirm that the Strategic Bomber 
Offensive was badly mismanaged.  They also provide support for the contention 
that Harris should have been replaced.  His removal does not necessarily mean 
that the war would therefore have been brought to an earlier conclusion, but had it 
meant greater concentration on German oil during the winter of 1944/45, then that 
was a possible outcome. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that the 
destruction of Germany’s oil resources was but one element in the total 
requirements for Allied victory.  Even a sustained and effective oil offensive may 
not necessarily have brought about an early an end to the war.  Total victory 
required industrial collapse in Germany together with the defeat of what was left of 
her armies in the field.  Unconditional surrender, with the forces available, was 
never going to be either readily or speedily achieved.  And so it proved. 
Noble Frankland, however, has pointed out that the deep disagreements 
relating to targets after the middle of 1944 resulted in the bombing effort lacking  
concentration.  He argued that the bombing 
 
effort was divided to a greater extent than it need have been and it 
seems virtually certain that Germany’s downfall could have been 
accelerated if a greater concentration had been achieved.  
Operationally it could have been achieved.  If it had been, some 
months might have been taken off the duration of the war.77    
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Apart from Portal and Harris, the figure given most prominence in this study 
has been Sydney Bufton.  Most historians of the bomber war have seen him as 
playing but a minor part in the disagreements between Harris and the Air Staff.  In 
fact, in both the PFF affair and the oil targeting question he was a leading player.   
Bufton’s role as Director of Bomber Operations and his part in the Strategic 
Bomber Offensive have been significantly under-valued because, although he was 
a decision maker, he was never in a position to issue the orders required to 
implement change.  He had learned of some of the problems of the bomber war as 
an operational pilot in 1940/41 and he went to the Air Ministry convinced many 
changes were essential, and believing that he possessed some of the answers.  
But, as a junior member of the Air Staff, he was never in a position to order that 
alterations be made to equipment, methods, procedures or techniques.  In the 
case of the Path Finder Force, Harris later deemed that the order he had received 
had been “yet another occasion when a Commander in the field was over-ruled at 
the dictation of junior staff officers in the Air Ministry,”78 but, as has been shown, 
he was in error.  In 1946, at the invitation of Air Commodore McEvoy, Director of 
Staff Duties at the Air Ministry, Bufton was offered the chance to provide his 
reactions to the Harris Despatch on War Operations.  His extensive commentary 
included a powerful denial of Harris’s claim of having been over-ruled. He affirmed 
that  
 
The Commander in the field was not overruled at the dictation of 
junior staff officers in the Air Ministry.  The idea of a Pathfinder 
Force (and its accompaniment of a Bomber Development Unit) was 
fully discussed within the Air Staff and with Bomber Command.  The 
arguments for and against were weighed by the Air Staff, and the 
C.A.S., after full discussions with the C-in-C., finally decided that 
the scheme should be put into effect.79  
 
Bufton’s task was to identify when change was required and then gather 
and collate supporting evidence from a wide variety of sources and present it to 
those appointed and in a position to issue the requisite orders.  His staff, as the 
war progressed, were vastly experienced and, as new problems were revealed, 
wide-ranging discussions were held and consensus decisions reached and 
solutions provided.  It was then Bufton’s role to attempt to convince the Air Staff 
not only of the problem, but also of the correctness of the decision provided. 
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Harris should have been removed.  It would not have been an easy step, 
but it had become a necessary one. Saward’s claim that “Harris was 
irreplaceable”80 was a nonsense.  To assert that someone is irreplaceable 
indicates the non-acceptance of the one brutal fact of life: that in life there is but 
one certainty: death.   The new Bomber Commander whether, Cochrane, 
Bottomley, or another, would have been different, but he would not necessarily 
have been worse.  It is even conceivable that he might have been better.  Harris’s 
removal would not have been unique, but it had become a necessary step.  
Portal’s failure to act, and the consequent weakening of his own position, is 
indicative of a flaw in his leadership qualities.   
In conclusion, should any attempt be made to attach blame for what might 
be identified as an unnecessary prolongation of the Second World War, then that 
blame must be shared.  Should the finger of blame be pointed at Harris then it is 
essential to remember that the responsibility for his appointment rests on both 
Portals’ and Churchills’ shoulders.  There are a multitude of persons and reasons 
responsible for the war in Europe continuing until 8 May 1945 but if I have alerted 
readers to some of the other possibilities that might have influenced events then 
this thesis has achieved its purpose.  
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